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Abstract
This thesis explains Hamas’s development, from its modest beginnings to the political force it
is  today,  by analyzing it  as a case of party institutionalization. The analytical  framework,
based on elements from the literature on social movements and political parties, distinguishes
between  institutionalization  as  a  process  and  a  property  variable.  By  investigating  its
ideological  and  organizational  development,  the  processual  element  interrogates  the
institutional  trajectory of  Hamas,  from a militant  movement  toward a political  party.  The
property element, by contrast, estimates the degree to which Hamas was institutionalized at
various historical junctures. The thesis combines  the interpretative case study method with
within-case, longitudinal comparisons, and relies on interview data,  secondary sources, and
opinion  polls.  By  referencing  suitable  theories  and  grounding  the  analysis  within  sound
methodological frameworks, the thesis aims to avoid essentializing Hamas, thus contributing
with an improved understanding of its development.
The thesis finds that Hamas largely developed as hypothesized, i.e., moderating ideologically
and routinizing organizationally, while becoming increasingly valued as an end in itself. From
its establishment as a religiously motivated liberation movement set on erecting an Islamic
state in the whole of historic Palestine, Hamas limited its territorial claims and softened its
focus on religion. Organizationally, Hamas expanded and routinized by easing its recruitment
requirements  and  instituting  legitimate  decision-making  procedures.  In  short,  Hamas
developed  away  from  the  ideological  rigidity  and  operational  logic  of  a  movement
organization toward the pragmatism of an institutionalized political party. By 2011, however,
Hamas had developed into an awkward but somewhat institutionalized organizational state
between that of a liberation movement, a governing party, and a party-statelet. This mixing of
roles is explained by the unresolved nature of the Israel-Palestine conflict, which makes it
difficult for Hamas to discard its identity as a liberation movement, and by Hamas’s roots as a
religious liberation movement, a legacy that counteracts both pragmatism and moderation.
Yet, Hamas’s awkward organizational state does not detract from the explanatory power of the
applied theories  or  the relevance of  the  findings,  as  the  thesis  offers  a  de-exoticized and
nuanced account of Hamas’s development. The thesis concludes that through the course of its
institutional  trajectory,  Hamas  has  institutionalized  sufficiently  to  remain  a  key  political
player both in domestic Palestinian politics and as part of the Israel-Palestine conflict.
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Chapter 1:  Introduction
Hamas has come a long way in a short time; emerging as a modest militant movement only in
1987, it soon established itself as the main Palestinian opposition party, and in 2006 it won the
Palestinian elections and entered into office. While such a rapid development and ascension to
power would be a feat for any political movement, Hamas pulled it off while operating under
the challenging circumstances of the Israeli occupation. Furthermore, it has not only survived
but also managed to hold on to power in Gaza in the years since the 2007 Palestinian civil
war, despite the debilitating economic consequences of the international boycott and political
isolation from the rest of the occupied Palestinian territories. Even in the face of large-scale
attacks from Israel, such as the military offensive Operation Cast Lead, Hamas has persisted.
Carried out in the winter of 2008௅2009, this three-week bombardment left Gaza in ruins, its
population destitute,  and the  international  community  with  a  humanitarian  disaster  on its
hands.  The  war  inflicted  enormous  destruction  on  Hamas’s  territory,  killed  many  of  its
constituents,  and  left  the  organization severely  weakened.  Hamas survived the  onslaught,
however, and was even considered a victor by many Palestinians.1 A similar trend has been
observed  in  the  years  that  has  followed;  Hamas continues  to  rule  Gaza  with  widespread
domestic  legitimacy  while  being  isolated  from  the  West  Bank,  suffering  regular  Israeli
attacks, continued international boycott, and lackluster economic development.
By surviving while retaining a high level of legitimacy in the face of such challenges, Hamas
has proved itself to be a political actor of considerable skill, and one that likely will continue
to play a key role on the Palestinian political scene. And by the same tokens, Hamas have
seemingly  institutionalized  as  political  party.  For  one,  Hamas  has  endured  despite  the
assassination of many of its leaders,  including its founder Sheikh Ahmed Yassin. Second,
Hamas has arguably moderated both rhetorically  and strategically in order to increase its
reach, rather than staying true to its cause and thus remain at the fringes. As Hamas can no
longer  credibly  claim  to  pursue  the  goals  that  initially  gave  it  legitimacy  and  drove  its
recruitment, this indicates that it has become a valued end in itself for its members. Third,
Hamas’s strong position and popularity among Palestinians stand in stark contrast to its failure
to provide for and protect its constituents. This, in turn, underlines that Hamas has become a
fixture in the Palestinian public imagination, and is taken for granted as a leading movement,
1 Approximately half of those asked in a poll carried out in late January 2009 considered Hamas to be the
victor of the war (JMCC 2009).
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both by its supporters and detractors. In short, Hamas’s survival is in itself indicative of high
levels of organizational capability and strategic adaptability, and combined with its position
among Palestinians in the occupied territories, it can be said to have become a valued end in
itself—i.e., it has become established as an institution.
Based on the above, it is advanced that Hamas merits analysis for two interconnected reasons.
Theoretically,  Hamas’s  rapid  transmutation  from a  loosely  organized,  militant  movement
toward a seemingly stable and institutionalized governing party is an interesting case of party
institutionalization.2 And because  of  Hamas’s  apparent  institutionalization,  it  is—and will
likely continue to be—a force to be reckoned with on the Palestinian political scene and thus
also  play a  role  for  any peace  process  between the  Palestinians  and Israel.  As  such,  the
analysis has obvious empirical and political merit.
The aim of this dissertation, then, is to analyze the development of Hamas as a case of party
institutionalization and through such an analysis contribute to an improved understanding of
how Hamas developed from its  modest  beginnings to  the  political  force  it  is  today.  And
contribute and  improve are two keywords here; the extant literature on Hamas is vast and
contains  important  contributions.  Nevertheless,  as  with  most  topics  related  to  the
Israel-Palestine conflict,  many studies of  Hamas are  either  overly politicized,  and/or  they
belong to the Palestine-area studies literature, which has a tendency to focus on the unique
and peculiar (see chapter 2 for a literature review). As a consequence, the quality of much of
the existing knowledge of what Hamas is, how it came to be, how it has developed, and where
it might be going, is found wanting. And the most common reason for this inadequate quality
is the widespread lack of theoretical and methodological grounding in many Hamas studies.
One  approach  promising  to  contribute  with  improved  and  non-politicized  knowledge  is
therefore  to  interpret  Hamas  by  referencing  suitable  theories  and  grounding  the  analysis
within  sound  methodological  frameworks.  By  analyzing  Hamas  as  a  case  of  party
institutionalization,  aided  by  established  theories  drawn  from  the  literature  on  social
movements and political parties, and by doing so with methodological rigor, this dissertation
will produce more reliable and valid knowledge about Hamas. In addition, the application of
established political scientific theories on a case such as Hamas promises to test and refine the
applied theories.3
2 “Transmutation” is preferred to “transformation” or the simpler “change” when analyzing the development
from movement toward party, as it highlights the fundamental differences between movement and party.
3 This  is  important,  for  as  long  as  political  science  theories  are  developed  mainly  to  target  political
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 1.1 Research outline: Hamas as a case of party institutionalization
Party institutionalization holds such a central role for the thesis that a short discussion of how
it is understood and used is in order early on. As the analytical framework will be laid out in
detail in section 1.3.3 below, the following section is limited to some brief introductory and
clarifying statements.
 1.1.1  Institutionalization explained
Political parties are—as is often repeated in the literature—considered a  sine qua non for
democracy (see, inter alia, Randall and Svåsand 2002a; Webb and White 2009a, 1–2). And as
“[a]ll parties must institutionalize to a certain extent in order to survive” (Panebianco 1988,
54),  the  study of  party  institutionalization is  important  for  uncovering the mechanism by
which parties can fulfill their assumed role in democracy. Or, in other words, the performance
of a party for a democracy depends on it being institutionalized (Webb and White 2009a, 11).
Basically,  a  party  is  considered  institutionalized  when  it  is  seen  by  the  electorate  as  a
necessary  component  of  the  political  system,  and when it  has  developed its  organization
sufficiently to both be autonomous from individual personalities and have the organizational
capacity to pursue its primary objectives to a meaningful degree (Webb and White 2009a, 11–
3). To analyze Hamas as a case of party institutionalization, then, is to carry out a theoretically
grounded investigation of its position in Palestinian society and to examine its organizational
capabilities.
Somewhat more specifically, the  process of institutionalization is what takes place when a
party  “becomes  valuable  in  and  of  itself  and  its  goals  become  inseparable  and
indistinguishable from it”  (Panebianco 1988, 53). Or, in the words of Scott, it is when the
party  acquires  both  “stability  and  persistence”  (2008,  128).  The  process  of  party
institutionalization, then, refers to the transmutation of a party from being a pure vehicle for
seeking some political goal, to incrementally becoming a valued end in itself. Such a process
can  be  traced  from  the  party’s  origins,  via  its  identity  building  phase,  through  its
organization-building phase, to its stabilization phase and eventual institutionalization.
In  addition  to  the  process,  institutionalization can  be  understood  as  a  property  variable
(Zucker 1977, 728). For, at any stage in the process of becoming an institution—or, for that
phenomena in the Western world, they often fall short of providing the tools necessary to explain politics
elsewhere. It is recognized, however, that the potential for theory development based on a case study of
Hamas is limited.
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matter, at any point in its history—a party is always more or less institutionalized. In short,
institutionalization also refers to the degree to which the party has institutionalized. Although
the  conceptualizations  of  institutionalization  as  a  process  and  as  a  property  variable  are
interlinked, it makes analytical sense to distinguish between them.
A number of authors have theorized around party institutionalization understood as a property
variable  (see in particular Huntington 1968; Janda 1980; Levitsky 1998; Panebianco 1988).
For this thesis, Randall and Svåsand’s  (2002a) take on institutionalization as a property is
deemed to be the most refined and useful. Their conceptualization will be discussed in detail
when the full analytical framework is presented below. Suffice it to say for now, they offer a
multi-dimensional  framework  to  measure  the  degree  of  institutionalization,  building  on
previous  theories,  but  taking  great  care  to  allow  for  contextual  variations.  Their  model
contains four elements in two dimensions, each capturing different but interlinked parts of a
party’s institutionalization. In essence, they distinguish between routinized patters of behavior
and  attitudes, both with regard to the  internal  workings of the party and its relation to the
external environment in which it operates. Combined, these elements capture both formal and
informal  aspects  of  a  party’s  organization;  the  nature  of  its  relationship  with  external
sponsors; cohesiveness within the party; and how the party is perceived by the Palestinian
population at large, including its political opponents. In short, the degree to which Hamas has
institutionalized throughout its process of institutionalization will be measured with the aid of
these four elements.4 As such, they constitute the core of institutionalization as a property of a
party.
Tracing the institutionalization process of Hamas and measuring the degree to which it has
institutionalized,  together  make  up  the  analysis  of  Hamas  as  a  case  of  party
institutionalization. The first, sequential or processual, element of this analysis will provide
insights into the institutional development of Hamas, whereas the second element, supported
by the four elements suggested by Randall and Svåsand, will estimate and assess the degree to
which Hamas has institutionalized at various junctures throughout this process. Combined,
these  two  elements  of  the  analysis  will  contribute  to  a  fuller  understanding  of  Hamas’s
transmutation  from  its  roots  as  militant  movement  toward  a  governing  party;  its
organizational  outline,  discipline,  and  coherence;  its  degree  of  autonomy  from  external
sponsors and donors; the extent to which it is valued as an end in itself by its card-carrying
4 It should be noted, however, that these four elements of party institutionalization might be in tension with
each other, i.e., they are not assumed to be simply cumulative (Randall and Svåsand 2002a, 12).
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members; as well as how it is perceived both by other Palestinian political actors and the
Palestinian population at large.
In short, it is the aim of this thesis to analyze and explain the process of institutionalization
and to measure  the degree to which Hamas has institutionalized as a  political  party.  The
following pages will briefly outline the chronological sequence of the analysis and indicate
which theoretical tools will be employed at each step.
 1.1.2  From movement … 
Given the importance ascribed to the roots  of a party for  its  institutionalization  (see e.g.,
Panebianco 1988, 163; Scott 2008, 158–59),5 the natural point of departure for the analysis is
Hamas’s organizational heritage and subsequent establishment.  And because Hamas is the
organizational  offspring  of  the  Palestinian  Muslim  Brotherhood,  a  social  movement  that
worked to Islamize Palestinian society through welfare work and proselytizing  (Abu-Amr
1994a; Milton-Edwards 1996; Shadid 1988), the first part of the analysis will be informed and
structured by the classic movement-to-party thesis (Michels 1915; Panebianco 1988; Tarrow
2011;  Zald  and  Ash  1966).  Arguably,  the  hallmark  of  this  thesis  is  “its  emphasis  on
routinization or institutionalization” (Close and Prevost 2008, 9), with institutionalization here
being understood as the combined process of “formalization of the internal structure of [the
social movement organization] with moderation of its goals”  (Tarrow 2011, 212). In other
words,  institutionalization  is  taken  as  the  process  through  which  the  manifest  ideology,
collective incentives, and often informal and loose organization of a social movement gives
way  to  the  more  adaptable  ideology,  selective  incentives,  and  formalized  organization
associated with a political party (Panebianco 1988, 20).
As a necessary backdrop to such an analysis, the development of the both the historical and
immediate precursors of Hamas, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and its Palestinian branch,
must be laid out. Then, based on this backgrounder, the founding of Hamas at the eve of the
first  intifada (from 1987 to 1993) can be detailed. This phase has previously been analyzed
through social movement theories, specifically by Robinson (2004) interpreting Hamas as a
case of social movement  organization. Aided by Robinson’s contribution and based on the
rich empirical literature dealing with the emergence of Hamas  (e.g., Abu-Amr 1993; Filiu
2012;  Hroub  2000;  Tamimi  2007),  the  thesis  will  elaborate  on  and  nuance  the  existing
5 Also, Gunther and Diamond argue that the “‘founding contest’ [of a given party] can leave a lasting imprint
on the basic nature of the party’s organization for decades to come” (2003, 173).
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analyses of Hamas’s first years, with particular reference to its early organization-building.
 1.1.3  … toward institutionalized political party
Following the end of the intifada and during the ensuing “Oslo years” (1994 to 1999), Hamas
tried to further  develop as a political  movement.  However,  the period saw the movement
suffer intense persecution at the hands of Israel  and the newly established PA, effectively
obstructing  its  organization-building  efforts.  Added  to  this,  Hamas’s  dual  legacies  as  a
religio-social movement and a liberation movement pulled its ideological and organizational
development  in  contradictory  directions  (Close  and  Prevost  2008;  de  Zeeuw  2008b).
Combined, these exogenous and endogenous factors led Hamas to remain ambiguous with
regards  to  its  ideological  goals,  prompting  unpredictable  behavior  indicative  of  an
organization still undecided about its political aims and role.
With the outbreak of the second intifada and the “death of Oslo process” in September 2000,
Palestinian  politics—and  by  implication  also  Hamas—entered  a  new violent  and  chaotic
phase. Despite being a volatile period, however, the following six years saw Hamas evolve
further  as  a  political  organization.  Organizational  expansion  and  increasing  ideological
coherence coupled with rising popularity elevated Hamas’s political position and confidence,
culminating in its decision to participate in the 2006 elections to the Palestinian Legislative
Council (PLC).
By certain crucial tokens, Hamas can be said to have reached maturity as a political  party
when it  participated in and won the 2006 PLC elections.  For one,  contesting elections is
probably the defining characteristic of political parties according to most definitions (Sartori
1976, 57). Second, occupying office and governing is one of the prime functions ascribed to
parties (Gunther and Diamond 2003). As such, the years from 2006 and onward to 2011 will
be analyzed by relying mainly on party theories. More specifically, this period in Hamas’s
development will reference theories dealing with party-in-government (Deschouwer 2008b).
Although discussed in more detail below,6 it is pertinent to note here that, while a conceptual
distinction  is  made  between  movement  organizations  and  political  parties  when  tracing
Hamas’s  transmutation  from  the  former  toward  the  latter,  the  two  are  not  necessarily
dichotomous. Although movement organizations are expected to be ideologically rigid when
compared to the pragmatism associated with political parties, and parties in turn usually have
6 See in particular sections 1.3.2 and 1.3.3, on pp. 30ff. and pp. 34ff., respectively.
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stricter  organizational  structures,  there  can  be  a  great  deal  of  overlap  between  these
organizational  expressions  of  political  mobilization.  Moreover,  the  transmutation  process
from movement to party is often characterized by incremental changes in the balance between
these roles rather than a clear-cut and abrupt move from one to the other. Yet, the two are
associated  with  different  qualities  and  characteristics  in  terms  of  ideological  rigidity,
organizational structure, operational logic, and thus strategy and behavior. In order to identify
these  changes  and  highlight  their  consequences  for  Hamas,  it  makes  analytical  sense  to
distinguish between the two when tracing its transmutation from one toward the other.
 1.2 Consequences of Palestinian politics  ordinary politics
Given the ongoing Israeli  occupation of the Palestinian territories,  Palestinian politics can
hardly be seen as “ordinary politics.” Apart from dictating the economic, civil, and political
circumstances in the Palestinian territories, the Israeli occupation also prompts all Palestinian
political factions to be dedicated to the liberation of (at least some part of) their homeland.7
Many also advocate armed resistance to achieve this, and some—including Hamas—retain
armed branches and carry out militant and terrorist operations against Israel. Within such a
context, the decision to analyze Hamas as a case of party institutionalization must be properly
justified.
Furthermore,  to  travel  to  the  occupied  Palestinian  territories  with  theories  and  concepts
developed mainly to explain political phenomena in the industrialized world must also be
qualified.  The  party  literature  is  highly  biased  toward  the  Western  European  experience
(Erdmann 2004). Care must therefore be taken when utilizing these theories and concepts
elsewhere  (Collier  and Mahon,  Jr.  1993).  In addition,  politics  in the  occupied Palestinian
territories  are neither  stable nor  democratic  as  assumed by theories dealing with political
parties,  but  rather  characterized  by  volatility,  violence,  and  destabilizing  international
interference (Longo and Lust 2012, 259).
And finally, to complicate things further, “Palestine” itself remains a contested, complex, and
ambiguous political entity, “[n]ot a state but rather a territory, a national entity, perhaps a
state-in-becoming” (Lentin 2008a, 1). For although the Palestine National Authority (PA) is a
state-like construct, it has severely circumscribed powers within the limited territories it was
set up to rule, and has developed into more of a management than governing body (Parsons
7 For concise introductions to Palestinian factional politics, cf. Baumgarten (2005) and Løvlie (2014). For a
comprehensive treatment of the same topic, see Sayigh (1997).
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2005).8 Moreover, it is not the PA but the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)—of which
Hamas is  not  a member—that  is  recognized as the “sole legitimate representatives of the
Palestinian people,”  and thus negotiates with Israel  on behalf  of  the Palestinians  and has
observer status in the UN.9
Given the peculiarities and volatility of the political system in which Hamas operates, then,
the following sections are devoted first to further substantiating the empirical rationale for
analyzing Hamas as a case of party institutionalization, and subsequently making the case for
traveling with the selected theories and concepts to the ambiguous political entity “Palestine.”
 1.2.1  Hamas as a party—the empirical rationale
It is noteworthy that, with only a few exceptions, the international community defines Hamas
as a terrorist organization and not as a political party. This approach is prompted by Hamas’s
use of terrorist tactics from 1994 onward, which has also led to a number of studies of Hamas
as a terrorist group  (see, in particular, Frisch 2009; Levitt 2006; Singh 2011).10 Yet, Hamas
slowly supplemented militant resistance with political and social work throughout the latter
part of the 1990s, a development culminating with their participation and surprise victory in
the 2006 elections to the PLC. This in effect made Hamas not only a legitimate political party
for  the  Palestinians,  but  also  their  legally  elected  representative  (Butenschøn  and  Vollan
2006).
And although Hamas continues to rely on armed tactics, and at times also mounts terrorist
operations as part of their overall strategy, this does not render it unfit for analysis via party
theories. Instead, it is maintained here that terrorism should be understood as a strategy or
tactic, not as an ideology, and as a consequence only those organizations that rely on terrorist
violence as their primary means of political expression should be labeled and analyzed as
terrorists groups (Weinberg, Pedahzur, and Perliger 2008, 3). So, while the military wing of
8 See chapter 5, section 5.1.1, pp. 146ff. for an introduction to the PA.
9 See the section The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in chapter 3 on pp. 89ff. for an introduction
to  the  PLO.  It  is  pertinent  to  note  here,  however,  that  already  in  1974,  the  UN  General  Assembly
Resolution 3210 first  recognized the PLO as the “legitimate representatives of the Palestinian people”
(UNGA 1974a),  before  Resolution  3237  provided  the  PLO  with  observer  status  in  the  UN  General
Assembly as a non-state entity  (UNGA 1974b). In 1988, the UN General Assembly Resolution 43/177
decided that the designation “Palestine” should be used in place of the PLO, and in 2012, after its bid to
obtain  full  membership  status  was  stopped  in  the  UN  Security  Council,  the  UN  General  Assembly
Resolution 67/17 upgraded the status of Palestine in the UN from that of non-state entity observer to
“non-member observer State status” (UNGA 2012).
10 The ministries of foreign affairs from certain European countries—including Norway—have definitely
softened their stance toward Hamas in recent years (see e.g., TV2 Nyhetene 2011).
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Hamas continues to intermittently carry out terrorist operations, it presumably does so on the
orders of the political wing. Indeed, in a list compiled by Close and Prevost of revolutionary
movements  that  have  evolved  into  political  parties  (2008,  4),  Hamas,  together  with  the
Lebanese Hezbollah, are categorized as parties maintaining “armed operations alongside their
electoral actions”—contrasted to those that have made the full transition to political parties,
and  the  revolutionary  movements  that  maintain  political  wings.11 And in  an  overview of
terrorist groups that have turned to party politics, Weinberg  et al.  also place Hamas in the
same category as Hezbollah, together with the Herut party of Israel, M-19 from Colombia,
and the Basque ETA (2008, 75–104).12
Also note that the most obvious theoretical alternatives to interpreting Hamas through the lens
of party theories—to conceptualize it either as a terrorist group or a movement organization—
are  both  considered  inferior  to  the  adopted  approach.  On  the  one  hand,  if  Hamas  was
conceptualized purely  as  a  movement  organization,  the  analyses  would  lose  some  of  the
focused  qualities  provided  by  party  theories.  For  instance,  reliance  on  social  movement
theories would fail to adequately explain Hamas’s participation in the 2006 PLC elections and
subsequent behavior in government. To define and analyze Hamas as a terrorist group, on the
other hand, would limit the analytical focus to its militant aspects, thereby losing sight of its
non-violent activities and politically comprehensive goals.
In brief, and despite being defined as a terrorist group and consequently boycotted by both
Israel and most of the international community, Hamas is currently a legal and legitimate
political party within the Palestinian territories. This discrepancy has severe implications for
the  populations  in  both  Israel  and  the  occupied  territories,  and  attests  to  the  need  for
reconceptualizing Hamas. Here, it is maintained that to analyze Hamas as a case of party
institutionalization is a fruitful analytical approach, promising to capture a wide range of its
social  and  political  activities—including  both  its  grassroots  work  as  a  religious  social
movement  and  terrorist  activities  as  a  liberation  movement—as  well  as  its  overall
development as a political organization.
11 Examples of the latter include Sinn Fein, which is linked to the Irish Republican Army (IRA), and the
political wing of the Basque ETA, Batasuna (Close and Prevost 2008, 4–5).
12 Also, Scholey argues that the use of violence is just “one of an array of political tools” used by Hamas to
pursue its political agenda (2008, 131).
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 1.2.2  The theoretical case for traveling to Palestine
As part of one of the world’s longest running conflicts, Palestinian politics has been studied
extensively.  Numerous  well-researched  books  and  articles  have  been  written,  covering
different  aspects  of  Palestinian history,  economy,  society,  and politics,  and with a  steady
stream of  new books  and  journal  articles  continuously  being  published,  the  accumulated
knowledge of this tiny area in the Middle East is impressive. However, many of these works
suffer from what Tamari labeled “the problem of Palestinian exceptionalism” (1994, 70), the
tendency to grant the unique and exceptional nature of the Palestinian experience center stage
in the analysis.  This  has led many scholars  to approach Hamas as a  sui  generis  political
phenomenon, elevating, as it were, the uniqueness of the Palestinian context to the detriment
of both analytical rigor and theoretical development.13
Admittedly, the unresolved nature of the Israel-Palestine conflict lends some credibility to
those arguing that the Palestinian case and thus Hamas are somewhat unique. But, because of
the politicized nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict itself, and of the research on topics
related to it, these claims of exceptionalism take on an added dimension. On the one hand,
there is  the tendency to focus on the Israeli  occupation as an all-explanatory variable for
Palestinian politics, reminiscent of Zionist conspiracy theories. On the other hand, there is the
neo-Orientalist approach whose proponents fall prey to traditional essentializing explanations
of Palestinian politics, assuming that some Middle Eastern, Arab, or Islamic “culture” is the
one salient variable explaining Palestinian politics (Al-Anani 2012, 467; Halliday 2003, 200).
This inclination to focus on the unique and particular is by no means specific to Palestine
studies. Area specialists in general have traditionally been reluctant to examine “their region”
through theories and concepts developed to explain social and political phenomena in the
West, exactly because these theories and concepts presumably fail to take into consideration
the assumed exceptional nature of their own subject matter (Bunce 1995; Schmitter 2001, 75–
76). Dubbing the application of Western theories and concepts on their cases as the “violence
of abstraction”  (Baber 2002, 747), many area specialists argue that such research strategies
are bound to produce ahistorical, acontextual, and thus inaccurate or even incorrect findings.
Here,  this  argument  is  reversed.  For,  regardless  of  where  a  scholar’s  sympathy  lies,  the
application  of  “culture-specific  paradigms  …  diminishes  the  possibility  of  studying  …
comparatively or within broader theoretical  frameworks”  (Tamari  1994, 71).  And because
13 See chapter 2 for a review of the extant literature on Hamas.
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such  culture-specific  paradigms  assume,  a  priori,  that  some  set  of  peculiarities  of  the
Palestinian context is of such importance that it accounts for the matter at hand, it is studies of
this type that can lead to inferior and dubious, if not straight out erroneous, inferences. In
short, to assume exceptionalism prior to empirical studies is to put the cart before the horse.
Rather, it is through comparative analysis and by asking theoretically informed questions that
both shared and unique characteristics of any society can be identified (Halliday 2003, 196–
97).
Provided  that  the  need  for  contextual  sensitivity  is  appreciated,  then,  the  utilization  of
established political scientific theories on new cases can yield new, interesting, and important
knowledge, while also help to refine these same theories (Lijphart 1971; Lustick 1997). And
finally, when countering some of the common points made with regard to conceptual and
theoretical traveling and stretching, it has been argued that
the  theoretical  apparatuses  brought  to  bear  in  political  science  …  are  more
elaborate, more precisely rendered, more ready for operationalization, and more
able to refine themselves in response to new evidence than the bodies of theory
available to previous generations of scholars (Lustick 2000).
Added to the empirical rationale outlined in the previous subsection, then, it is maintained that
analyzing Hamas as a case of party institutionalization is theoretically promising. Moreover, it
is  deemed  an  analytical  necessity  to  ground  the  analysis  within  applicable  theoretical
frameworks to contribute with improved knowledge. In sum, because Hamas appears as an
organization  pursuing  a  comprehensive  political  project  through  both  institutional  and
non-institutional  politics,  the  analytical  approach promising to provide  the  most  thorough
explanations  of  its  development  and  behavior—also  capturing  its  characteristics  as  a
movement organization employing violent tactics—is exactly to conceptualize it as a political
party.
 1.3 The analytical framework
As mentioned,  this  thesis  will  analyze Hamas as  a  case  of  party  institutionalization.  The
processual element of the constructed analytical framework allows the analysis to capture the
decisive  ideological  and  organizational  developments  as  Hamas  evolved  from  a  militant
movement  toward a  political  party,  whereas  the  property  element  enables  the  analysis  to
estimate the degree to which Hamas had institutionalized at the various junctures. The process
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of  party  institutionalization  can  be  divided  into  different  phases,  which  in  turn  can  be
explained and interpreted with reference to different theoretical frameworks. These different
stages of Hamas’s institutionalization toward a party will be analyzed with the assistance of
concepts, stipulations, and hypotheses drawn from social movement theory and party theory.
The property element, in turn, relies on the multi-dimensional framework offered by Randall
and Svåsand (2002a) and measures  the degree to which Hamas has institutionalized.  The
following sections will lay out and explain the various theoretical elements that together make
up the analytical framework. 
 1.3.1  Party institutionalization in Palestine 
To analyze  Hamas as  a  case  of  party  institutionalization ultimately  means  that  Hamas is
conceptualized as a political party. There is thus a need for a clear conceptualization of what
constitutes a political party. As one of the largest subfields within comparative politics (Mair
1994, 1), research on political parties has produced a vast and analytically diverse body of
literature, with contributions focusing on different aspects of political parties. Naturally, then,
there  are  a  number  of  different  definitions  of  what  a  political  party  is.  One  famous  and
influential definition was offered by Sartori, who defined a political party as  “any political
group that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections, candidates for
public office”  (1976, 57). Writing later, Strøm offers a somewhat similar definition, stating
that  a party is  “an organization that  seeks benefits  derived from public  office by gaining
representation in  duly constituted elections”  (1990,  574).  More or  less  similar  definitions
abound, most of which share at least the focus on electoral participation as a defining feature
of political parties. However, most definitions of political parties—and indeed most of the
literature on parties itself—share another common feature, namely a  heavy bias toward the
European party experience (Gloppen and Rakner 2007; Gunther and Diamond 2003; Gunther,
Linz, and Montero 2002). 
This  bias  is  of  obvious  relevance for  the  case  at  hand.  In  general,  as  it  is  the  European
experience that has been most influential in the party literature, most party theories assume a
high degree of political  stability and a certain degree of political  predictability. These are
qualities lacking in the unstable and conflict-prone political environment in which Hamas
operates. Analyzing Hamas as a case of party institutionalization, relying in large parts on
different party theories, then, risks conflating and reducing the theories’ analytical value by
stretching both intention and range (Collier and Mahon, Jr. 1993; Sartori 1970).
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It should be noted, however, that as the population of political parties has grown considerably
due  to  recent  waves  of  democratization,  there  have  been  calls  to  widen  the  range  and
applicability of party theories. In particular, the alleged crucial role played by political parties
for democracy and democratization processes (cf. Michels 1915; Randall and Svåsand 2002b,
5; Stokes 1999) has motivated a growing body of research on parties in democratizing or new
democracies  (e.g., Carbone 2007; Deonandan, Close, and Prevost 2008; Garcia-Rivero and
Kotze 2007; Webb and White 2009b; de Zeeuw 2008a).  The utilization of party theories to
analyze Hamas will fit with the growing number of party studies aimed at explaining political
parties outside the Western world and through this counter the bias in the party literature by
refining the  applied theories  by testing them on a  new case  (Gloppen and Rakner  2007;
Lijphart 1971).
Although participation in elections is an important feature of political parties and thus also a
key reason to analyze Hamas as one, it is advanced here that a broader conceptualization is
needed so as not to lose or discard important aspects in the analysis of Hamas. One such
definition is given by Ware, who defines a political party as “an institution that (a) seeks
influence  in  a  state,  often attempting to  occupy positions  in  government,  and (b)  usually
consists  of  more  than a  single  interest  in  the  society  and so  to  some degree attempts  to
‘aggregate interests’”  (1995, 5). Here, it  is recognized that neither elections nor office are
necessary  conditions  for  a  political  group  to  be  a  political  party.  Instead,  the  defining
characteristics are those of  seeking to influence  the state in some way or another, and the
pursuit of more than one interest.
Inspired by this definition, taking one analytical step back, and focusing on the conflictual
nature of politics, the phrase “war is merely the continuation of politics by other means” can
be reversed to capture the essence of political  parties,  seeing them as the “organizational
weapon” of political interests  (Close and Prevost 2008, 2).  This is a more comprehensive
conceptualization of parties, as it retains the conflictual aspects of politics, but avoids limiting
the  political  conflict  only  to  elections.  And  while  not  a  strict  definition,  conceptualizing
political  parties  as  the  organizational  expression  of  political  interests  involved  mainly  in
non-violent conflict is a comprehensive understanding of political parties deemed applicable
for the case at hand.
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 1.3.2  The roots of Hamas—a social movement organization in Palestine
The importance of a party’s origins for its institutionalization has been reiterated by numerous
authors, maybe most forcefully by Panebianco (1988, 50–53).14 A natural point of departure
for  analyzing the institutionalization of  Hamas is  thus to investigate its  origins.  Different
mechanisms  for  party  roots  and  construction  have  been  identified  (see  for  example,  van
Biezen 2005; Panebianco 1988, 50–53), but a common assumption is that many parties grow
out of more or less formalized movements founded to pursue or defend a certain political
interest (Ware 1995, 22).15 From a theoretical point of view, the most basic understanding of
such a collective expression of interests is to be found in the social movement literature. And
empirically,  Hamas  traces  its  ideological  and  organizational  heritage  directly  back  to  the
Palestinian  Muslim  Brotherhood,  a  movement  that  fits  within  most  social  movement
organization conceptualizations and is itself part of the broader Islamization movement.
Although  there  exists  a  multitude  of  analytical  approaches  to  and  definitions  of  social
movements,  the  encompassing  purview  of  social  movement  theory  provides  analytical
frameworks and concepts that capture the most basic expressions of (more or less organized)
political  interests.  And  the  synthesized  definition  offered  by  Diani  strikes  a  fine  balance
between generality and specificity, stating that a “social movement is a network of informal
interactions  between a  plurality  of  individuals,  groups and/or  organizations,  engaged in  a
political  or cultural  conflict,  on the basis of a shared collective identity”  (1992, 13).  One
important strength of this definition is that it distinguishes between social movements and
social movement  organizations as different analytical units. This, in turn, allows for a more
complete analysis of both the loosely organized network of the Muslim Brotherhood groups in
the occupied territories, and how Hamas emerged as a social movement organization from
this. 
Here, then, Hamas will  be approached as a social movement organization being part  of a
network of more informally organized groups, all “engaged in a cultural and political conflict
[against  colonialism, occupation and for  Islamization],  on the basis of a shared collective
identity [Islam].” Furthermore, it should be noted that in contrast to the European bias found
in the party literature discussed above, social movement theories have already been applied to
14 In the oft-quoted words of Duverger, “[j]ust as men bear all their lives the mark of their childhood, so
parties are profoundly influenced by their origins” (1959, xxii).
15 This is not to say that all or indeed most social movements necessarily develop into parties. See fn.  17
below.
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a wide range of cases, spread out both historically and geographically (Bayat 2007; Tilly and
Wood 2009; Wiktorowicz 2004). As such, adopting a social movement approach to analyze
the background, origins, and early years of Hamas is considered a promising approach.
A number of analytical concepts have been used to explain the emergence of various social
movement  organizations  (McAdam,  McCarthy,  and  Zald  1996).  Inspired  by  Robinson’s
(2004) convincing  analysis  of  Hamas,  changes  in  political  opportunity  structures, its
utilization of  mobilizing structures, and the more or less successful formulation and use of
framing techniques  will be used to examine and explain how Hamas as a social movement
organization  came  to  be  established  from  the  larger  Palestinian  Muslim  Brotherhood
movement. As used here and by Robinson  (2004),  political opportunity structure  refers to
“changes in the institutional structure or informal power relations of a given national political
system” that “might help explain the emergence of a particular social movement,” whereas
mobilizing structure refers broadly to “those collective vehicles, informal as well as formal,
through which people mobilize and engage in collective action”  (McAdam, McCarthy, and
Zald 1996, 3). Finally, framing techniques or framing processes is defined as “the conscious
strategic  efforts  by  groups  of  people  to  fashion  shared  understandings  of  the  world  and
themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action”  (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald
1996, 6).16
The phase following the establishment of Hamas as a social movement organization is its
incremental transmutation toward a political party. The classic model explaining this process
has  been  dubbed  the  Weber-Michels  model  (Zald  and  Ash  1966). It  shares  many
characteristics  with  the  party  institutionalization  literature,  as  it  assumes  that  a  social
“movement organization will become more conservative and that its goals will be displaced in
favor of organizational maintenance” (Zald and Ash 1966, 327), i.e., that the movement will
become an end in itself.  Introducing a somewhat more nuanced prediction, Zald and Ash
suggest that the process by which a social movement organization becomes established as a
political party does not mean that it evolves “from goals to structure” but rather with regard to
both “goals and structure” (1966, 340). In current social movement literature, this is how the
transmutation  from social  movement  organization  to  political  party  is  understood:  as  the
formalization of its internal structures  and the moderation of its goals  (Tarrow 2011, 212–
13).17
16 Consult McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald (1996, 1–20) for an introduction and discussion of these concepts.
17 Social movement organizations do not necessarily develop into political parties. Indeed, and as discussed
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Importantly, the Islamist movement out of which Hamas emerged, and of which it is still a
part,  pursues  a  totalitarian  goal  reminiscent  of  the  historic  socialist  movement.  More
specifically,  Hamas’s stated goals  of re-Islamization and liberation of Palestine are of the
same subversive and revolutionary nature found in the socialist movements of 19th century
Europe, and its structure resembles the hierarchical and disciplined organization of the labor
movement  (Michels 1915,  333).18 What  is  currently labeled  old social  movements is  thus
considered a better fit with the social movement organization that was Hamas than the more
narrowly defined claims put forward by the so-called new social movements.19 Based on this
observation, it is expected that the European experience of socialist movements developing
into  social  democratic  political  parties  can  be  informative  for  the  analysis  of  Hamas’s
transmutation from movement organization toward party.
Przeworski and Sprague convincingly argue that “there is a permanent tension between the
narrower interests of unions and the broader interests represented by parties,” as the “class
base  of  unions  is  confined  to  certain  groups  of  people  [whereas]  political  parties  which
organize workers can also mobilize people who cannot be members of unions”  (1986, 19).
This argument illuminates an important difference between social movement organizations
and political parties;  the former can remain content with representing an exclusive group,
pursuing a narrowly defined issue, or defending a special interest, whereas the relevance of a
political party depends on articulating and taking a position on all—or at least most—policy
areas that mobilize voters. Somewhat crudely, it can be argued that political parties can be
expected to—at least as a tendency—espouse less ideological rigidity than social movement
organizations. Hence, it is hypothesized that Hamas over time would adopt less absolutist and
narrow goals to the benefit of more centrist goals in order to widen its potential electoral base
and thus increase its political relevance.
by Della and Diani, “few of them actually survive for a significant time spell” (2006, 151). And even in the
framework employed here, institutionalization into a political party is only one of four trajectories of social
movement organizations identified by Kriesi, with the other three being (1)  commercialization, i.e., “the
transformation  in  the  direction  of  a  service  organization,”  (2)  involution,  in  which  the  movement
organization gives primacy to its social incentives and turns into a self-help group, voluntary organization,
or a club, and (3), radicalization, “the path to reinvigorated mobilization” (1996, 156–57; these paths are
also discussed in Tarrow 2011, 212–14).
18 Close and Prevos argue that “[f]lexibility, of course, is far more characteristic of new social movements—
for example, second- and third-wave feminism, antiglobalization, and the environmental movement—than
of old social movements, for example labour” (fn. 9, 2008, 16).
19 Writing on the difference between “old” and new social movements (NSM), Pichardo argues that the latter
“[r]ather than focusing on economic redistribution (as do working-class movements), NSMs emphasize
quality  of  life  and life-style  concerns.  Thus,  NSMs question the wealth-oriented materialistic  goals  of
industrial societies” (1997, 414).
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Organizationally  speaking,  the  difference  between  political  parties  and  social  movement
organizations goes in the opposite direction. Whereas movements “generally have flexible
structures [and] encourage members to participate broadly and allow substantial innovation,”
members of a political party are expected to be disciplined and toe the party line when asked
to  (Close and Prevost  2008, 9).  As mentioned above, this is understood as the process of
routinization of social movement organizations. As will become clear in the next section, this
can be construed as the organization-building phase in the institutionalization process toward
a stabilized political party.
It should be noted, however, that movements employing militant means such as Hamas are
expected to have far greater organizational cohesion and ideological rigidity from the outset.
Militant  operations  require  vertical  command  structures  and  disciplined  and  dedicated
members. Because of this, the transmutation from liberation  movement toward party is not
necessarily marked by increased routinization and greater ideological flexibility; to succeed as
a political party and attract both voters and new members the organizational structure might
instead have to become more inclusive, and the ideology more flexible and moderate (Close
and Prevost 2008; de Zeeuw 2008b).
With reference to the adopted conceptualization of  political party, it is pertinent to reiterate
that there is no obvious a priori point in time at which Hamas could be expected to complete
its transmutation from a movement organization into a political party. Rather, it is the goal of
the analyses to investigate if or when Hamas indeed finished this process. Intuitively, it is
expected that Hamas’s development from a movement organization toward political party will
overlap with the process of party institutionalization. For, given the violent and unpredictable
nature of politics in occupied Palestine, it seems unlikely that Hamas would abruptly leave
behind its role as either a liberation movement or a grassroots-oriented religious movement
for  an  uncertain  fate  as  a  political  party  competing  for  power  in  a  non-state  entity  still
occupied  by  Israel.  As  such,  throughout  Hamas’s  transmutation  process  the  difference
between  movement  organizations  and  political  parties  can  be  construed  as  a  question  of
priority or balance between their respective modi operandi. These points should be borne in
mind in the next section, which lays out the analytical framework for examining the process
and degree by which Hamas institutionalized as a political party.
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 1.3.3  The institutionalization of Hamas as a political party
As argued, party institutionalization should be understood both as a process and a property
variable. Consequently, a framework suitable to analyze Hamas’s institutionalization into a
political party must deal both with  how  it  institutionalized and the  degree  to which it  has
institutionalized. These two aspects of institutionalization will be dealt with separately in the
following sections.
  The process of institutionalization
Famously defined by Huntington, institutionalization is “the process by which organizations
and procedures acquire value and stability” (1968, 12), or, in the words of Panebianco, it is
what takes place when an “organization slowly loses its  character  as  a tool  [and instead]
becomes  valuable  in  and  of  itself”  and  when  “its  goals  become  inseparable  and
indistinguishable from it” (1988, 53). In broad terms, the process of institutionalization can be
traced from the party’s establishment to its “relevance” (Sartori 1976), and it can further be
sequenced in the following three main phases (Harmel and Svåsand 1993; Panebianco 1988,
20):
First, the party must develop a message and establish its identification, and through this define
and carve out its ideological “hunting domain.” During this phase, the party can be seen as a
tool or a means toward some ideological end. Next, to be capable of reaching its goal, the
party labors to increase its organizational capacity. This is done by building its organization
through the establishment of local branches, and by bureaucratizing and professionalizing its
operations. And finally, as it becomes increasingly bureaucratized and professionalized, the
party stabilizes, at which time it is expected to have gone from being a means toward some
political  end  to  becoming an end in  itself.  These  three  phases,  labeled the  identification,
organization,  and  stabilization  phase,  will  guide  the  analysis  of  Hamas’s  process  of
institutionalization.20
The process of institutionalization, however, does not play out in the same way for all parties.
Rather,  the mechanism through which the party came to be in  the first  place,  its  genetic
makeup as it were, has consequences for both its process and degree of institutionalization.
From Panebianco’s model outlining factors affecting party genetics, Hamas seems to most
closely  resemble  an  externally  legitimated party  established  through combined  territorial
20 As Harmel and Svåsand note, many parties of course also go through a fourth phase, namely that of decline
(1993, 87, fn. 16), alternatively labeled de-institutionalization (Randall and Svåsand 2002a, 15).
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diffusion and penetration (1988, 51–53).21
To be externally legitimated means that  a party is created or sponsored by some external
institution, a mechanism consistent with the movement-to-party thesis. Being the creation of
the  Palestinian  Muslim  Brotherhood,  Hamas  can  thus  be  said  to  have  been  externally
legitimated. And to be the political arm of some external sponsor has consequences for the
institutionalization process. For one, the presence of an external sponsor can lead to double
organizational loyalties and thereby undermine the authority of the party leadership to the
benefit of the sponsoring institution’s leadership. This makes it more difficult for the party
leadership to establish its identity and articulate its goals and strategy freely, as the sponsoring
institution is  expected to directly or indirectly interfere—at least  if  the goals and strategy
wanted by the party diverge from those of the sponsoring institution.
Second,  to  be  externally  legitimated  also  has  potentially  negative  consequences  for
organization-building. The sponsor is expected to wield considerable influence over the party
organization for two reasons. For one, as the leadership at least initially draws its legitimacy
from this sponsoring institution, the sponsor has significant leverage regarding the makeup of
the leadership. One example would be where the sponsor favors one leadership coalition over
another,  presumably  the  more  loyal  one.  And  two,  the  development  of  the  party  into  an
autonomous organization is impeded as the sponsoring institution is loath to see its political
arm emancipated. In sum, being externally legitimated poses some ideological, strategic, and
organizational challenges for the party’s institutionalization.
At the same time, it is argued here that stemming from a social movement also has its benefits
in  terms  of  institutionalization.  Although  the  problems  for  organizational  development
associated with being the creation of a sponsoring institution still have some relevance for
Hamas, being the organizational offspring of the Muslim Brotherhood meant that it arrived
with an established ideology and a ready-made constituency  (Randall and Svåsand 2002a,
19). And based on the experience from Islamic parties elsewhere in the developing world, its
roots in a social movement bodes well for Hamas’s institutionalization (Randall 2007, 645).
So,  while  the  presence  of  an  external  sponsor  might  have  worked  to  curb  the
institutionalization of  Hamas in  some ways,  the  strong roots  of  the  Muslim Brotherhood
canceled out this effect to a certain extent.
21 Panebianco  distinguishes  between three  factors  affecting  a  party’s  genetics:  it  can be created  through
territorial diffusion or penetration, it can be externally or internally legitimated, and its initial leadership
can qualify as being a case of personal charisma in the Weberian sense (1988, 65–67).
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As for the territorial aspect of Hamas’s genetics, it spread through a combination of diffusion
and penetration. A party is said to be established through diffusion when it emerged at the
periphery and only over time and through alliance building became a national organization.
Conversely, a party founded at the center and then expanding to the periphery to establish a
national presence is said to be created through territorial penetration. The former is expected
to lead to a more turbulent and uncertain process toward institutionalization, as competing
claims of leadership and local interests take on a more salient role. The latter precipitates a
cohesive  and  strong  central  leadership,  which  in  turn  makes  for  a  smoother
organization-building phase.
Although Hamas was established on the Gaza Strip and then spread to the West Bank, it was
not  a  clear-cut  case  of  territorial  penetration.  Rather,  Hamas  relied  on  the  existing
organizational  structure  of  the  Muslim  Brotherhood  on  the  West  Bank.  So,  while  the
organizational center of gravity undoubtedly was in Gaza at the time of its establishment, the
process by which Hamas spread out  through the occupied territories  relied on an already
existing structure, meaning that the process was a combination of penetration and diffusion.
Rather than a smooth organization-building phase, some of the turbulence associated with
territorial diffusion is expected to have affected the organization-building of Hamas.
In brief,  the process of Hamas’s institutionalization toward a political  party will  analyzed
according  to  three  phases:  identification,  organization,  and  stability.  Furthermore,  the
emphasis on the consequences of Hamas’s genetic makeup calls for an investigation into how
it was legitimated and how it built its early organization. With regard to this latter point, it is
pertinent to note that both Hamas’s ideological heritage from the Muslim Brotherhood and its
history  as  an  armed  liberation  movement  are  hypothesized  to  counteract  the  expected
ideological moderation associated with the transmutation from movement to party and the
subsequent  institutionalization  process.22 Also,  certain  characteristics  of  the  political
environment  in  occupied  Palestine  undermine  this  theoretically  expected  moderation.  In
particular, the unresolved nature of the Israel-Palestine conflict intuitively means that it would
be tantamount to political suicide for any Palestinian faction—including Hamas—to abandon
its  goals  of  Palestinian  liberation.  It  is  therefore  recognized  that  even  if  the  need  for
contextual  sensitivity  is  heeded  when  traveling  to  occupied  Palestine  with  the  selected
22 See  Gunther  and  Diamond  (2003) for  a  brief  discussion  regarding  the  expected  ideological  rigidity
associated with religious parties, and Close and Prevost  (2008) and de Zeeuw (2008b) for details of the
effects of militancy on ideological development.
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theories, the ongoing occupation of Palestine limits their applicability somewhat and they can
thus not be expected to exhaustively explain the subject matter.
Notwithstanding these caveats, the processual elements of the analytical framework suggested
above are deemed suitable to ground the analysis theoretically, thereby producing improved
knowledge  regarding  the  development  of  Hamas.  Throughout  the  analysis  of  Hamas’s
transmutation  from movement  toward party  and  institutionalization  process,  its  degree  of
institutionalization will be measured at critical junctures, aided by the framework discussed in
the next subsection.
  Institutionalization as a property variable
The framework offered by Randall and Svåsand (2002a) will be taken as a point of departure
for analyzing and measuring the degree to which Hamas has institutionalized at various points
in its development. Although theories on institutionalization abound  (see Huntington 1968;
Janda  1980;  Levitsky  1998;  Panebianco  1988),  Randall  and  Svåsand’s  framework
convincingly builds upon and refines previous theories, and is explicitly developed to allow
for  the  analysis  of  parties  in  the  developing  world.  In  addition,  it  has  already  been
operationalized and applied on empirical cases (Basedau and Stroh 2008; de Zeeuw 2009).23 It
is therefore considered the most well-developed and suitable framework for the case at hand.
In brief, Randall and Svåsand argue that a more complete measurement of institutionalization
than previously available is made possible by distinguishing between a party’s structural and
attitudinal qualities  in  its  internal  and  external  dimensions.  Their  conceptualization  of
institutionalization is summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: Dimensions of party institutionalization
Internal External
Structural Systemness Decisional autonomy
Attitudinal Value infusion Reification
Beginning in the top left corner with their internal-structural element of institutionalization,
Randall and Svåsand define systemness as “the increasing scope, density and regularity of the
interactions  that  constitute  the  party  structure,”  adding  that  this  regularity  “implies  …
23 See the next section for details regarding the selected criteria and associated indicators used to assess the
degree to which Hamas has institutionalized.
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routinization, and the development of prevalent conventions guiding behaviour” (2002a, 13).
As a party’s systemness increases, so does its degree of institutionalization. This definition of
systemness is inspired by Panebianco, although its somewhat broadened scope captures other
forms  of  routinization  than  the  explicitly  formal  ones,  e.g.,  routinization  of  informal
procedures.
On the external-structural dimension,  Randall and Svåsand identify an important conceptual
disagreement in the literature. Both Huntington (1968, 20) and Panebianco (1988, 55) define
and use autonomy in a similar way, arguing that parties are more institutionalized the more
independent they are from their environment. However, as argued by Janda, “a party can be
highly institutionalized and yet lack independence of other groups … as the Labour Party in
Great  Britain”  (1980,  19).  Randall  and  Svåsand  also  point  to  Levitsky’s  analysis  of  the
Justicialist Party in Argentina, in which he argues that the close (but informal) ties between
the  trade  union  movement  and  the  party  in  fact  increased  the  latter’s  degree  of
institutionalization (1998, 86).24
Randall and Svåsand proceed to suggest decisional autonomy as an alternative to circumvent
the conceptual  disagreement and confusion regarding the term. This is deemed as a more
useful indicator of party institutionalization as it says something specific about the nature of
the relationship between a party and other organizations, allowing parties to have strong ties
to external organizations or other nonpolitical actors, while retaining its decisional discretion
(2002a, 14). This element relates directly to the question of internal or external legitimation,
as  already  discussed.  Given  Hamas’s  roots  in  the  Muslim  Brotherhood  and  the  alleged
influence of its international sponsors, the question of decisional autonomy is of particular
importance.
Value infusion is defined as “the extent to which party actors and supporters … acquire an
identification  with  and  commitment  to  the  party  which  transcend  more  instrumental  or
self-interested incentives for involvement” (2002a, 13). As the party takes on a value in and
for itself, it stops being just a means to an end for its members; it becomes a valued end in
itself (Randall and Svåsand 2002a, 13). In essence, the more infused with value a party is, the
more institutionalized it is.
24 Interestingly, Levitsky uses this close link between the Justicialist Party and the trade union movement as
an example of informal routinization, which Randall and Svåsand avoid incorporating explicitly into their
framework.
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The last  concept  in  Randall  and Svåsand’s  framework is  the  attitudinal-external  element,
reification,  defined as “the extent to which the party’s existence is established in the public
imagination … including other parties” (2002a, 14).25 In short, the more reified a party is, the
more institutionalized it is.
Adaptability  has been a  traditional  dimension in conceptualizations of  institutionalization.
Randall and Svåsand, however, leave it out as a measurement, as “it seems more appropriate
to regard it as a likely but not inevitable consequence of institutionalization, leaving its exact
relationship with institutionalization in any given case as a matter of empirical investigation”
(2002a,  15).  Depending on which dimension a party has institutionalized, a high level  of
institutionalization might even impede its capability to adapt to environmental challenges and
shocks. For, as Panebianco argues,
a “strong” institution can be more fragile than a “weak” one [because w]hen an
organization’s systemness level  is high … a crisis  affecting one of its parts is
destined to make itself quickly felt by all its other parts. When its level is low, the
relative autonomy of the different parts allows for an easier isolation of the crisis
effects (1988, 57–8).26
More specifically, he argues that
an inverse relation exists between the party’s degree of institutionalization and its
sub-groups’ degree of organization, for  the more institutionalized the party, the
less  organized  its  internal  groups.  Correlatively,  the  less  institutionalized  the
party, the more organized are its internal groups (1988, 60).
This relationship between degree of institutionalization and coherence of a party’s internal
groups is presented in Figure 1, employing Sartori’s terminology for more (factions) or less
(tendencies) organized sub-groups (1976, 66–67).
25 Note that Harmel and Svåsand introduced a similar element in their theory on party development phases.
According to their theory, a party must, in its third and final phase of development, “develop [a] reputation
for credibility and dependability [and] develop … relations with other parties” (1993, 75).
26 As an example of this counterintuitive weakness of highly institutionalized parties, Svåsand points to the
Venezuelan  experience,  in  which  the  “two  main  parties  appeared  to  be  well  institutionalized”  but
nevertheless collapsed (2013, 16–17).
39
Figure 1: Organizational strength of party sub-groups
(Source: Panebianco 1988, 61).
While  an  important  observation  in  its  own  right,  it  also  underlines  the  high  level  of
complexity in the institutionalization concept. For, although institution connotes permanence
and survival, this means—somewhat counterintuitively—that being highly institutionalized is
no  guarantee  for  survival.  As  Hamas  has  faced  environmental  shocks  and  challenges  of
considerable force, this implies that its subunits are closer to being factions than tendencies,
and in turn that the degree of  systemness  throughout considerable portions of its existence
might have been rather low.
 1.3.4  Tracing the process and measuring the degree of institutionalization
By combining the three discussed theoretical components—the movement-to-party thesis, the
process  of  party  institutionalization,  and  institutionalization  as  a  property  variable—a
coherent  analytical  framework  suited  for  examining  the  institutionalization  of  Hamas  is
constructed. The framework is divided into two basic elements, namely that of  process and
property.  The  processual  or  sequential  element  fuses  social  movement  theory  and
institutionalization as a process, whereas the property element is focused on measuring the
degree of institutionalization.
The processual element allows for a theoretically founded analysis of Hamas from its modest
beginnings  as  a  militant  movement,  its  transmutation  toward  a  political  party,  and  its
institutionalization into an increasingly stabilized political party. Based on the sequencing of
the two theoretical components, the process is divided into five phases: It begins by tracing
Hamas from its roots in the Muslim Brotherhood movement to its establishment as a social
movement  organization;  then  the  focus  shifts  to  Hamas’s  transmutation  from  a  social
movement  organization  to  a  political  party;  and  finally  comes  the  three  phases  of
institutionalization as a  process—i.e.,  identification,  organization,  and stabilization. Recall
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tendencies factions
that  there  are  no  clear-cut  thresholds  between  these  phases,  but  rather  that  both  the
transmutation from movement organization toward political party and the institutionalization
process are expected to be incremental and overlapping. In combination with the need for
contextual  sensitivity,  the  processual  element  of  the  analysis  will  therefore  be  organized
according to historical phases rather than to the theorized steps.
The  property  element  enables  the  analysis  to  investigate  the  degree  to  which  Hamas
institutionalized throughout these phases. Importantly, there are no standardized frameworks
to  measure  the  degree  of  institutionalization.  Furthermore,  as  the  environment  in  which
Hamas emerged and matured escapes clear classification and in any event is a far cry from
“ordinary  politics,”  it  would  be  of  limited  analytical  value  to  directly  adopt  existing
frameworks  developed  to  measure  the  degree  of  party  institutionalization  in  more  stable
political  systems.27 In  short,  the  volatility  and  violence  characterizing  the  political
environment in occupied Palestine render some of the criteria usually employed to measure
the  degree  of  party  institutionalization unsuitable  for  the  case  at  hand,  and  for  the  same
reasons, Hamas can not be expected to institutionalize to the same degree as parties operating
under more conventional circumstances.28
By  carefully  selecting  criteria  and  associated  indicators  deemed  appropriate  given  the
environmental  conditions in occupied Palestine,  it  is  nevertheless possible to estimate the
degree  to  which  Hamas  has  institutionalized  at  various  historical  junctures.  Following
previous studies of party institutionalization employing Randall and Svåsand’s framework,
such as de Zeeuw (2009), Hamas’s changing degree of institutionalization from one period to
the next  will  be estimated on a rough ordinal  scale  from  low,  via  medium,  to  high.  This
approach is adopted to highlight in a clear and consistent manner the changes in Hamas’s
degree of institutionalization between the historical periods covered.29
It would have been preferable to offer a more precise and nuanced scoring of Hamas’s degree
of institutionalization. However, the data needed for achieving this was neither available in
27 Basedau and Stroh (2008) suggest a number of criteria to measure party institutionalization that are suitable
for comparison. However, adopting their framework wholesale would sacrifice the contextual sensitivity
needed to properly measure the degree to which Hamas has institutionalized. Note, however, that certain
criteria  listed  below are  taken  from or  inspired  by  the  framework  developed  by  Basedau  and  Stroh,
complemented  with  suitable  criteria  partly  based  on  those  employed  in  other  studies  of  party
institutionalization, including de Zeeuw (2009), Levitsky (1998), Dix (1992), and Janda (1980).
28 For example, it would be a tall order for a political organization operating under the dire conditions of
occupation to routinize organizationally to an extent comparable to parties in stable political systems.
29 Because of this, no claims for external comparability of these scores are made.
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the extant literature nor obtainable as primary data—mainly due to the Israeli occupation and
the consequent secrecy surrounding certain aspects of Hamas.30 And in lieu of higher quality
data, it was also unfeasible to define exactly what would qualify for an increase or decrease
between the ordinal levels. To compensate for this lack of explicit  coding rules, care was
taken to be as transparent  as  possible  in the inductive assessments  of  Hamas’s  degree of
institutionalization.  As  a  result  of  the  above,  the  scoring  is  admittedly  rather  rough  and
somewhat  subjective.  Nevertheless,  the scores  do provide a clear  picture of  the changing
degree to which Hamas had institutionalized in the various periods of analysis.
In  essence,  Hamas’s level  of  institutionalization will  be  measured by relying on the four
elements of institutionalization suggested by Randall and Svåsand (2002a), i.e.,  systemness,
value  infusion,  decisional  autonomy,  and  reification.  Below,  the  selected  criteria  and
associated  indicators  for  each  of  the  four  elements  are  laid  out  in  some  detail.  For  a
summarized version, see Table 10 on page 343, Appendix D.
  The criteria
Criteria used to assess Hamas’s level of systemness in each period include the degree to which
it  had routinized—both  formally  and  informally—leadership  alternation,  decision-making,
and recruitment and advancement procedures. Although details regarding Hamas’s internal
workings  and  structure  are  scarce,  crucial  aspects  were  nevertheless  uncovered,  both  in
interviews with current  and former  Hamas members  and by consulting certain  secondary
sources.31 Based on this information, it is possible to infer with some certainty how routinized
Hamas was at various points. Moreover, by observing the behavior of Hamas, deviations from
these routines can be identified, which in turn would indicate lack of systemness.
Organizational  coherence  is  also  deemed  a  suitable  indicator  of  Hamas’s  systemness.
Operationalized as factionalism, observed occurrences of either horizontal or vertical power
struggles between identifiable sub-groups will be taken to indicate a lack of systemness. In
addition,  how closely bylaws are followed and the degree of material  self-sufficiency are
regularly used as criteria of systemness. However, as Hamas refuse to disclose both its bylaws
and financial details—ostensibly for reasons of security—it is difficult to rely on these criteria
30 Consult  chapter  2,  section  2.2,  pp.  56ff.  for  discussions  regarding  the  consequences  that  the  Israeli
occupation has for the quality of the data used in the thesis.
31 In  particular,  Mishal  and  Sela  (2000),  Hroub  (2000,  2006b),  Tamimi  (2007),  Gunning  (2008),  Caridi
(2010), and Milton-Edwards and Farrell (2010) provide credible details regarding the inner workings and
organizational structure of Hamas. For details regarding the interviewees, see chapter 2, section 2.2.1, pp.
56ff.
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to measure Hamas’s level of systemness. Yet, based on secondary sources, it is possible to at
least indicate the degree to which Hamas was materially self-sufficient at various junctures.
Hamas’s level of value infusion will be measured by its degree of organizational cohesion,
i.e.,  how disciplined its  members remain in the face of unpopular decisions taken by the
leadership. More specifically, if the Hamas leadership fundamentally alters its stated goals or
changes its preferred strategy without suffering defections or facing public opposition from its
rank-and-file, it is arguably infused with value. Conversely, members defecting in protest, or
rank-and-file vocally opposing changes in ideology or strategy, are taken to indicate a low
degree of value infusion. Note, however, that given Hamas’s organizational and ideological
heritage, there are probably limits as to how infused with value it can become; simply put, as
Hamas was founded as a religious liberation movement, it can neither stray too far from Islam
nor abandon its goals of liberation without risking organizational splits and possibly its own
demise.32
Decisional autonomy will be measured through investigations of the nature and number of
relationships  between  Hamas  and  external  sponsors.  More  specifically,  if  it  can  be
demonstrated that Hamas depends on the sponsorship of one particular donor for its survival,
there is obviously a risk that this patron can exercise undue influence on Hamas and thus
impede on its decisional autonomy. Because of this, it is assumed that having a larger array of
external sponsors, Hamas will be less dependent on any one of them, which in turn is taken to
indicate  a  higher  degree  of  decisional  autonomy.  In  addition,  the  nature  of  Hamas’s
relationship with civil society organization can be used to evaluate its degree of decisional
autonomy.33
Finally, the degree to which popular support for Hamas has fluctuated will be used to estimate
its  level  of  reification.  Specifically,  trends in  available  polling data  will  indicate  whether
Hamas became more  or  less  reified  throughout  the  periods  examined.  Added to  this,  the
question of identifiability, i.e., if Hamas successfully monopolized important symbolic values
and whether it was recognized as a serious contender by both its supporters and detractors,
32 Another criterion used to measure value infusion relates to whether a party belongs to a broader social
movement. However, as this question can be answered in the positive at the outset—after all, Hamas was
established by the Brotherhood movement—this criterion will not be used to trace its changing degree of
value infusion.
33 While this criterion will be used intermittently in the coming analyses, it should be noted that, despite some
overlap in personnel, Hamas’s relationship with civil society organizations in occupied Palestine have been
thoroughly studied by various authors, most of whom find that there is no obvious or official ties, and no
examples of meddling in either direction (cf. Benthall 2010; Høigilt 2010; Kjøstvedt 2011; Roy 2011; see
Levitt 2006 for a different view).
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will be used to suggest the degree to which it had become reified in the public imagination.
In sum, these criteria and associated indicators constitute the main independent variables used
to track the degree to which Hamas has institutionalized throughout the analyses; Hamas’s
degree of institutionalization as estimated at the end of the first intifada will form the baseline
for the longitudinal comparison, and each subsequent analytical chapter will conclude with a
section  assessing  and  detailing  Hamas’s  degree  of  institutionalization  at  the  end  of  the
respective period under scrutiny.
 1.4 Structure of thesis
Before delving into the analysis itself, a number of methodological questions must be tackled.
The  next  chapter  will  therefore  present  and  discuss  the  most  crucial  methodological
challenges arising when analyzing Hamas through established political science theories. First,
the chapter covers some basic methodological issues related to studying a controversial topic
such as Hamas. Then, a discussion of case study methods follows, dealing in particular with
the applicability of qualitative case study methods to achieve the necessary context and depth
for understanding Hamas. Next follows a discussion of the quality of the data sources used in
the analyses. This subsection includes a short account of the fieldwork carried out for the
thesis, a brief evaluation of the extant literature, and some reflections around the quality of the
quantitative data used.
Chapter  3 is  also dedicated to covering some necessary ground before  committing to the
analysis, namely that of historical background and context. In short, the chapter will focus on
three topics deemed key to appreciating the historical context and the conditions under which
Hamas operates. First, it is necessary to obtain a grasp of the history of the conflict between
Israel and the Palestinians, both because this is an omnipresent factor in all that is taking place
within the  occupied territories,  and more specifically  to  contextualize  the  environment  in
which Hamas emerged and developed; second, a general overview of the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO)  is  needed,  as  this  movement  dominated Palestinian  politics  from the
1960s onward and naturally has influenced Hamas; and third, a concise introduction to the
Muslim Brotherhood is needed to allow for an analytical treatment of the ideological and
organizational  background  of  Hamas.  In  brief,  chapter  3  purports  to  lay  the  necessary
contextual and historical groundwork for a theoretically grounded analysis of Hamas and its
history  from  1987  onward  by  providing  a  short  account  of  its  ideological  roots  and
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organizational ancestors.
With the context in place, chapter 4 will lay out and discuss the emergence and first years of
Hamas, from its establishment during the first  intifada  to the signing of the Oslo Accords
(1987 to 1993). This period in Hamas’s history has been dealt with expertly and extensively in
the existing literature (see e.g., Abu-Amr 1993; Chehab 2007; Filiu 2012; Gunning 2008), and
in particular Robinson’s (2004) analysis of Hamas as a case of social movement organization
will  be  informative  for  the  first  section  of  this  chapter.  The  analysis  then  turns  to  an
investigation  into  the  early  development  of  Hamas  with  reference  to  its  organizational
evolution (Meyer 2004; Panebianco 1988; Porta and Diani 2006, 153–54).
Crucially, the years of the first  intifada were challenging for the incipient organization, and
Hamas’s survival was by no means guaranteed. However, as will be demonstrated in chapter
4,  Hamas  did  survive  the  persecution  it  suffered  during  the  intifada,  and  had  by  1993
established itself as a viable, if organizationally weak, alternative to the PLO, with a clear
identity as the religiously motivated Palestinian liberation organization.
In  terms  of  Hamas’s  degree  of  institutionalization at  the  end  of  the  first  intifada,  its
undisputed identity  as  the  main  Islamist  liberation movement  suggests  that  it  was highly
reified in the public imagination from the outset. However, Hamas was still organizationally
underdeveloped  and  dependent  on  its  founding  leaders  at  the  end  of  the  first  intifada,
indicating a rather low degree of systemness. Furthermore, its rank-and-file still perceived it
as a means to an end rather than an end in itself, meaning that it was not infused with value to
any noticeable extent. And although Hamas was free to make its own decisions without undue
interference,  its  heavy  reliance  on  the  Jordanian  Brotherhood  during  these  first  years
effectively and markedly limited its decisional autonomy.
Chapter 5 will cover Hamas’s development throughout the so-called “Oslo years” (1994 to
1999). The defining characteristics of this period were the establishment and growth of the PA
and the return of Yasser Arafat  and the PLO to the occupied territories.  The chapter will
therefore devote considerable attention to how Hamas coped with these developments.  In
particular,  the  introduction  of  formalized  politics  in  the  guise  of  the  PA  proto-state
fundamentally altered the operational  logic of all  Palestinian factions,  prompting many of
them to begin transmuting from militant liberation movements to political parties. To explain
this process with reference to Hamas, the analysis will rely in part on analytical frameworks
specifically constructed to trace the development of militant movements into political parties
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(Close and Prevost 2008; de Zeeuw 2008b) and in part on an analytical framework aimed at
accounting for how the institutional makeup of states affects the organization and behavior of
political parties (Samuels and Shugart 2010). 
While the Oslo years saw Hamas take its first steps both ideologically and organizationally on
its transmutation from movement toward party,  its dual legacy as a conventional religious
social  movement  and  a  militant  revolutionary  movement  pulled  its  development  in
contradictory  directions.  Furthermore,  the  increasingly  effective  persecution  of  Hamas
undermined its organization-building efforts. In sum, by boycotting the 1996 PLC elections,
and  failing  both  to  develop  its  organization  and  to  unite  behind  a  consistent  ideological
message, it seems as if the balance between its identity as a movement and party tilted in
favor of the former, thus prompting the conclusion that Hamas remained more of a movement
than a political party at the end of the 1990s.
Hamas had increased its overall level of institutionalization somewhat by the end of the Oslo
years as compared to the previous period. As mentioned, Hamas was already highly reified by
the end of the first intifada. However, it was still dependent on its sponsors, and its decisional
autonomy thus remained unchanged. Furthermore, the persecution Hamas suffered throughout
this  period  forced  it  to  rely  on  informal  routines  and  improvisation  simply  to  survive.
However, by surviving as a united organization despite the ordeals of the 1990s suggests a
slight increase in informal routinization and thus systemness. Finally, as both Hamas’s new
and old members still saw it as a means toward an end, it did not noticeably increase its level
of value infusion.
With the outbreak of the second intifada and the “death of Oslo process” in September 2000,
Palestinian politics—and by implication Hamas—entered a new violent and chaotic phase.
Chapter 6 is  dedicated to detailing Hamas’s development in this six year period (2000 to
2006), which, despite being volatile, saw Hamas evolve further as a political organization.
Organizational expansion coupled with rising popularity elevated Hamas’s political position
and confidence, culminating in its decision to contest the 2006 PLC elections. The analysis
will  therefore  concentrate  on  Hamas’s  organization-building  efforts  and  its  strategic
deliberations.
Although  the  years  of  the  second  intifada  also  saw  Hamas  develop  ideologically  and
organizationally in  the direction of  a  political  party,  crucially indicated by its  decision to
contest  the  2006 PLC elections,  it  proved unprepared to  complete  its  transmutation from
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movement to party;  instead of willingly assume office, Hamas expressed reservations and
reluctance to fulfill its role as a responsible and mature political party when it unexpectedly
found itself the winner of the elections.  As such, it is argued that Hamas stopped short of
completing its transmutation from movement to party by the end of the period in question,
remaining too influenced by the operational logic of movements to be considered a bona fide
political party.
However, Hamas’s level of institutionalization increased slightly from the Oslo years to the
end of the second intifada. The persecution Hamas suffered throughout the uprising had made
it  all  but  impossible  to  improve  its  organizational  state,  leaving  its  level  of  systemness
unchanged. Added to this, Hamas’s vulnerable position made it sensitive to the priorities of its
donors, meaning that its level of decisional autonomy also was as it had been. Yet, Hamas did
increase its level of value infusion noticeably, indicated by the fact that it adopted a more
pragmatic  and moderate  ideology without  seeing members  defect.  Finally,  with  regard  to
reification, Hamas’s rise in the polls and eventual victory in the 2006 PLC elections is taken
as proof that it  remained highly reified and had cemented its position as one of the main
contenders for political power in the occupied territories.
The penultimate chapter will cover Hamas’s first five years in government, from its electoral
victory in 2006 until the Arab Spring spread to occupied Palestine in 2011. As running in
elections is probably the defining characteristic of political parties, and occupying office and
governing  is  one  of  the  prime  functions  ascribed  to  parties,  the  development  of  Hamas
throughout these years  will  be analyzed by relying mainly on party theories dealing with
first-time  governing  parties  (Deschouwer  2008a).  By  assuming  office,  Hamas  crossed  a
crucial  threshold in its  development as  a political  party;  governing is  an end-point  in the
evolution of a political party, as it ostensibly means that the it finally has obtained the power
to implement its political program.
However,  although  a  host  of  environmental  challenges  hampered  Hamas’s  efforts  to
demonstrate  its  capabilities  in  government,  most  saliently  the  international  boycott  that
eventually toppled the Palestinian unity government, Hamas itself also proved unprepared and
insufficiently developed to fulfill  its  role as party-in-government.  In short,  its  legacy as a
religious liberation movement remained too crucial a marker of its organizational identity, and
continued to influence its strategic, ideological, and organizational development. This state of
affairs led to a situation in which the demarcation lines between the Hamas organization,
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Hamas in government, and the statelet of Gaza, were blurred at best, and nonexistent at worst.
Nonetheless,  after  five  years  in  office,  Hamas’s  overall  level  of  institutionalization  had
increased somewhat as compared to 2006, although its level of systemness remained largely
unchanged. In particular, its erratic behavior while in office suggests that its decision-making
procedures and command structures were insufficiently routinized to meet the demands of
governing. Moreover, by not implementing the promised Islamist order while in government,
and by brokering ceasefires with Israel instead of resisting the occupation, Hamas provoked a
number of its members to defect. However, the fact that so many members remained loyal,
despite Hamas’s broken promises, suggests that it was more or less similarly infused with
value as in the previous period. The organizational and financial resources made available to
Hamas  as  the  sole  authority  in  Gaza  decreased  its  reliance  on  external  sponsors,  and
conversely undermined any influence such actors might have had—in effect increasing its
decisional  autonomy.34 Finally,  as  the  second most  powerful  political  faction in  occupied
Palestine and the sole authority in the Gaza Strip, Hamas remained reified to a high degree.
The  concluding  chapter  will  recapitulate  the  analyses  and  their  results.  In  short,  the
overarching  finding  is  that  Hamas’s  development  from  its  establishment  as  a  militia
movement in 1987 to governing body in 2011 closely followed the trajectory hypothesized by
the employed theories. Hamas had not completed the transmutation process from movement
to party by the end of the analysis, however. Instead, it reached an awkward and somewhat
institutionalized—and thus seemingly sustainable—equilibrium between that of a liberation
movement, a governing party, and a party-statelet. Yet, this finding does not detract from the
overall theoretical and empirical contributions of the thesis; the theories aided the analyses in
providing  a  de-exoticized  account  of  Hamas’s  development,  added  nuance  to  the  extant
knowledge,  and  demonstrated  that  the  theories  employed  can  yield  results  when  applied
outside their intended scope.
The chapter ends with a section briefly outlining the developments in occupied Palestine since
2011, looking at how Hamas handled the Arab Spring and the Israeli bombardment of Gaza in
2014, with a specific view on how the findings of the thesis hold up. Although a fully fledged
analysis of Hamas’s continued development and institutionalization in the years since 2011
would have been preferable, this was not feasible for want of reliable sources. And as will be
discussed in brief, the Arab Spring has not only affected domestic Palestinian politics and thus
34 Added to this, the number of donors increased, as various Arab regimes stepped in to compensate for the
shortfall of aid following the international boycott of the Hamas government.
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Hamas, but fundamentally recast the regional power balance, rendering it difficult to analyze
and  infer  with  any  certainty  the  consequences  for  the  further  development  of  Hamas.
However, and notwithstanding the uncertainty surrounding Hamas’s immediate future, it is
maintained that  through the course of  its  institutional  trajectory,  Hamas has  laid a  strong
foundation to remain a key political player for years to come, both in domestic Palestinian
politics and as part of the Israel-Palestine conflict.
49
Chapter 2:  Researching  Hamas—methods,  sources,  and
data
This  chapter  presents  and  discusses  what  are  considered the  most  crucial  methodological
challenges  facing  an  analysis  using  established  political  science  theories  to  investigate  a
controversial  topic  such  as  Hamas.  The  two  main  methodological  issues  identified  for
discussion are (1) the choice of method to employ and (2) the quality of the sources consulted
and the data utilized.
The first section deals with the choice of method, initially arguing for the importance of a
sound and consciously chosen methodological grounding to avoid the widespread tendency to
essentialize Palestinian politics, which can lead to weak or even erroneous conclusions. A
discussion  of  case  study  methods  follows,  dealing  in  particular  with  the  applicability  of
comparative case study methods for the case at hand, and including a short subsection on
theoretical  comparisons.  Some general  issues  regarding within-case  comparisons  are  then
covered, followed by a brief outline of the spatial aspects of the coming analyses, and then an
outline of the within-case, temporal comparative method.
The second section covers the challenges associated with the quality of the sources consulted
and the data used in the analyses. The fact that Palestine remains occupied undermines the
reliability and validity of both the public opinion polls and the primary data collected through
fieldwork,  as  the  occupation  produces  a  volatile  and  unpredictable  situation  in  which
respondents—both in  in-depth interviews and in  surveys—are more likely to  distort  their
responses for fear of reprisals.  To mitigate these challenges,  caution was exercised in the
analysis of the interview material, whereas the quantitative data only will be used to indicate
changes in Palestinian public opinion.
Furthermore, given the politicized nature of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians,
the  extant  literature  tends  to  suffer  from  culturalist  biases  of  both  the  pro-Israeli  and
pro-Palestinian type. At the same time, this politicization means that the conflict has for long
attracted a disproportionate level of attention from scholars, the media, and the public at large.
This, in turn, has led to the publication of innumerable books, reports, articles, and analyses
covering both historical and current events in detail, constituting a rich source of data for this
thesis. And by meticulously perusing and evaluating the reliability of these written sources,
those not weeded out are hoped to be of sufficiently high quality.
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 2.1 Comparative case studies as a remedy to ideological bias
As discussed in the introductory chapter, the overarching aim of this thesis is to contribute
with an updated and improved understanding of Hamas’s development from its establishment
as the armed wing of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1987 to a governing party in 2007. To
achieve this, Hamas will be analyzed via a selection of meso-level theories drawn from the
literature  on  social  movement  organizations  and  political  parties.  For  one,  the  analytical
frameworks  provided  by  these  theories  offer  well-grounded  hypotheses  and  stipulations
regarding the emergence and development of political organizations such as Hamas, and the
theoretically  guided  analyses  thus  promise  to  contribute  improved  knowledge  of  the
development and institutionalization of Hamas into a political party. It is further argued that
such theoretically grounded analyses will aid in avoiding the essentializing approaches often
tainting  studies  of  political  phenomena in  the  Arab  world  (R.  Khalidi  1995;  Said  1978),
including those dealing with the “question of Palestine” (Halliday 1993; Lentin 2008b; Said
and Hitchens 2001).
In  addition,  a  conscious  methodological  approach  and  the  application  of  “‘normal,’
comparative social science methods” will further this aim “to de-exoticize [the] Arab political
culture” of which Hamas is a part (Carapico 2006, 430). On a general level, it is argued that
atheoretical  and  unconscious  applications  of  case  study  methods  are  prone  to  produce
idiographic knowledge  (Sartori 1991, 252–53).35 Furthermore, it is advanced that when the
topic  at  hand is  controversial,  such idiographic  knowledge easily  turns  biased  (Sadowski
1993; Volpi 2009).36 This has been true for much of the research dealing with Hamas, as it
“has  lacked  methodological  rigor  as  well  as  a  thorough  foundation  in  historical  and
sociopolitical realities” that in turn has led to “moralizing, acrimonious, and prescriptive …
academic works that  read more like  political  propaganda than social  science”  (Strindberg
2002, 264). 
While the quality of the scholarly literature on Hamas has improved since Strindberg offered
the above critique, methodological rigor is arguably still lacking in many studies of Hamas.
This is itself partly a result of the ideological polarization plaguing much research related to
35 See Gerring (2004, 351–52) for a short discussion on the distinction between ideographic and nomothetic
ontologies in relation to case study methods. There he argues that case study methods “occupies a tenuous
ontological midway ground between ideographic and nomothetic extremes” (2004, 352).
36 Abaza and Stauth  (1988) have an interesting exploration of ideological trends following essentializing
approaches to fundamentalist Islam.
51
the Israel-Palestine conflict  (Christison 1988).37 For good reasons, ideologically influenced
researchers tend to avoid being explicit about their methodological choices (or lack thereof).
Without  an  explicit  method,  researchers  are  free  to  pick  and  choose  how  and  what  to
emphasize, allowing them to conclude with “findings” that always seem to agree with and
corroborate their initial expectations (Nickerson 1998). The application of sound methods, on
the other hand, might eventually produce analyses and conclusions that contradict these initial
expectations.38 As such, this lack of methodological rigor also works to cement the various
ideological positions of researchers, exacerbating the bias problem even further. Thus, much
of the knowledge produced on Hamas still suffers from ideological bias and polarization.39
To  avoid  this  ideological  diffusion  and  the  tendency  to  essentialize  Palestinian  politics
(Tamari 1994), the analyses of Hamas will utilize different comparative case study methods.
In  the  words  of  Sartori,  “[c]omparing  is  ‘learning’ from  the  experience  of  others  and,
conversely, … he who knows only one [case] knows none” (1991, 245). So, to analyze Hamas
without any (explicit or implicit) reference to other (more or less) comparable cases would
produce  ideographic  findings,  and the  thesis  could  easily  fall  victim to  the  bias  problem
described above. As such, 
[c]omparative analysis … seems to be essential, not only to see what is shared
between  [cases],  but  also  to  pose  theoretical  questions  that  the  study  of  the
particular may ignore, as well as to be able, with greater justice, to identify what is
specific or original (Halliday 1993, 146).
In  short,  adopting  comparative  case  study  methods  when  analyzing  Hamas  promises  to
structure and discipline the thesis in a way that—at least  in part—aids it  in avoiding the
ideological bias trap and the essentialization pitfall. 
To achieve the necessary in-depth knowledge and contextual sensitivity, Hamas is defined as
the main unit of analysis throughout the thesis, and will be analyzed through different case
study methods relying mainly on qualitative data. Specifically, two case-oriented, comparative
methods  are  adopted:  the  interpretative  case  study  method  and  within-case,  longitudinal
37 Isacoff  (2005), Nusseibeh  (2005), and Pressman  (2005) debate the use of different historical sources in
political science analyses specifically related to the Israel-Palestine conflict.
38 Flyvbjerg (2006, 234–37) discusses confirmation bias and case studies in some detail, arguing that “[t]he
case study contains no greater bias toward verification of the researcher’s preconceived notions than other
methods of inquiry. On the contrary, experience indicates that the case study contains a greater bias toward
falsification of preconceived notions than toward verification” (2006, 237).
39 The quality of the extant literature is evaluated and discussed in some detail in section 2.2.2, pp. 69ff.
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comparative method.  The following sections will discuss and outline the specificities of the
selected methods in some detail.
 2.1.1  Theoretical comparisons
Given the theoretically grounded nature of the thesis,  the primary method through which
Hamas is analyzed resembles the  interpretative case study  method described by Lijphart.40
This method is “selected for analysis because of an interest in the case” itself, and makes
“explicit use of established theoretical propositions” to interpret, understand, and explain the
said case (1971, 692). The primary merit of this method is to structure and focus the analyses,
as it makes use of the theoretical stipulations and assumptions spelled out in the theories. As
such,  this  method  works  to  guide  the  analyses  and—depending  on  the  relevance  and
explanatory power of the theories—promises increased validity of any findings. Furthermore,
it allows for  implicit comparisons, e.g., between Hamas and other well-documented parties
sharing important characteristics or between Hamas and anti-colonial movements elsewhere
(Lijphart  1971).41 Similarly,  this  method  also  helps  the  analyses  to  avoid  the  previously
discussed essentializing tendency and ideological bias.
In addition to implicit  comparisons and analytical  guidance, the application of established
theories on a certain case also allows for some theory development. As Eckstein argues, a
“case can impugn established theories if the theories ought to fit it but do not [and thus] the
application of theories to cases can have feedback effects on theorizing” (2009, 135). In this
way,  the  theoretically  grounded,  case-oriented  method  adopted  also  has  a  theory  testing
component.42 Even  if  theory  testing  case  study  methods  often  are  distinguished  from
empirically  oriented  and  theoretically  grounded  case  studies  such  as  this  one,43 the
interpretation  and  analysis  of  Hamas  through  established  theories  can  help  refine  them,
providing increased confidence and extending their geographical reach (Gloppen and Rakner
2007; Sartori 1970, 1994; Tilly 2004). On the one hand, then, the interpretative case study
method assists in explaining and understanding Hamas, and on the other, the chosen theories
are both tested and ultimately refined by being applied to Hamas.
40 According to  George  and  Bennett  (2005,  213),  Lijphart’s  interpretative  case  study  is  similar  to  what
Eckstein (2009, 134–37) labels the disciplined configurative case study.
41 For example, the ANC in South Africa shares important characteristics with Hamas. See also Deonandan,
Close, and Prevos (2008), and de Zeeuw (2008a).
42 Lijphart dubs this theory-confirming and theory-infirming case studies (1971, 692), whereas Eckstein calls
it crucial case studies (2009, 140–52).
43 See discussions in George and Bennett (2005) as well as Eckstein (2009) and Lijphart (Lijphart 1971).
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 2.1.2  Within-case comparison
Given the primacy granted to the theoretical grounding of the thesis, the interpretative case
study remains the main adopted methodological approach. However, further specification is
required in terms of its application. Indeed, as argued by Gerring, “when one refers to the case
study method, one is in fact referring to three possible methods, each with a different menu of
covariational evidence” (2004, 343). These are (1) case studies with spatial variation, (2) case
studies  with  temporal  variation  (longitudinal),  and  (3)  case  studies  with  both  spatial  and
temporal variations. This specification of different within-case comparisons is similar to the
one offered by Lijphart  when he argued that  “analyzing the same case  … diachronically
[and/or]  select[ing]  intra[unit]  cases”  maximizes  the  shared  similarities  between  the
observations,  and  thus  aids  in  identifying  variables  with  explanatory  power  (1975,  159).
While the thesis covers certain spatial aspects of Hamas, it relies mainly on the method of
temporal comparison. Both will be briefly discussed below.
  The spatial aspects
The analyses will focus on certain spatial aspects of Hamas’s development. From early on in
its history, Hamas was organized in a federated manner, with branches operating in the two
occupied territories (the West Bank and Gaza), with a leadership body in Amman, Jordan, that
later moved to Damascus, Syria, and in recent years with a local presence among Palestinian
refugees both in Lebanon and Syria. As these Hamas branches operate under widely different
conditions  and  to  some  extent  emerged  under  unique  circumstances,  they  have  different
ideological outlooks and preferences. The spatial dimension will therefore be covered in some
length throughout the analyses, in particular with regard to alterations in the internal power
balance between them, as these changes had an effect on Hamas’s behavior. However, the
various branches will not be compared as such. The geographical aspects will be included
only when relevant to explain the changing behavior of Hamas. As such, the thesis does not
comply with the requirements of a proper spatial comparison.
  Temporal comparison
The focus on Hamas’s development from a social movement organization to a governing party
gives the thesis a processual quality. As such, the within-case, longitudinal approach will be
the method applied throughout the analyses. In essence, and as alluded to in the introductory
chapter, the comparisons are informed by the analytical framework adopted. To recapitulate,
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the framework was built by combining theoretical elements from the literature dealing with
social  movement  organizations and political  parties.  This  framework enables the thesis  to
analyze  Hamas  from  its  modest  beginnings  as  a  social  movement  organization  to  its
transmutation  and  institutionalization  toward  a  stabilized  political  party.  Based  on  the
sequencing of the two theoretical components, this process can be divided into five phases:
first, tracing Hamas from its roots in the Muslim Brotherhood movement to its establishment
as  a  social  movement  organization;  then Hamas’s  transmutation from a social  movement
organization  to  a  political  party;  and  finally  the  three  phases  of  institutionalization  as  a
political party, namely identification, organization, and stabilization.44
While the analyses are informed by and focused on these phases, the longitudinal comparison
itself  is  not  neatly  divided  according  to  them.  For  one,  there  are  no  clear-cut  thresholds
between these steps. As a result, Hamas is expected to be at various stages simultaneously,
e.g., still qualifying as a social movement organization in terms of ideology and strategy, but
with organizational elements similar to that of a political party. Furthermore, changes in the
environmental conditions under which Hamas operates—in the Palestinian political system, in
relation to the conflict  with Israel,  and internationally—strongly affected its development.
Taking  these  two  factors  into  consideration,  the  within-case  comparison  of  Hamas  is
organized in historical phases rather than according to the theorized steps.
It should also be noted that relevant, additional theoretical frameworks will supplement the
main analytical framework. For example, part  of the analysis in chapter 5 is informed by
theoretical assumptions related to how Hamas’s legacy of violence shaped its development
(Close and Prevost 2008). Or in chapter 6, which partly deals with the institutionalization of
the Palestinian political system, the consequences of the introduction of semi-presidentialism
in the PA for Hamas’s development and behavior are covered (Cavatorta and Elgie 2010).
It  should finally be mentioned that  each analytical  chapter ends with a  section analyzing
Hamas’s degree of institutionalization for the period in question. Based on the findings from
the preceding analysis and supplemented with data gleaned from the relevant literature, these
44 Such theoretically informed, within-case analyses can easily be confused with the methods of congruence
and process-tracing described by George and Bennett (2005, chapters 9 and 10). As its name indicates, the
process-tracing method focus on processes, attempting “to identify the intervening causal process—the
causal chain and causal mechanism—between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of
the dependent variable” (2005, 206).  The congruence method “begins with a theory and then attempts to
assess its ability to explain or predict the outcome in a particular case” (2005, 181). So, while both of these
methods  are  used  in  case  studies  such  as  this  one,  they  give  primacy  to  theory  testing  and  theory
development, which are secondary to the empirical focus in this thesis.
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measurements  allow  for  a  stringent  temporal  comparison  of  Hamas’s  degree  of
institutionalization throughout its history.45
 2.2 Sources and the quality of “occupied” data
The thesis makes use of different data sources. The extant literature on Hamas is an important
source of secondary and descriptive information, as are data collected from various other
secondary sources, such as different media, the gray literature (NGO reports, etc.), and the
extensive literature dealing with Palestinian politics. In addition, the analyses rely on primary
data generated during fieldwork in the occupied Palestinian territories and among Palestinian
refugees in Lebanon. These are mainly interview data from multiple interviews of a wide
range of Hamas members,  but  they also include informal  conversations and observations.
Finally, quantitative data, primarily public opinion surveys, are utilized, although mainly for
descriptive and corroborating purposes.
In the following subsections, these data sources will be discussed in some detail, including the
rationale behind using them, how the data were collected, and what their respective strengths
and weaknesses are—both in terms of relevance for the thesis and in terms of reliability and
validity. The first subsection deals with the fieldwork carried out for this thesis, with a focus
on the collected interview data; the next subsection covers the quality of the extant literature;
and the final subsection discusses the quality of quantitative data in the occupied territories.
 2.2.1  Fieldwork and expert interviews—some reflections
To complement the data provided by the extant literature, long-term fieldwork episodes were
conducted in occupied Palestine and in Lebanon. Through this fieldwork, new and previously
unavailable data were collected by means of qualitative, semi-structured interviews of Hamas
cadres in various localities. This was done to obtain information suitable to answer some of
the theoretically informed research questions, for example with regard to Hamas’s degree of
institutionalization,  its  ideological  rigidity,  and  its  organizational  structure.  Specifically,
systematizing expert interviews (Bogner and Menz 2009, 46–47) was employed, as this form
of interview is particularly suited to extract information and collect data from the mid- to
higher echelons of Hamas (Abels and Behrens 2009, 139–40; Meuser and Nagel 2009, 24).
45 The degree of institutionalization is measured at the ordinal level (low, medium, high) and relies on the
four-dimensional  framework  suggested  by  Randall  and  Svåsand  (2002a).  See  the  discussion  in  the
introductory chapter for details regarding this framework and its four elements (in particular pp. 37ff. and
pp. 42ff.).
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Systematizing  expert  interviews  as  a  data  generating  method  is  distinguished  from other
forms of interview techniques in its explicit focus “on knowledge of action and experience
[which is] reflexively accessible, and can be spontaneously communicated,” aiming to extract
and generate “systematic and complete information … on ‘objective’ matters”  (Bogner and
Menz 2009, 46–47).46
And, although the reasoning behind the use of expert interviews rests in part on the current
deficit  of  relevant  empirical  data,  it  is  important  to  note  that  it  also  was  theoretically
grounded. In particular with regard to ideological rigidity, mid-level activists from political
parties  are  expected  to  constitute  a  major  pool  of  experts,  as  they  are  the  ones  often
formulating and suggesting why and how ideology should be put into practice (Downs 1957;
Panebianco  1988,  8–9).  Because  of  their  “know-why”  and  “know-how”  with  regard  to
ideology formulation,  the  activists  are  considered  expert  informants  in  terms  of  Hamas’s
ideological rigidity  (Littig 2009, 98–99).  Put simply, their role as activists means they are
expected  to  possess  currently  unavailable,  exclusive  knowledge  on  Hamas’s  ideological
rigidity.
These  activists  can  also  be  important  informants  for  questions  regarding  Hamas’s
institutionalization  and  organizational  structure.  However,  given  the  relatively  short
organizational history of Hamas, it is, again based on relevant theories, assumed that the more
high-ranking  cadres  within  Hamas  might  be  better  positioned  and  have  more  relevant
expertise on these variables  (Panebianco 1988). So,  as with the rationale for interviewing
activists as experts on Hamas’s ideology, high-ranking, long-standing members with in-depth
knowledge  on  the  inner  workings  of  Hamas  served  as  expert  informants  providing
information suitable to generate data for further analysis.
There are, however, a number of challenges associated with the expert interview as a method
to generate data. Some challenges are shared with qualitative methods in general (chapter 4 in
Mason 2002, 62–83), such as questions of ethics (see e.g., Christians 2005; for a discussion
on ethics in expert interviews, see Obelene 2009) and reliability and validity  (chapter 15 in
Silverman 2009, 268–91). Others are specific to the qualitative interview or expert interview,
e.g., questions regarding sampling  (Littig 2009, 103–4), getting access to informants  (Littig
2009,  104–5),  how one should define expert  in the first  place  (Bogner,  Littig,  and Menz
2009a, 3–5), and challenges associated with the power balance between the interviewer and
46 This latter characteristic of the systematizing expert interview also contrasts with the interpretative nature
of most other qualitative interview techniques.
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the interviewee (Abels and Behrens 2009; Pfadenhauer 2009).
  The fieldwork localities and the interviewees
In addition to some data from a previous and unrelated month-long fieldwork on the West
Bank in August 2007,47 two long-term fieldwork episodes were conducted to collect primary
data for the analyses: three months on the West Bank in the spring of 2011, and then again
two months on the West Bank followed by one month in Lebanon during the fall of the same
year.  In  addition  to  innumerable  informal  meetings  and  conversations  throughout  the
fieldwork,  a  total  of  69  in-depth,  semi-structured  interviews  of  60  respondents  were
conducted. These interviews constitute the brunt of the primary data material for the analyses.
The choice of the occupied West Bank as location for the first fieldwork episode was based on
two considerations. For one, previous fieldwork experience from the West Bank meant that
there was already an established network of colleagues and potential interviewees, both of
which made getting access and getting around rather straightforward. Second, getting into the
West Bank has for long been the easiest option compared to the Gaza Strip. And related to this
latter point, the West Bank is considered to be less violent and volatile than Gaza, also making
it a more attractive place to carry out fieldwork.
It  should be mentioned that  plans were made to get into Gaza as well.  For,  although the
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has advised against all travels in and near the
Gaza Strip since Hamas took over in 2007, getting there was considered crucial for that exact
reason; as Hamas is the governing party in Gaza, it is obviously a promising place to collect
relevant  information  for  a  thesis  analyzing  Hamas  through  the  lens  of  party  theories.
Nonetheless,  despite  several  promising  attempts,  the  security  situation  simply  made  it
impossible to get in.48
Fieldwork in Syria was also considered early on, as Hamas’s Political Bureau has resided in
Damascus since 1999. However, because of the uprising and ensuing civil war beginning in
March 2011, no attempt was made to travel to Syria, for reasons of personal security. Instead,
the monthlong fieldwork episode in Lebanon was carried out, partly because getting into Gaza
and  Syria  proved  impossible,  but  also  because  interviews  conducted  in  a  non-occupied
47 Specifically, this relates to information provided by four respondents only interviewed in 2007.
48 High-ranking Hamas officials in Gaza offered to facilitate the stay by providing a guide and a translator,
and diplomats promised transport to and from the isolated strip by means of cars with corps diplomatique
license plates. However, the trip never materialized as the particular MFA in question decided that the
potential liability associated with aiding a researcher’s entry into Gaza was too steep.
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territory would add quality to the collected data. Furthermore, it should be added that Hamas
has had a long-term presence in Lebanon, both with an official country representative and
local chapters. Note also that certain members of Hamas’s  Political Bureau frequently visit
Lebanon, making it a promising fieldwork locality.
Notwithstanding the merits of the fieldwork episodes on the West Bank and in Lebanon and
the usefulness of the data collected in these localities, they did not fully compensate for the
failure to get into Gaza. As mentioned, data gathering in Gaza was considered crucial for the
thesis, exactly because Hamas since 2007 has operated as the sole authority there. In short, it
was  expected  that  interviews  conducted  there  could  provide  information  unavailable
elsewhere. For one, it was hoped that access to commanders from the al-Qassam Brigades
would have been possible.  Such interviews could potentially have been illuminating with
regard  to  the  opaque  relationship  between  the  political  and  armed  wings  of  Hamas.
Furthermore, it was hoped that interviews with Hamas leaders in Gaza would provide crucial
information regarding the inner workings of Hamas—a topic of which interviewed Hamas
leaders on the West Bank and in Lebanon only occasionally were willing to discuss.49 In short,
it  is recognized that  the analyses probably suffer somewhat from relying on primary data
collected solely on the West Bank and in Lebanon.
Yet, even if access to Gaza had been possible, it is unlikely that data gathered there would
have proved a panacea for the analyses. The secrecy surrounding certain aspects of Hamas’s
internal workings are ostensibly there for reasons of security. As long as the Israeli occupation
is upheld and Hamas remains a persecuted movement, its leaders will naturally be loath to
disclose information they consider sensitive for the organization’s survival. This would, for
example,  include  detailing  the  changing  power  balance  between  its  various  leadership
branches, as this would be an admission of weakness; discussing the specificities regarding its
decision-making  procedures,  as  this  would  render  the  organization  vulnerable  to  targeted
attacks by Israel and the PA; and providing information regarding its relationship with and
number of patrons, as this would acknowledge its state of dependence on external actors and
thus undermine Hamas’s credibility as an autonomous Palestinian movement.
49 Of the numerous Hamas leaders interviewed, Dr. Mohammad Ghazal (interviewed in Nablus, April 17 and
September  29,  2011),  Ousama  Hamdan  (interviewed  in  Beirut,  November  18,  2011),  Dr.  Ayman  H.
Daraghme (interviewed in Ramallah, August 26, 2007 and April 10, May 18, and September 27, 2011), and
Nizar Ramadan (interviewed in Ramallah, May 8, 2011) were the ones willing to somewhat openly discuss
and share information regarding the internal workings of Hamas.
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On a general level, and as emphasized in the relevant literature, conducting interviews for
data collection purposes is by nature a challenging and unpredictable exercise (see e.g., Part II
in  Bogner,  Littig,  and  Menz  2009b;  Dexter  2008;  Gubrium  and  Holstein  2001).  And
particularly when attempting to do so in authoritarian Middle East regimes, the size, power,
and reach of the internal security services in the region create a “culture of suspicion” that in
turn makes interviewees reluctant to speak freely  (Clark 2006). While the PA is a non-state
polity, the combined effect of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, the authoritarian turn of
the PA there, and its extensive security cooperation with Israel, creates conditions similar to
those found in authoritarian regimes in the region. In short, the combined “size, power, and
reach”  of  Israel  and  the  PA’s  security  services  on  the  West  Bank  is  comprehensive;
cooperation between PA’s numerous security and intelligence services and Israel’s internal
security service (known as Shabak or Shin Beth) and military intelligence (Aman) is such that
sympathizers or  members of Hamas there are increasingly reluctant  to speak freely or be
associated with Hamas.50
This fear of persecution among Hamas members and its sympathizers is not unfounded. The
Israeli and Palestinian security services regularly persecute, imprison, and assassinate both
real  and  alleged  Hamas  members,  as  well  as  other  political  dissidents  (see  e.g.,  Ma’an
2009a).51 That  known  Hamas  members  refuse  to  be  identified  as  such  is  therefore
understandable. Sometimes they explicitly cited fear for themselves and their family as the
main reason for not wanting to be identified as Hamas—thus implicitly admitting that they
indeed  were members.52 Instead,  many  agreed  to  be  identified  as  affiliated  or  associated
members, or just people sympathetic to and/or ideologically similar with Hamas.
Note, however, that many of those reluctant to be identified as Hamas spoke relatively freely,
and  some  had  detailed  knowledge  about  the  organization.  For  example,  both  Dr.  Ayman
Daraghme and Abderrahman F. Zaidan shared far too detailed information about the inner
workings  of  Hamas  for  their  claimed  independence  to  be  credible.  In  addition,  those
interviewed both in 2007 and 2011 were open about their membership in Hamas the first time
50 As an indication of this increased reluctance, people interviewed in 2007 who openly admitted to being
Hamas members refused to be identified as such in 2011. 
51 Human rights abuses from both the PA and Israel are common in occupied Palestine. For details on this, see
e.g.,  B’Tselem  (2011), Amnesty International  (Amnesty International  2012, 186–89, 265–67), and later
chapters.
52 For example, one prominent PLC member from Change and Reform expressed fear of what might happen
to their family if they were interviewed as a Hamas member (interviewed on the West Bank, April 2011).
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around.53 Finally,  some  of  those  interviewed are  known through the  media  and  previous
academic work to be Hamas members.54 In particular, when well-known Hamas leaders such
as Dr. Aziz Dweik, Dr. Mohammad Ghazal, and Sheikh Hassan Yousef said they were not
members but only sympathetic to or associated with the organization, their claims were given
little heed. In short, it is hard to believe that all of those claiming to be independents really
are independents and not members in Hamas.
The  fieldwork  experience  in  Lebanon  strengthened  the  doubts  about  the  ostensibly
“independent” status of many interviewees on the West Bank. Interviewees in Lebanon—from
low-level  activists  to  official  country  representatives  and  members  of  Hamas’s  Political
Bureau—all had business cards with the Hamas emblem, and more often than not also had
Hamas  flags  in  their  offices.  Except  for  some  researchers  and  analysts  with  uncertain
ideological allegiance, none of those interviewed in Lebanon had any apparent qualms about
being identified as Hamas members.
The status of each interviewee has therefore been assessed through triangulation with other
sources. It is recognized that such an approach might be insufficient to ascertain if someone
actually is a member of Hamas, as disinformation and mistakes are reproduced throughout the
media.  It  is,  for  example,  easy to assume that  a  high-ranking official  such as  the former
Deputy Prime Minister in the 2006 Hamas government, Nasser al-Din al-Shaer, is a member,
as has been reported by numerous media outlets (BBC 2009; Myre 2006). However, he labels
himself as an “independent Islamist,”55 and Palestinian media seems to agree (see e.g., Ma’an
2012). While al-Shaer is classified as an independent Islamist here, it is acknowledged that it
is difficult to ascertain his exact his status, and as such, it is recognized that there might be
potential false positives or false negatives in the classification of interviewees.
The interviewed Hamas members had different positions within the movement, ranging from
young recruits, via activists and cadres, through to mayors, MPs, ministers, and members of
Hamas’s  Political  Bureau. Regarding the MPs,  it  should be noted that  some were elected
through the district quota to the PLC, whereas others were elected through the national list. 
53 For example, an MP from the northern parts of the West Bank admitted to being Hamas in 2007, but
refused to be identified as such in 2011 (interviewed on the West Bank, August 2007, and April 2011). Also
a former Minister in the first Hamas government and current MP admitted to being Hamas in 2007, but
claimed in 2011 only to be “associated” with the movement (interviewed on the West Bank, August 2007,
and April 2011).
54 See e.g., Hadi (2006) for biographies of various Hamas leaders.
55 Interviewed in Nablus, April 18, 2011.
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Few if any from the national list are likely to be non-members, as it is assumed that a political
party nominates its own members as candidates when possible. For the district elections, this
is different. In particular on the West Bank, Hamas has had a weak position in certain areas. It
therefore  made sense for  Hamas to  enter  into alliances  with local  leaders who had good
chances of winning, rather than nominating their own, unknown candidates.56
Of the  60 interviewees,57 one was from the Popular  Front  for  the Liberation of  Palestine
(PFLP), two were from the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), five
were from Fatah (the main PLO faction), three were independents (although politically active
on  different  levels),  14  were  without  any  known  or  relevant  political  affiliation  (mostly
academics and analysts), and the remaining 35 were either from Hamas (31) or associated
with Hamas as independent Islamists (four).58 It  was useful to interview both independent
observers  and  Hamas’s  domestic  political  opponents,  as  these  interviews  could  provide
sobering versions of certain events where Hamas members gave an unlikely rosy account of
history, and at  other times these interviews could be used to corroborate equally unlikely
accounts that otherwise could have been easily dismissed.
While eleven of the interviewees refused to be recorded, including Dr. Nasser al-Din al-Shaer
who requested a citation check if  quoted,59 most  accepted both to  be recorded and to be
quoted by name. Four of the interviewees wanted to remain anonymous, however, and an
additional five were anonymized. Four of the anonymized were lower ranking and largely
unknown members in Hamas, and one was a Fatah cadre. They were all anonymized because
they seemingly did not appreciate the risk stemming from being identified with full name
(Clark 2006, 420).60
56 See later chapters, and in particular chapter 6, for details regarding Hamas’s nomination procedures. 
57 See Appendix B: List of interviewees on page 334 for details.
58 The interviewed Hamas members were of both genders, different age groups, and came from a variety of
socioeconomic backgrounds. However, almost all had higher education in a technical profession, such as
engineering or medicine. Only a few had any formal religious training. See also Robinson (2004, 117) and
Jamal (2005, 108) for similar observations regarding the socioeconomic makeup of the Hamas leadership.
59 Interviewed in Nablus, April 18, 2011. Dr. al-Shaer has not been quoted in the thesis.
60 For example, Hamas members who are used to persecution may feel confident that providing information
critical of the Israeli occupation or the corruption in Fatah to a Western researcher has little or no bearing
on their situation, as they often have said such things in public before. However, the public sphere in
occupied  Palestine  is  different  from the  internationalized,  English-speaking  research  community.  Both
Israel and Fatah might want to stop what is well established in the occupied Palestine from spreading, and
react harshly against informants revealing what they themselves thought was only common knowledge.
See Thomson  et al. (2005) for a general discussion of the  ethical concerns associated with naming and
identifying interviewees.
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The  interviews  lasted  anywhere  from  30  minutes  to  2  hours,  with  most  clocking  in  at
approximately  one  hour.  In  total  about  63  hours  of  interviews  were  recorded.  However,
because an interpreter was used in some interviews, a significant amount of this time was
spent  on  translating  between  Arabic  and  English.  The  recorded  interviews  were  in  turn
transcribed, after which the text files were imported and analyzed in ATLAS.ti, a software
package designed for analysis of qualitative data.61
It  should be mentioned that  not  all  of  the transcribed interviews will  be used directly as
primary sources for the analyses; a number of the interviewees provided no new or directly
relevant information. However, even these interviews have helped contextualize Palestinian
politics, and have thus indirectly informed the analyses.
  Sampling, translating, interpreting, and facilitating
In terms of sampling of interviewees, a strategy combining purposiveness, convenience, and
snowballing was  adopted.  Initial  interviewees were thus  sampled based on their  assumed
knowledge  on  and/or  position  in  Hamas,  as  well  as  on  ease  of  access.  Following  each
interview,  the  interviewees  were  asked  about  other  relevant  and  potential  respondents
(Ritchie, Lewis, and Elam 2003, 81–94). Such a strategy—and in particular the convenience
dimension—led a number of the interviews to be of limited relevance in and for themselves.
Those most accessible have often been interviewed by others before, and consequently their
histories and viewpoints on different issues are well known.62 Because of this, many of the
initial interviews produced little new knowledge. By getting started right away and accepting
that the purpose of some interviews were to get access to other interviewees, however, this
strategy eased what is often considered a major challenge in field research, namely getting
access to interviewees (Littig 2009, 104–5). 
Dr. Basem Ezbidi, a colleague at the University of Birzeit, also helped arrange meetings with
certain  higher-ranking politicians  that  otherwise  would have been out  of  reach.  This  was
especially  the  case  for  the  meetings with  former  Deputy Prime Minister  and Minister  of
Education for the 2006 PA Government, Dr. Nasser al-Din al-Shaer, and Speaker of the PLC,
Dr. Aziz Dweik.63 However, it should be noted that many high-ranking Palestinian politicians
61 See http://www.atlasti.com for details.
62 For example, Sheikh Mohammad Totah, an MP living in a Red Cross compound in East Jerusalem to avoid
being captured by Israel, is regularly interviewed by both journalists and researchers. And his consequent
media savvy meant that his answers came across as rather rehearsed (interviewed October 4, 2011).
63 Interviewed in Nablus, April 18, 2011, and in Hebron, April 13, 2011, respectively.
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are very approachable. The Minister of Religious Affairs, Dr. Mahmoud al-Habbash,64 and the
Minister of Planning and Public Administration, Dr. Ali al-Jarbawi, for example, both agreed
to be interviewed without any “gatekeeper” involvement. The same was often the case with
high-ranking Hamas members, e.g., with PLC member and Hamas West Bank leader, Sheikh
Hassan Yousef,65 the official representative of Hamas in Lebanon, Ali Barakeh,66 and Hamas
Political Bureau member, Ousama Hamdan.
Most Palestinians on the West Bank speak English, and almost all the interviewees belong to
an educated political elite proficient in English. The language barrier was therefore rarely a
real  problem.  Of  course,  the  fact  that  neither  the  interviewer  nor  the  interviewee  could
communicate in their mother tongue had consequences for the quality of the data collected.
The language was often simplified so as to minimize the chances of misunderstandings. This,
in turn, had consequences for nuance and accuracy—both for the questions asked and the
answers provided. A difficult balance therefore had to be struck between being understood
and successfully soliciting the information wanted.
Despite the fact that most interviewees spoke English, research assistants were hired during
all three stays on the West Bank (although not in Lebanon). For the initial fieldwork carried
out in 2007, the lack of fieldwork experience made it difficult to identify and get access to
interviewees. As such, it became clear that it was necessary to hire a “stringer” that could set
up appointments and facilitate during the interviews. With the help of a colleague from Birzeit
University,  a young teacher with scholarly interests in Hamas was recruited as a research
assistant.67 For  the  fieldwork  in  the  spring  of  2011,  a  lecturer  at  Birzeit  University  was
recruited  as  a  research  assistant.68 He  was  helpful  in  identifying  potential  interviewees,
contacting  and  setting  up  appointments  throughout  the  West  Bank,  and  translating  when
necessary. When returning to the West Bank in the fall of 2011, a student majoring in English
at Birzeit University was hired.69 He also aided in identifying and setting up appointments,
and translated when necessary.
64 Interviewed in Ramallah, May 27, 2011 and October 6, 2011, respectively.
65 Interviewed October 16, 2011, in Ramallah.
66 Interviewed in Beirut, November 11 and 18, 2011, respectively.
67 The teacher is anonymized because he has been persecuted by both Israel and the PA.
68 Named Nashaat Abdalfatah.
69 The student is also anonymized for similar reasons as the teacher.
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One major challenge associated with the use of interpreters in interviews relates to what is
translated and what  is  not.  It  seems obvious that  literal  translation of semi-structured (or
conversational) interviews are unwarranted. However, there were times during the translation
back and forth that what seemed like a long-winded and elaborate answer in Arabic to a
complicated question was simply translated as “no” or “yes”—suggesting that the translator
had either skipped all that he considered unimportant (Bujra 2006) or that he failed to grasp
either the question or the answer. This was probably partly because none of the research
assistants were professional translators.
Another and important side effect of using translators during interviews has to do with the
communication  between  the  interviewer  and  the  interviewee.  On  the  positive  side,  the
presence of a local third-party can ease the interviewee and give the interviewer more time to
formulate questions and keep track of the interview, as time goes by translating back and
forth. On the negative side,  the presence of the third-party can create more of a distance
between the interviewer and the interviewee, and as noted above, the quality of the translation
can lead to a loss of not only nuances but even crucial details. In sum, and although it is
obvious that the fieldwork would have suffered without the help of these research assistants,
the use of such services were not without challenges.
  Reciprocity and credibility under occupation
Some observations about the interview situation itself are in order. First, and on a general
level,  it  is  important  to recognize and remember that  the interviewer and the interviewee
probably have different reasons for wanting the interview  (Berry 2002, 680). Whereas the
interviewer  is  seeking  information  not  available  elsewhere  (Rathbun  2010,  690),  many
interviewees might be willing to talk on some (explicit or implicit) condition of reciprocity—
that something is given in return (Carapico 2006, 430). In the words of Berry, it is not only the
interviewer who has a reason to interview the interviewee; “the subjects have a purpose in the
interview too: they have something they want to say … They’re talking about their work and,
as such, justifying what they do” (2002, 680). This was in all likelihood the case in many if
not most of the interviews carried out for this dissertation. For one, many Palestinians are
interested in talking to researchers and journalists to convey their version of their lives under
Israeli occupation—a version they often express as being unknown or ignored in the West.
For Hamas members,  this  promotion of their  own version of history might be even more
important, as they claim to have been vilified not only by Israel and the West, but by many of
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their  fellow Palestinians  as  well,  despite  being  the  legally  elected  representatives  of  the
Palestinian people.70
For the quality of the collected data, this means that some answers were either sugarcoated or
even straight out lies. To promote a certain version of events, interviewees from Hamas had a
tendency to either downplay the importance of particular incidents if they suspected these to
be detrimental to the reputation of Hamas, or alternatively to overstate the role played by
Hamas  at  various  junctures  in  an  attempt  to  improve  the  stature  and  prominence  of  the
organization.
One salient example of this tendency to downplay potentially negative aspects surfaced time
and again when the interviews touched upon the issue of  factionalization.  In  short,  most
interviewees  from  Hamas  consistently  ignored  or  refused  to  acknowledge  that  the
organization intermittently suffered from internal power struggles,71 despite the fact that the
various leadership branches have clashed publicly on numerous occasions. At most, the more
confident  and  free-spoken  interviewees  from  Hamas  admitted  that  “we  are  only  human
beings, and of course we may have differences and make mistakes,” but they always hastened
to add that these differences “have not led to any problems. We have, thankfully, not have had
any problems like other Palestinian movements.”72
In terms of sugarcoating, a prime example is the attempt to construct a historical narrative in
which Hamas is  only  the  latest  incarnation of  a  long tradition  of  Islamist  movements  in
Palestine to resist  the Israeli  occupation.73 Dr.  Aziz Dweik, for  example,  claimed that  the
Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood ran clandestine cells resisting the Israeli occupation “in the
50s, the 60s, the 70s, and the 80s” before eventually establishing Hamas in 1987.74 However,
as will be covered in chapter 4, the few armed groups operated by the Muslim Brotherhood
prior to the establishment of Hamas were focused on fighting the various secular Palestinian
groups, and not the occupation.
70 A number of Hamas members even expressed gratitude for being interviewed, as this would enable them to
inform a Western researcher of the real—and alleged just, democratic, and legitimate—nature of Hamas.
71 The power struggles within Hamas will be a recurring theme throughout the analyses.
72 Dr.  Mohammad Ghazal,  interviewed  in  Nablus,  April  17,  2011.  The  “problems  like  other  Palestinian
movements” mentioned by Dr.  Ghazal refer to the widespread fractionalization and splits  plaguing the
various PLO factions (cf. chapter 3).
73 See chapter 4 for an extensive treatment of this topic.
74 Dr. Aziz Dweik,  interviewed in Hebron, April 13, 2011. Similar sentiments were expressed by Sheikh
Mahmoud Musleh and Sheikh Hassan Yousef (both interviewed in Ramallah in 2011, April 21 and October
16, respectively).
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Another tactic employed was to conveniently ignore reactionary, anti-Western or even racist
public  statements  from  their  leadership,  as  if  these  are  not  known  to  even  the  casual
newspaper reader, let alone someone who researches Hamas. Or, they avoided talking about
Hamas’s position regarding women, secularism, or other topics where the interviewees expect
to meet strong resistance. 
There were exceptions to this trend of avoiding contentious topics, as when a Hamas official
interviewed in Lebanon argued that the Holocaust never took place.75 Holocaust denial among
Palestinians is sadly not uncommon. In an article tracing the history of the Holocaust in the
Palestinian narrative, Litvak and Webman argues that
[s]ince the Palestinians regarded themselves as the victims of Zionism, they could
not  accept  the  victimhood  of  their  enemy,  as  it  might  give  it  some  moral
justification. In addition, acknowledging systematic Nazi policy to exterminate all
Jews might give implicit credence to the Zionist claims that the Jews were indeed
a people and a persecuted one, who therefore had the right for statehood (2003,
125–26).
Furthermore, Litvak has argued that Holocaust denial and antisemitism are intrinsic parts of
Hamas’s ideology, quoting speeches made by its officials, the 1988 Charter, and articles from
the Hamas-affiliated newspaper Filastin al-Muslima (2006). Without understating the actual
problems with antisemitism and Holocaust denial, the methodological challenge here relates
to the likelihood that many interviewees share the sentiments documented by Litvak, but that
only one of 60 interviewees ever admitted to it. As such, it is probable that many of them
concealed their true position for fear of alienating a Western researcher.76
The topic of women’s position in society was another exception to this tendency to conceal
what the interviewees must have suspected to be controversial. A number of interviewees—
both  male  and  female—had  few  inhibitions  to  conveying  conservative  and  reactionary
positions on a number of issues related to gender. For example, a female MP from Hamas
advanced  that  women  should  only  get  half  of  what  men  get  in  inheritance,  as  men  are
supposed to  be  the  breadwinners.  The  fact  that  this  is  not  always  so  and  thus  that  such
inheritance laws are unfair, was explained away as a problem of adherence to Islam, not a
75 Hamas leader interviewed in Tripoli in northern Lebanon, November 12, 2011.
76 It is possible that such topics rarely came up during interviews because most interviews were focused on
domestic Palestinian issues and not on the historical conditions for the occupation of Palestine.
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problem with the proposed law; the men simply should be the breadwinners.77
In any event, triangulation with other interviewees and/or secondary sources can be used to
ascertain what really happened, when the interviewees employed various tactics to hide or
distort factual and historical data (Berry 2002, 680). However, most of the data is not easily
confirmed through secondary sources.  Indeed,  if  that  had been the case,  the merit  of  the
fieldwork would have been dubious.  And even if  it  is  possible to cross-check with other
interviewees,  it  is  often inherently difficult  to evaluate the truthfulness of two contrasting
versions of the same story. There is no simple solution to this challenge, but by staying alert
throughout the coding process and the analyses, it is hoped that any problems stemming from
this can be minimized.
Next, interview recording is often associated with certain problems for data quality. In short,
recording the interview is  expected to lead the interviewees to toe the party line and not
answer the questions freely (Clark 2006, 421). But, while some of the interviewees certainly
seemed  to  toe  the  party  line,  the  overall  impression  was  that  this  had  little  to  do  with
recording the interview. Some interviewees were simply not interested in speaking freely and
preferred to  follow the official  discourse  of  their  organization,  whereas  others  lacked the
knowledge and independence to know anything but the party line. In particular among these
latter ones, many had probably not expected to find themselves in such an elevated position
within Hamas. Hamas’s electoral victory in 2006 was a surprise for Hamas as much as to its
competitors and most observers. As such, candidates low on the ballot were in all likelihood
put there to fill the list, and thus qualify as backbenchers. One such backbencher who wished
to remain anonymous, for example, seemed incapable of admitting any mistakes on the part of
Hamas. For instance, he claimed that the situation in Gaza had  improved  in the years  after
Hamas took power in 2007, despite overwhelming proof of rapidly deteriorating conditions.78
By and large, however, most interviewees answered questions freely and surprisingly often in
opposition to the official party line. Yet, not toeing the party line does not necessarily increase
the credibility. As Berry succinctly notes, “[i]t’s a little too easy to believe you’re getting the
77 Sameera Halayqah interviewed in Hebron, May 8, 2011. In this particular interview, the issue of women
witnesses in court cases was also covered. In short, according to certain interpretations of Islamic law, there
must be two female witnesses for every male witness. The interviewee explained that this is so because
women menstruate, which makes them a bit unbalanced. So, a second woman is needed to make sure that
they together can remember what really happened, and in combination constitute one truthful witness.
78 Hamas  MP interviewed  on  the  West  Bank,  April  2011. That  this  particular  MP wished  to  remain
anonymous was probably due to the fact that he only days before the interview was released from a long
stay in Israeli prison. He was arrested soon after the interview took place.
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truth when it’s coming from a source who is going out of his way not to give you the party
line” (2002, 680).
In sum, there is no easy way to ascertain the truthfulness and validity of the data provided in
the interviews, regardless of whether the interviewees seemed to sugar-coat certain events or
were overly critical of these same events, whether they stuck to the party line or went out of
their way  not  to do so, or whether they were overly creative in their efforts to construct a
historical narrative suitable to their worldview. However, as argued by Burgat,
[i]t is an obvious fact that you must not “take their [the interviewees’] word for
it”. One of the basic laws of good methodology is to exercise extreme caution
when dealing with  discourse  from a subject  in  general,  and when the  subject
speaks about him- or herself in particular (2003, 4).
By  striving  to  exercise  such  “extreme  caution”  throughout  the  analyses  of  the  interview
material,  it  is  hoped  that  any  grave  misinterpretations  have  been  avoided,  and  that  the
interview data relied upon in the analyses are of a sufficiently high quality.
 2.2.2  Questions of quality in the extant literature
Data for the analyses are informed by the rich, voluminous literature on Hamas, ranging from
monographs focusing on the terrorist aspect, e.g., Levitt (2006), Schanzer (2009), and Singh
(2011);  via  empirical  narratives  and journalistic  accounts  such as those by Caridi  (2010),
Chehab (2007), McGeough (2010), and Tamimi (2007); to the more scholarly approaches by
researchers  such  as  Gunning  (2008),  Hroub  (2000),  Jensen  (2008),  Milton-Edwards  and
Farrell  (2010),  Mishal  and Sela  (2000),  and Roy  (2011).  In  addition,  there  is  a  range  of
smaller  studies  aimed at  explaining certain  aspects  of  Hamas,  such as  Hovdenak  (2009),
Hroub  (2006a), and Nusse  (1998), who focus on its ideology and ideological development;
Kristianasen  (1999),  and Milton-Edwards  and Crooke  (2004),  who deal  with  its  strategic
responses to important events in the occupied Palestinian territories; Hilal (2006, 2010), who
traces Hamas’s sources of legitimacy and popularity; and Gunning (2004), Knudsen (2005a),
Milton-Edwards (2008a), Roy (2003), Strindberg (2002), and Turner (2006), who all look into
Hamas’s political behavior and development.
  The common problem
As discussed above, however, a recurring deficiency plaguing many of these studies is their
lack of rigorous theoretical and methodological grounding (Robinson 2004, 113). While the
69
various authors approach Hamas from different vantage points and with different research
questions, most nevertheless define it as a sui generis religious-political phenomena, reduced
to a product “of the peculiar social milieu” in the occupied Palestinian territories, and/or of
“distinct Islamic mentalities” (Tilly 2004, x–xi; Denoeux 2002; see however Robinson 2004;
Gunning  2004,  2008;  and  Turner  2006  for  notable  exceptions).79 And  to  reiterate,  such
approaches pose a common challenge in studies of political Islam, and are partly responsible
for  the  politicization  of  the  subject  and  the  survival  of  Orientalist  and  neo-orientalist
paradigms (Sadowski 2006).80
As  some  of  the  literature  suffers  from  either  being  politicized  and  biased  or  providing
accounts of an atheoretical and thus often eclectic nature, these studies cannot necessarily
simply be used “as-is,” but must be meticulously perused prior to analysis so that unreliable
and overly  biased sources  or  claims  within  these  can be  weeded out.  Probably  the  most
common fallacy  in  the  literature  is  the  culturalist  bias,  i.e.,  the  tendency  to  rely  on  and
overstate some general cultural feature of Hamas as the explanatory factor for its political
development and behavior.
Importantly,  this  culturalist  bias  includes  both  the  neo-Orientalist,  pro-Israeli  type,  which
vilifies  and  simplifies  Hamas,  and  the  auto-Orientalists  or  apologists,  who  rely  almost
exclusively on the Israeli occupation as the explanation of everything Hamas does, and who
ignore, downplay, or even excuse Hamas’s use of terror tactics. In between these extremes
there is a number of journalistic accounts that often provide new and interesting information,
although these frequently lack historical framing and methodological grounding. Finally, there
is a range of high-quality, scholarly work that—to varying degree and with varying success—
avoids overt bias and essentialization of Hamas.
  The culturalist biases—pro et contra both Israel and Palestine
Two  relevant  examples  from  the  neo-Orientalist,  pro-Israeli  camp  include  the  works  of
Schanzer (2009) and Levitt (2006). They both fall prey to the temptation to “portray Hamas
79 Furthermore, this lack of theoretical rigor has led existing research on Hamas to be overly descriptive or to
select explanatory variables eclectically, producing explanations with limited validity (Lijphart 1971, 691;
López  1992).  Such  descriptive  or  selective  analyses,  in  turn,  easily  fall  prey  to  ideological  biases,  a
problem that has been exacerbated by the contentious nature of the Israel-Palestine conflict  (Said and
Hitchens 2001).
80 As with classical Orientalism, neo-Orientalism now epitomizes the problematic but reciprocally beneficial
relationship  between state  and  scholars.  The  state  gets  knowledge that  corroborates  and  facilitates  its
imperial  and colonial  ambitions,  and the scholars  receive funding and political  influence in  exchange
(Bilgin 2004, 430; Sztompka 2007, 218).
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strictly as a terrorist movement,” in the face of a growing consensus among scholars who
“recognize that Hamas has greatly developed since its founding and that the movement … has
often  shown  a  pragmatic  and  flexible  side  in  dealing  with  both  Israel  and  the  PA”
(Wagemakers  2010,  358).  As  such,  they are  guilty  of  essentializing and in  turn  vilifying
Hamas, which in sum leaves much to be desired in terms of reliability and validity of these
studies.  In her scathing review of Levitt’s  Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the
Service of Jihad (2006), for example, Khalili criticizes the author for aiming solely
to prove that Hamas is all about terror, terror, terror, and nothing else [and that]
[t]o accomplish this aim, Levitt uses declassified documents primarily drafted by
Israeli and US security agencies [and] English-language news reports and court
documents. Levitt consults no Arabic sources, conducts no interviews with Hamas
members  or  leaders,  and  relies  on  documents  produced  by  Hamas’s  avowed
political  adversaries  to  illuminate  the  organization.  In  so  doing,  he  reduces
Hamas’s complex social relations, the divisions within its political organization
and its broad methods of contention, to its use of violence against Israel, a militant
tactic that Levitt does not come close to explaining why it has chosen, under what
specific political conditions, and to achieve which particular political aims (2007,
605).
A similar criticism can be leveled at Schanzer’s book,  Hamas vs. Fatah: The Struggle For
Palestine  (2009).  As  Levitt,  Schanzer  relies  solely  on  secondary  sources,  and  as  Levitt,
Schanzer  seems  to  have  a  political  rather  than  scholarly  agenda.  His  analysis—while
containing some interesting observations—suffers from being one-sided in favor of Israel,
which  leads  him  to  simplify  and  at  times  put  forward  incorrect  claims.  Already  in  the
introduction it becomes clear that Schanzer has an ax to grind, as he claims that “most of the
professorate [dealing with the Israel-Palestine conflict] has produced streams of anti-Israel
diatribe but very little critical work on the internal Palestinian dynamics” (2009, 4), ignoring
the scores of well-researched studies of intra-Palestinian politics (see e.g., Cobban 1984; Hilal
2007, 2010; Jamal 2005; Lybarger 2007; Sayigh 1997; Usher 1995a). He apparently disagrees
with the findings of these studies, and so he identifies a non-existing lacuna in the literature
that he sets out to fill.
One small but important example of the pro-Israeli bias in Schanzer’s book is found in his
account of the outbreak of the second intifada. Without a single reference to any other study
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on this topic,81 he simply concludes that “[t]his was a war that Yasir Arafat launched, after
concluding that he would make painful  concessions to Israel,  in the same way that  Israel
would  have  to  make  painful  concessions  to  the  Palestinians  if  peace  was  to  be  made”
(Schanzer  2009,  49).  Such a  blatant  disregard for  historical  intricacies  that  led up to the
outbreak  of  the  second  intifada—most  important  of  which  arguably  was  the  failed  Oslo
Accords,  the  failure  of  which  the  Israelis  played  no  small  part—and  demonstrated
one-sidedness by blaming it all  on Arafat, leaves little hope that the writings of Schanzer
qualifies as “disinterested” and sound analysis.82
At  the  other  end  of  the  continuum,  arguably  committing  a  similar  type  of  essentializing
mistake,  are the auto-Orientalist  apologists,  including authors such as Tamimi  (2007) and
Chehab (2007). While the authors in this category rarely go to the same lengths to justify and
rationalize Hamas’s actions as the neo-Orientalists go when demonizing it, there is a quite
obvious  tendency  among  these  authors  to  rely  on  the  Israeli  occupation  as  a  catch-all
explanation for whatever takes place in Palestinian politics.
Tamimi,  in  general,  tends  to  portray  Hamas  in  an  overly  positive  light;  throughout  his
admittedly meticulously detailed and well-researched book  Hamas: A History from Within
(2007), he time and again paints a rosy picture of Hamas and its leaders. At one place, he
argues that the leadership in Hamas is known for their “asceticism, altruism, dedication, and
honesty,” claiming as an example of this how Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, Hamas’s founder and
long-time spiritual leader, apparently refused a monthly stipend from the organization of USD
1000,  accepting only  USD 600.  To account  for  this  ascetic  behavior,  Tamimi  first  rather
simplistically credits “Islamic values,” explaining further that
Hamas’s altruism is motivated by the principle that the world belongs to God, that
He gives wealth to whom He wishes and denies wealth to whom wishes, and that
all those that earn wealth in this life shall be brought to account on the Day of
Judgment (Tamimi 2007, 116–17).
81 Of which there are may, including Pressman (2003), Rabbani (2001), and Usher (2003).
82 There are numerous other examples of inaccurate and biased reporting in this book. Some are minute, such
as  mixing the years  2004 with  2003 when accounting for  the Israeli  assassination of  Hamas  political
leaders  (2009,  81).  Others  are  more  serious,  however,  such  as  when he  claims  that  Hamas  has  been
persecuting Christians for their faith in Gaza (2009, 110–15), even if the stories he bases these claims on
have been refuted by a number of scholars and witnesses (Long 2010, 134). Another example of how his
ideological bias affects his analysis is the omission of any reference to the now well-documented US-Fatah
conspiracy to carry out a coup d'état in occupied Palestine following Hamas’s 2006 electoral victory (see
Hogan 2008; Rose 2008). By doing so, Schanzer can keep with his vilifying approach vis-à-vis Hamas,
ignoring the defensive nature of Hamas’s 2007 takeover of the Gaza Strip (see Schanzer 2009, 108).
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In  short,  and  notwithstanding the  potential  explanatory  power  of  religion and culture  for
political  behavior,  Tamimi’s  analyses and explanations closely resemble the  essentializing
neo-Orientalism espoused by Levitt and Schanzer as discussed above, albeit with reversed
partiality.
Chehab for his part  avoids the most  glaring examples of such essentializing analysis  and
panegyric characterizations of Hamas. However, in his book Inside Hamas: The Untold Story
of  Militants,  Martyrs  and  Spies (2007),  Chehab  commits  the  mistake  of  uncritically
reproducing the narratives provided by his  interviewees,  which in  turn prompts him to—
maybe inadvertently—advance some rather naïve and far-fetched claims regarding the tactical
and strategic prowess of Hamas. For example, he claims that Hamas choreographed its own
victory in the 2006 elections to the PLC, ostensibly by instructing its supporters to hide that
they intended to vote for Hamas when asked by pollsters, and thus “fly under the radar” as it
were throughout the election campaign  (Chehab 2007, 1–14). Notwithstanding the fact that
most  sources—both  secondary  and  primary—strongly  suggest  that  Hamas  indeed  was
surprised by its own victory in the said election,83 the theory itself lacks credibility. In the
words of Jamil Rabah, a Palestinian pollster and political analyst, Chehab’s claim qualifies as
“a conspiracy theory logistically impossible to carry out in the real world” and thus naïve in
the extreme.84
  Useful nevertheless—secondary sources used
Despite  the  obvious  inadequacies  of  these  culturalist  studies  of  Hamas,  they  are  still
considered useful supplementary source of data for the proposed analyses. The  journalistic
accounts by authors such as Caridi  (2010) and McGeough  (2010), which, although lacking
methodological and theoretical  grounding, suffer no obvious ideological bias and have no
apparent agenda other than to tell an interesting story, also provide crucial details often not
available elsewhere. And finally, the more academic  studies of Hamas, such as Roy (2011),
Hroub (2000, 2006b), and Gunning (2008), are highly useful data sources for the analyses. In
short,  these empirically thick case-studies are a necessary precondition for any theoretical
analysis, and the extensive literature on Hamas therefore constitutes a rich and encompassing
source of secondary empirical data  needed  for the proposed theoretical analyses  (Robinson
2004, 113; Sadowski 2006).85
83 The 2006 elections and its outcome is covered in detail in chapters 6 and 7.
84 Interviewed in Ramallah, March 23, 2011.
85 Even the politicized sources can be of use for the analyses, as they allow for triangulation and increased
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Various media sources such as newspaper and magazine articles dealing with Hamas and the
Israel-Palestine conflict will also inform the analyses. However, given the disproportionate
media coverage of this conflict and the degree to which it has become entangled in domestic
politics in various Western countries, media reports—and in particular analytic pieces—on
Palestinian politics and Hamas often takes on a politicized nature. As such, these also must be
vetted properly to avoid relying on overly biased sources.
Note,  however,  that  vetting  in  these  cases  are  less  of  a  challenge  than  in  the  scholarly
literature.  For  one,  the  day-to-day  coverage  of  Palestinian  politics  is  largely  focused  on
specific events and are thus often possible to confirm. For example, Palestinian news agencies
such as Ma’an cover Palestinian politics in a no-nonsense manner, and their articles can thus
be used as reliable sources. And second, the abundance of purported analytical pieces that fail
to  meet  any  standard  of  objectivity  is  easily  identified  and  discarded.  In  sum,  then,  the
voluminous literature dealing with Hamas and the extensive media coverage of Palestinian
politics both constitute important sources of information for the coming analyses, provided
that the necessary degree of caution is demonstrated both at the stage of source selection and
throughout the actual processes of analysis.
 2.2.3  Numbers from the occupied territories
Different sources of quantitative data will be utilized to illustrate and corroborate findings
from the analyses. To a limited extent, data from the World Bank will be used to illuminate
the economic development  and de-development  in occupied Palestine  (World Bank 1999,
2003). More important, however, are the opinion surveys used to indicate the rise and fall of
Hamas’s  popularity  throughout  its  history.  Survey  data  are  drawn  from  one-off  studies
(Shadid and Seltzer 1988a, 1988b, 1989; Smith 1982), aggregated public opinion analyses
(Shamir and Shikaki 2010; Zureik and Moughrabi 1987), and raw figures from Palestinian
polling bureaus  (CPRS 2000; JMCC 2009; NEC 2010; PSR 2011). The following sections
will outline some basic challenges and strengths associated with these different data sources.
  Palestinian public opinion
In  addition  to  the  range  of  common  challenges  associated  with  conducting  surveys  and
utilizing their data, such as sampling, response rates, biases, etc.  (see Johnston 2010 for a
brief account of these), the relevant surveys from the occupied Palestinian territories were all
confidence in findings that are reported across the board (Lustick 1996, 616).
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hampered by additional challenges. As Shadid and Seltzer note,
[t]he task of conducting political surveys in the occupied territories is difficult and
potentially  hazardous  with  perhaps  the  most  difficult  obstacle  being  that  of
obtaining the trust of the respondents who are often afraid to express their political
views for fear of punishment by the military authorities (1988a, 19).
This echoes the challenges faced when attempting to interview Palestinians on the occupied
West Bank discussed above; some were reluctant to express their views freely for fear of
reprisals from either the IDF or the PA. On the West Bank this is nowadays particularly true
for Hamas sympathizers, whereas Fatah supporters probably are scared in Gaza.
Furthermore, Shadid and Seltzer write, 
[a] second obstacle is that the occupation authorities essentially ban field research
and surveys on political topics. If we had applied for and received a permit—a
slim possibility at best—we would have been suspected by the local population of
collaboration, and the refusal rate would have been much higher. We decided not
to request a permit, and thus our field staff was subject to imprisonment and the
materials were subject to confiscation. Researchers from Hebrew University and
al-Najah University were recently punished for conducting political research in
Tulkarm and Nablus respectively.
TIME Magazine had a similar experience a couple of years earlier:
When they learned of the project, Israeli authorities charged that the poll violated
both a 1950 Jordanian law,  retained by the Israelis  after  the  1967 occupation,
forbidding  the  collection  or  publication  of  “statistical  data”  without  prior
permission, and two Israeli military regulations for the occupied territories. One of
the  Israeli  rules  banned publication of  material  of  “political  significance”;  the
other forbade “publishing, in writing or orally, praises, sympathy or support of a
hostile organization.” The Israeli authorities accused PORI of using “a member of
a Palestinian Arab terrorist group” to canvass public opinion. They arrested that
poll-taker and confiscated some of his data. None of the seized material was used
in tabulating the poll. Last week the Israeli government decided not to prosecute
TIME (Smith 1982).
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In short, the ongoing occupation of the Palestinian territories has consequences for the quality
of the data collected through surveys, in turn limiting their analytical value. As such, there is
reason to doubt both the reliability and validity of these surveys.  Yet not using these data
solely because of this shortcoming seems like a wrong choice. For example, the early surveys
carried out by Shadid and Seltzer (1988a, 1988b, 1989), TIME Magazine (Smith 1982), and
A’si (1987)86 are important historical records of political attitudes previously prevalent among
Palestinians. Such data can be employed as a corrective to the often biased and politicized
narrative of Palestinian political history. In addition, the regular surveys carried out under the
auspices  of  Dr.  Khalil  Shikaki  from 1993 until  today constitute  a  rich source of  data  on
Palestinian  public  opinion,  and  importantly  changes  in  these  attitudes  (CPRS 2000;  PSR
2011).87 
However, it is obvious that the data from all of these political surveys must be handled with
great care, as the aforementioned challenges with data collected under occupation arguably
might undermine their quality. It should, for instance, be mentioned that all publicly available
polling  data  prior  to  the  2006  elections  to  the  PLC  indicated  that  the  incumbent  Fatah
movement  would  remain  in  office,  and  that  Hamas  would  obtain  around  a  third  of  the
parliamentary seats. Hamas won in a landslide, however, winning 74 of the 132 seats up for
grabs. Although numerous factors explain the failure of the polls to predict this outcome,88 it
nevertheless strongly suggests that any trends and tendencies gleaned from these polls should
only be considered indicative and suggestive.
Despite such obvious weaknesses, the polling data from CPRS and PSR is used throughout
the thesis to trace the popularity of Hamas. While there are some variations, the typical CPRS
and PSR poll had an average sample size of around 1 300 randomly selected persons over the
age of 18, of which roughly two thirds came from the West Bank (including East Jerusalem)
and one third from the Gaza Strip. These persons were then interviewed face-to-face in some
127 randomly selected locations, and asked a variety of questions pertaining to Palestinian
politics. The reported non-response rate varied from 2 percent to 9 percent, with a margin of
86 The chapter analyzes hard to find survey data, e.g., two unpublished reports in Arabic from 1982௅3 and
four surveys conducted by a Palestinian magazine (three in 1983 and one in 1985, cf. A’si 1987, 188–96).
87 In the first seven-year period (1993 to 2000) these surveys were carried out by the Center for Palestine
Research and Studies (CPRS) in Nablus. From 2000 and onward, Dr. Shikaki’s team has conducted the
same survey from the Ramallah-based Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR). 
88 See chapters 6 and 7 for detailed analyses of the electoral outcome and reasons why most involved parties
and almost all observers, pollsters, and other analysts failed to predict the outcome.
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error not exceeding 3 percent.89
The surveys asked some one-off questions, e.g., related to specific events such as the Hebron
Massacre  in  1994  or  some  ongoing  round  of  negotiations  between  the  PLO  and  Israel.
However,  throughout  all  the  polls,  all  respondents  were  asked  “Which  of  the  following
political parties do you support?,” and presented with a list of the main Palestinian parties
(Fatah, Hamas, PFLP, DFLP, Feda, PPP, Islamic Jihad), one or two categories of independents
(either one without specification, or two specified as “nationalist” and “Islamist”), “other” or
“none” as the alternatives.90 Respondents have been asked this question approximately four
times a year since 1993, although some years saw far more surveys conducted (e.g., nine
times in 1994), and in some years fewer were conducted (e.g., at the height of the second
intifada in 2001, when only two surveys could be carried out).
Throughout the analyses, the response to this question is used to measure the popularity of
Hamas. Specifically, the data is used to build graphs indicating the fluctuating popularity over
time of Hamas, its main contender Fatah, and the residual category of “all others combined”91
among Palestinians in the occupied territories. Given the discussed challenges associated with
conducting survey research in occupied Palestine,  it  is  crucial  to  avoid the  temptation to
overstate the significance of the trends and tendencies that can be gleaned from looking at
these  surveys.  In  sum,  however,  the  data  is  considered  to  be  useful  for  illustrative  and
corroborating purposes.
89 Consult  http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/metodology.html for  further  details  regarding  the  methodology
employed by PSR and CPRS. See also Shamir and Shikaki (2010, 13).
90 It should be noted that—in addition to minor adjustments in the formulation of the question—pollsters
sometimes asked “If elections were held today, you would vote for candidates affiliated with,” and then
presented respondents with the same list  of  alternatives. However, while there is  a difference between
supporting a party and saying that one would vote for a party, as the former can be likened to partisanship
while the latter is a mere expression of intent, this difference has had negligible consequences for the use of
these  data,  as  the  polls  and  their  associated  graphs  only  are  suggestive  and  indicative  of  changes  in
popularity.
91 The “all others combined” category include all the minor Palestinian parties, independents, as well as the
unspecified “other” category.
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Chapter 3:  Historical and contextual background
This  chapter  is  dedicated  to  providing  a  necessary  if  brief  historical  and  contextual
background of the political environment in which Hamas emerged and developed. As the
Israel-Palestine conflict, and indeed the longer history of this small territory at the eastern
shores of the Mediterranean, have been covered in great detail,92 the below sections will not
be an exhaustive account; rather,  it  is a limited overview of the developments and events
considered  crucial  for  understanding and  contextualizing the  emergence  and  evolution  of
Hamas.
In short,  the chapter  will  focus on three topics deemed key to appreciating the historical
context  and  the  conditions  under  which  Hamas  operates.  First,  contextualizing  the
environment in which Hamas emerged and developed necessitates obtaining a grasp of the
history of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. Second, a general overview of the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) is needed, as this movement dominated Palestinian
politics  from the  1960s  onward,  and  naturally  also  has  influenced  Hamas.  Third,  a  brief
introduction to the Muslim Brotherhood is needed for  an analytical  treatment of Hamas’s
ideological and organizational background.
The  chapter  begins  with  a  historical  summary  of  the  conflict  between  Israel  and  the
Palestinians,  covering first  the period from the emergence of  modern Zionism in the late
1800s until the end of the Second World War, then from the establishment of the state of Israel
in 1948 until the Six-Day War of 1967, and finally from the subsequent Israeli occupation of
the remaining parts of Palestine until the outbreak of the first intifada in 1987. The discussion
will then move to a short overview of the PLO, beginning with a section on its organizational
makeup,  followed by a brief  history from its  founding by the Arab League until  the late
1980s, and ending with a section focused on the Fatah party, which from the late 1960s and
under the leadership of Yasser Arafat took control of the PLO and has dominated Palestinian
politics  ever since.  Thereafter,  an account of the Islamist  movement  out  of which Hamas
emerged will  be offered, beginning with a historical  introduction to the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood and its ideological characteristics and organizational attributes, followed by two
subsections covering the historical development of the Palestinian branches of the Muslim
92 The number of scholarly works dedicated to the conflict is innumerable. For a general introduction, see
Milton-Edwards (2008c) or Pappe (2006). For the history of Israel and its people, see e.g., Sand (2010) or
Bregman (2002). For historical accounts of the Palestinian people, see Muslih (1989) or R. Khalidi (2010).
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Brotherhood, first under Egyptian and Jordanian rule from 1948 until 1967, and then under
Israeli occupation from 1967 until 1987.
 3.1 A brief history of the Israel-Palestine conflict
Because of the unresolved nature of the Israel-Palestine conflict, competing—and politicized
—historical narratives of its causes and consequences abound; depending on whose version to
believe, the area today making up Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories rightfully
belong to  the  Jews,  given to  them by God’s  sacred decree,  or  it  is  the  homeland of  the
Palestinians, who have lived and cultivated the land for the thousands of years of the Jewish
diaspora. However, and notwithstanding the fact that it would be outside the scope of this
thesis to trace the conflict back to the expulsion of the Jewish people from the Kingdom of
Judah in the 6th century BCE, such a historical approach would provide little relevant insights
into the development and nature of the conflict. There is nothing intrinsically peculiar about
the Israel-Palestine conflict; it is simply a conflict between two peoples laying claim to the
same piece of land (Hajjar, Rabbani, and Beinin 1989, 103).
There is therefore no need to go back several millennia to understand and contextualize the
conflict and the political situation created by its perpetuation. Rather, as the creation of the
distinct and competing nationalities of Israelis and Palestinians are at the root of the conflict,
these are what must be traced and explained to understand the background for the political
environment in which Hamas emerged and developed.
 3.1.1  From the Ottomans to the nakba (1880s–1948)
The basis for the Israel-Palestine conflict was laid with the emergence of the modern Zionist
movement late in the 19th century (Sayigh 1997, 1), and in particular with the publication of
The State of the Jews by Theodore Herzl in 1896 and the first Zionist Congress in Basel in
1897.  These  events  marked  the  proper  beginnings  of  the  creation  of  the  modern  Jewish
nationalist movement known as Zionism, which hold that “Jews all over the world constitute a
single nationality” and that  their  rightfully owned homeland is Eretz Yisra’el,  or  Land of
Israel, which coincidentally refers to the same area as Palestine (Hajjar, Rabbani, and Beinin
1989, 102).93 In the years following the congress in Basel, the incipient Zionist movement
started  purchasing  land  in  the  three  Ottoman  provinces  making  up  Palestine,  to  which
93 See Figure 2 on page 84 for a political map of occupied Palestine, Israel, and the neighboring states.
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European Jews migrated in increasing numbers (Singh 2011, 31).94
As a result of this strategy, the number of Jews residing in Palestine more than doubled from
35 000 in 1880 to 75 000 in 1914 (Robinson 1997, 5).  Palestinian tenant farmers who were
expelled as a result of the Zionist purchases of the land they worked on unsurprisingly came
to resist the influx of European Jews. By the time the First World War broke out in 1914, there
were organized efforts from the Palestinians to protest and prohibit the sale of land to the
Zionists (Singh 2011, 32). The resistance intensified toward the end of the First World War,
and  in  particular  with  the  publication  of  the  Balfour  Declaration  by  the  British  Foreign
Secretary in 1917, which promised to aid the Zionist project of establishing a “Jewish national
home in Palestine” (Schneer 2010).
Following the fall of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War, the territory of
Palestine fell to Britain, which in 1920 obtained endorsement from the Allied powers to rule
the territory as the British Mandate over Palestine, a state of affairs ratified by the League of
Nations  in  1922  (Sayigh 1997,  1).  Partly  because  of  the  mentioned  Balfour Declaration,
Palestinians feared that their new rulers were partial to the Zionist project, and consequently
the opposition to both intensified in the interwar years. Both in 1920–21 and in 1929, violent
anti-Jewish riots took place in Palestine, prompting the British, via the so-called 1930 White
Paper, to alleviate the volatile situation by limiting the influx of European Jews to Palestine
(Abboushi 1977, 23).95
However, with the rise to power of Adolf Hitler in Germany in 1933, the situation deteriorated
again. Fearing the spread of antisemitism in Europe, the Zionists increased their purchases of
land  in  Palestine,  which  in  turn  prompted  further  violent  clashes  with  the  Palestinians.
Eventually, the 1936–1939 Arab revolt in Palestine broke out, with the Palestinians attempting
to  both  stem the  influx  of  European  Jews  and  gain  independence  from British  rule  (see
Abboushi 1977 for details). Although the British successfully—and brutally—suppressed the
revolt, the uprising was not a complete failure; it proved beyond a doubt that the Palestinians
had national  aspirations  of  their  own,  that  they  were  willing  to  fight  the  British  to  gain
independence, and that they would not sit idly by watching the Zionists take over their land.
Partly because of this, the British published yet another white paper in 1939,96 in which the
94 Crucially, Zionism gained many adherents as a consequence of the spread of antisemitism throughout much
of Europe at this time, exemplified by the pogroms in Eastern Europe, the Dreyfus Affair in France, and
later with the Holocaust (Hajjar, Rabbani, and Beinin 1989, 102).
95 Also known as the Passfield White Paper, after its author, Colonial Secretary Lord Passfield.
96 Referred to as the MacDonald White Paper, after Malcolm MacDonald, the then Colonial Secretary who
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British government limited further Jewish immigration and promised that Palestine would
become an independent state in ten years. Moreover, it 
declared unequivocally that the government had no intention of creating a Jewish
state in Palestine. It explained that the creation of a Jewish state had never been
promised  to  the  Jews  either  by  the  Balfour  Declaration  or  by  the  Mandate
Agreement, and that such a notion was in fact contrary to those two documents
(Abboushi 1977, 45).
However, with the outbreak of the Second World War that same year, the British suddenly had
far more pressing issues to focus on than what to do with Palestine in the future; it had to
defend its territories in the Middle East and North Africa against German and French Vichy
invasion forces.  And at  the same time,  Zionist  paramilitary organizations intensified their
resistance  to  the  newly adopted  British  policy  position,  carrying out  a  number  of  armed
operations targeting British servicemen.97 By the end of the Second World War, it had become
apparent for the British that the situation in Palestine was untenable; the Holocaust had led to
a dramatic increase in the number of illegal Jewish immigrants to Palestine, and although the
British tried to contain the influx, it was obvious in the immediate postbellum period that the
international  community had to take on a larger responsibility to solve the ongoing crisis
(Sayigh 1997, 3).
It fell on the newly established United Nations (UN) to intervene, and already in November
1947, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 181, titled United Nations Partition Plan
for Palestine.98 The partition plan divided the former British Mandate over Palestine between
the Zionists and the Arab Palestinians, and each “state was to occupy a little under half the
territory, leaving Jerusalem in an enclave under UN supervision” (Sayigh 1997, 3). While the
Zionist movement largely seemed to accept the plan, it was refused by both the surrounding
Arab states and the Palestinian national movements. Only days after the General Assembly
passed Resolution 181, fighting between Palestinian Arabs and the Jewish setters broke out.
By April 1948, the Zionist  forces obtained control of most of the territory provided for a
Jewish state according to the partition plan, and in the process it had displaced some 200 000
presided over it.
97 Maybe the most crucial of these attacks was the bombing of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem in 1946, in
which 91 people died and a further 46 were injured. The bombing was perpetrated by Irgun, a precursor to
the current right-wing Likud party in Israel.
98 The Resolution passed with 33 votes in favor, 13 against, and ten abstentions.
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to 300 000 Palestinians  (Sayigh 1997, 3; Singh 2011, 33).99 On May 14, 1948, the Zionist
leaders proclaimed the establishment of the State of Israel, to become independent with the
termination  of  the  British  Mandate  over  Palestine.  And  as  anticipated,  Britain  formally
evacuated from the  territory the  following day,  prompting the neighboring Arab states  to
intervene in an attempt to retake the territory claimed by the Zionists (Sayigh 1997, 3). The
Arab states  failed in  their  attempt,  however,  and when the armistice  agreements  between
Israel and the various neighboring states were concluded by late July 1949, Israel had added
an additional third to the territory it initially was allotted under the UN partition plan.
Importantly,  when  successfully  claiming  these  additional  territories  as  its  own,  Israel
displaced  a  further  500 000  Palestinians  from  their  homes,  making  the  total  number  of
Palestinian refugees surpass 700 000. Most of these fled to the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, or
to one of the surrounding Arab states  (Morris 2004, 603–4).  In the end, of the estimated
900 000 to 950 000 Palestinians residing in the areas now making up the state of Israel, only
150 000 remained (Sayigh 1997, 4).100
The establishment of the State of Israel on much of the territory of the Mandate of Palestine
and the ensuing Palestinian exodus became known as the nakba, meaning catastrophe, among
Palestinians.  The  nakba  soon became—and still  remains—a crucial  marker  of  Palestinian
identity and nationalism. The conflict with Israel therefore constitutes a major uniting force
for  Palestinians,  largely  superseding  opposing  loyalties  and  potential  identity  conflicts
between different  socioeconomic classes,  families,  clans,  religious groups,  ideologies,  and
cultural  traditions  (R.  Khalidi  2010,  194).101 In  short,  the  exclusiveness  of  Palestinian
nationalism—i.e., who is and who is not a Palestinian and where the territory of Palestine is—
has been largely uncontested since the establishment of Israel: The territory of Palestine is
what used to be the British Mandate over Palestine, and all who lived there prior to the influx
99 The issue of the Palestinian exodus of 1948 has attracted both politicized and scholarly attention. Consult
Glazer (1980) for a brief overview, and see the first couple of contributions in the edited volume by Karmi
and Cotran (1999) for more details.
100 While the war was still ongoing, the UN General Assembly reacted to the imminent refugee crisis as part of
its Resolution 194, stating in Article 11 that “the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace
with  their  neighbours  should  be  permitted  to  do  so  at  the  earliest  practicable  date”  (UNGA 1948).
Interpretations of this statement diverge, with the Palestinians using it as the legal basis for their claim to
right of return for their refugees, a claim Israel vehemently refuses to accept. It should also be mentioned
that the scale of the refugee problem was such that the UN established a specialized agency to deal with it,
called the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).
101 As  discussed  in  Robinson  (1997,  1–8),  the  dominant  Palestinian  political  class  was  traditionally  the
“notables,” i.e., rich families with strong standings in the local communities.
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of the Zionists are Palestinians.102
 3.1.2  From the nakba to The Six-Day War (1948–1967)
Following the 1948 war,103 Mandatory Palestine was divided between three countries:  the
newly established State of Israel successfully maintained control of some 77 percent of the
area (colored yellow in Figure 2 below); the 365 km2 Gaza Strip was under Egyptian military
administration (located in the lower left corner, colored green); whereas the West Bank, the
brunt of the remaining 23 percent of Mandatory Palestine and including East Jerusalem (also
colored green, middle right), was under Jordanian control (Beinin and Hajjar 2014, 5).
Although tensions at times ran high between Israel and its neighboring Arab states after the
war, it was initially in the interest of all to remain calm; the involved states were young and
vulnerable, and naturally cautious not to upset the delicate regional balance, no matter how
hostile the Arab states were to the establishment of Israel  (Singh 2011, 34).104 Furthermore,
they had all large populations of Palestinians, who in turn had become increasingly patriotic
and nationalistic following the nakba trauma (Sayigh 1997, 46). As such, it was imperative for
the continued stability of these states to control the Palestinians.
And as discussed by Robinson, the three states occupying the former territories of Mandatory
Palestine—Israel, Egypt, and Jordan—all tried to control the Palestinians residing within their
borders by replicating the “Ottoman and British policies of social control by strengthening the
notable elite through allocation of resources,” in effect attempting to co-opt local Palestinian
leaders  and  using  these  to  control  the  population  (1997,  8–11).  Note,  however,  that  the
administrative way in which these three states dealt with the Palestinians differed somewhat.
Whereas  Egypt  kept  rather  tight  control  over  Gaza,  ruling  the  territory  by  military
administration  (Butler 2009, 98–100),105 Jordan decided to annex the West Bank and East
102 Note also that the resistance against the Zionists has worked to counteract the diffusion of an Arab identity
among Palestinian refugees, even if pan-Arabism to some extent has influenced the Palestinian fight for
their homeland. See Løvlie (2014) and Baumgarten (2005) for further details.
103 Whereas the Palestinians as mentioned call this war the nakba, it is labeled by the Israelis as either the War
of Liberation or the War of Independence.
104 To indicate the instability of the involved Arab states, there was a coup d'état in Egypt in 1952, when the
Free Officers Movement deposed King Farouk; Egypt and Syria together formed the United Arab Republic
from 1958 to 1961; in 1963, the Arab Socialist Baath party seized power in Syria, and in 1966, a second
coup d'état was carried out by the neo-Baathists. Also in Lebanon the situation was volatile, and in 1958
UN forces had to aid the government to quell a violent insurrection aimed at getting Lebanon to join the
United Arab Republic. Although no revolutions took place in Jordan, its first monarch, King Abdullah I,
was assassinated by a Palestinian activist in East Jerusalem in 1951, and his successor Talal I was in turn
deposed by his own son and heir, King Hussein I, soon after ascending the throne.
105 See Feldman (2008) for an in-depth study of the ways in which first Britain and then Egypt governed Gaza.
83
Jerusalem in 1950 and offered all Palestinians within its borders Jordanian citizenship (Sayigh
1997,  41).106 Inside Israel,  the  relatively few Palestinians  remaining were subject  to  tight
control, although most eventually received Israeli citizenship (Sayigh 1997, 37–39).107
Figure 2: Political map of Palestine
(Source: map 3584, rev. 2 by the UN Cartographic Section 2004, slightly adjusted).
106 Jordan’s rule of the West Bank from 1948 until 1967 has been dealt with expertly by various authors. See,
for example, A. Cohen (1982) for an overview of political parties on the West Bank under the Jordanian
regime.
107 The de jure and de facto social, economic, and political rights of the Israeli-Palestinians (alternatively, the
Arab-Israelis) is a distinct area of research. See e.g., Tessler and Grant (1998) for a brief overview.
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Notwithstanding the efforts of the various host countries to control the Palestinians and curb
their national aspirations, largely uncoordinated Palestinian guerrilla movements managed to
carry  out  military  operations  inside  Israel  in  the  years  following  1948.  These  operations
inevitably led to reprisals from Israel,  sometimes prompting Israel to breach the armistice
lines and venture into its neighboring countries to capture or kill Palestinian militants. The
Arab nations, in turn, saw these Israeli operations as provocations, and as a consequence of
this  tit-for-tat  pattern  of  Palestinian  guerrilla  operations  and Israeli  reprisals,  the  regional
situation became increasingly tense (Singh 2011, 34).108
Following the 1966 coup d'état in Syria, the already tense situation took a turn for the worse;
the  new regime actively  encouraged Palestinian  guerrilla  movements  to  operate  along its
border with Israel, which inescapably destabilized the region. Added to this, in the spring of
1967, the Soviet Union provided false intelligence to the Syrians, claiming that Israeli forces
were massing close to its border (Beinin and Hajjar 2014, 6). Responding to Syria’s plea for
assistance, Egypt in turn began mobilizing its troops in Sinai in May, prompting the crisis to
escalate further (Singh 2011, 34).
On June 5, 1967, Israel responded preemptively and struck militarily against both Syria and
Egypt, and what became known as the Six-Day War was a fact.109 Jordan soon came to the aid
of its Arab brethren, and was subsequently also attacked by Israel. The war lasted only for six
days, after which Israel emerged as the decisive victor; it had successfully defeated the much
more populous surrounding Arab states and established itself as the dominant military power
in the region. Through the course of this brief war, Israel captured the Gaza Strip and the Sinai
Peninsula from Egypt,  the Golan Heights from Syria,  and the West  Bank,  including East
Jerusalem, from Jordan (Beinin and Hajjar 2014, 6). In short, the Six-Day War of 1967 recast
the fundamentals of the regional power balance, and its outcome continues to affect Middle
Eastern politics to a profound degree (Popp 2006, 281).
108 Also, changes in the international power balance affected the regional situation and the Israel-Palestine
conflict. For example, in 1956, when the Egyptian president Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, which
hitherto had been under joint French and British control, a short war broke out; Britain and France tried to
regain control of the canal by military means and were aided in this by Israel. For a short period, this led
Israel to occupy both Gaza and the Sinai Peninsula in Egypt. However, pressure from the US and the
Soviet Union forced the former great powers to retreat, and Israel first handed back Gaza, and later the
Sinai Peninsula, to Egypt. Naturally, such events did little to ease the tense regional situation (Sayigh 1997,
23–27).
109 See Popp (2006) for a thorough analysis of the various theories purporting to explain the outbreak of the
Six-Day War.
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 3.1.3  From occupation to the intifada (1967–1987)
The UN Security Council responded to the Six-Day War and the ensuing Israeli occupation of
the remaining parts of Mandatory Palestine with Resolution 242,110 stating that Israel had to
withdraw its “armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict” and that “a just
settlement of the refugee problem” had to be found (UNSC 1967). For, as a consequence of
Israel’s new-won territories, some 1.3 million Palestinians now lived within the cease-fire
lines, with 400 000 inside Israel proper, 400 000 on the occupied Gaza Strip, and 500 000 on
the occupied West Bank (Masalha 1999, 103).111
Despite immense international pressure on Israel to end the occupation, exemplified both by
UNSCR 242, the number of subsequent Security Council Resolutions reaffirming it,112 and the
attempts by the neighboring Arab states to reclaim the territory by force,113 Israel has upheld
the occupation and governed the territories through military administration since June 10,
1967.114 And as  summed  up  by  Nakhleh  twenty  years  after  the  Six-Day War,  the  Israeli
military administration of the occupied territories has
affected every facet of the people’s daily existence: travel is restricted, building
permits are delayed or denied, and funding for social services have [sic] been cut.
Goods produced on the West Bank cannot easily be marketed in Israel, and all
aspects  of  local  government  are  controlled by the  military  government  (1988,
209).
110 The Resolution was adopted unanimously.
111 In  addition,  some  320 000  Palestinians  fled  or  were  expelled  during  and  immediately  after  the  war
(Masalha 1999, 64).
112 UNSCR 242 has  become somewhat  of  a  mainstay  in  later  UNSCR dealings  with  the  Israel-Palestine
conflict, including, for instance, in UNSCR 338 (1973), UNSCR 667 (1990), and UNSCR 1322 (2000).
113 The year after being defeated by Israel, Egypt began preparations to launch its War of Attrition against
Israel, in what was ultimately a failed attempt to regain control of Gaza and the Sinai peninsula. The war
ended with a ceasefire agreement in 1970, without any border changes  (A. S. Khalidi 1973). Next, on
October 6, 1973, the Arab states, led by Egypt and Syria, launched a surprise attack against Israel. Known
as the Yom Kippur War, as it was launched on this holiest day in Judaism, the element of surprise initially
allowed the Arab armies to recapture parts of their respective territories (i.e., the Sinai Peninsula for Egypt
and  the  Golan  Heights  for  Syria).  Israel  proved  able  to  repel  the  invading  forces,  largely  thanks  to
increased US military support, and the war ended with yet another ceasefire agreement (Beinin and Hajjar
2014, 8). It should be noted that the initial military successes by the Arab armies at least partly rehabilitated
their honor from the humiliating defeat in the Six-Day War, which in turn was a necessary precondition for
the negotiations between Egypt and Israel in the latter part of the 1970s. These US-sponsored negotiations
first led to the Camp David Accords of 1978, and eventually culminated with the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty
in 1979, whose main points included the mutual recognition between Israel and Egypt, normalization of
relations, and the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Sinai Peninsula, which Egypt promised to
leave demilitarized (Beinin and Hajjar 2014, 8).
114 See Jamal (2005, 22–29) for a brief overview of the occupation policies implemented by Israel following
the 1967 war.
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And Hajjar, Rabbani, and Beinin provide further examples of how the occupation has affected
Palestinians in the territories, where
it is illegal to fly the Palestinian flag, publish or possess “subversive” literature, or
hold a press conference without permission. One Israeli military order in the West
Bank makes it illegal for Palestinians to pick and sell wild thyme, to protect an
Israeli family’s monopoly over the herb’s production (1989, 108).
In short, Israel has since its occupation of the remaining parts of Mandatory Palestine defined
the social, economic, and political conditions there.115 In addition to the military orders and
general occupation policies curbing the political and economic development, Israel also began
settling in the occupied territories soon after its victory  (B’Tselem 2010). As indicated in
Figure 3 below, the  number of settlers  and settlements  on the occupied West  Bank grew
steadily, from 3 200 settlers in 20 settlements in 1976, to 57 900 settlers in 110 settlements in
1987.116 This proliferation of settlers  and settlements carved the occupied West Bank into
disconnected enclaves, further exacerbating the already difficult situation of the Palestinians
living there.117
The  harsh  conditions  in  the  occupied  territories  led  many  Palestinians  to  protests  the
occupation.118 From 1977 to 1982, the yearly number of protests averaged 500 and included
general strikes, guerrilla attacks against Israeli military installations, and both organized and
unorganized  demonstrations  and  revolts.119 Most  of  these  various  forms  of  protest  led  to
Israeli  retaliations,  and from 1967 to  1982,  some 300 000 Palestinians  were  detained for
various periods by Israeli security forces, almost all without any trial.120 And as the situation
failed to improve throughout the 1980s, the number of protests increased, with an average
between  3 000  and  4 400  per  year  (Hajjar,  Rabbani,  and  Beinin  1989,  108).  Crucially,
Palestinian protests against the occupation also became increasingly violent in this period, and
115 Consult Aronson (1990) for a detailed account of Israeli occupation policies on the West Bank and their
consequences. See Roy (1995) for a similarly thorough account of Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip.
116 This equals a compound annual increase of settlers from 1976 to 1987 on the occupied West Bank of 27.29
percent.
117 Israel also illegally settled the Gaza Strip, although to a far less extent.
118 See the section titled From a diaspora of diplomats to exiled guerrillas pp. 92ff. for a short discussion of
the organized guerrilla movements resisting the Israeli occupation in the years from 1967 to 1987.
119 Cf. Pearlman (2011, 94–102) for an overview of Palestinian protests under Israeli occupation from 1967
until the first intifada.
120 It should also be noted that Israel deported a number of Palestinians from the occupied territories since
1967, initially rather extensively but later more selectively, targeting “specific people with public appeal
and mobilizing potential” (see Table 1.2 in Jamal 2005, 26–27 for details).
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Figure 3: Settlers and settlements, 1976–1987 (West Bank, excluding East Jerusalem)
(Source: B’Tselem 2010).
both  the  number  of  stone  throwing  incidents  and  armed  attacks  rose  markedly  in  the
mid-1980s (Pearlman 2011, 101).
In late 1985, and as a direct response to the intensification and violent turn of the Palestinian
protests, Israel declared its Iron Fist policy  (Shakrah 1986, 120). The ensuing months and
years  saw  an  increase  in  deportations  of  Palestinian  activists,  renewed  use  of  so-called
“administrative  detention,”  i.e.,  short-term  imprisonment  of  Palestinians  without  trial,121
further escalation in the settlement of the West Bank,122 with the associated demolition of
Palestinian houses and confiscation of Palestinian land, all  accompanied by statements by
Israeli  officials  such  as  then  Defense  Minister  Yitzhak  Rabin  that  “there  will  be  no
development [in the occupied territories] initiated by the Israeli government, and no permits
will be given for expanding agriculture or industry [there], which may compete with the state
of Israel” (Shakrah 1986, 124).
121 According to the Red Cross, some 80 percent of those detained from the various refugee camps on the West
Bank were between the age of twelve and sixteen (Shakrah 1986, 121).
122 Up from 35 000 settlers in 1984 to 63 600 in 1988 (B’Tselem 2010, 9).
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In essence, the developments following the implementation of the Iron First policy “continued
the trend of Palestinian displacement and dispossession and increased Palestinian dependency
on Israeli facilities and the ongoing implementation of economic policies”  (Shakrah 1986,
123), and worked to exacerbate the already tense and volatile situation. As will be covered in
the next chapter, the escalation eventually culminated with the outbreak of the first intifada in
1987,  a  popular uprising that  rapidly  spread throughout  the  occupied  territories  and  also
marked the entrance of Hamas on the Palestinian political scene.
To summarize, it is clear from the above that Israel for a long time has exercised a high degree
of influence on the Palestinian political scene; in particular since its occupation of the Gaza
Strip and the West Bank following the Six-Day War in 1967, Israel has for most intents and
purposes dictated the conditions of the everyday lives of Palestinians, and fundamentally—
and negatively—affected the possibilities for social, economic, and political development. It
is against this backdrop that the establishment of Hamas in the early days of the first intifada
will be analyzed and understood.
 3.2 The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
In  addition to  Israel,  which,  as  explicated above,  has  dictated the  conditions in  occupied
Palestine since 1967, Hamas has also been influenced by various domestic players, primarily
the PLO. Founded by the Arab League in 1964, the PLO was initially closely associated with
the more powerful Arab leaders, and in particular president Nasser of Egypt  (Cobban 1984,
28–29; R. Hamid 1975, 93–94). However, after the Arab states lost to Israel in the Six-Day
War in 1967, both the defeated regimes and pan-Arabism as an ideology lost a great deal of
credibility  (R. Khalidi 2010, 193). The outcome of the war proved to the PLO that  Arab
patronage would be insufficient to liberate Palestine.
The  PLO  therefore  freed  itself  from  such  direct  sponsorship  and  developed  into  an
independent Palestinian organization, dominated by the Fatah party and its late leader Yasser
Arafat (R. Hamid 1975, 98). From then on until the first intifada (1987),123 Palestinian politics
became synonymous with the PLO (Hilal 2010; Malki 2006; Muslih 1990, 4). Illustrative of
its importance, the PLO has observer status in the UN General Assembly, and it was the PLO
that signed the Oslo Accords on behalf of the Palestinians, thereby ending the first  intifada
123 Intifada is usually understood to mean “uprising” or “resistance.” The first Palestinian intifada broke out in
December 1987 and lasted until the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993.
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and establishing the Palestinian Authority (PA) as the Palestinian proto-state.124 As will be
discussed in detail in the later chapters, the PLO in effect recreated the PA as its own tool.125
The overlap of personnel and mixing of roles and mandates makes it difficult to disentangle
the  exact  relationship  between  the  Fatah,  the  PLO,  and  the  PA.  Suffice  it  to  say,  this
Fatah-PLO-PA nexus is a formidable political force in the occupied territories, and is and has
been—apart from Israel—the most influential actor vis-à-vis Hamas.
 3.2.1  The organization
The  PLO is  a  confederate,  multi-faction  organization  currently  made  up  of  ten  guerrilla
movements.126 Because of the ideological climate at the time of their founding, all the factions
currently in the PLO ostensibly subscribe to various revolutionary and secular ideologies,127
although most  of  them arguably  lack ideological  depth  (Sayigh 1997,  56).128 Rather  than
ideological  differences,  the  major  conflict  lines  between  the  various  PLO  factions  have
traditionally been strategic in nature.129 In brief, one can identify two competing blocs within
the PLO. The PFLP led those factions convinced that the solution to the Palestinian question
in essence was a common Arab problem and that any solution would involve a pan-Arab
revolution.130 As  such,  they  criticized  the  nationalist  bloc  led  by  Fatah,  who  for  its  part
distrusted the revolutionary credentials of the Arab regimes and claimed that the Palestinians
124 Consult Abu-Amr (1994b) and Butenschøn (1998) for a discussion on the Oslo Accords and the first years
of the PA. See Cobban (1984) for a detailed account of the PLO and its history.
125 Although the PA nominally was an independent political entity, cadres and guerrillas from Fatah and the
PLO filled its political positions and bureaucracy and formed the backbone of its security forces (Abu-Amr
1997; Usher 1996).
126 The number of constituent organizations have fluctuated somewhat throughout the history of the PLO. For
details, consult Sayigh (1997).
127 The PFLP and its offshoot, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), are to varying
degrees Marxist (or at least leftist) in their outlook (Cubert 1997, 52, 96–112); the DFLP’s own offshoot,
the Palestine Democratic Union (known as Fida), is social democratic, as is the Palestinian People’s Party
(PPP) (Sayigh 1997, 647), although the latter used to be communist (the PPP was formerly known as the
Palestinian Communist Party, PCP); Sai’qa is the Palestinian arm of the Syrian Baathists whereas the Arab
Liberation Front (ALF) and the Palestinian Arab Front (PAF) are associated with the Iraqi Baath Party,
meaning that  they all  subscribe to  versions of  Arab socialism  (Cobban 1984,  157,  163);  the Palestine
Liberation Front (PLF) and the Palestinian Popular Struggle Front (PPSF) are both minor factions with
leftist inclinations (both of which can trace their pedigree to the PFLP); and finally Fatah (the inverse
acronym of  Palestinian  National  Liberation  Movement  in  Arabic,  often  translated  to  “conquest”),  the
largest and most important PLO faction, also subscribes to leftist and secular ideas.
128 See Sayigh (1997, xlii) for a genealogical diagram of Palestinian organizations.
129 Løvlie  (2014) identifies three main strategic points of contention within the PLO, namely  how Palestine
should  be  liberated  (armed  resistance  or  negotiations),  how  much  to  liberate  (all  or  part  of  historic
Palestine), and by whom (a pan-Arab solution or a Palestinian solution).
130 The ideological outlook of the PFLP can be explained by the fact that it was established in the wake of the
Six-Day War by former leaders of the Arab National Movement (ANM), a pan-Arab organization founded
in Beirut in the 1950s by Palestinian refugees set on solving the Palestinian issue through a common Arab
solution (Baumgarten 2005, 27; R. Khalidi 1991).
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should take responsibility for their own liberation. While both factions were nationalist, the
one led by Fatah was arguably more nationalistic and patriotic than the one led by the PFLP
(Jamal 2005, 16–19).131
The PLO is organized hierarchically. Nominally, ultimate authority within the PLO rests with
the Palestine National Council (PNC), the Palestinian parliament made up of some 350—400
members appointed by the constituent organizations of the PLO, as well as various Palestinian
civil  society  organizations  (Cobban  1984,  13;  Pina  2005,  3).132 The  PNC  in  turn  elects
between  14  and  18  members  to  the  Executive  Committee,  which  in  turn  appoints  the
Chairman of the Committee. The Chairman of the Committee, in turn, was from the outset
vested with autocratic powers within the PLO, and functioned as both the Spokesman for the
PNC and nominally the Commander-in-Chief of the now largely defunct Palestine Liberation
Army (PLA) (R. Hamid 1975, 96).133 
Traditionally, the Executive Committee has been far more powerful than the PNC, and its
makeup has largely reflected the power balance between the various membership factions.
The  various  departments  of  the  PLO,  such  as  the  political,  information,  and  planning
departments, are all  subjugated to the Executive Committee,  and not the PNC  (R. Hamid
1975, 102). It should also be noted that, as a result of the Palestinian exodus, the PNC has
only rarely managed to obtain a quorum. Because of this, the PNC has been defunct for long
periods of time. The PLO Central Council was therefore established to function as the acting
deliberative and legislative forum when the PNC could not meet. This Central Council has
had between 40 and 124 members, elected from the PNC (Pina 2005, 3).134
It should also be mentioned that while the PLO previously had its own regular army, the PLA,
most of the constituent organizations of the PLO have their own guerrilla units. Crucially,
131 It should also be noted that while the pan-Arabists still exist today and do command a certain level of
popular support, the Fatah-led bloc has dominated the PLO since its leader, the late Yasser Arafat, was
elected its Chairman in 1969 (Cobban 1984, 44).
132 According to Hamid, the first PNC in 1964 had 422 officials, and “included members of the Jordanian
Parliament and that of the Gaza Strip, and mayors and presidents of urban and rural councils … clergymen,
pharmacists, professors, lawyers, doctors, engineers, businessmen, bankers, and industrialists … farmers,
labour leaders, and representatives of refugee camps and women’s and students’ organizations” (1975, 94).
133 Note, however, that the three PLA contingents were usually controlled by their respective host countries,
i.e., Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, and only to a limited degree by the PLO itself.
134 In addition to this political hierarchy, the PLO is also made up of a plethora of civil society organizations,
trade unions, and interest organizations. According to Cobban, at least the following organizations are part
of the PLO: General Union of Palestinian Workers, General Union of Palestinian Students, General Union
of Palestinian Writers, General Union of Palestinian Women, and General Union of Palestinian Engineers
(1984, 13).
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these are not controlled by the PLO, but are rather commanded by their own organizations (R.
Hamid 1975, 105). And finally, it is noteworthy that the PLO has never held popular elections
to its various bodies, relying instead on opaque backroom dealings to nominate and appoint
representatives and officials from its constituent organizations (Muslih 1990, 5).
 3.2.2  From a diaspora of diplomats to exiled guerrillas
The PLO has operated in exile for most of its existence.135 From its establishment in 1964
until the Six-Day War in 1967, the PLO was tightly tied to Egypt, and while the first and
constituting PNC session was held in then Jordanian controlled Jerusalem in 1964, subsequent
sessions  were  located  in  Egypt  or  Egyptian  controlled  Gaza.  The  Egyptian  influence,
combined  with  the  aforementioned  need  for  the  newly  independent  Arab  states  to  retain
control of the Palestinians lest they risk destabilizing the region, meant that the PLO for these
first years remained mostly a diplomatic outfit (R. Hamid 1975, 96–97).
The rhetoric of the PLO soon became more militant, however, at least in part as a response to
the ongoing guerrilla warfare against Israel by Palestinian movements not yet part of the PLO,
the most prominent of which was Fatah  (Baumgarten 2005, 29). As the official liberation
movement of the Palestinians, the PLO could not be seen to be less active in its efforts to
actually  liberate  Palestine  than  these  smaller  groups.  Late  in  December  1966,  then  PLO
Chairman Shuqairy therefore “announced the replacement of the Executive Committee with a
Revolutionary Council ‘to assume the responsibility of preparing the people for the war of
liberation’” (R. Hamid 1975, 97).
Nevertheless, the events of 1967 voided whatever plans Shuqairy might have had; following
their humiliating defeat in the Six-Day War, it became imperative for the Arab regimes to
regain both honor and the territory they lost by military means (R. Hamid 1975, 98). For the
PLO and the other Palestinian movements, it was now obvious that armed struggle—and not
Arab sponsorship—was the only viable way toward liberation  (Baumgarten 2005, 34). And
these  changes  in  strategic  thinking  within  both  the  Arab  regimes  and  the  Palestinian
movements had consequences for the PLO.
For  one,  the  various  Palestinian guerrilla  units  gained both  experience  and popularity  by
fighting alongside Jordanian and Egyptian forces against Israel in the War of Attrition.136 In
135 See Jamal  (2005) for  an  analysis  of Palestinian  politics  between 1967 and 2005 with  a  focus  on the
competition between the inside, local leaders, and the exiled PLO leadership.
136 See fn. 113 on page 86.
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particular,  the  Battle  of  Karameh  in  March  1968,  where  Palestinian  commandos  and the
Jordanian army fought against a larger Israeli force, increased the standing of the Palestinian
guerrilla groups (R. Hamid 1975, 99). Second, and after various attempts to reconcile the old
PLO leadership and the increasingly popular and powerful militias throughout 1967 and 1968,
the latter eventually won control of the PLO.137 At the 5th PNC session in Cairo, February 1 to
5, 1969 (JPS 1987, 150), Fatah won 33 of the then 105 seats of the PNC, and became the
single largest faction in the PLO. Furthermore, the leader of Fatah, Yasser Arafat, was elected
Chairman of the PLO (R. Hamid 1975, 100).
Under the new leadership, and operating from Jordan, commandos from the various PLO
organizations continued to  carry out  military incursions into the occupied West  Bank.  As
before,  these  operations  inevitably  provoked  Israeli  retaliations,  some  of  which  had
devastating consequences for civilians in Jordan.138 Combined with the fact that the PLO had
expanded and entrenched its position in Jordan, operating as a state within a state, complete
with security services, courts, information and media offices, King Hussein of Jordan became
increasingly worried about the integrity and survival of his country.139
In an attempt to regain control and stabilize the situation, King Hussein therefore tried to rein
in  and  control  the  guerrillas  in  1970  by  setting  new terms  for  guerrilla  activities  in  the
Kingdom. The PLO, however, was eager to keep its autonomous position. Throughout the
spring and summer of 1970, the relationship between the King and the PLO deteriorated, and
in September that year, the PLO called for the overthrow of the monarchy and the installation
of  a  “revolutionary nationalist  [Palestinian]  government”  in  its  place  (Sayigh 1997,  260).
Subsequently, and in what became known as Black September, intense clashes between the
PLO and the Jordanian army broke out. Although there were various lulls and hiatuses in the
fighting over the coming months, the war continued until June 1971. By then, the Jordanian
army had successfully routed out the PLO from the Kingdom (Sayigh 1997, 262–81).
The  PLO subsequently  relocated  to  Lebanon,  and  from there  continued  to  mount  armed
incursions into the northern parts of Israel. However, Lebanon descended into civil war in
1975, and the PLO soon became part of the fighting. To complicate things further, a renegade
137 For details of these internal struggles for power in the PLO, see Hamid (1975, 99–100) and Sayigh (1997,
218–21).
138 Israeli retaliatory strikes in 1968 forced 100 000 inhabitants in the Jordan Valley to flee, and in 1969 Israeli
airstrikes extended far into Jordan (Sayigh 1997, 243).
139 For a detailed historical account of the relationship between Jordan and the PLO, consult Sayigh  (1997,
243–81).
93
Palestinian faction tried to assassinate the Israeli ambassador in London on June 3, 1982. With
the attempted assassination as the immediate pretext, but having waited for a provocation to
finally respond to the ongoing Palestinian attacks, Israel invaded Lebanon on the following
day  (Sayigh  1997,  523).  By  August  1982,  Israel  had  laid  siege  on  Beirut,140 prompting
international involvement. Under US auspices, a ceasefire agreement was negotiated, which
stipulated that the PLO and its guerrillas would evacuate from Lebanon.141
After the expulsion from Lebanon, the PLO relocated to Tunisia, where it remained until 1994
(Beinin and Hajjar 2014, 8). Then, following the Oslo Accords in 1993 and the establishment
of the PA in 1994, the PLO and its exiled leaders could for the first time return to occupied
Palestine.142 A number of crucial events and developments took place in the intervening years,
and  these  will  be  discussed  in  the  coming  section  covering  the  history,  ideology,  and
development of Fatah. For although Fatah is only one of ten constituting organization of the
PLO and the two cannot be conflated, it dominated the Palestinian national movement from
the mid-1970s onward. In particular, Yasser Arafat, both the leader of Fatah and the Chairman
of the PLO, came to personify the Palestinian struggle for liberation. As such, it is pertinent to
provide a brief but focused history of Fatah.
 3.2.3  Fatah—powerful and pragmatic
Fatah was established in the late 1950s (Cobban 1984, 23),143 with the stated aim “to liberate
the whole of Palestine and destroy the foundations of [the] colonialist,  Zionist occupation
state  and  society”  (Sayigh  1997,  87).  Modeled  after  and  inspired  by  the  contemporary
liberation wars and movements—and in particular those in Algeria, Cuba,  and Vietnam—
Fatah  had  established  itself  as  the  main  Palestinian  nationalist  faction  advocating  armed
struggle against  the Israeli  occupation by the time it  took leadership of the PLO in 1969
(Baumgarten 2005; Rubin 1994, 1–23). Partly as a side effect of adopting the strategies and
tactics of these guerrilla groups, and partly as a byproduct of the Cold War—with the Soviet
Union sponsoring many liberation movements against the colonial powers of the West—Fatah
adopted a revolutionary and secular ideology, which it combined with a nationalist rhetoric
140 For details of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, see Sayigh (1997, 522–43). 
141 As part of the invasion, and after the evacuation of the PLO, Israel cooperated with the Lebanese Phalange
party to commit the Sabra and Shatila massacres, in which somewhere between 300 and 3 000 Palestinian
refugees and Lebanese Shias were killed in two refugee camps on the outskirts of Beirut (Malone 1985).
142 Both the Oslo process and the return of the PLO to the occupied territories will be covered in some detail
in chapter 5.
143 There are some discrepancies regarding the exact date between the different historical accounts of Fatah’s
founding, ranging from 1958 to 1962 (Cobban 1984, 23–24; Sayigh 1997, 84). 
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influenced by the anti-colonial discourse.144
Crucially,  Fatah has  arguably only paid lip-service  to  these  ideals  throughout  most  of  its
history. As a consequence of its strong focus on nationalism and lack of ideological rigidity,
Fatah has been free to adopt and discard ideological rhetoric as its leaders have seen fit.145
During the late  1960s and 1970s,  Fatah therefore utilized the then prevalent  anti-colonial
discourse,  as  can  be  gleaned  from  its  Constitution.  However,  as  long  as  pan-Arabism
remained an ideological force to be reckoned with,146 it made sense for Fatah to downplay the
exclusivity of its Palestinian nationalism. Instead, Fatah framed its goal of liberating Palestine
as the necessary first step toward Arab unity (Sayigh 1997, 198–99).147 Later, after the Iranian
revolution  of  1979 and  the  Islamic  revivalism that  followed,  Fatah  supplemented  its  old
slogans, such as “the right to self-determination” and “revolution until victory,” with verses
and excerpts from the Koran (Frisch 2005).
This ideological elasticity and pragmatism have had consequences for Fatah’s strategy, and
given its dominance, also for the PLO and thus Palestinian politics. In particular, two key
developments underline this. First, Fatah led the 12th PNC session in Cairo, June 1 to 9, 1974,
to  adopt  the  so-called  ten-point  political  program,  which  would  come  to  influence  PLO
strategy and policy for the next decades  (JPS 1987, 151). Although the first  article in the
adopted program rejects UNSCR 242 and states that the PLO “refuses to have anything to do
with this resolution at any level, Arab or international” (PNC 1974), it also paved the way for
alternative strategies in the struggle for liberation. Specifically, article two of the ten-point
program states that the PLO “will employ all means, and first and foremost armed struggle, to
liberate Palestinian territory and to establish the independent combatant national authority for
the people over every part of Palestinian territory that is liberated” (PNC 1974).
Although the wording remains revolutionary, two crucial points should be highlighted from
the above quotation. First, even if armed struggle remains the primary strategy, it implicitly
144 A brief look at Fatah’s 1968 Constitution supports such an interpretation. Among other claims, it states that
Fatah  is  a  national,  revolutionary  movement  fighting  against  Zionism,  colonialism,  and  international
imperialism. In this way, Fatah frames the liberation of Palestine as part of the global fight against Western
colonialism and imperialism,  situation itself  squarely in  the anti-colonial  camp  (Rubin 1994, 8–9).  Of
course, the officially stated goals of any political party or movement might be sidelined for various reasons
and should not  be taken at  face value  (Panebianco 1988). They are, nevertheless,  considered a useful
source of data on ideology and policy positions (Budge et al. 2001).
145 See Baumgarten (2005) and Løvlie (2014) for analyses of Fatah’s pragmatism.
146 I.e., until the defeat of the Arab armies at the hands of Israel in the Six-Day War of 1967.
147 The exact slogan was the reverse of the pan-Arabist, i.e., “Palestine is the road to unity” rather than “unity
is the road to Palestine” (Sayigh 1997, 198).
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opens for other strategies in the Palestinian fight for liberation. This marks a departure from
the  dominant  idea that  armed struggle  was the  only way to  liberate  Palestine.  Second,  it
advocates the establishment of a Palestinian state on “every part of Palestinian territory that is
liberated,” i.e., not necessarily the whole of historic Palestine  (R. Hamid 1975, 108–9). In
essence, then, the adoption of the ten-point program in 1974 constituted a radical shift for the
PLO in both strategy and goals (Løvlie 2014).148
Crucially, since the adoption of the ten-point program allowed for both negotiations and a
Palestinian state alongside Israel, the Arab Summit held in Rabat, Morocco, in October 1974
rewarded the  PLO by recognizing it  as  the  Palestinian’s  “sole  legitimate  representatives”
(Cubert 1997, 59). This, in turn, paved the way for the adoption of UN General Assembly
Resolution 3237 in November 1974, which invited “the Palestinian Liberation Organization to
participate  in  the  sessions  and  the  work  of  the  General  Assembly  in  the  capacity  as  an
observer,” i.e., granting the PLO non-state observer status in the UN (UNGA 1974b).
The second event  underlining the ideological  elasticity  and pragmatism of  Fatah was the
Palestinian Declaration of Independence proclaimed at the 19th PNC session in Algiers. On
November  15,  1988,  Yasser  Arafat,  Chairman  of  the  PLO,  announced  a  “moral  and
psychological” Palestinian state on the occupied Palestinian territories, with Jerusalem as its
capital. In an accompanying document, UN Security Council Resolution 242 was referenced,
specifying the territory of the Palestinian state as that of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, thus
reducing the Palestinian territorial claim by some 78 percent (Muslih 1990; PNC 1988).
This proclamation of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders constituted a radical shift in
PLO politics with far-reaching consequences; by adopting a two-state solution and thus  de
facto recognizing the State of Israel, direct talks between Israel and the Palestinians became
possible for the first time.149 In 1991 the demise of communism and the ensuing “new world
order” made it  possible for the US to arrange the Madrid Conference between Israel  and
Palestine (Usher 1995a, 2–3). This conference was the first of a range of talks between Israel
148 The adoption of this ten-point program led certain constituent PLO factions, and most prominently the
PFLP, to temporarily leave the organization in protest. Collectively, these were known as the Rejectionist
Front (Cubert 1997, 59).
149 Confronted with these examples of political pragmatism and ideological opportunism, a senior Fatah cadre
retorted that Fatah has been and continues to be the “National Movement for the Liberation of Palestine,
and not a party which has an ideology. We have no ideology. We are not Marxist. We are not Islamist. Fatah
is  not  a  party  with  a  political  or  social  program” (interviewed  in  Ramallah,  May 24,  2011).  Similar
sentiments regarding the ideological elasticity of Fatah were expressed by various Palestinian scholars,
including Dr. Giacaman and pollster and analyst Jamil Rabah (interviewed in Ramallah, April 5 and March
23, 2011, respectively).
96
and Palestinians leading up to the Oslo Accords, and the first in which Israeli and Palestinian
officials negotiated directly with each other.150
In sum, it  is  clear from the above that  the PLO under the control  of Fatah has played a
dominant and crucial role in Palestinian politics from the late 1960s onward. Although the
effects of the Israeli occupation far outweigh the influence of the PLO for Palestinians living
inside the occupied territories, the establishment of Hamas by the Muslim Brotherhood in
Gaza was partly a response to the lack of religiosity on the part of the PLO, as well as its
failure to liberate Palestine after decades of trying. And as will be demonstrated in the coming
chapters, the competition between the Fatah-PLO-PA nexus and Hamas has come to define
and polarize the Palestinian political field (Hilal 2010; Løvlie 2014).
 3.3 The Muslim Brotherhood—Hamas’s ancestor
The Islamist revivalist movement of which Hamas is a part has a history going back to at least
the  1920s.  This  section  purports  to  lay  the  necessary  historical  backdrop  for  the  coming
theoretically grounded analyses of Hamas and its history from 1987 onward, by providing a
short account of its ideological roots and organizational ancestors.
First, a brief overview of the history, ideology, and organization of the Society of the Muslim
Brothers in Egypt from its inception in the 1928 to the late 1940s is provided. Next comes a
somewhat more detailed account of the development of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine,
beginning with its establishment in 1945௅46 and onward until the 1967 Six-Day War, and
then from the ensuing Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories to the establishment of
Hamas in 1987.
 3.3.1  The Society of the Muslim Brothers
The Society of  the  Muslim Brothers  is  recognized as  the  20th century’s  largest  and most
influential Islamic political movement  (Simms 2002).151 With its long and rich history, it is
outside the  scope of  this  chapter  to  provide a  complete  account  of  all  the  Brotherhood’s
aspects.  The  following  paragraphs  are  therefore  limited  to  a  historical  overview  of  the
Brotherhood’s first 20 years, a summary of its most important ideological characteristics, and
a brief discussion of its basic organizational attributes.
150 The Oslo Accords and their consequences for Palestinian politics in general and Hamas in particular will be
covered in coming chapters.
151 Colloquially known as the Muslim Brotherhood or just The Brothers.
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  The first 20 years at a glance
The Muslim Brotherhood was established by the schoolteacher Hassan al-Banna in 1928, in
the Egyptian city of Isma’iliya. The Brotherhood was but one of a number of conservative
reformist  Islamic  organizations  emerging  in  Egypt  at  the  time,  many  of  which  were
established in response to the “failure of liberal institutions … to free the country from the
British” (Aly and Wenner 1982, 339). The Brotherhood—as many of its Islamic contemporary
movements—argued  that  the  current  woes  of  Egyptians  stemmed  from  the  decadence
produced by secularization, Westernization, and their  departure from “true” Islam  (Simms
2002,  570).  Consequently,  the  Brothers’ suggested remedy was  a  return  to  Islam,  and in
particular a return to the ways of the “golden age” of the early Islamic caliphates  (Aly and
Wenner 1982, 338–39).
While the Brotherhood eventually developed into a political anti-colonization organization
aiming to liberate Egypt from British rule, it remained a largely apolitical movement for its
first ten years, focusing on religious education, welfare provision, and social work (Aly and
Wenner 1982, 338).  During these early years, al-Banna also spent considerable efforts on
membership recruitment and organization-building (Lia 2006c, 93–108). His efforts paid off,
as indicated by the rapid expansion of the Brotherhood. After relocating to Cairo in 1932, the
number of branches increased from five to 15, and by 1938, the Brotherhood had some 300
branches (Lia 2006c, 295). In the same period, the number of regular members increased to
somewhere between 50 000 and 150 000 members (Munson 2001, 488).152
The late 1930s also saw the Brotherhood’s first forays into political activism. Responding to
the Great Arab Rebellion in the British Mandate of Palestine,153 the Brotherhood organized
demonstrations  and  raised  funds  to  support  the  rebellion.  It  also  turned  increasingly
anti-British in its leaflets and newspapers, calling for the withdrawal of British troops from
Egypt (Munson 2001, 488). Finally, in 1941, the Brotherhood announced its candidates for the
upcoming  parliamentary  elections  in  Egypt.  In  many  ways  the  Brotherhood  had  thus
completed its transformation from a socially oriented, conservative reform movement to a
political organization intent on exploiting its increasing popular support to influence politics.
152 See Munson (2001) for an in-depth analysis explaining the Brotherhood’s rapid expansion.
153 Discussed briefly in the section From the Ottomans to the nakba (1880s–1948) pp. 79ff. Also known as the
“Arab revolt in Palestine” or the “Arab general strike in Palestine,” this was a nationalistic uprising against
the British rule and the influx of Jewish immigrants to Palestine (see Abboushi 1977). Note that the current
militant branch of Hamas (the al-Qassam Brigades) was named after Sheikh Izz ad-Din al-Qassam, one of
the early Palestinian martyrs taking part in the uprising.
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The Brotherhood’s political turn and vocal opposition to the regime, however, was met with
harsh government responses; its public rallies were banned, its offices were ransacked, and
many of its leaders—including al-Banna—were at different times arrested for varying periods
of  time  (Simms  2002,  571).  While  World  War  II  occasionally  limited  the  Egyptian
government’s ability to oppress the Brotherhood, the conflict between them ebbed and flowed
throughout the 1940s. Following the Israeli victory over Egypt and other Arab states in the
Arab-Israeli  War  of  1948,  the  relationship  between  the  Brotherhood  and  the  regime
deteriorated rapidly. One decision with far-reaching consequences was taken by the Egyptian
Prime Minister, when late in 1948 he officially banned the Brotherhood (Mitchell 1969, 58).
He did so partly because the Brotherhood had become increasingly vocal in its denunciation
of  his  government,  but  also  because  they  had  gained  important  combat  experience  after
sending volunteers to fight in the war against Israel.154 The Brothers thus became more of a
threat for the Egyptian government. The Brotherhood for its part was frustrated by Egypt’s
lackluster performance in the war, blaming the government for the humiliating defeat against
Israel. Against this backdrop, and provoked by being outlawed, a Brother assassinated the
Egyptian Prime Minister on December 28, 1948. Some six weeks later, on February 12, 1949,
the Egyptian political police retaliated by killing al-Banna himself  (Aly and Wenner 1982,
341; Mitchell 1969, 67–71; Munson 2001, 489).
Despite  this  long-running  and  at  times  bloody  conflict  with  the  regime,  the  Brotherhood
managed to continue its expansion, commanding the support of an ever-growing number of
people. From 1944 to 1949, the Brotherhood doubled its number of branches to some two
thousand.  In  the  same  period,  membership  estimates  increased  from between  100 000 to
500 000 in 1944, to between 300 000 to 600 000 in 1949, effectively making it “the largest
organized force in  the country”  (Munson 2001,  489;  Zahid and Medley 2006,  693).155 In
addition the Brotherhood had expanded abroad, establishing branches in the Sudan, Syria,
154 It is uncertain how many Brothers fought against the Israelis in the 1948 war, with estimates ranging from
471  to  1500  (Abu-Amr  1994a,  2).  Consult  El-Awaisi  (1998) for  a  dedicated  analysis  of  the  Muslim
Brotherhood and the question of Palestine.
155 The Muslim Brotherhood themselves claimed to have had two million members at the time (IkhwanWeb
2007), but this seems rather unlikely. Partly because other sources have far lower estimates, and partly
because it is in the interest of the Brotherhood to inflate their membership numbers to appear larger and
more powerful than they in reality are  (Mair and van Biezen 2001, 7). As the estimated ranges indicate,
there is a degree of uncertainty associated with the membership figures of the Brotherhood. One reason is
that  they operate  with  varying  levels  of  membership  (Lia  2006c,  96,  103).  Finally,  it  should  also  be
underlined that no other organization in Egypt managed to attract such a large following, even if one relies
on  the  lowest  estimates.  Warburg  even  argues  that  the  Muslim  Brotherhood  was  the  only  Egyptian
organization “who succeeded to attain grass-roots support” (1982, 132).
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Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, and the Palestinian territories  (Simms 2002, 570–71). In short,  the
movement  had established itself  as  one of  the main political  and religious players  in the
Middle East in the span of roughly 20 years.
  Ideology and strategies
Somewhat simplified, the overarching goal of the Brotherhood is “the creation of an ‘Islamic
order’,” in which the principles of  sharia  will regulate society  (Mitchell 1969, 234–35).156
Within this  Islamic order they will  then erect  an Islamic state  modeled after  the just  and
righteous rule of the first four caliphs, collectively known as The Rightly Guided Caliphs
(Mitchell 1969, 209–11).157 As such, resistance to Westernization and colonization was only
part of the  raison d'être for the Brotherhood; from the outset, it also had an encompassing
vision of how society should be governed (Aly and Wenner 1982, 340).
The specificities of this vision have naturally changed throughout the Brotherhood’s history,158
often in response to changes at the topmost levels of the Egyptian regime (Aly and Wenner
1982). Nevertheless, certain overarching ideological and strategic constants can be identified.
First and foremost, the Brotherhood believes
the rules  and teachings of  Islam to be comprehensive,  to include the people’s
affairs in the world and the hereafter. Those who believe that these teachings deal
only  with  the  spiritual  side  of  life  are  mistaken.  Islam is  an  ideology  and  a
worship, a home and a nationality, a religion and a state, a spirit and work, and a
book and sword (Hassan al-Banna, quoted in Aly and Wenner 1982, 340).
In  short,  and  according  to  the  Brotherhood,  Islam  provides  the  solution  to  all  possible
challenges, be they at the international, national, societal, or personal levels, or of a moral,
cultural, political, or economical nature (Simms 2002, 573).159 It is noteworthy, however, that
the  organization  often  remains  vague  as  to  the  exact  details  of  how  Islam  can  be
operationalized into public policy, instead arguing on an overarching level that “true Islam
was  essentially  democratic  and  capable  of  solving  the  problems  of  the  modern  world”
156 Sharia translates to Islamic law. It is drawn from the Koran and the sayings and traditions of the Prophet,
known as the  sunna.  Of the four  sharia  traditions,  the Brotherhood subscribes  to  the Hanbali  school,
described as “the most conservative in terms of its insistence on a literal reading of the Quran and other
texts” (Munson 2001, 489).
157 They were Abu Bakr, Umar ibn al-Khattab, Uthman ibn Affan, and Ali ibn Abi Talib.
158 The ideology of the Brotherhood has evolved throughout its existence. For a brief overview of its various
phases, consult the account provided by former Brotherhood leader Helbawy (2010).
159 This belief in the all-encompassing relevance of Islam is reflected in the Brotherhood slogan “Islam is the
solution” (Najjar 1996).
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(Munson 2001, 490).
This is not to say that the Brotherhood has never come up with specific policy proposals. In
its early years, the Brotherhood promoted the strengthening of the Egyptian army, greater
pan-Arab cooperation, the increase and expansion of social services, and the improvement of
working conditions, e.g., through the introduction of a minimum wage (Munson 2001, 490).160
While these tasks are run-of-the-mill policies, and thus should be implemented by the state,
the Brotherhood firmly believes that the ills of Egyptian society only can be alleviated if the
population return to the “path of Islam” (Munson 2001, 490).
This emphasis on the return to Islam is explained by the Brotherhood’s argument that most
societal problems are attributable to the increasingly secular lifestyle adopted by Egyptians
from the  days  of  the  British  and  onward.  And  secularism,  the  Brothers  argue,  leads  “to
immorality,  poverty,  and domination”  (Munson 2001,  490).  In  this  way,  the  Brotherhood
connects the large-scale political, economical, and social problems with the personal beliefs of
ordinary Egyptians. To recreate Egyptian society in the image of Islam, the organization has
thus adopted a bottom-up,  grassroots  approach.  By building and running everything from
mosques  and  schools,  via  social  clubs  and  small  industrial  enterprises,  to  hospitals,  the
Brotherhood has essentially been duplicating many conventional state functions. The aim of
these activities, in addition to their obvious usefulness in an impoverished nation, is to help
convince people through real-life examples how and why a return to “true” Islam would be
beneficial.
In sum, the Brotherhood has a two-tiered strategy to reach their goal of creating an Islamic
order and establishing an Islamic state modeled after the first four caliphs: On the one hand,
the  Brothers  have  turned  to  political  activism,  e.g.,  by  organizing  demonstrations  and
participating in elections.  On the other,  they have retained a socially oriented,  bottom-up
approach. Through their religious and social activities, they strive to “educate the masses and
render them aware of ‘proper’ Islamic principles and way of life” (Karam 1997, 159). Step by
step, they strive to pave the way for the Islamic order, in turn a prerequisite for the success of
the coming Islamic state.
160 In later years, the Brotherhood has been represented in the Egyptian parliament, and from 2012 to 2013 it
also held the office of the President.
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  Organizational characteristics
The Egyptian Brotherhood was a multifaceted organization already by the mid-1930s, spread
throughout a large and diverse country,  and with an extensive portfolio of operations.  As
mentioned, the organization has at times been banned by the Egyptian state,  forcing it  to
operate underground  (Munson 2001). Because of these factors, its organizational outline is
both  complex  and  has  changed  multiple  times  throughout  the  organization’s  history
(IkhwanWeb 2007; Mitchell 1969, 163). It is therefore difficult to accurately account for its
organizational characteristics, although it is possible to provide a brief and schematic account
of its organizational makeup.161
In short, the Brotherhood has a hierarchical, federated, and stratified organizational structure.
The hierarchical dimension relates to the power and authority of the leadership to control and
instruct  the  lower  organizational  units;  the  federated  dimension  means  that  the  various
geographic branches are given leeway to adjust and prioritize goals and strategies to best fit
their  particular  context;  and  the  stratified  dimension  means  that  although  the  lower
organizational units are subjugated to the higher strata in the organization, they retain a high
degree  of  autonomy and  are  relatively  free  to  organize  and  prioritize  according  to  local
circumstances and needs.
At the top of the organizational hierarchy are three intertwined institutions: the Consultative
Assembly, the deliberative and legislative branch of the Brotherhood; the General Guidance
Council, the administrative and executive branch; and the General Guide, which essentially is
the  head  of  the  Brotherhood  and  chairman  of  both  the  Consultative  Assembly  and  the
Guidance Council. The Brotherhood thus concentrates a lot of influence and power in this one
position (Mitchell 1969, 165–69).162
At the next level down in the hierarchy is the administrative office. These are operated by a
small  council  appointed by the Guidance Council,  tasked with the implementation of  the
overarching  strategy,  as  formulated  by  the  Consultative  Assembly,  as well  as  the
prioritizations  for  each  governorate  as  decided  by  the  Guidance  Council.  Below  these
administrative  offices  are  approximately  300  district  offices.  These  are  run  partly  by
appointees from the Guidance Council and partly by leaders from the more important local
161 The organizational experience and development of the Egyptian Brotherhood have influenced many of its
chapters  in  other  countries.  As  will  be  demonstrated  later,  the  Egyptian  experience  was  particularly
important for the Gaza branch of the Muslim Brotherhood (Abu-Amr 1994a, 6–10).
162 The General Guide must be a member of the Consultative Assembly and is elected for life by a qualified
majority (3/4) of its deputies.
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branches. Each district office administers a varying number of local branches.163 In sum, the
hierarchy is as follows: The local branches are subordinate to its district branch, the district
branch to its respective administrative office, which in turn is subordinate to the Guidance
Council (IkhwanWeb 2007; Mitchell 1969, 175–80).
The local branch is the basic administrative unit in the Brotherhood. Each local branch has a
headquarter  governing  the  Brotherhood’s  activities,  the  most  important  of  which  is  the
building and running of mosques. Bigger local branches might also run schools, health clinics,
sports clubs, and even local industries (Munson 2001, 501). While the number of Brothers in
each branch varies, a rough average of estimated total members divided by the known number
of local branches indicate that there are approximately between one hundred to three hundred
Brothers in any one branch. Although the local branch is the basic administrative unit, and
initially also the basic organizational unit, the Brotherhood introduced small cells in response
to government persecution.164 These cells are made up of between five and ten Brothers and
function as the main vehicle for recruiting and initial training.
The Brotherhood has a rather sophisticated, three-tiered recruitment procedure (Munson 2001,
499–500).165 At first, prospective members are only asked to sign on as supporters and donate
a  small  amount  of  money to  the  organization.  Through education  and  training,  they  can
advance to become regular members. Regular members are asked to contribute a larger share
of  their  income to  the  Brotherhood,  and  are  given voting rights  within  the  organization.
Finally, they can become active members, which means that they can run in internal elections
to higher positions (Mitchell 1969, 183–84).166
The Egyptian Brotherhood continues to be the largest and arguably most influential  of all
Islamist  movements  throughout  the  Middle  East,  and  in  particular  its  influence  on  the
development of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood—and by extension Hamas—has been
strong. Because of this, the remainder of this chapter will focus on the Palestinian experience
of the Brotherhood.
163  Villages will typically have one local branch, whereas bigger cities might have multiple branches.
164 The different governments of Egypt have all cracked down hard on the Brotherhood at one time or another.
The assassination of al-Banna in 1949 is one important example (Mitchell 1969, 71), and the hanging of
three Brothers convicted of conspiring to overthrow the regime of Nasser in 1966 is another  (Mitchell
1969, vii).
165 Trager  (2011) suggests  there  are  five  levels  of  membership  in  the  Brotherhood.  However,  all  other
consulted sources, including the Brotherhood’s English language website, agree that there are only three
levels (IkhwanWeb 2007).
166 Mitchell labels these three stages of membership as (1) assistant, (2) related, and (3) active  (1969, 183).
Other authors use different terms.
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 3.3.2  The Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood
The Muslim Brotherhood established its first Palestinian branch in Jerusalem in 1945, when
Palestine was still part of the British Mandate.167 Predominantly a religious reform movement,
and  without  a  political  agenda  outside  of  Egypt,  the  British  allowed the  Brotherhood to
operate  relatively  freely.168 And in  the  years  until  UN General  Assembly  Resolution  181
passed in late November 1947, the Brotherhood had recruited some 20 000 Brothers spread
among some 20௅25  branches throughout Palestine. While this rapid expansion partly came
about because the Brotherhood’s ideological message resonated well among Palestinians, it
must be noted that it profited from recruiting a number of notables and established politicians,
and from the co-optation of a range of already established religious societies (El-Awaisi 1998,
155–56).  Following  the  founding  of  the  State  of  Israel  and  the  ensuing  nakba,  some
Brotherhood branches within the 1948 territories were closed down, mainly as a response to
the participation of the Brotherhood in the war against Israel.169
  Egyptian and Jordanian rule (1948–1967)
As discussed  above,170 Egypt and Jordan adopted different policies vis-à-vis Gaza and the
West Bank; whereas Egypt relied on its military to rule Gaza, Jordan annexed the West Bank
and offered the Palestinians there citizenship.  These differences had consequences for  the
conditions under which Palestinians in these territories could mobilize politically, and thus
also for the experience of the two branches of the Palestinian Brotherhood (Shadid 1988). In
turn,  and  as  argued  by  Robinson,  these  divergent  experiences  “go  a  long  way  toward
explaining the disparate state of affairs for the Islamist movement in the Gaza Strip and West
Bank under Israeli rule following 1967” (2004, 120).
In brief, the Gaza branch of the Palestinian Brotherhood was established on November 25,
1946, and was from the outset closely integrated with the main Brotherhood in Egypt (Filiu
2012, 56–58). This tight integration continued after the nakba when Gaza was ruled by Egypt,
and meant that whenever the Egyptian Brotherhood was outlawed, so was the Gaza branch of
167 There is some disagreement on the exact year and date for the founding of the first branch, but most
authors seem to agree that it was either in late 1945 or early 1946. See El-Awaisi (1998, 153), Abu-Amr
(1994a, 3), and A. Cohen (1982, 144).
168 El-Awaisi  (1998, 164–66) documents how the British tried to curb the expansion of the Brotherhood in
Palestine.
169 The Muslim Brotherhood inside Israel continues to operate independently from the Brotherhood in the
occupied territories. For details, consult Tal (2000), Rosmer (2010), and Ghanem and Mustafa (2014).
170 See section From the nakba to The Six-Day War (1948–1967) on pp. 83ff.
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the Palestinian Brotherhood. In general, the Egyptian regime enforced a harsh and strict rule
of the Gaza Strip; in particular, following the ousting of the Egyptian King Farouk in 1952 by
the Free Officers Movement, political activities in Gaza were brutally suppressed  (Milton-
Edwards 1996, 49; Shadid 1988, 660).171
The persecution of the Brotherhood by the Egyptian regime seriously and negatively affected
the  operational  capabilities  of  the  Gaza  branch;  whereas  the  Brotherhood  operated  an
estimated eleven branches throughout the Gaza Strip with some 1 000 active members prior to
the clampdown in 1952, the severity of the suppression essentially forced the Brotherhood
underground (Milton-Edwards 1996, 48). The incipient organizational structure developed in
the late 1940s was obliterated in the next decade and a half, and by the time the Six-Day War
broke out  in  1967,  the  Brotherhood had no impact  on politics  in  Gaza,  operating only a
clandestine network of independent but largely defunct cells (Milton-Edwards 1996, 55).
Despite this sorry state of affairs, the Brotherhood in Gaza survived the ordeal of Egyptian
rule. And by outlawing the Brotherhood, Egypt inadvertently provided “its activists in the
Gaza Strip  experience in  building decentralized and clandestine  organizations”  (Robinson
2004, 120). As will be demonstrated in the coming chapters, this experience where the Gaza
branch ran a clandestine network of operative cells under persecution later proved invaluable
for the survival of Hamas.
On the  Jordanian-ruled  West  Bank,  the  situation  was  rather  more  relaxed  (Shadid  1988,
661).172 From the nakba onward, the West Bank branches of the Brotherhood became closely
aligned with the Jordanian Brotherhood.173 Crucially, the Jordanian Brotherhood had pledged
allegiance to the monarchy, and did not constitute a subservient force such as in Egypt.174
Rather,  as  Islam  “served  as  one  of  the  building  blocks  of  regime  legitimacy  and  of
nation-building”  in  Jordan,  the  Brotherhood  there  was  given  ample  room  for  political
mobilization (Bar 1998, 5). Because it enjoyed a rather amicable relationship with the King,175
171 See Milton-Edwards (1996, 49–55) for details of the Egyptian rule of Gaza and the consequences for the
Muslim Brotherhood there.
172 Consult Milton-Edwards  (1996, 55–64) for an account of Palestinian Islamist politics on the West Bank
under Jordanian rule.
173 This claim—often found in the literature on the Muslim Brotherhood—was supported by Sheikh Hassan
Yousef, a former Brother and current Hamas leader on the West Bank, when he was interviewed during one
of his short hiatuses from Israeli prison, October 16, 2011, in Ramallah.
174 As summed up by Burgat, the “Hashemite kingdom of Jordan relied upon the support of members of the
very Muslim Brotherhood organisation that Egypt imprisoned in their thousands” (2003, 51). 
175 See Boulby (1999) for a history of the Muslim Brotherhood and its relationship with the various kings of
Jordan.
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the Brotherhood in Jordan was one of the few parties not outlawed on the West Bank  (A.
Cohen 1982, 146). And as part of a legal party, the Brotherhood branches on the West Bank
participated in multiple elections while under Jordanian rule.176 
While the  organizational structure of the Jordanian Brotherhood  was partly inspired by the
Egyptian  Brotherhood,  it  developed  according  to  the  localized  needs  and  possibilities  in
Jordan. And unlike in Egypt and on the Gaza Strip, there was no need for the Brotherhood in
Jordan to rely on small and secret cells as the basic organizational unit. Rather, the basic unit
was the local branch, just as had been the case in Egypt until the Brotherhood there had been
outlawed and forced underground (Bar 1998, 15).177
These divergent experiences of the Gaza and West Bank branches of the Muslim Brotherhood
help explain their different ideological outlooks and political priorities later on.178 Whereas the
Gaza branch barely survived as a clandestine movement during the two decades of Egyptian
rule,  the  Jordanian  branch  was  allowed  to  operate  legally,179 gained  crucial  electoral
experience, and expanded its organization.
  The Israeli occupation (1967–1987)
The Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip following the Six-Day War in 1967
fundamentally altered the political, economic, social, and cultural nature of Palestinian society
(Milton-Edwards 1996, 79).180 Simultaneously, the years following the Arab defeat saw the
ascendance of the Palestinian secular nationalist movement, most saliently indicated by the
rise of Fatah and its control of the PLO. Combined, the Israeli occupation and the dominance
of the PLO weakened the Palestinian Brotherhood, prompting Milton-Edwards to conclude
that in the first decade after the Six-Day War, it “played almost no role in politics in the West
176 First in 1956, when they became the largest faction in parliament (Bar 1998, 26), next in 1961 (Bar 1998,
29), then in 1962 (A. Cohen 1982, 147), and finally in early 1967 (Bar 1998, 30).
177 Operating legally, the Brotherhood in Jordan and on the West Bank expanded rather than contracted in the
years between 1948 and 1967. According to Bar, by 1955 there were “approximately 6,000 members in at
least 19 branches in Jordan; on the East Bank, in Amman, Irbid, Salt, Zarqa, Jarash, Karak, and the refugee
camps  of  Karama  and  Jabal  Hussein,  and  on  the  West  Bank,  in  Jerusalem,  Hebron,  Nablus,  Jenin,
Tulkarem, and the refugee camps in Jericho” (1998, 15–16).
178 See discussions of factionalism within Hamas in later chapters, in particular the section Decision-making in
chapter 4, pp. 133ff., and the sections The dominance of the Bureau and the Brigades—electoral boycott
and violence on pp.  173ff., and  Gaza obtains factional dominance—renewed moderation on pp.  177ff.,
both in chapter 5.
179 It should be noted, however, that while the Brotherhood was allowed to operate rather freely in Jordan, the
regime discriminated against the Palestinians on the West Bank. Although the two Brotherhood branches
had merged completely, the King remained reluctant to give the Palestinians the same free reins as were
granted to the Jordanians (Bar 1998, 16).
180 See section From occupation to the intifada (1967–1987) pp. 86ff.
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Bank and Gaza Strip” (1996, 79).181
In  Gaza,  the  Brotherhood  was  almost  nonexistent  following  two  decades  of  Egyptian
persecution.  In  addition,  the  Israeli  occupation  meant  that  whatever  clandestine  links  the
Brotherhood there had to its Egyptian counterpart were severed, further weakening whatever
organizational presence it had (Milton-Edwards 1996, 91–92). Yet its weakness turned out to
be a blessing in disguise; whereas the Israeli occupation spent a lot of resources attempting to
pacify the different nationalist resistance movements, it largely ignored the Brotherhood. In
the words of Filiu, “[a]s the nationalist  forces were bled dry,  Shaykh Yasin was patiently
constructing  …  a  whole  network  of  interlocking  activities  subsumed  under  the  name
Al-Mujamma’ al-Islami” (2012, 63).182
On the West Bank, the Palestinian Brotherhood branches faced a dual challenge in the wake
of the Israeli occupation. For one, and as in Gaza, their ties with the Jordanian Brotherhood
were  disrupted  (Shadid  1988,  664–65),183 forcing  many  of  the  already  struggling  local
branches to close down. Second, and in contrast to their Gaza brethren, those on the West
Bank  proved  incapable  or  unwilling  to  continue  their  religious  and  social  work,  instead
winding down their activities and allowing the ascending Palestinian nationalist movement to
take on an increasingly important political and social role (Milton-Edwards 1996, 89–90). In
sum, the two Palestinian Brotherhood branches had negligible political impact and played
only a marginal role as a religious and social movement in the occupied territories during the
first decade of the Israeli occupation (Milton-Edwards 1996, 102; Shadid 1988, 662).
In the latter part of the 1970s, however, the Brotherhood in Gaza came to play an increasingly
important role. Although it kept out of the political game, it experienced an increased social
influence and popularity in the years following the establishment of the Islamic Center in
Gaza  in  1973.  Under  the  auspices  of  Sheikh  Ahmed  Yassin,  the  Brotherhood  in  Gaza
developed an extensive network of health and medical facilities, sports clubs, kindergartens,
and  schools  (Abu-Amr  1993,  6–8).  Through  its  highly  successful  welfare  work,  the
Brotherhood gained followers and supporters, in particular in Gaza (Shadid 1988, 663).
181 Or as Shadid observed, “[d]uring the first ten years of occupation the Muslim Brotherhood [on the West
Bank and in Gaza] maintained a low profile” (1988, 662).
182 Roughly translating to “Islamic Center” and known locally only as the Mujamma, this religio-social center
is considered the forerunner to Hamas.
183 For  analyses  of  Palestinian  politics  on the  East  and  West  Bank of  River  Jordan following  the  Israeli
occupation, see Jamal (2005, 55–102).
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Added to this, Islam became increasingly popular and politicized throughout the 1980s. Often
seen as part of a larger regional trend beginning with the Iranian revolution in 1979 (Aburaiya
2009; Hroub 2010, 170),184 indicators of this rise of Islam in the occupied territories are found
in the available polling data, election results to the student councils at Palestinian universities,
and in the number of mosques built in the occupied territories. With regard to the latter, the
number of mosques in the West Bank nearly doubled in the decades from 1967 to 1987, from
400 to 750. In the same period, the number of mosques in Gaza tripled, from 200 to 600
(Abu-Amr 1994a, 15–16).
In terms of public opinion, three polls were carried out in the occupied territories (in 1982,
1984,  and  1986).  Although  all  indicated  that  there  was  no  real  challenge—religious  or
otherwise—to the secular nationalism pursued by Fatah and the PLO,185 the results from the
polls also suggested that religion was making inroads into Palestinian politics throughout the
1980s, and could come to produce a “cleavage within Palestinian society … between those
advocating secularism and those who advocate  religious alternatives”  (Shadid and Seltzer
1988a, 24). For one, the 1982 poll found that 35 percent of respondents indeed preferred an
Islamic Palestinian state to a secular-democratic one  (Smith 1982).186 And while the results
between  the  polls  are  not  directly  comparable  because  of  differences  in  sampling  and
questionnaires, 56 percent of respondents in the 1986 poll supported either a Palestinian state
governed according  to Islamic Law (26 percent) or a state based on Arab nationalism and
Islam (30 percent) (Shadid and Seltzer 1988a, 24).
Another  trend  indicating  that  Islam  was  becoming  increasingly  popular  and  politicized
throughout the 1980s is found in the election results to the student councils at Palestinian
universities. For while Fatah and various other secular PLO factions fared well in elections in
the West Bank universities, by and large winning majorities and the most powerful positions,
the Islamist blocs consistently obtained around one third of the votes  (Robinson 1997, 19–
184 Note, however, that a number of scholars have labored to nuance this picture, arguing that to conflate the
rise of Islamic revivalism in the occupied territories with the regional trend is an insufficient explanation.
See e.g., Lybarger (2007, 8–9), who points out that the Palestinian case differs because the occupation is
still on-going, and Milton-Edwards (1996, 8–9), who lists a number of additional factors, for example the
failure of the secular PLO and interference by Israel.
185 In the 1982 poll, 56 percent of West Bank respondents stated that they  “wanted a ‘secular-democratic’
Palestinian state,” thus underlining the strong position of Fatah’s secular-nationalist project (Smith 1982).
186 That the poll  was carried out  on the West  Bank makes these findings particularly interesting,  as it  is
documented that Palestinians on the Gaza Strip are more religious than those residing on the West Bank
(Shadid 1988, 681; Shadid and Seltzer 1989, 295). 
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27).187 Combined, these election results from the universities and the available polling data
indicate  that  the  hegemonic  position  of  Fatah  and  its  secular-nationalist  project  came
increasingly at odds with large parts of the Palestinian grass roots throughout the 1980s.188
Shadid and Seltzer thus cautioned that if Fatah failed to “produce tangible [political] results”
one could expect  their  support  to  be transferred to  the  Islamic  movement,  which in  turn
“undoubtedly would shift its strategy to armed struggle and violent confrontation with Israel”
(1989,  297–98).189 And as will  be demonstrated in  the next  chapter,  Shadid and Seltzer’s
prediction proved correct in late 1987, when Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and other Brothers from
Gaza decided to establish Hamas as the armed and political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood.
To summarize, the organizational and ideological legacy of Hamas goes back to the Society of
the  Muslim  Brothers  founded  in  Egypt  in  the  late  1920s.  While  the  two  Palestinian
Brotherhood branches for some time operated under disparate conditions, the anti-colonial
and Islamist ideology remained largely intact, as did the preferred bottom-up modus operandi
—even  if  both  were  adjusted  to  better  suit  the  local  conditions  in  Palestine.  Also,  the
organizational  learning  experience,  first  from  the  Egyptian  Brotherhood  and  later  from
divergent  conditions  on the West  Bank and Gaza Strip,  has influenced the way in which
Hamas later came to be organized. As will become clear, Hamas adopted the Brotherhood’s
hierarchical,  federated, and stratified structure,  as well  as its  consultative decision-making
procedures,  recruitment  requirements  and  membership  indoctrination,  and  routines  for
advancement.
187 The exceptions to this trend are the Islamic University in Gaza where the Islamists won the majority (Filiu
2012,  65),  and  the  Christian  Bethlehem  University  where  the  Islamists  naturally  fared  quite  badly
(Robinson 1997, 26).
188 As Shamir and Shikaki point out, these results “probably do not mirror the actual factional balance of
power in public opinion, since they are too small and too particular to reflect the mood and interests of the
general public” (2010, 132).
189 An  important  strategic  dimension  relates  to  the  discussion  on  whether  the  Palestinians  supported  a
two-state solution or still wanted to liberate the whole of Palestine. Also here, the gap between the strategy
pursued  by  Fatah  and  the  opinions  in  the  Palestinian  population  widened  following  the  PLO’s  1974
decision to accept a two-state solution as an interim step toward complete liberation of Palestine.
109
Chapter 4:  Enter Hamas—the intifada years (1987–1993)
The current chapter will lay out and discuss the emergence and first years of Hamas, from its
establishment during the first  intifada  (starting in 1987) to the signing of the Oslo Accords
(1993).  Empirically,  this  period  in  Hamas’s  history  has  been  dealt  with  expertly  and
extensively by various authors (see e.g., Abu-Amr 1993; Chehab 2007; Filiu 2012; Gunning
2008). The extant literature focuses mainly on the outbreak of the intifada as the immediate
catalysts prompting the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza to create Hamas as its armed wing; how
Hamas then came to eclipse the Brotherhood and emerge as a political actor in its own right;
the effects of Hamas’s Brotherhood legacy for ideological development; and the challenges
posed by the circumstances of the intifada for its early organization-building.
Theoretically, then, these first years in Hamas’s evolution coincided with the identity building
phase  of  political  organizations,  i.e.,  the  period  in  which  the  articulation  of  a  distinct
ideological message is the prioritized task. As discussed in the introductory chapter, during
this identification phase an organization is still expected to be a pure vehicle for realizing the
stated  ideological  goals.  The  period  in  question  also  overlaps  somewhat  with  the  early
organization-building phase, i.e., Hamas’s efforts to increase its organizational capacity to be
able to reach its goals (Harmel and Svåsand 1993; Panebianco 1988, 20).
The  chapter  begins  by  covering  the  establishment  of  Hamas.  Although  this  period  is
thoroughly addressed in the literature, competing narratives have been promoted—both by
scholars and the involved political actors—as to how exactly Hamas came to be. In particular,
Hamas’s  own  efforts  to  establish  a  distinct  political  identity  by  constructing  a  historical
narrative  all  the  way  back  to  the  1930s  is  considered  illuminating  and  will  therefore  be
covered in some detail.
Following this, the emergence of Hamas will be analyzed aided by analytical concepts drawn
from social movement theories. Here, Robinson’s (2004) analysis of Hamas as a case of social
movement organization will be particularly useful. In line with Robinson’s analysis, the focus
will be on how changes and openings in certain  political opportunity structures led to the
creation of Hamas, how Hamas utilized available mobilizing structures to garner support and
gain influence, and how it used framing in different ways to establish its distinct identity as a
political  organization and thereby attract  supporters.  As hypothesized by relevant  theories
(e.g., Randall 2007), the analysis of Hamas as a social movement organization finds that it
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quite easily was able to articulate its ideology and establish a distinct political identity.
Next follows a somewhat detailed analysis of Hamas’s early organizational development. For
although Hamas inherited a more or less ready-made identity as the religious alternative to the
secular  PLO in Palestinian domestic  politics,  the  organizational  structure  it  inherited was
inadequate  for  its  new  role  and  more  prominent  position;  both  its  expansion  and
diversification, combined with the relentless persecution it  suffered at the hands of Israel,
necessitated a more sophisticated organizational structure. And when building and developing
its  organizational  structure,  Hamas—as any organization—needed to balance a number of
competing  organizational  interests.  How  Hamas  reconciled  and  prioritized  these
organizational  dilemmas  has  consequences  for  its  organizational  structure,  which  in  turn
influences both its behavior and possible future trajectories (Meyer 2004; Panebianco 1988;
Porta and Diani 2006, 153–54).
The chapter then provides a recapitulation of the findings, concluding that at the end of the
intifada, Hamas had successfully established itself as  the  religiously motivated, Palestinian
liberation  movement,  albeit  with  an  underdeveloped  and  weak  organization.  Finally,  and
based on the analyses and supplemented by additional data from interviews and the extant
literature,  the  chapter  concludes  with  a  brief  overview  of  Hamas’s  degree  of
institutionalization  at  the  end  of  the  intifada.  Measured  in  the  four-pronged  model  of
institutionalization suggested by Randall and Svåsand (2002a), it is argued that Hamas was
highly reified in the public imagination more or less from its inception, recognized by both its
supporters and detractors as a force to be reckoned with. Its level of systemness, however, was
still rather low, as indicated by its weak organizational state and dependence on its founding
leaders. Moreover, Hamas’s heavy reliance on the Jordanian Brotherhood during these first
years is taken to have effectively and markedly limited its decisional autonomy. Finally, and
as would be expected from a recently established militia,  Hamas was still  perceived as a
means to an end rather than an end in itself, meaning that it was not infused with value to any
notable extent.
 4.1 The establishment of Hamas
This first section will cover the establishment and early years of Hamas, beginning with a
brief  discussion  of  the  competing  historical  narratives  of  Hamas’s  creation.  Then,  the
founding of  Hamas will  be  analyzed as a  case of  social  movement  organization,  thereby
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providing  a  theoretically  grounded  account  of  its  early  development.  Crucially,  such  a
theoretically informed analysis promises to counter the tendency in the literature to focus on
the unique and peculiar aspects of Hamas, which undermines both the analytical quality and
comparability of previous studies (Robinson 2004).
 4.1.1  Competing narratives and the creation of Hamas
Hamas was established as a direct response to the outbreak of the first Palestinian  intifada.
This fact  is  uncontested,  in the  relevant  literature,  within Hamas,  and among its  political
opponents  (Caridi  2010;  Gunning  2008;  Hroub  2000;  Milton-Edwards  and  Farrell  2010;
Mishal and Sela 2000).190 And this is also where the consensus ends with regard to the early
history of Hamas. Whereas the competitors and enemies of Hamas—in particular Fatah—
claim that Hamas is an Israeli creation, Hamas itself traces its lineage of resistance directly
and  all  the  way  back  to  ‘Izz  al-Din  al-Qassam,  a  Syrian  cleric  fighting  for  Palestinian
liberation in the 1930s (Filiu 2012, 54–55). As for the literature, it is largely in agreement on
the main points, e.g., that Hamas was founded as a wing of the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza
to take part in the intifada.
For Fatah it is rational—at least in the short term—to promote a historical narrative that puts
their domestic nemesis in league with Israel. And their version of history goes roughly as
follows: The strength and cohesion of the PLO was such that it at times threatened the Israeli
occupation. This prompted the occupier to do as occupiers have done to its occupied for ages,
adopt a strategy of divide et impera. By establishing—or in the more modest versions of the
history, assist in establishing or allow for the establishment of—Hamas, Israel successfully
drove  a  wedge  between  the  different  Palestinian  factions,  dividing  their  leaders,  thus
weakening them all, and thereby making it easier to uphold and manage the occupation. And
despite vehement protests from Hamas, there is some merit to this version of history. In short,
the Muslim Brotherhood was largely free to operate its  auxiliary organizations within the
occupied territories throughout the 1980s, and its members had almost unrestricted freedom of
movement. This stands in stark contrast to the way in which Israel treated the nationalists,
whose  members  were  often  persecuted  and  imprisoned,  and  whose  organizations  were
outlawed  (Shadid  1988,  674–75).191 There  are  also  some  Israeli  sources  supporting  this
190 In all the interviews in which the topic of Hamas’s establishment came up, the interviewees—whether from
Hamas or not—agreed that the movement was established as a direct response to the first intifada.
191 Following the Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip in 1967, it took the IDF four years and immense military
resources to pacify and root out the nationalist resistance there.  Tens of thousands of Palestinians were
forced to relocate, thousands were imprisoned, and hundreds of resistance fighters were killed (Filiu 2012,
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version of events, such as IDF commander of the Gaza Strip, Zvi Poleg, who is on record
claiming that
Hamas was set up by us, in the mid-1980s, as a competitive movement to the
PLO.  The  idea  was  that  Hamas  would  carry  out  cultural,  educational,  and
humanitarian activities. Within a few months the movement became more militant
and began leading the violent resistance, including the use of guns against the IDF
(quote  from interview  in  Mideast  Mirror,  December  15,  1994,  reproduced  in
Robinson 2004, 137).
Others attempt to moderate Israel’s responsibility in creating Hamas, but admit openly that
they allowed the Brotherhood to operate far more freely than the PLO factions, exactly in the
hope  that  a  strong,  Islamist  movement  could  counterbalance  the  PLO  and  make  the
Palestinians  within the  occupied territories  more easily  ruled  (see  e.g.,  quotes  in  Higgins
2009). In social movement theory parlance,192 this tactic pursued by the Israelis led to an
opening in the political opportunity structures for the Brotherhood. In his analysis of Hamas
as a social movement organization, Robinson argues that the “political space provided [by
Israel] to the Muslim Brotherhood throughout the 1980s was critical to the development of the
Islamist movement in Palestine” (2004, 124).193
While Hamas naturally disagrees with the parts of this narrative that puts them in league with
Israel,  it  is  impossible  to  deny  that  the  movement  historically  did  receive  preferential
treatment.194 For one, it is well documented that the immediate organizational forerunner to
Hamas, the Islamic Center,195 was established by the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood in
Gaza in 1973, first with the tacit approval of the Israelis, and from 1979 with legal status
granted  by  the  occupation  (Abu-Amr  1994a,  16;  Filiu  2012,  64;  Sayigh  1997,  628–29).
Understandably, Hamas members prefer to ignore or touch only briefly upon this aspect of
63).
192 See, for example, Tarrow (2011, 32).
193 Robinson points to the victory of the Likud party in Israel in 1977 as the explanation for this  divide et
impera strategy toward the Palestinians, and thus also as a key factor leading to the creation of Hamas
(2004, 123).
194 Indeed, some Hamas  cadres have expressed a sort of gratitude for Israel’s naïvety vis-à-vis the Muslim
Brotherhood in this period. For example, Muhammad Nazzal, Hamas’s representative in Jordan, said in an
interview with Robinson that Israel “thought its security was enhanced by allowing us to grow, without
thinking what might happen down the road” (1997, 157). See also the section Hamas at the end of the first
intifada on pp. 136–138.
195 In Arabic the name of the Center was al-Mujamma al-Islami, by some authors, e.g., Sayigh (1997, 628–
29), translated as the Islamic Complex.
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their history. And when they do mention the 1973 establishment of the Islamic Center, it is
portrayed as a premeditated decision that would lead to the establishment of an organization
such as Hamas.196
What is often highlighted when Hamas members retell their history is the alleged tradition in
the  Brotherhood  for  resisting  the  Israeli  occupation.  Admittedly,  the  Egyptian  Muslim
Brotherhood did train and dispatch soldiers to fight in the 1948 war against Israel (El-Awaisi
1998; Mitchell 1969, 55–58), and a number of famous Palestinian resistance fighters were
initially members of the Brotherhood in Gaza. However, the Brothers who fought in the 1948
war were few and achieved little success. Furthermore, while people like Khalil al-Wazir and
Salah Khalaf, better known by their  noms de guerre Abu Jihad and Abu Iyad, were indeed
members in the Brotherhood in the 1950s (Filiu 2012, 60; Hadi 2006, 111 and 205), they left
because the Brotherhood refused to take up arms against the resistance (Shadid 1988, 662).
Instead,  they  joined  Yasser  Arafat—himself  close  to  but  probably  not  a  member  of  the
Brotherhood—to found Fatah.197 So, while there are grains of truth in the Hamas narrative
emphasizing the early role of the Brotherhood in resisting the Israeli occupation, their claim
of an unbroken tradition of  resistance in the Islamic movement  in  Palestine  is  clearly an
exaggeration.
Another point emphasized in the Hamas narrative was the decision made by Sheikh Yassin
and the Islamic Center to begin military work in the early 1980s.198 In particular, they point to
the imprisonment of Sheikh Yassin in June of 1984 as proof of their resistance against the
occupation. He was captured by Israel following their discovery of a small weapons cache in
a mosque in Gaza. These weapons, however, were intended to aid the Brotherhood in their
ongoing fight against other Palestinian movements (Filiu 2012, 65).199 Among others, Shadid
convincingly argues that the Brotherhood saw the Islamization of society as a prerequisite for
the coming liberation of Palestine. This prioritization of goals in turn led the Brotherhood to
define  secularization  as  a  major  obstacle  to  the  return  to  Islam,  and  consequently  their
immediate  fight  was with  the  communists  and  nationalists,  not  Israel  and the occupation
(1988, 680). As such, Hamas’s version of events in this period is somewhat at odds with
196 This was the case, for example, in one interview with Hamas leader Dr. Mohammad Ghazal (interviewed in
Nablus, September 29, 2011). 
197 According to Sayigh, “his exact status as supporter or member remains uncertain,” but it is clear that he
was close to the Brotherhood (1997, 81).
198 Dr. Mohammad Ghazal, interviewed in Nablus, September 29, 2011.
199 Both  Shadid  (1988) and  Sayigh  (1997,  629),  among  others,  mention  and document  how the  Muslim
Brotherhood and their affiliates used violence against other Palestinian movements in the early 1980s.
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documented  history,  effectively  questioning  the  validity  of  their  narrative  of  being  the
continuation of a long and unbroken Islamic tradition of resisting Israel.
In addition to the obvious—that the early history of Hamas is contested—the above provides
important insights into the self-perception of Hamas, and consequently indications as to how
the identity within Hamas was created. It is argued here that the widespread belief within
Hamas that it constitutes the last incarnation of Islamic resistance movements in Palestine is
indicative of a skillful  construction of a historical narrative as a mechanism to produce a
collective identity  (Porta and Diani 2006, 95–96). By exaggerating their ancestors’ role in
fighting  Israel,  Hamas  is  effectively  tapping  into  the  main  source  of  identity  formation
available to Palestinians, namely the occupation itself.
 4.1.2  The founding of a social movement organization
The following pages will account for the deliberations leading up to the decision to establish
Hamas, demonstrating that far from being a clear-cut decision—neither by the Brotherhood
itself nor Israel—the creation of Hamas was instead largely a result of certain openings in the
political  opportunity  structures,  followed  by  exploitation  of  the  available  mobilizing
structures, and the successful framing of Islamic ideology and popular political positions. 
  Exploiting the opportunities
Large demonstrations erupted in Gaza following a road accident there on December 8, 1987,
involving an Israeli truck and Palestinian fatalities (Sayigh 1997, 607). Known as the intifada
(uprising),200 the  riots  rapidly  spread  throughout  the  occupied  Palestinian  territories,
mobilizing  an  unprecedented  number  of  Palestinians  to  protest  the  Israeli  occupation.201
According to Robinson,  the outbreak of the  intifada was the “most important change in the
political  opportunity  structure”  leading  to  the  creation  of  Hamas.  He  argues  that  “[t]he
Intifada provided the opportunity for the second stratum [in the Brotherhood] and its Islamist
ideology to come to the organizational fore, leading directly to the creation of Hamas” (2004,
125).202
200 Intifada literally  means “shaking off”,  but  is  usually  translated  as  “uprising”  or  “rebellion.”  The first
intifada lasted from 1987 until the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993.
201 For analyses of the causes and catalysts prompting the first intifada, see for example Abu-Amr (1994a, 53–
58) and Sayigh (1997, 607–37).
202 Robinson identifies three additional changes in the political opportunity structures “that directly enhanced
Hamas’s opportunity to organize and mobilize” (2004, 123), namely (1) changes in Israeli policies toward
the PLO in the late 1970s that indirectly benefited the Islamist movement (2004, 123–24); (2) the rise of
political Islam in the greater Middle East, most saliently exemplified by the Iranian revolution in 1978 and
the emergence of Hezbollah in Lebanon in the early 1980s, which proved that Islam could be a viable
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For the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, the outbreak of the  intifada was at first seen as a
challenge, not an opportunity. Most of the traditional leaders in the Brotherhood thought they
should keep with their current strategy of political abstention, continuing their efforts to create
“the preconditions for an Islamic moral code” through the institutions of the Islamic Center
(Taraki 1989, 173).203 Others, in particular the younger and more radical activists, argued that
the  Brotherhood should  change  their  modus operandi and  join  the  intifada as  an  Islamic
alternative to the secular PLO (Abu-Amr 1994a, 66–7; Sayigh 1997, 630).
One argument for joining the intifada was to counter the competition for the growing Islamic
constituency posed by the Islamic Jihad (Kristianasen 1999, 20; Milton-Edwards 1996, 145).
As a breakaway group from the Muslim Brotherhood, Islamic Jihad began violent resistance
against the Israeli occupation already in the early 1980s (Abu-Amr 1994a, 90–127), a strategy
the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Center had been reluctant to employ (Gunning 2008,
38; Robinson 2004, 122).204 Tied to this was the argument that the Brotherhood needed to
consolidate  their  steadily  increasing  influence,  something  they  could  not  do  by  peaceful
means during a popular and violent uprising (Burgat 2003, 117; Milton-Edwards 1996, 146;
Tamimi 2007, 52).
The  potential  political  and  military  consequences  of  participating  in  the  intifada was  an
important counterargument, and the Brotherhood recognized that the Islamic Center and its
network of social and welfare institutions was at stake if the intifada failed (Abu-Amr 1993,
11). Furthermore, most of the traditional leadership in the Brotherhood remained convinced
that the Islamization of Palestinian society had to precede any liberation efforts, and they were
consequently opposed or at least reluctant to join the intifada. This generational schism had
developed  throughout  the  1980s,  pitting  an  increasingly  impatient  young  guard  favoring
political action and active resistance against an old guard advocating patience, quiescence,
and Islamization (Robinson 2004, 121–22).205
political force  (2004, 124–25); and finally (3) the Oslo Accords signed between the PLO and Israel in
1993, the eventual failure of which proved to be a blessing for Hamas (2004, 125–26).
203 In short, and despite taking a more active role in Palestinian society from the 1970s, the Brotherhood’s
modus operandi did not differ much from the bottom-up approach of Islamization as a prerequisite for the
creation of an Islamic state as originally advocated by Hassan al-Banna.
204 As mentioned, the Brotherhood already had begun military action by the start of the intifada. Already in the
mid-1980s,  Brotherhood leaders,  including  Sheikh  Ahmed  Yassin,  who later  founded  and  was  widely
considered the spiritual leader of Hamas,  were arrested after  a weapons cache was exposed by Israeli
intelligence (Filiu 2012, 65).
205 Describing the socioeconomic background of the leaders of the Islamist movements in the Middle East,
including  Hamas,  Robinson  argues  that  they  “have  virtually  the  same social  profile  as  those  who,  a
generation earlier, agitated in favor of Ba’thism, Nasserism, and Arab socialism” (2004, 117).
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It was finally decided by the leaders of the Islamic Center that the Brotherhood should join
the  intifada through an armed proxy, Hamas  (Milton-Edwards 1996, 146; Robinson 2004,
122–23). Participating in the intifada through a proxy and not under their own banner allowed
the Brotherhood—at least in theory—to deny any involvement with the  intifada, avoid the
reprisals from Israel, and thus protect their infrastructure of social and welfare institutions
(Mishal and Sela 2000, 35). The decision to establish Hamas and join in the intifada was not a
unanimous one,  however.  Rather,  the  decision was made by a handful  of  middle-stratum
leaders  in  Gaza  led  by  Sheikh  Ahmed  Yassin,  effectively  staging  a  “palace  coup”  by
establishing Hamas and marginalizing the more quietist old guard (Robinson 2004, 123).
The  importance  of  this  generational  cleavage  within  the  Palestinian  Brotherhood  for  the
creation of Hamas has been reiterated by numerous authors.206 Caridi, for example, argues that
Hamas’s birth took place as a kind of coup within the Muslim Brotherhood: a
generational  and  social  coup,  an  ascent  to  power  by  that  increasing  wing  of
militants made of refugees,  their descendents,  and of new young professionals
who had reached political maturity in Egyptian and Palestinian universities (2010,
64).207
Interviewees close to the Brotherhood and Hamas account for the establishment of the latter
in similar ways. Dr. Nashat Aqtash, for instance, used the term “revolution” to describe how
Hamas was founded from within the Muslim Brotherhood. Himself a former member of the
Brotherhood, Dr. Aqtash went on to claim that, while Sheikh Ahmed Yassin was important for
the founding of Hamas, “he was only a spiritual leader. The real leaders were the younger
generation of the Muslim Brotherhood.”208
In sum, it is argued here that the two most important exogenous factors leading to the creation
of Hamas can be interpreted as openings and changes in the political opportunity structures.
First, the lenient position Israel had vis-à-vis the Brotherhood throughout the 1980s enabled
the rise of a new generation of more radical Islamists, and second, the outbreak of the intifada
206 “The  oldest  generation  consists  mainly  of  religious  leaders  with  little  influence  on  decision-making.
Members of the second generation, which came of age during the First Intifada, hold most of the senior
leadership positions in Hamas today. The third generation is the most  radical,  and maintains ties with
Salafist Islamist groups both inside and outside the Gaza Strip” (Fattouh, paraphrased in Wikileaks cable
2010a).
207 Caridi also quotes Imad al-Fauji, a former Brother who allegedly was expelled for being too moderate, as
saying that “the young people in the movement were violent and rebellious. They sometimes engaged in
actions  without  consulting  the  traditional  leadership,  which  was  not  fully  convinced  of  the  need  for
confrontation” (interviewed by Rashwan [2007], 2010, 64–65).
208 Interviewed in Ramallah, April 11, 2011.
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itself proved to be the necessary opportunity for this new echelon of leaders to take over the
movement and pursue a more proactive and political strategy (Robinson 2004, 123–25).
  Religious mobilizing structures
While Hamas’s role in the  intifada  is one factor explaining the movement’s popularity, it
seems reasonable to assume that the increasing religiosity among Palestinians also played into
its rise to prominence. Representing an Islamist alternative to the secular-nationalists headed
by  Fatah,  Hamas  could  easily  make  use  of  the  increasing  numbers  of  religious—and
politically  disenfranchised—Palestinians  as  their  very  own  constituency  (Abu-Amr  1993;
Gunning 2008, 39; Knudsen 2005a, 1382–84; Robinson 1997, 149). More specifically, it has
been argued that the rising number of mosques in the occupied Palestinian territories and the
highly professionalized social and welfare institutions associated with the Islamic movement
were crucial for Hamas’s rising legitimacy and popularity (Abu-Amr 1994a, 15–16; Robinson
2004, 126–29).
For Hamas, as for the Islamic movements elsewhere in the largely authoritarian Middle East,
the mosques function as semi-public spheres suitable for agitation and recruitment. Many of
the mosques in Gaza were built and controlled by the Islamic Center itself, and many of them
organized social and educational activities in addition to religious ones. The Islamic Center
also helped establish medical clinics, professional associations, and eventually labor unions,
all with an Islamic hue (Robinson 2004, 127).
The exact relationship between Hamas on the one hand, and the mosques, schools, nurseries,
clinics,  and  other  Islamic  charitable  organizations  on  the  other,  is  somewhat  contested.
Authors such as Levitt (2006) argue that the two are synonymous, and that Hamas relies on
the  various  charitable  organization—in  particular  the  zakat  committees—to  support  its
terrorist  activities.209 Others,  such  as  Benthall  (2010),  Roy  (2011),  Gunning  (2008),  and
Høigilt  (2010), provide a more nuanced picture. While these authors agree that the Islamic
charities and Hamas are part of the same “Islamic trend”  (Høigilt 2010, 7), and that there
might  be  overlap  of  personnel  in  certain  cases  (Gunning  2008,  115,  fn.  8),  they  also
emphasize that ideological affinity does not equal official affiliation (see e.g., Roy 2011, 141–
44).210 Rather, it should be noted that any charitable organization in the occupied territories
209 Zakat is an Islamic tax used throughout the Islamic world for redistributive purposes.
210 On a related topic, Kjøstvedt argues that “the majority of the Islamic women’s organisations on the West
Bank are isolated groups [and there] is therefore no reason to believe that these organisations constitute a
network of any kind, Hamas-affiliated or other” (2011, 3).
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would lose legitimacy and credibility if it was too closely associated with any one political
faction.
Regardless of the nature or existence of their ties to Hamas, the extensive network of mosques
and Islamic social  and educational  institutions  helped the movement  to expand and grow
(Abu-Amr 1993, 13–15; Tamimi 2007, 53). And while no formalized Islamic network as such
can be said to exist in the occupied territories, it is clear that the Islamization agenda pursued
by  the  many  Islamic  NGOs and  civil  society  organizations  there  all  function  directly  or
indirectly  as  mobilizing  structures  for  Hamas  (Roy 2011,  142–43).  As  such,  it  might  be
fruitful to see Hamas as a social movement organization tied to the larger and less organized
Islamic social movement in the occupied territories (Diani 1992, 13–15).
An exception to this “affinity, not affiliation” argument is found in the Islamist student lists.
Regarded  by  Robinson  as  one  of  the  best  examples  of  an  explicit  mobilizing  political
institution  for  Hamas  (Robinson  2004,  128),  the  Islamist  blocs  found  at  universities
throughout the occupied territories have worked almost as recruitment agencies for Hamas. In
the words of a student activists at Birzeit University, “those who join the Islamic Bloc at
university  often  become  Hamas  when  graduating.”211 Another,  somewhat  older  student
activist, claimed to hold dual memberships, both in Hamas and the Islamic bloc.212
Combined, the mobilizing structures provided to Hamas by the various Islamic organizations
aided the movement in its expansion, enabling it, in the course of just a few years, to eclipse
first  the  Islamic  Center  and  eventually  outgrow  and  co-opt  the  Palestinian  Muslim
Brotherhood’s organizational infrastructure (Abu-Amr 1993, 5; Robinson 2004, 123).213
  Hamas’s stated aims interpreted as frames
Underlining Hamas’s Islamist roots, the 1988 Charter proclaims its ultimate goal  is to raise
“the banner of Allah on every inch of Palestine”214 and establish an Islamic state throughout
what  are  today  Israel  and  the  Palestinian  territories.  Defining  Palestine  as  an  eternal,
indivisible waqf (Islamic trust), the Charter further admonishes that it is the obligation of all
Muslims to protect and liberate Palestine from oppressors and aggressors, and that to give up
any part of Palestine would be tantamount to forfeiting Islam. According to Robinson, this use
211 Anonymous Islamic Bloc activists interviewed on the West Bank, October 2011.
212 Anonymous Hamas member, interviewed on the West Bank, October 2011.
213 See  Burton  (2012,  533–34) for  further  details  on  Hamas’s  use  of  education  as  a  strategic  tool  for
recruitment and indoctrination.
214 All quotations from the Charter are taken from Maqdsi’s (1993) translation.
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of waqf is a prime example of successful cultural framing (2004, 130). Hamas skillfully fuses
its nationalistic and religious aims into one effective frame, reaping the support both from the
religiously inclined Palestinians and those who for nationalistic reasons were disappointed in
Fatah and the PLO.
In the same vein, Hamas also refuses to  “[r]ecognise the Zionist existence” or “[c]ede the
larger part of Palestine to the Zionist entity” (Hroub 2000, 293). These statements should be
seen in light of the 1988 PLO declaration of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, a
move that in effect meant Palestinian recognition of the State of Israel, and a surrender of
most  of  historic  Palestine  to  the  Israelis  (Muslih  1990).  By  positioning  itself  firmly  in
opposition to the accommodating strategy pursued by Fatah and the PLO, Hamas in effect
submitted its bid to become the new standard-bearer of the Palestinian nationalist project.
Importantly, the delimited territorial claim to Palestine constitutes somewhat of a departure
from Hamas’s Islamist ideological heritage, which by and large rejects the notion that any
territory is more sacred than another.215 This, in turn, further supports the interpretation of
Hamas’s  territorial  claims  as  political  and  not  religiously  motivated.  Similarly,  when  the
Charter states that Hamas’s nationalism “is part and parcel of [its] religious ideology [and
based  on]  material,  humanistic,  and  geographical  ties,”  the  movement  also  ignores  the
traditional  condemnation  of  racially  or  nationally  based  identity  found  in  much  Islamist
thought (Nusse 1998, 47–52).216 However, by utilizing the language of nationalism, Hamas is
well positioned to tap into the national aspirations of Palestinians. And by claiming that the
nationalist project pursued by the PLO has failed because it is secular and thus by definition
ignores the Islamic nature of Palestine, Hamas went on to frame Palestinian nationalism as an
Islamic  project—that  again  enables  Hamas  to  tap  into  both  the  increasingly  religious
segments  of  the Palestinian population and those disappointed with Fatah and other  PLO
factions (Robinson 2004, 134–35).
Hamas’s Charter also asserts that “[t]here is no solution to the Palestinian Problem except by
jihad,” and that attempts to solve the conflict with Israel through negotiations are futile. This
call for jihad and an uncompromising stance toward negotiations are often taken as proof of
215 Naturally, most Islamist movements accept the existence of the states in which they operate, but in general
their  ultimate  aim is  not  to  create  territorially  bounded  Islamic  states,  but  rather  to  recreate  a  larger
Caliphate (Brubaker 2012, 13).
216 For Islamists, Islam should of course constitute the main identity marker, which goes counter to the nature
of  nationalist  identities.  Indeed,  Islamists  are  often  considered  to  be  explicitly  “anti-nationalist  [or]
supra-national” (Brubaker 2012, 14).
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both Hamas’s  extremism and religiosity.  However,  these  positions  are  here  interpreted as
religious framings of Hamas’s political and strategic positions, i.e., opposition to negotiations
and armed resistance as  the  preferred strategy against  the  Israeli  occupation of  Palestine.
Much  of  Hamas’s  early  communiqués  and  documents  contain  such  a  religious-political
duality.
In a 1993 communiqué entitled Hamas introductory memorandum, the organization provided
a  summary of  its  ideological  basis  and established its  identity  as  a  religiously  motivated
liberation movement:
Hamas  is  a  popular  struggle  movement  that  seeks  to  liberate  Palestine  in  its
entirety from the Mediterranean Sea to the River Jordan. It bases its ideology and
policies on the teachings of Islam and it juridical tradition … Hamas believes that
the ongoing conflict between the Arabs and Muslims and the Zionists in Palestine
is a fateful civilizational struggle incapable of being brought to an end without
eliminating its cause, namely, the Zionist settlement of Palestine … Believing in
the sacredness of Palestine and its Islamic status, Hamas believes it impermissible
under  any circumstances  to  concede any part  of  Palestine  or  to  recognize the
legitimacy  of  the  Zionist  occupation  of  it  …  [T]he  principal  of  [a]  political
settlement, whatever its source and details, entails the capitulative acceptance of
the Zionist right of existence on a part of Palestine. Since this matter enters the
domain of Islamic jurisprudence, in our view it cannot be accepted. For Palestine
is a sacred Islamic land that has been forcibly seized by the Zionists, and it is the
duty of all Muslims to conduct a holy struggle to regain it and to expel the invader
from it.217
In  short,  it  is  argued  here  that  Hamas  from  the  outset  proved  to  be  quite  capable  of
popularizing  its  ideology  and  strategic  positions.  By  fusing  Islamic  concepts  that  had
increasing reach in Palestinian society with already popular political goals, Hamas skillfully
constructed frames that resonated well in the occupied territories. It is noteworthy that these
frames were constructed to maximize and not consolidate support. This means that from its
early beginnings, Hamas saw itself as a potential mass-movement, aspiring and laboring to
garner enough legitimacy and support to eventually take their rightful place at the center of
Palestinian politics (Taraki 1989, 177).
217 Translated and reproduced in Hroub (2000, 292–301).
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 4.2 The building and rebuilding of an organization
As  explicated  above,  Hamas  inherited  an  almost  ready-made  ideology  from the  Muslim
Brotherhood. To carve out an identity as the religious liberation movement for Palestinians, it
needed only to reframe the Islamist ideas and goals of the Brotherhood to better conform to
the local Palestinian context (Randall 2007, 645). Exactly how Hamas was organized during
these first years, however, remains somewhat vague and unclear, and as a consequence so are
the details of its decision-making procedures. This is so partly because the volatile and violent
situation brought about by the intifada has had negative implications for the reliability of the
historical data from this period, and further because of the secretive and clandestine nature of
Hamas.
It seems likely, however, that Hamas relied on what was left of the organizational structure of
the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip. Initially, the Brotherhood there was organized
vertically, with cells (called usra, meaning family) as the basic organizational unit, a couple of
cells constituting a branch (shuba), and with the General Administrative Center running the
day-to-day affairs under the auspices of the Consultative Council (Majlis al-Shura). Because
the movement was banned in Gaza by Israel, however, it functioned mainly on the cell level
from 1967, with the remaining layers existing in name only (Shadid 1988, 664). The lack of a
coordinating leadership was eventually filled by the Islamic Center, which in turn also formed
the backbone of the early leadership in Hamas (Milton-Edwards 1996, 151).
Under the initial  leadership of  Sheikh Yassin,  Hamas was organized functionally in three
wings, (i) political, (ii) intelligence, and (iii) military (Milton-Edwards 1996, 148), and with
Gaza divided into five sub-districts, each with its own commander  (Mishal and Sela 2000,
58).218 Without the checks and balances of a traditional Brotherhood organization in place,
Sheikh Yassin and his colleagues were relatively free to formulate Hamas’s goals, strategy,
and  tactics  without  interference.  They  granted  each  cell  a  high  degree  of  operational
autonomy, however, in an attempt to protect their young and vulnerable movement through
organizational compartmentalization.219 This was meant to secure continued operation if or
when the leaders were arrested (Mishal and Sela 2000, 56).
218 These five districts were probably congruent with the branches (shuba) of the Muslim Brotherhood.
219 An organization in which the lower levels enjoy a high degree of autonomy can be labeled a “stratarchy”
(Katz and Mair 1995, 21), an organizational state of affairs characterized by a hierarchical or stratified
dispersion of organizational power and authority (Lasswell and Kaplan 1950, 219–20).
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As will  be  shown,  however,  these  early  organizational  designs  did  not  provide sufficient
protection for Hamas. The movement was close to being completely obliterated by Israel only
two years after it was founded (Tamimi 2007, 59). Furthermore, Hamas had still some way to
go  in  terms  of  organizational  development  after  being  established,  both  with  regard  to
geographic spread and bureaucratic capacity. Initially, Hamas operated mainly in and from
Gaza.  This  was where the  intifada  first  broke out  and spread,  and it  was also where the
movement was founded and had the most well-developed organization. Hamas also executed
operations on the West Bank in its early years, but because the Brotherhood there was less
inclined  to  take  part  in  the  intifada,  its  activities  were  initially  limited  (Robinson  1997,
150).220 In short, Gaza was both Hamas’s main base of operations and where its leadership
was located (Mishal and Sela 2000, 57).
 4.2.1  Persecution and organizational restructuring
The first major strikes against Hamas came in the movement’s second year. Until then, Israel
had largely accepted its  existence and even looked the  other  way as  Hamas orchestrated
protests and strikes in its competition with the PLO-affiliated Unified National Leadership of
the Uprising (UNLU) (Abu-Amr 1994a, 69).221 In April 1989, however, Hamas undertook its
first mission directed at Israel, kidnapping and murdering two Israeli soldiers. In May, Israel
responded by imprisoning some 250–300 of  its  members,  including Sheikh Yassin  and a
number  of  Hamas’s  military  commanders  (Milton-Edwards  1996,  152;  Robinson  1997,
156).222 Later that year Israel outlawed the movement, and again hundreds of its members
were arrested.223
The Israeli measures taken against Hamas in 1989 threatened to decapitate the movement,
forcing it to overhaul its organizational structure or risk being wiped out  (Mishal and Sela
2000,  58).  As  described  above,  Hamas  initially  had  a  compartmentalized  organizational
structure. The restructuring was overseen by the exiled Hamas leader Mousa Abu Marzook,
220 It should also be mentioned that Hamas faced much stronger competition from the secular PLO factions on
the West Bank than in Gaza (Gunning 2008, 31).
221 This is  not to  say that  Israel  did not  capture Hamas activists  during this  period,  only that  large-scale
persecution did not take place.
222 Sheikh  Yassin  was  sentenced  to  15  years  in  prison.  Hamas  leader  al-Zahhar  claims  the  number  of
imprisoned members was ten times as high (interviewed by Caridi 2010, 106–7), indicating yet again how
Hamas view suffering and persecution as tightly tied to legitimacy and credibility.
223 Different sources give different dates for when Hamas was outlawed. Mishal and Sela claim it was in June
(2000, 56), Robinson offers September 28 as the exact date (1997, 155), whereas Milton-Edwards states
that “[b]y December the organisation was prohibited and membership in it declared a punishable offence”
(1996, 153).
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who introduced a much stricter vertical hierarchy. Separate headquarters were established on
the  West  Bank  and  Gaza,  with  each  territory  divided  into  five  and  seven  sub-districts,
respectively.  Functionally,  the  intelligence  and  military  committees  were  merged,  with
religious indoctrination and coordination being added as separate committees in addition to
the  existing  political  one.  A separate  coordinating  body  was  also  set  up  to  manage  the
relationship between the branches in Gaza and on the West Bank, which in turn was ruled by
the senior leadership (Mishal and Sela 2000, 58).
Importantly, the decision to revamp the organizational structure was made by Hamas leaders
outside  Gaza,  many  of  whom  were  close  to  the  Jordanian  and  West  Bank  Brotherhood
(Mishal  and  Sela  2000,  58).224 The  new  organizational  structure  thus  marked  the  full
incorporation of the West Bank Brotherhood into Hamas, and highlights the close and strong
relationship  between  Hamas  and  the  Jordanian  Brotherhood  (Mishal  and  Sela  2000,  58;
Tamimi 2007, 72). Up until this restructuring, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and his colleagues in the
Gaza Strip had constituted the uncontested leadership of Hamas. But now, the power balance
tipped decisively in favor of the newly emerged external  leadership  (Caridi  2010, 108–9;
Tamimi 2007, 60).
Furthermore, it soon became clear that the rapid expansion of the organization throughout
Gaza and the West Bank during its early years had strained the organization’s underdeveloped
and provisional bureaucracy (Abu-Amr 1993, 13; Knudsen 2005a, 1376). The sheer number
of newly enlisted members, combined with continued persecution by Israel, made it obvious
that a stronger and more advanced bureaucracy was needed, preferably also with a presence
outside of the occupied territories  (Abu-Amr 1993, 11, 14; Mishal and Sela 2000, 56–57,
154–57; Tamimi 2007, 58–59, 66). And as will be detailed below, Hamas responded to this
need by establishing  two additional  organizational  units.  For  one,  and in  response to  the
persecution of its  political  leadership, Hamas created a new leadership body, the  Political
Bureau. Located in Amman, Jordan, this executive branch of Hamas’s topmost leadership was
for most intents and purposes the sole leadership for long periods in the early 1990s. And
second,  Hamas  also  isolated  its  militant  activities  by  creating  its  own  armed  wing,  the
al-Qassam Brigades.
224 The nature of the relationship between Hamas and the Brotherhood on the West Bank and Jordan during
these first years remains somewhat unclear.
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  Amman and the Political Bureau
There is widespread agreement in the literature that  Hamas’s presence in Amman, Jordan
from 1991–92 was of utmost importance for the organization’s survival. Because almost all of
its senior leaders were either imprisoned or deported by Israel in the early 1990s, the existing
domestic leadership was largely defunct at the time (Caridi 2010, 107; Tamimi 2007, 61). And
the supposedly secret and partly exiled Consultative Council was considered an insufficient
and  ineffective  leadership  even  by  members  of  Hamas.  For  example,  Ousama  Hamdan,
member of Hamas’s Political Bureau with responsibility for international affairs,  stated that
“back then, the Shura Council assembly [Consultative Council] did not function properly … It
was only later that it became more active.”225 In short, the building of a proper bureaucracy
outside the territories was urgently needed at that time.
Exactly how the office in Amman came to be, however, is still somewhat contested. The way
most Hamas members tell the story, it was a well-planned operation as they realized the need
for  an  operational  base  beyond  Israeli  reach.  Others  argue  that  it  was  more  of  a  lucky
coincidence. According to former Hamas leader and current minister of religious affairs in the
PA, Dr. Mahmoud Habbash, the establishment of a Hamas office in Amman was not planned
at all. He retells the story as follows:
The  movement  of  the  Muslim  Brotherhood  decided  to  send  a  delegation  to
Baghdad to speak with Saddam about  his invasion of  Kuwait.  They wanted a
member of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine. But who will say about himself
that he is the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine? No one! No one can! Because of
the occupation, anyone that says “I am a Muslim Brother,” he will be arrested! So,
they found a Palestinian member of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood named
Ibrahim  Ghousheh,  and  he  agreed  to  join  the  delegation  of  the  international
Muslim Brotherhood as a member of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood. And
when he went to Baghdad, he found himself the most important member of the
delegation because of how Saddam felt about Palestine. So by accident he became
a leader of the Palestinian Islamic Movement!
Habbash  claims  that  when  Hamas  members  now  say  that  they  carefully  planned  the
establishment of the Political Bureau, they are lying and only trying to place themselves and
225 Interviewed in Beirut, November 18, 2011. As discussed in Gunning (2008, 115), the Consultative Council
was ineffective as a leadership body because its members were spread throughout the region and could
only rarely meet in person.
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their movement in a positive light; he even calls Hamas’s own version of this part of their
history a joke.226
The version of how the political office in Amman came to be as retold by interviewed Hamas
members by and large lend credence to Dr. Habbash’s claim that the movement consistently
and consciously has sugarcoated its own history. According to Ousama Hamdan, for example,
the  establishment  of  a  Hamas  office  in  Amman  seemed  very  organized.  He  stated  that
“Hamas’s  presence  in  Jordan was according to  our  agreement  arranged in  1992 between
Hamas represented by Dr. Mousa Abu Marzook and Jordan at that time represented by the
Prime Minister  Zaid ibn Shaker.”227 It  is of course in the interests  of Hamas members to
project an image of their organizational development as conscious, planned, and professional.
Similarly, it can be argued that it is in the interest of former Hamas members such as Dr.
Habbash  to  undermine  this  version  of  events.  Regardless  of  whether  it  was  pre-planned,
Hamas arguably utilized its presence in Amman well.
For, as a direct response to Hamas’s dire need for an operative leadership,  the organization
used its representatives in Amman as the basis to establish a political bureau (Hroub 2006b,
118). Consisting of approximately ten members appointed by the Consultative Council, the
idea was that this Political Bureau should function as the executive branch of Hamas, dealing
with the day-to-day management of the organization in an effective and efficient manner, and
—importantly—beyond Israel’s  reach.  The  larger  and  more  slow-moving  Consultative
Council  would  for  its  part  be  left  in  charge  of  the  ideological  and  principally  important
decisions (Hroub 2000, 58; Mishal and Sela 2000, 161–62).228
It  should  be  emphasized that  Hamas deliberately  kept  the  exact  relationship  between the
Consultative Council and the Political Bureau opaque. Both the decision-making processes
and the division of labor and responsibility between the two are kept secret. The justification
for this complexity and secrecy relies on the logic of security-through-obscurity; not knowing
who or how Hamas makes its decisions renders it harder for its enemies to effectively target
the organization (Hroub 2000, 58; Mishal and Sela 2000, 154, 158).
226 Interviewed in Ramallah, May 27, 2011.
227 Interviewed in Beirut, November 18, 2011.
228 The founding of the Political Bureau was part of the restructuring efforts led by Mousa Abu Marzook
(Mishal and Sela 2000, 58–59), and he also served as its first leader until his arrest in the US in 1995
(Caridi 2010, 110; Zaboun 2009).
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The  formalization  of  an  executive  leadership  in  Amman  was  what  essentially  tipped  the
internal power balance away from the weakened domestic leadership and toward the exiled
Political  Bureau  (Caridi  2010,  110).  Importantly,  much  of  the  Political  Bureau’s
organizational influence depended on its good relations to the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood,
who for its part enjoyed a certain amount of political influence in Jordan in the early 1990s.
As  a  result,  the  Political  Bureau initially  had  generous  room  for  political  maneuvering.
Exploiting this, it was able to provide its domestic counterparts inside the occupied territories
with weapons for the continuing intifada. Likewise, the Political Bureau developed the overall
fund-raising capabilities of Hamas, which allowed for the continued implementation of social
and  welfare  programs  inside  occupied  Palestine.  In  addition  to  channeling  weapons  and
money into the occupied territories, the external leadership also established relationships with
countries and movements in the Arab world, Europe, and the US that were sympathetic to
their cause (Mishal and Sela 2000, 87–88; Tamimi 2007, 61, 72–78).229
While the establishment of the Political Bureau in Amman was a response to the persecution
Hamas suffered in 1989–1991 at the hands of the IDF inside the occupied territories, it came
to play an even more crucial role for the survival of the organization than initially intended. In
late  1992,  Hamas  intensified  its  military  activities,  killing  six  Israeli  soldiers  inside  the
occupied territories in December alone. On December 13, Hamas militants kidnapped an IDF
soldier inside Israel, planning to exchange him for Sheikh Ahmed Yassin who remained in
Israeli captivity. Although the exact details of the mission and the aftermath remain fuzzy,
what is clear is that the IDF soldier for some reason was killed almost immediately. This left
Hamas without any bargaining chips, thus rendering the initial plan obsolete. Israel responded
to the kidnapping and killing of its soldier by launching a massive crackdown on Palestinian
militants, arresting some 1 300 people in the span of a few hours. Some days later,  Israel
deported 415 Islamic resistance fighters to a “security zone” in southern Lebanon  (Caridi
2010, 111–12).
The deportation was illegal according to the Supreme Court in Israel (Caridi 2010, 111), and
naturally provoked an international outcry. Even a unanimous UN Security Council (UNSC)
signed Resolution 799, strongly condemning Israel’s actions and demanding that Israel, “the
229 Finance and environmental relations are two crucial zones of uncertainty, i.e.,  “areas of organizational
unpredictability [on which the] survival and functioning of the organization depend”  (Panebianco 1988,
33). Control of such zones of uncertainty is in turn considered a “resource that is ‘spendable’ in the internal
power games” of any given party or organization  (Panebianco 1988, 33–35), and thus helps explain the
dominant position of the Political Bureau.
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occupying Power, ensure the safe and immediate return to the occupied territories of all those
deported”  (UNSC  1992).  Only  in  the  fall  of  1993  did  Israel  relent  and  transported  the
deportees back to their place of origin in the occupied territories (Caridi 2010, 114).
The deportation of the remaining Hamas leaders not already imprisoned by Israel naturally
had  serious  ramifications  for  the  organization’s  decision-making  capabilities  within  the
occupied territories. If the mass arrest of 1989 had threatened to decapitate Hamas, the events
of late 1992 effectively obliterated the domestic leadership. So, while Hamas initially had
come to increasingly rely on its exiled Political Bureau, it became completely dependent on it
after the deportations in 1992. In essence, then, the establishment and continued operation of
the  Political  Bureau  in  Amman  was  crucial  for  Hamas’s  survival,  not  only  as  a  welfare
provider in occupied Palestine and a participant in the ongoing intifada, but as a movement
organization still in its infancy (Mishal and Sela 2000, 96–97; Tamimi 2007, 60–67).
  A militant proxy with an armed wing
Hamas responded to the organizational challenges posed by Israel’s crackdowns by separating
its  military  operations  from the  political  and  social  work.  Sometime  in  1991  or  1992,230
Hamas founded the al-Qassam Brigades as its military wing, complete with decision-making
capabilities and an infrastructure of its own. This enabled Hamas to carry out attacks inside
Israel, independent of the current whereabouts or status of the political leadership  (Chehab
2007, 43, 53, 67; Hroub 2000; Mishal and Sela 2000, 64–66).231
It is noteworthy that Hamas—itself created as a militant proxy for the Muslim Brotherhood
only years before—already felt compelled to isolate its political leadership from the ongoing
intifada. This indicates that Hamas already had evolved into a full-blown social movement
organization with more encompassing goals and a comprehensive portfolio than that  of a
militant proxy. In short, the establishment of the al-Qassam Brigades suggests that Hamas
performed  functions  as  a  social  movement  organization  that  needed  defending  from  the
inevitable  repercussions  provoked  by  its  military  activities  (Gunning  2008,  40).  And  as
relayed by former Palestinian Brother and Hamas leader, Dr. Mahmoud Habbash, Hamas had
indeed  outgrown  the  Muslim  Brotherhood  by  1990  and  eclipsed  its  parent  organization
sometime  in  1991:  “The  Muslim  Brotherhood  disappeared.  Now,  you  can’t  differentiate
230 Various authors provide different dates for the founding of the al-Qassam Brigades, but most seem to agree
that it happened sometime between 1991 and 1992 (e.g., Gunning 2008, 40).
231 For a detailed history and discussion of the al-Qassam Brigades, see chapter 3 in Chehab’s book  Inside
Hamas: The Untold Story of Militants, Martyrs and Spies (2007).
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between Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine.”232 Another former Brother, Dr.
Aqtash, corroborated his claim, stating that he could “100 percent guarantee that there is no
more Muslim Brotherhood organization left in Palestine. It disappeared sometime during the
first intifada.”233
Similar to the rationale behind the creation of Hamas itself, then, the al-Qassam Brigades was
established  as  a  separate  and  clandestine  military  wing  both  because  a  specialized
organizational unit would be better suited to manage and survive the periodic crackdowns
from Israel, and to provide the civil and political wing more leeway  (Abu-Amr 1993, 13;
Hroub 2004, 23). Following the separation, the political leadership of Hamas has claimed—
although with limited credibility—that the al-Qassam Brigades carry out military operations
without the leadership’s direct involvement (Mishal and Sela 2000, 159).234
Just as Hamas has kept the relationship between the  Consultative Council and the  Political
Bureau opaque,  it  is  likewise  difficult  to  ascertain  the  exact  command structure  between
Hamas proper and the al-Qassam Brigades. Although some authors, notably Levitt  (2006),
claim that there is no real distinction between Hamas and the al-Qassam Brigades, others,
such as Gunning (2008, 40–41), Hroub (2006b, 121–22), and Mishal and Sela (2000, 159), all
argue that the Brigades from the beginning was subjugated to the political leadership, and in
particular the Political Bureau, which remained in control of much of the financial flows. At
the same time, it is widely assumed that the Brigades from the beginning was provided with
room to  operate  freely,  exactly  so  that  imprisoned  political  leaders  could  not  reveal  any
operative details when detained by Israel (Caridi 2010, 142).
It  should be noted that the relatively high degree of autonomy enjoyed by the al-Qassam
Brigades indirectly allowed for a number of “strategic mistakes” to take place in 1992–1993,
suggesting a lack of discipline within Hamas (Mishal and Sela 2000, 159–60). In essence, the
persistent  persecution  of  the  political  leadership  allowed  the  younger  recruits  to  gain  a
disproportionate amount of influence within Hamas inside the occupied territories, exploiting
the stratified structure of Hamas and further weakening the hierarchical command structure.
Furthermore, as many if not most of these younger recruits joined Hamas exactly to resist the
Israeli  occupation,  they  naturally  found  their  place  within  the  al-Qassam  Brigades.235
232 Interviewed in Ramallah, May 27, 2011.
233 Interviewed in Ramallah, April 11, 2011.
234 Although more countries designate the al-Qassam Brigades as a terrorist organization than do Hamas, most
of the great powers do not distinguish between the two.
235 Numerous interviewed Hamas cadres admitted to joining the organization with the intention of resisting the
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Combined with the Brigade’s autonomy, then, these developments “help explain the frequent
irregularities in Hamas’s hierarchical order and even the violations of its official leadership’s
policies” (Mishal and Sela 2000, 159).
 4.2.2  A rudimentary organizational structure
To  recapitulate,  Hamas  was  initially  rather  informally  organized,  relying  heavily  on  its
charismatic founders such as Sheikh Ahmed Yassin for authority and decision-making (Mishal
and Sela 2000, 153). The original leadership also granted the local branches a high degree of
autonomy. This federated and stratified organizational structure was a legacy from the Gaza
Brotherhood days, and was retained by Hamas as it would allow it to continue operating even
if  other  branches  were  dissolved  by  Israel.236 However,  the  harsh  Israeli  response  to  the
ongoing uprising came to threaten Hamas’s very survival in the early 1990s. In response, it
took a number of steps to strengthen and institutionalize its organization, so that it no longer
would depend on any one particular leader. For one, Hamas established its Political Bureau
abroad to ensure that whatever happened to its domestic leaders, the organization would still
have  an  operative  leadership.237 Importantly,  the  founding  of  the  Political  Bureau was
accompanied by the formalization of a hierarchical organizational structure. Second, Hamas
also tried to protect its political and social work by separating its militant activities into a
distinct organizational unit. Ostensibly, this armed wing, the al-Qassam Brigades, operates
autonomously from the political  leadership but  in accordance with the overall  strategy of
Hamas.238
Israeli occupation, notably former Fatah activist and prominent Hamas leader Muhammad Hassan Abu Tir
(interviewed in Ramallah, April 21, 2011) and Hamas MP Dr. Ayman Daraghme (interviewed in Ramallah,
April 10, May 18, and September 27, 2011).
236 The  federated dimension  means  that  the  various  geographical  branches  were  given  operational  and
strategic leeway to adjust and prioritize goals and strategies to best fit their particular context, whereas the
stratified dimension means that the lower organizational units retain a high degree of autonomy, although
they remain subjugated to the higher strata (Katz and Mair 1995, 18, 21).
237 By establishing its  Political Bureau abroad, Hamas’s organizational order came to resemble that of the
PLO, which for most of its history was led from abroad (Cobban 1984). Other liberation movements were
similarly organized, e.g., the South African ANC during the apartheid period.
238 The political leadership isolated itself from the activities of the al-Qassam Brigades, although there has
been some overlap in personnel between the political and armed wing, most importantly exemplified by
Salah Shehadeh, co-founder of Hamas and leader of the al-Qassam Brigades for many years (Hadi 2006,
187–88). Likewise, Fathi Hammad from Gaza has been identified as being both a political leader and an
al-Qassam commander  (Gunning 2008, 178). According to Hamilton  et al. (2007),  Hamas leaders Fadel
Hamdan and  Khaled  Thouaib  have  also  been  involved  in  the  resistance  wing,  as  was  Yunis  al-Astal
according to a list of Palestinian legislators compiled by the Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung (quoted in Gunning
2008, 179). Prior to the establishment of Hamas, however, this distinction was rather blurred. In 1984,
Sheikh Ahmed Yassin established and personally supervised a military group in Gaza called the Palestinian
Fighters, together with the aforementioned Shehadeh and later Hamas leader Ibrahim al-Maqadmeh. The
group never  gained any prominence,  as  Israeli  security  services soon arrested most  of  those involved
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  The formal structure
Because Hamas is unwilling to share its bylaws with outsiders for reasons of security, it is
impossible  to  accurately  describe  its  organizational  structure,  know  exactly  how  its
decision-making procedures work, how internal elections are conducted, or how its bylaws
can be changed. Based on secondary sources and interviews with both current and former
Hamas members, parliamentarians, cadres, and leaders on the occupied West Bank and in
Lebanon,  Figure 4 below is suggested as a schematic organogram of Hamas as of the early
1990s.
In short, the Consultative Council has been the topmost leadership in Hamas almost from the
very  beginning.  And  while  accounts  differ,  it  is  assumed  to  have  been  composed  of
somewhere between twelve and 24 members in the early 1990s, most,  if not  all,  residing
outside of occupied Palestine.  As discussed, this Consultative Council  is  in charge of the
overall strategy and ideological development of Hamas, and appoints the ten member Political
Bureau to  deal  with the  day-to-day management  of  the  organization.  Inside the  occupied
territories,  Hamas  has  three  main  wings.  The  West  Bank and  the  Gaza  Strip  each  has  a
regional  headquarters,  further  divided  into  smaller  administrative  units,  while  the  ever
increasing  numbers  of  imprisoned  Hamas  members  and  leaders  are  represented  through
prisoners committees (Chehab 2007, 30; Hroub 2006b, 118; Mishal and Sela 2000, 156–58).
The  al-Qassam  Brigades,  the  Consultative Council,  the  Political  Bureau,  and  the  three
branches  within  the  occupied  territories  are  considered  the  major  organizational  units  of
Hamas.
Because of the secrecy surrounding Hamas’s organizational structure, the below figure is only
suggestive and outlines what is assumed to be the formal hierarchical structure of Hamas, not
necessarily the  de facto structure. Furthermore, because accounts of Hamas’s organizational
makeup for the period in question diverge somewhat, some organizational units depicted in
the organogram might not ever have existed or only existed for a short period. In particular,
the coordinating body mentioned in Mishal and Sela (2000, 162) is conspicuously absent in
other consulted sources and was never mentioned by interviewed Hamas cadres. This does not
necessarily mean that such a body never existed, but maybe it was set up sometime in the
early 1990s and then became superfluous and was disbanded. And as discussed above, the
(Milton-Edwards and Farrell 2010, 115). See also fn. 235 above.
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Figure 4: Schematic Hamas organogram, approximately 1993
(Source: Based on interviewed Hamas members and supplemented by information gleaned from the relevant
literature, in particular Mishal and Sela  (2000).  Usra is Arabic for family,  shuba means division, and  shura
translates into consultation.)
domestic leadership was for most intents and purposes defunct for long periods in the early
1990s  due  to  Israeli  assassination,  imprisonment,  and  deportation  policies.  Also,  the
Consultative Council  was  able  to  operate  only  intermittently  (Gunning  2008,  114–15),
meaning that the Political Bureau was the sole remaining leadership body.
While details regarding the leadership levels in Hamas for this period are scant and uncertain,
even less is known about the lower levels of the organization. Neither the exact number of
levels, nor the operative capabilities or functions of the units at these lower levels are known.
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However,  given  the  fact  that  Hamas  inherited  the  Brotherhood’s  organizational  structure,
accounts  provided by former  Brotherhood leader  Dr.  Habbash is  considered illuminating.
Talking  about  his  rise  through  the  hierarchy  on  the  Gaza  Strip  during  his  days  in  the
Brotherhood, he detailed the levels of the organization as follows:
I was first in a small usra, which contains of three members and a leader, called a
naqib. And then I became a member of an usra of nouqaba, a council of leaders.
First of all, you have to be a member, then a leader, a naqib, and then a al-Aquib,
which means the leader of a  nouqaba, the leader of the council of leaders. And
after that you can become a member of the local shura council, and then you can
become a member of the leadership in one of the [seven shuba] districts. Those
that belong to the group who leads a region can finally be part of the leadership of
the movement in the Gaza Strip region.239
If Hamas kept with the organizational structure of the Muslim Brotherhood, then, it can be
assumed that there were five hierarchical levels below the topmost leadership bodies.240 But
this  remains speculative.  For one,  and notwithstanding the credibility  of Dr.  Habbash,  he
described the Brotherhood’s rather than Hamas’s organizational structure. Furthermore, the
already oft-mentioned persecution of  Hamas would certainly have negatively affected the
operational capabilities and even the existence of these lower level organizational units. In
short, too little is known about these lower levels for any claims to be made.  As such, the
organogram in Figure 4 only depicts a generic lowest level, included to illustrate that Hamas
had some local presence.
  Decision-making
While the internal workings of Hamas also are deliberately kept opaque, some details have
emerged, and certain characteristics can be inferred based on Hamas’s behavior, secondary
sources, and interview data. For one, and as discussed above, it is well established that Hamas
from the outset granted its local branches a high degree of decisional autonomy—within the
limits of the overall strategic framework. Such a decentralized organizational structure proved
invaluable for Hamas’s ability to survive and continue their social, military, and political work
during the difficult circumstances of the intifada. A high degree of local autonomy can lead to
factionalism,  however,  and  to  counter  this  Hamas  also  adopted  various  decision-making
239 Dr. Mahmoud al-Habbash, minister of Religious Affairs and Waqf, interviewed in Ramallah, May 27, 2011.
240 (1) usra, (2) the councils of usra leaders, (3) the local shura councils, (4) regional leaderships, and (5) the
Gaza leadership.
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procedures inherited from the Brotherhood.
As in the Brotherhood, ultimate authority within Hamas rests with the Consultative Council. It
remains the prerogative of this leadership body to articulate the goals of Hamas, and to make
decisions regarding the movement’s overall strategy. According to Mishal and Sela, decisions
in the Consultative Council were  based on a majority vote  (2000, 161), whereas decisions
“which  fundamentally  affect  the  movement’s  direction  require  a  two-thirds  majority”
(Gunning  2008,  104).  To  further  increase  the  internal  legitimacy  of  decisions  on  such
fundamental  issues,  the  leadership  at  times  also  consulted  its  rank-and-file  and  even
conducted internal referendums. 
The consultative and democratic nature of these procedures has been repeatedly emphasized
both in the literature and among interviewed Hamas members  (see e.g., Caridi 2010, 222;
Gunning 2008, 101).241 In short, Hamas early on implemented mechanisms to consult widely
among its rank-and-file when deliberating on important decisions. Such an inclusive process
helped ensure internal legitimacy for the final decision, even among those that were initially
opposed. Although such a consensual model has its benefits, it is also slow-moving and rather
cumbersome. And as Hamas operated in a volatile and unpredictable political environment, it
could not always rely on these decision-making procedures (Gunning 2008, 113).
The establishment of the  Political Bureau was the foremost organizational response to this
challenge,  as  this  executive  leadership  body  was  given  a  rather  encompassing  and  open
mandate to run the day-to-day operations of Hamas. And as detailed above, in periods of
extreme hardship and political repression in the occupied territories, Hamas largely relied on
the  Political  Bureau  for  both  funding  and  decision-making.  However,  there  are  intrinsic
contradictions  within  a  movement  seeking  to  combine  a  hierarchical  with  a  federated,
horizontal  organizational  structure,  and  to  formalize  a  vertical  chain  of  command  in  an
informal and stratified organization.
So, while Hamas leaders both outside and inside the occupied territories continuously stressed
the  unity  and  coherence  of  the  organization,  tensions  between  the  various  factions  have
intensified at various points in time, either because of challenges stemming from changes or
shocks  in  the  political  environment  or  internal  challenges.  In  particular,  with  regard  to
principally  important  and  overarching  issues,  such  tensions  have  been  well  documented
241 The democratic nature of Hamas and its decision-making procedures were recurring themes among almost
all interviewed cadres.
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(Gunning 2008, 40–41; Mishal and Sela 2000, 163–66). However, there were few examples
of Hamas suffering from such intensified tensions between its various factions during the
period in question. Because of this, detailed analysis of this issue is left for later chapters.
It  is,  nevertheless,  pertinent  to  note  that  the  three  main  sources  identified  as  leading  to
factionalism in Hamas were all in place by the early 1990s: For one, and as already discussed,
factionalism is  an expected by-product of organizational  stratification,  i.e.,  that  the lower,
local levels of the organization were given a high degree of autonomy.242 Second, Hamas
became increasingly heterogeneous throughout the first intifada, both because the persecution
of the old guard forced a generational change in the leadership, and because its political vision
attracted new recruits, many of whom did not go through the extensive indoctrination process
of  the  Brotherhood  (Gunning  2008,  40;  Robinson  1997,  170).  Third  and  final,  Hamas’s
federated structure at the topmost levels also led to factionalism. In particular, the internal
power struggles have emerged because the various leadership branches operated under widely
different conditions: the Gaza wing was continuously targeted by Israel, the West Bank wing
and the prisoners’ committees were fragmented, while the external leadership operated under
comparatively easy conditions, largely out of reach from Israeli persecution (ICG 2004, 11;
Mishal and Sela 2000, 161).243
In summary, the years of the first intifada saw Hamas expand and make attempts to formalize
and  professionalize  its  organizational  order.  Despite  its  best  efforts,  the  challenging
environment of the first intifada, marked as it was by violence, volatility, dramatic changes,
and  relentless  persecution  by  Israel,  proved  to  effectively  preclude  Hamas’s  attempts  to
successfully build and develop its organization. Although it survived the intifada and to some
extent  retained  the  capacity  to  continue  operating  as  a  religiously  motivated  liberation
movement, Hamas emerged from the intifada as a weakened organization, almost completely
dependent on its exiled leadership.
242 As discussed above, it made sense for the Hamas leadership to provide the lower levels with decisional
autonomy for reasons of security. However, the autonomy of the lower levels was also a consequence of
the way in which Hamas spread throughout the occupied territories.  For, notwithstanding the fact that
Hamas was founded in the Gaza Strip, the expansion of the organization throughout the occupied territories
relied on the pre-existing network of Brotherhood institutions, meaning that it was partly created through
territorial penetration and partly through territorial diffusion. This, in turn, is hypothesized to mean that the
local leaders in Hamas had more authority and  de facto  power over their subordinates than would have
been the case if Hamas spread through territorial penetration. Consequently, they are expected to be harder
to whip into line by the central leadership (Panebianco 1988, 51–53).
243 An important exception was the failed assassination attempt in 1997 on the leader of the Political Bureau of
Hamas in Amman, Khaled Meshaal (McGeough 2010). This issue will be covered in more detail in later
chapters.
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 4.3 Hamas at the end of the first intifada
Writing on the eve of the first intifada, Shadid and Seltzer concluded their analysis of the rise
of  Islamic  fundamentalism  in  Palestine  in  the  1980s  by  cautioning  that  if  the
secular-nationalist Palestinian leadership—essentially the PLO—failed to “produce tangible
[political] results” one could expect their support to be transferred to the Islamic movement,
which “undoubtedly would shift its strategy to armed struggle and violent confrontation with
Israel [which would mean that the] Palestinian conflict with Israel would take on a religious
character”  (1989, 297–98).244 And  Shadid and Seltzer’s prediction came true when Hamas
entered the intifada as the armed wing of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, soon thereafter
eclipsing its mother organization and rapidly rising to become a player in Palestinian politics
in its own right (Kristianasen 1999, 20–22).
While  Hamas’s  pivotal  role  in  the  intifada  explains  part  of  the  movement’s  rise  to
prominence,  it  should be reiterated that  the increasing religiosity among Palestinians also
played a part; representing an Islamist alternative to the secular nationalists headed by Fatah,
Hamas could easily exploit the increasing numbers of religious Palestinians as supporters and
potential recruits  (Abu-Amr 1993; Gunning 2008, 39; Knudsen 2005a, 1382–84; Robinson
1997, 149). In short, Hamas inherited an almost ready-made ideological message from the
Brotherhood, already resonating among an increasing number of Palestinians. And as argued
by Taraki, “Hamas’ active participation in the uprising, then, should best be seen as part of the
campaign of a prospective opposition Islamist party in the future Palestinian state.” She goes
on to conclude her chapter with a note of caution to those who at the time were unimpressed
with the newcomer, stating that “there is no doubt that Hamas should be taken seriously”
(1989, 177).
Despite its rapid ascension to the Palestinian political scene and active participation in the
intifada, Hamas remained the junior resistance movement throughout the uprising. Partly, this
was due to the fact that the PLO still enjoyed almost unrivaled legitimacy among Palestinians.
For one, the PLO had a much longer history of actively resisting the Israeli occupation, which
naturally gave the organization a head-start in terms of popular credibility. Furthermore, both
the PLO and its largest faction, Fatah, were led by the charismatic Yasser Arafat, by many
244 An important strategic dimension relates to the discussion of whether the Palestinians supported a two-state
solution or still  wanted to liberate the whole of Palestine. On this issue,  the gap between the strategy
pursued by Fatah and opinion among the Palestinian population widened following the PLO’s decision in
1974 to accept a two-state solution as an interim step toward the complete liberation of Palestine.
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considered to be the personification of the Palestinian national struggle (Herzog 2006; Karon
2004). And finally, as a testament to its international stature, the PLO was recognized as the
“sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people” and given observer status in the UN
General Assembly in 1974—a feat never reproduced by any other liberation movement.245 In
short, and notwithstanding its efforts throughout the first intifada, it would take more than a
few years for Hamas to be in a position to challenge the PLO in terms of popular legitimacy.
Also, Hamas’s sorry organizational state helps explain its weak position at the end of the
intifada. Although it can be argued that Hamas competently responded to the persecution it
suffered, i.e., by separating its militant activities from its political and social work, and by
establishing the Political Bureau as a leadership body outside Israel’s reach, its efforts proved
inadequate; as detailed, its domestic leadership was for long periods completely defunct, and
even the operational capabilities of the new clandestine armed wing were at times seriously
hampered. In essence, the intensity of the persecution Hamas suffered—in particular in 1989
and 1992—combined with the fact that it was still a young movement busy designing and
building its organization while operating in an unpredictable, volatile, and violent political
environment,  all  help  explain  why  it  emerged  at  the  end  of  the  intifada  as  a  weak  and
wounded, barely operational, movement.
It is therefore  noteworthy that when interviewed Hamas members talked about these early
years, they often focused on how Israel “helped” them recruit new members and build the
organization by persecuting,  assassinating,  imprisoning,  and deporting their  leaders.246 Dr.
Mohammad Ghazal, for example, called the deportation of Hamas activists to south Lebanon
in  1992 “a  very  good point  in  our  history  that  helped us  a  lot.”247 Other  Hamas leaders
expressed similar sentiments. The explanation behind this gratitude is twofold: First, Israeli
persecution is seen as a badge of honor for Palestinian resistance movements. And despite
their  best  efforts  to  establish  a  narrative  to  the  contrary,  Hamas  was  for  all  intents  and
purposes a newcomer to the Palestinian political scene, to some extent also tainted by having
been allowed by Israel to operate rather freely (Milton-Edwards 1996, 152). Hamas was thus
in need of credibility as a resistance movement, which Israel in effect granted by persecuting
245 Consult UN General Assembly resolution 3237 for further details (UNGA 1974b).
246 Naturally, gratitude for persecution and imprisonment might come easier for those that avoided it, or as the
events grow more distant in history. However, some of those expressing such sentiments in interviews had
themselves been incarcerated for long periods of time, often in solitary confinement, and not always so
long ago.
247 Interviewed in Nablus, September 29, 2011.
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the movement.248
Second, and somewhat more convoluted, Hamas members argue that because their leadership
was  imprisoned  and  assassinated,  the  movement  had  to  evolve  and  develop  as  an
organization, or risk being destroyed. And although interviewed Hamas members and parts of
the literature portray the relationship between persecution and organizational development in
an overly mechanic and deterministic way, the  above demonstrates that Hamas did indeed
survive  the  first  onslaughts  mainly  because  it  competently  responded  to  persecution  by
restructuring its organization. So even if, as argued by Robinson (1997, 173), Hamas “lost its
distinct organizational distinctiveness” in the latter years of the intifada and developed from a
disciplined “cadre-based organization to a large umbrella movement,” it not only survived the
persecution  of  the  intifada,  but  had  by  then  managed  to  establish  itself  as  a  viable,  if
organizationally weak, alternative to the PLO, with a clear ideological message.
On September 13, 1993, Israel and the PLO signed the Declaration of Principles (DOP),249
officially ending the first  intifada and ushering in a new era in Palestinian politics, the most
important  characteristic  of  which  was  the  establishment  of  a  Palestinian  proto-state,  the
Palestinian  Authority  (PA).  Although  the  next  chapter  will  elaborate  on  the  background,
institutional  makeup,  and  early  development  of  the  PA,  and  proceed  to  analyze  the
consequences for Hamas’s development, it is pertinent to conclude the analysis of Hamas’s
development  throughout  the  first  intifada  by  stating  that  Hamas  by  then  already  was  a
recognized player on the Palestinian political scene. And although  the so-called Oslo years
from 1994 to 1999 also proved challenging for the young movement organization, Hamas’s
experiences from and development throughout the first  intifada were invaluable, and it was
well positioned to increase its political reach and stature as a religiously motivated liberation
movement in occupied Palestine, step-by-step taking on a more prominent role.
 4.4 Hamas’s  level  of  institutionalization  at  the  end  of  the  first
intifada
Based on the above analyses and supplemented with data from interviews and the relevant
literature,  the  chapter  will  end  with  an  overall  measurement  of  Hamas’s  degree  of
248 By framing their personal suffering as proof of resilience and dedication to the cause, Hamas members
attempt—and arguably largely succeed—in using imprisonment to reproduce and strengthen the collective
identity of Hamas.
249 Colloquially known as the Oslo I Accord.
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institutionalization at  the end of  the  first  intifada.  The analysis  that  follows relies  on the
theoretical framework provided by Randall and Svåsand (2002a), who suggest that the degree
to  which  a  political  party  has  institutionalized  is  best  measured  in  the  four  elements
systemness  (structural,  internal  dimension),  decisional  autonomy  (structural,  external
dimension),  value  infusion  (attitudinal,  internal  dimension),  and  reification  (attitudinal,
external  dimension).  To  score  Hamas’s  level  in  each  dimension,  criteria  and  associated
indicators from various studies of institutionalization are utilized  (e.g., Basedau and Stroh
2008; Huntington 1968; Levitsky 1998; Panebianco 1988; Webb and White 2009a; de Zeeuw
2009).250
As concluded above, Hamas was a religiously motivated liberation movement at the end of
the first  intifada, and had as such not  even begun its transmutation toward a political party.
However,  even  if  the  theoretical  framework  applied  to  measure  the  degree  of
institutionalization was developed with political  parties  in mind,  any organization will  be
more or less institutionalized at any given point in time. Furthermore, it will be useful to have
a baseline of Hamas’s institutionalization for the sake of longitudinal comparison; all later
chapters will end with a section detailing Hamas’s degree of institutionalization at the end of
the respective period under scrutiny.
 4.4.1  Systemness
Systemness  is  the internal,  structural dimension in Randall  and Svåsand’s framework, and
refers  to  the  “scope,  density  and  regularity  of  the  interactions  that  constitute  the  party
structure”  (2002a, 13). Suitable criteria for measuring the  degree of  systemness  include the
routinization of leadership alternation and decision-making procedures, how closely a party’s
bylaws are followed, and the routinization of informal procedures.
In  brief,  Hamas is  considered to  have had a  low degree of  systemness  at  the  end of  the
intifada. For one, and although leadership alternation took place, it happened in a seemingly
haphazard and not a routinized manner; because deported, assassinated, or imprisoned leaders
had to be replaced at a moment’s notice, Hamas was forced to make do with whoever was
available from the higher echelons of the organization. Second, and despite the fact that little
is known about Hamas’s bylaws, it seems safe to conclude that adherence to these was not a
priority in a period when the existence of the organization itself was threatened. Rather, the
degree to which Hamas relied on the Political Bureau for leadership for much of the period
250 See chapter 1, pp. 42ff. for details.
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suggests  that  it  willingly  ignored  its  own  formal  hierarchy  to  the  benefit  of  continued
operations. Third, and related to the last point,  Hamas also seemed to circumvent its own
formal decision-making procedures extensively throughout these early years. And fourth, as
Hamas essentially was forced to improvise by the persecution it suffered, there was little to
suggest routinization of informal procedures.
 4.4.2  Decisional autonomy
Decisional autonomy is the external, structural dimension in the applied framework and refers
to the extent to which a given organization is free from “interference in determining its own
policies and strategies” (Randall and Svåsand 2002a, 14). Essentially, decisional autonomy is
a question of how freely an organization can decide on its own, without undue interference
from its donors. Importantly, this does not imply that the organization in question must be
autonomous per se from its donors, but that the nature of their relationship is such that a given
sponsor cannot dominate the organization in question. Consequently, the most salient criterion
for measuring Hamas’s decisional autonomy is the nature of its relationship with and number
of external sponsors.
Given Hamas’s clandestine and secretive nature, data on its relationship to external sponsors
remains scarce and speculative. It is, nevertheless, well established that Hamas enjoyed an
unexpected windfall of financial and political support from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states
in 1990 and 1991. For, following Yasser Arafat and the PLO’s ill-advised support for Saddam
Hussein during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (Ibrahim 1990), “aid that had been earmarked for
the PLO began to find its way into Hamas’s coffers” (Gleis and Berti 2012, 155). It should be
noted, however, that this support was provided without any obvious strings attached apart
from the implicit understanding that Hamas did not do as the PLO.
Yet Hamas’s reliance on the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood posed a bigger challenge for its
decisional  autonomy.  Although  the  Jordanian  Brotherhood  shared  Hamas’s  ideological
outlook and was sympathetic to its national aspirations, the Brotherhood was not itself free to
do as it pleased; it relied on the acceptance of the Jordanian regime in whatever decision it
made.251 As such, the Brotherhood could only aid their Palestinian brethren to the extent the
251 The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood was the sole political group that was allowed to operate legally in
Jordan at the time. Note also that the ties between the Jordanian Brotherhood and Hamas were further
complicated  by  the  fact  that  the  relationship  between  the  Palestinian  liberation  movements  and  the
Jordanian Kingdom had been strained for decades, and in particular since the events of Black September in
1970  (see chapter  3 in  this  thesis  for  a  brief  overview, and chapter 11 in  Sayigh 1997 for  a  detailed
historical account).
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regime in Jordan allowed it to do so. Although there were no obvious indications that Hamas
changed course or that the Brotherhood exercised undue influence on its decision-making,
Hamas’s heavy dependence on the Political Bureau located in Amman is taken to suggest that
it  in  all  likelihood let  the  interests  of  Jordan influence its  strategies  out  of  fear  of  being
deported. To conclude, it is therefore argued that Hamas enjoyed a medium level of decisional
autonomy throughout the intifada years.
 4.4.3  Value infusion
The internal,  attitudinal  dimension in Randall  and Svåsand’s framework is  value infusion,
defined as “the extent to which party actors and supporters … acquire an identification with
and commitment to the party which transcend more instrumental or self-interested incentives
for involvement”  (2002a, 13).  Value infusion  might be the most recognizable dimension of
institutionalization, as it captures the degree to which an organization stops being a means to
an end for its members and becomes an end in itself. Typically, a criterion to measure value
infusion  is  organizational  cohesion,  i.e.,  how disciplined  and  committed  the  rank-and-file
remain  in  the  face  of  unpopular  decisions  or  fundamental  changes  in  strategy  or  goals
implemented by the leadership.
However, and as is to be expected from a young organization such as Hamas with strong
ideological roots, its members were still dedicated to the cause throughout the first  intifada.
The liberation of historic Palestine and the eventual establishment of an Islamist state in the
liberated  territory  were  the  goals  that  motivated recruits  to  join  Hamas,  as  they  saw the
organization as a vehicle to reach these. And given that Hamas had existed for such a short
time,  and only experienced the volatility and violence of the first  intifada,  there were no
decisions its leadership could have made that would test the cohesion and dedication of its
rank-and-file. In essence, it is concluded that Hamas was still seen as a means to and end, and
not an end in itself, and as such it is deemed to be infused with value only to a low degree by
the end of the intifada.
 4.4.4  Reification
Reification is the external, attitudinal dimension in Randall and Svåsand’s framework, defined
as  “the  extent  to  which the  party’s  existence  is  established in  the  public  imagination  …
including other parties” (2002a, 14).252 Two criteria suited to measure reification are popular
252 Note that Harmel and Svåsand introduced a similar element in their theory on party development phases.
According to their theory, a party must, in its third and final phase of development, “develop [a] reputation
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support and being recognized as a serious contender by political opponents.
With regard to how popular Hamas was, it should be noted that prior to the Oslo Accords,
surveys  of  political  preferences  had  been  conducted  among  Palestinians  only  rarely  and
infrequently. As such, it is difficult to say with any certainty whether Hamas had become any
more popular throughout the first intifada, or indeed how popular it actually was by the end of
the period. Nevertheless, Shadid and Seltzer did carry out a poll among Palestinians in 1986,
in which they—among other things—asked 1 024 Palestinians about leadership preferences.253
And although they found that the vast majority of Palestinians supported the PLO leadership,
they found it pertinent to note that 
[a] significant minority of respondents (20.8 percent) had no opinion or gave the
optional response of “none of the above.” Many of the respondents who gave this
response are likely to be supporters of the Islamic groups because the religious
groups do not endorse any of the people that we listed (1988a, 23).
While this should not be taken to indicate that the entire 20.8 percent responding “none of the
above” in 1986 were supporters of Islamic groups, or that this automatically would translate
into support for Hamas following its establishment, Shadid and Seltzer were probably not too
far off target; in one of the first polls conducted in occupied Palestine after the Oslo Accords,
13 percent of respondents said they would have voted for candidates affiliated with Hamas “if
an election was held tomorrow” (CPRS 1993).254
More generally, it seems likely that Hamas capitalized politically by effectively monopolizing
the  identity  as  the  one  Palestinian  liberation  movement  with  an  Islamist  outlook.255
Furthermore, Islam had become increasingly politicized in occupied Palestine from the early
1980s and onward (see Shadid and Seltzer 1988a, 1988b, 1989),256 and by 1993 it functioned
as a source of legitimacy and mobilization in its own right. Likewise, Israel and the PLO—
for credibility and dependability [and] develop … relations with other parties” (1993, 75).
253 See Shadid and Seltzer (1988a, 18–20) for details about their employed methodology.
254 In another survey conducted by the Jerusalem Media and Communication Center (JMCC) in 1993, 12.4
percent  of respondents  answered the “Islamic movements” (i.e.,  Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood)
when asked who they thought represents the Palestinian people (JMCC 1993).
255 For example, the Islamist alternatives won an increasing share of the votes in elections to professional
unions, chambers of commerce, and student councils throughout these years (Gunning 2008, 42; Robinson
1997,  19–27).  And  although  Islamic  Jihad  admittedly  was  well  established  by  the  time  Hamas  was
founded, the latter surpassed the former it in popularity and operational capabilities more or less from the
moment it was founded.
256 See the chapter 3 in this thesis, Abu-Amr (1994a), and Løvlie (2014) for discussions on the rise (or return)
of Islam in Palestinian politics.
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Hamas’s  sworn enemy and main  political  opponent,  respectively—recognized that  Hamas
would benefit from these changes. Combined with its already established track record in the
first intifada, it is therefore concluded that Hamas—notwithstanding its juniority to the PLO
—already was highly reified by the end of the intifada.
Summarized,  Hamas  scored  low  on  both  systemness  and  value  infusion,  medium  on
decisional  autonomy,  and high  on  reification.  Hamas  was  already  recognized  both  by  its
supporters and competitors as a force to be reckoned with, and enjoyed a medium level of
autonomy from its  environment.  However,  the persecution it  suffered while  attempting to
build  its  organization  meant  that  it  lacked  routinization  and  remained  underdeveloped
organizationally. Moreover, as is to be expected from a young political movement, it was still
seen as a vehicle to achieve its stated goals, and as such it is argued that Hamas was only
infused with value to a low degree. In conclusion, and based on the above measurements of
the  four  elements,  it  is  argued  here  that  the  overall  score  of  Hamas’s  degree  of
institutionalization at the end of the first intifada was somewhere between low and medium.
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Chapter 5:  Hamas and the Oslo years (1994–1999)
This chapter will focus on Hamas’s development throughout the so-called “Oslo years,” i.e.,
the period from when the Oslo Accords came into effect until the failure of the peace process
had become apparent (1994 to 1999).257 The period saw Hamas exposed to unprecedented
levels of persecution at the hands of Israel and the newly established Palestinian Authority
(PA). The harsh conditions under which Hamas operated throughout these years seriously
hampered its organization-building efforts, which in turn had negative ramifications for its
overall development and led it to adopt a somewhat erratic and unpredictable behavior.
The  analysis  will  pick  up  on  Hamas’s  development  from  the  previous  chapter,  with  a
particular focus on the consequences of Hamas’s militant legacy for its organizational and
ideological development  (Close and Prevost 2008; de Zeeuw 2008b). In short, after having
eclipsed  the  Palestinian  Muslim Brotherhood,  Hamas  had come  to  display  characteristics
similar  to  that  of  a  conventional  social  movement,  although  it  still  remained  a  militant
resistance movement. Such a dual organizational legacy complicated Hamas’s development.
Hamas thus faced endogenous and exogenous challenges, both of which hampered its process
of transmutation from movement organization toward political party. Hamas did begin this
process,  however,  e.g.,  by  expanding  organizationally  and  attempting  to  strike  a  balance
between  its  long-term  ideological  goals  and  more  immediate  strategic  aims.  Despite  its
efforts,  the  challenges  posed  by  the  difficult  environmental  conditions  and  Hamas’s  dual
legacies  effectively  obstructed  its  organization-building  efforts.  This  led  to  increased
factionalism  at  its  topmost  levels,  which  in  turn  produced  a  contradictory  ideological
development characterized by intra-organizational competition and disagreement.
Before delving into the analyses of Hamas’s organizational and ideological development in
the  Oslo  years,  the  chapter  provides  a  short  historical  overview  of  the  period,  with  an
emphasis on the PA’s creation and development. The establishment and expansion of the PA
and  the  return  of  Yasser  Arafat  and  the  Palestine  Liberation  Organization  (PLO)  to  the
occupied territories were defining features of the period in question, as these developments
fundamentally altered the operational logic of all Palestinian factions, including Hamas.
Then  the  attention  shifts  to  how  these  developments  affected  Hamas’s  process  of
institutionalization. Here, the expected effect of Hamas’s legacy as a militant movement will
257 This period is referred to as the “interim phase” in the Oslo Accords (Bishara 1999).
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be discussed briefly, before covering first its ideological evolution and then its organizational
development. The penultimate section of the chapter provides a short discussion on how far
Hamas came on its way toward qualifying as a political party in this period, concluding that it
still remained more of a movement organization.
The chapter concludes with a brief account of Hamas degree of institutionalization at the end
of  the  Oslo  years,  finding  that,  overall,  it  had  increased  its  level  of  institutionalization
somewhat  as compared to the previous period.  As mentioned,  Hamas was already highly
reified by the end of the first intifada, and there were no signs that it had become any less so
by the end of the 1990s. Moreover, Hamas was still heavily reliant on its sponsors, suggesting
that its decisional autonomy also remained unchanged at a medium level. Furthermore, the
persecution Hamas suffered throughout this period forced it to rely on informal routines and
improvisation in order to persevere. However, by surviving as a united organization despite
the  ordeals  of  the  1990s  suggests  a  slight  increase  in  informal  routinization  and  thus
systemness as compared to the previous period. And, finally, as both Hamas’s new and old
members still saw it as a means toward an end, it did not increase its level of value infusion
noticeably.
 5.1 A new Palestinian politics
The signing of  the Declaration of  Principles  (DOP) between Israel  and the PLO in 1993
ushered in  a  new era  in  Palestinian  politics.258 Not  only  did  it  mark the  end of  the  first
intifada, but it recast Palestinian politics at its most basic levels (A. S. Khalidi 1995). For one,
the Oslo process gave hope for Palestinian self-determination in the not too distant future
(Roy 2002, 8). As its name indicates, the DOP was not a peace settlement itself, and it did not
deal  with  any  of  the  contentious  issues  such as  the  final  status  of  Jerusalem,  the  Israeli
settlements in the occupied territories, or the question of the right of return for Palestinian
refugees.  It  did,  however,  stipulate  the principles and time frame for further negotiations,
specifying, for  example,  that  further negotiations and the final  talks were to be based on
UNSCR 242 and UNSCR 338,259 and that final status negotiations should be concluded within
five years of the transitional period, specifically on May 4, 1999 (Bishara 1999). In addition,
the Oslo Accords specified that Israel should withdraw its troops, first from Jericho on the
258 Numerous works are dedicated to the Oslo process and its aftermath. See, for example, Butenschøn (1998),
Giacaman and Lønning (1998), and Waage (2002, 2005, 2008).
259 UNSCR 338 reiterates UNSCR 242 and in effect limits the Palestinians’ future state to about 20 percent of
their historical claim (Abu-Amr 1994b, 77; Butenschøn and Vollan 1996, 13).
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West Bank and parts of Gaza, and later from other parts of the West Bank and the rest of the
Gaza Strip  (Usher 1995a, 85). Importantly, the Accords also included the first ever mutual
recognition between the PLO and Israel of each others’ right to exist  (Abu-Amr 1994b, 76;
Usher 1995a, 10–11). 
Ending the intifada, withdrawing Israeli troops from the occupied territories,  and promising
them  a  sovereign  state  resonated  well  with  the  Palestinians;  optimism  and  great,  albeit
cautious,  expectations  for  the  future  thus  marked  this  new  phase  in  Palestinian  politics
(Kristianasen 1999, 22). The principles and time frame specified in the DOP and subsequent
agreements between Israel and the PLO were therefore important in their own right, as they
fundamentally altered the public sentiment in the occupied territories. As will be shown in this
chapter,  these  factors  had  ramifications  for  the  ideological,  strategic,  and  organizational
development of Hamas.
However, the most lasting and arguably important consequence of the Oslo agreements took
place at  the institutional  level.  The Oslo I  agreement specified that a “Palestinian Interim
Self-Government  Authority”  should  be  established,  and  this  proto-state  would  take  on  a
limited set of state functions on the West Bank and in Gaza “for a transitional period not
exceeding five years” (JPS 1993). Though characterized by its limited authority and divided
territory, the Palestinians largely welcomed the establishment of the PA in the summer of
1994.260 The PA was well received in part because it was Palestine’s first recognized national
governing body, but more importantly because it  was meant to be succeeded by a proper,
sovereign Palestinian state in 1999 (Butenschøn and Vollan 2006, 17).
 5.1.1  The Palestinian National Authority
The PA was by design a state-like construct, although it had a limited mandate with severely
circumscribed powers, and was arguably set up to  manage  more than  govern  the occupied
territories. In brief, the PA was given the authority over health, education, and social services,
as well  as tourism and some of the taxation in the territories it  controlled. It  had no real
sovereignty,  however,  as external  trade relations,  foreign affairs,  and currency policies all
were controlled by Israel.261
260 Formally established following the Gaza-Jericho treaty signed between Israel and the PLO on May 4, 1994
(Schad 1994a, 1994b), the PA became operational in July that same year, some six months after schedule
(A. S. Khalidi 1995, 5).
261 See also Hilal (1998) for an account of the structure and mandate of the PA, and its effect on the Palestinian
political system.
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Crucially,  the  PA did  not  even  have  a  monopoly  of  violence.  It  exercised  its  already
circumscribed authority to varying degrees in the occupied territories, as these were divided
into three categories depending on the degree of Israeli control. Area A was to be governed
and policed by the PA exclusively, area B was under Palestinian civilian control but policed
by the Israeli military, and area C was kept under complete Israeli control.262 Initially, the PA
managed  about  60  percent  of  the  Gaza  Strip  and  the  city  of  Jericho  on  the  West  Bank
(Rabbani 1996, 4). Israel slowly withdrew from the West Bank as stipulated by successive
agreements throughout the 1990s, and by 1999, area A made up 17 percent of the West Bank,
area B constituted some 24 percent, leaving 59 percent under complete Israeli control as area
C (Butenschøn and Vollan 2006, 37).263
Within  its  constrained mandate,  the  PA had an institutional  makeup resembling that  of  a
presidential  system,  with  a  strong  president,  a  legislative  council,  courts,  and  police  and
security services. Although nominal checks and balances were instituted, the office of the
president was, both de jure and de facto, by far the most powerful branch in the PA. Formally,
the executive was vested with the power to appoint and dismiss the cabinet at will and ratify
laws  adopted  by  the  legislature.  The  office  also  controlled  the  PA’s  budget  and  retained
exclusive control over the security apparatus.264 The Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), on
the other hand, suffered from an unclear constitutional mandate. It was intended to function as
a parliament, mandated to draft laws for the president to ratify, as well as bestowed with the
power to approve major policies proposed by the executive. But as long as the office of the
president in effect was “omnipotent” within the limited mandate of the PA, the legislative
council’s  potential  to  exercise  its  power  was  seriously  circumscribed  (Abu-Amr  1997;
Amundsen and Ezbidi 2004). In short, the formal structure of the PA was heavily skewed in
favor of the presidency, which had negative consequences for the Palestinian governance of
the occupied territories.
Also informally, the PA faced serious challenges. Although intended to be an independent
political entity, cadres and guerrillas from Fatah and the PLO filled the political positions and
bureaucracy of the PA, and formed the backbone of its security forces. This in effect rendered
262 Consult the map section at the website of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
(OCHA)—Occupied Palestinian territory for details, available at: http://www.ochaopt.org
263 Arguably, the PA could be said to resemble the institutions set up by the former colonial powers in which
the colonized in effect managed the colony for the colonizers, so-called “indirect rule” (Crowder 1964).
264 The control  of  the  security  forces  proved to  be a highly contested  issue.  In  later  periods,  Palestinian
ministers even resigned in protest of the original system, eventually gaining some control of the security
forces. See later chapters for more details.
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the PA as the tool of the PLO  (Abu-Amr 1997; Usher 1996). And importantly, it  was the
Chairman of the PLO, Yasser Arafat, who held the office of president in the PA. Without a
functioning parliamentary system in place, and with the prerogative to appoint and dismiss
cabinet members at will, Arafat in essence wielded unlimited powers within the framework of
the Oslo Accords (Amundsen and Ezbidi 2004). Furthermore, Arafat tied the powers of the PA
to his own person, exploited the institutional weaknesses of the PA and his exclusive control
of the numerous security services of the PA,265 and ignored both the rule of law and the
mounting evidence of corruption in the PA. In short, and regardless of whatever institutional
arrangements that  were theoretically in place,  the PA was  de facto  dependent  on Arafat’s
leadership—a leadership characterized as “the antithesis of … institutionalization,” and by his
ignorance of both “the concepts of separation of powers and power sharing” (Abu-Amr 1997,
94).
The PLC and the courts, meant to provide the incipient quasi-state with checks and balances,
were left with severely limited powers. The PLC by and large operated as a consultative body
as the president time and again refused to ratify their drafted laws, in effect marginalizing the
legislative branch. As for the judiciary, it not only had to cope with a number of different legal
systems,266 but also a set of Security Courts that overruled whatever sentences and rulings that
contradicted the interests of the president and his associates (Amundsen and Ezbidi 2004). In
sum, the PA was run as Yasser Arafat’s “one-man-show” throughout most of the Oslo period
(Abu-Amr 1997; Schulz 2002, 27–29).267
 5.1.2  The de-development of occupied Palestine
The aforementioned formal and informal institutional problems had negative ramifications for
the development in the occupied Palestinian territories. In addition, a number of interrelated
political events and processes that took place throughout the 1990s further exacerbated the
problems. First, even if the  intifada  had officially ended, the violence between Palestinian
liberation movements and the Israelis continued. Second, the 1996 election in Israel was won
by Benjamin Nethanyahu from the right-wing Likud party. And third, the 1990s were marked
by the “de-development of Palestine,” i.e., “economic decline, social regression, and political
265 For thorough analyses of the Palestinian security services under Arafat, see Lia (2006a, 2006b).
266 The West Bank inherited laws from Jordan, the Gaza Strip from Egypt, while Emergency Laws from the
British Mandate period were in effect in the areas where Israel upheld their occupation (Hilal and Khan
2004, 86). There are also laws regulating the occupied territories both from Israel and the PA, as well as the
numerous regimes of customary law still enforced at the local level, including Islamic laws.
267 See also Robinson (1997, 174–88).
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repression” (Roy 1999, 64).  In sum, these factors undermined the peace process, worked to
further de-institutionalize the PA, and produced political, economic, and social conditions in
the occupied territories void of any positive developments. Naturally, these developments—or
de-developments—posed serious strategic, ideological, and organizational challenges for the
institutionalization of Hamas.
  Continued violence
One prioritized task of the PA as stipulated in the Oslo agreements was to stop Palestinian
militants from perpetrating attacks in Israel (Mustaq Husain Khan 2004, 1; Usher 1995a, 19).
The president of the PA was in essence asked to secure Israel from Palestinian militants. The
task  was  hard  to  fulfill  partly  because  the  Palestinian  security  services  controlled  only a
limited portion of the Palestinian territories. In addition, providing security for Israel meant
persecuting Palestinians who were fighting for the liberation of Palestine. This, of course, was
unpopular  among  many  Palestinians,  as  it  essentially  meant  that  it  now was  the  task  of
Palestinians themselves to imprison those that were fighting for a free Palestine.268 And the
task was made even harder as a number of Palestinian liberation movements were intent on
continuing the intifada.
For, despite the popularity of the Oslo process in the occupied territories, Hamas and nine
other factions banded together in a coalition named the Alliance of Palestinian Forces (APF),
determined  to  subvert  the  peace  process  and  continue  their  armed  struggle  against  the
occupation (Strindberg 2000).269 
During the first half of 1993, in the lead up to the signing of the DOP, Hamas carried out a
number of militant operations, attempting to derail the incipient peace process. The attacks
included seven shootings, two knife attacks, and the first ever suicide operation carried out by
a Palestinian liberation movement (Singh 2011, 1, 55 and note 14 on page 154).270 Following
the signing of the DOP, Hamas continued its shooting and stabbing operations, but refrained
268 The developing  situation  highlighted  the  fact  that  the  PA was  not  a  state,  as  it  could  not  effectively
monopolize the means of legitimate violence within the occupied territories.
269 In addition to Hamas the APF was made up of the PFLP, DFLP, PFLP-GC, Palestinian Islamic Jihad,
Fatah-Uprising, Sa’iqa, Palestinian Revolutionary Communist Party (PRCP), Palestinian Liberation Front
(PLF), and the Palestinian Popular Struggle Front. See Strindberg (2000) for an overview of the APF and
its members.
270 This first suicide attack was initially believed to have been a regular suicide, as only the perpetrator himself
and a Palestinian bystander were killed. But Hamas later claimed responsibility for the operation, which
apparently was a collaborative effort with Islamic Jihad. At the time, “suicide attacks were ‘not yet the
policy of the movement’” (al-Qassam commander quoted in Milton-Edwards and Farrell 2010, 122).
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from suicide attacks. This, it has been argued, allowed Hamas to “project itself as the standard
bearer  for  Palestinian  rights”  without  attracting  “too  much  attention,  and  thereby  public
hostility”  (Singh 2011,  56).  By not  carrying out  the most  spectacular  terrorist  operations,
Hamas managed to retain its position as the most important opposition movement against the
PLO-led negotiations, without provoking too harsh reprisals from the PA and Israel.
This uneasy coexistence and relative calm came to an abrupt halt in early 1994. On February
25 of that year, an Israeli settler named Baruch Goldstein entered the Ibrahimi Mosque in
Hebron on the West Bank and shot dead 29 unarmed, praying Palestinians and injured some
125 others.271 Sparking an outrage of unprecedented proportions in the occupied territories,
the so-called Hebron Massacre prompted Hamas to carry out its first effective suicide attack
inside Israel, killing eight and injuring 44 Israelis on April 16. Hamas carried out three more
suicide  operations  inside  Israel  in  1994,  killing  an  additional  27  Israelis  and  injuring  89
(Singh 2011, 56, 138).272
Israel put pressure on the PA to crack down on the terrorists, a request the newly formed PA
and its leader Arafat had some difficulties complying with, as the Hamas operations proved
popular among Palestinians as a response to the atrocity in Hebron (Singh 2011, 57). The PA
eventually folded under pressure, however,273 first in August of 1994 when it imprisoned some
20 Hamas activists  (Usher 1995a,  68–9),  and later,  in October,  when Palestinian security
forces rounded up and arrested some 400 Hamas activists in the Gaza Strip  (Kristianasen
1999, 24). But the PA was unwilling or unable to keep the prisoners for long. In effect, the PA
was caught between two contradictory interests. On the one hand, it was forced to persecute
Palestinians to appease the Israelis so that the peace process could continue. But on the other
hand,  the  PA felt  obliged  to  release  these  same  prisoners  so  as  not  to  alienate  its  own
constituents. In an attempt to solve this predicament, the PA implemented a “revolving door
policy,” first imprisoning Hamas cadres to give Israel the impression that they did something
271 The Ibrahim Mosque in  Hebron is  situated  on top of  the  Cave of  Patriarchs,  in  which the patriarchs
Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, as well as the matriarchs Sarah, Rebecca, and Leah, are buried according to
both Jewish and Islamic tradition. Because of this, the mosque is religiously important for Muslims, and
second only to the Temple Mount in Jerusalem in the Jewish religion.
272 There are some discrepancies in the literature regarding the number of suicide operations carried out by
Hamas in 1994. Kristianasen, for example, arrives at the same number killed (35) but cites a higher number
of operations (five) and injured Israelis (“more than 135”) (1999, 23). This is probably due to uncertainties
regarding which group carried out which operation.
273 It is difficult to pin down exactly who decided what and when in the PA, but it seems clear that there was
infighting between different fractions, with some of the so-called returnees (i.e., Arafat and his compatriots
from the external leadership) being opposed by a young guard who had operated from within the occupied
territories (see e.g., Jamal 2005 for an in-depth analysis of these dynamics).
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to stop the violence, and then releasing the prisoners to appease its constituents after serving
only a short stint in jail (Kristianasen 1999, 25).
This policy allowed Hamas to retain its military capability throughout much of the 1990s.274
Consequently, the Israelis soon lost their patience with Arafat and the PA’s apparent inability
or unwillingness to halt the operations. Taking matters into their own hands, Israel therefore
returned to its tactic of targeted assassinations  (Honig 2007), and arrested, imprisoned, and
deported hundreds of suspected Hamas activists in the mid-1990s (Tamimi 2007, 194–95). In
particular, the reprisals for Hamas’s 1996 bombings were harsh. In themselves a response to
the Israeli assassination of Hamas bomb-maker Yahya Ayyash on January 5 1996, the attacks
carried out in February and March killed over 46 Israelis and injured 86 (Singh 2011, 139).275
Israel responded by suspending the peace talks, closing down the occupied territories, and
forcing the PA to take action.  And the action the PA took against Hamas was devastating;
Together with the IDF, the Palestinian security forces in effect dismantled the military wing of
Hamas, arresting hundreds of al-Qassam members, many of whom were tortured, some to
death.276
Following the crackdown on its military wing, there was a hiatus in the violence for over a
year. This was probably due to Hamas losing its capacity to carry out suicide operations, and
further  because  such  operations  had  become  increasingly  unpopular  among  Palestinians.
Responsive to popular opinion, Hamas saw no reason to carry out suicide bombings that
provoked harsh responses from the Israelis and the PA and alienated the Palestinians. The
calm ended, however, when Hamas carried out three suicide operations in 1997, first in late
March, followed by another one in July, and a third in September.277
Then another year of calm followed before Hamas again returned to violence, carrying out a
suicide operation in October 1998. This  operation coincided with the signing of the Wye
River  Memorandum,  an  agreement  between  Israel  and  the  PLO  aimed  at  implementing
previous peace Accords. As such, it seems as if the bombing was an attempt to derail the
peace process. Failing that, and responding to the declining popularity of suicide operations
274 See Appendix B in Singh (2011, 138–39) for a list of suicide operations carried out by Hamas.
275 Again, figures vary somewhat, with Kristianasen offering that the bombings claimed 58 lives. Interestingly,
she also argues that at least some of these bombings were carried out without the blessing of the political
leadership of Hamas (1999, 29).
276 See Amnesty International (1998) for details regarding the treatment of prisoners in PA and Israeli prisons.
277 Singh  (2011, 59) speculates that the attacks in 1997 were a way for Hamas to gauge the popularity of
suicide missions among Palestinians.
151
among Palestinians,  Hamas all  but  halted its  military operations for  the  remainder  of  the
1990s (Singh 2011, 60).278
  The rise of Likud in Israel
As in the occupied territories, the Oslo Accords also divided public opinion in Israel. The
promise of lasting peace was an easy political sell, but there was also strong opposition to the
peace process. In brief, the public opinion in Israel was divided into two blocs: those against
Oslo,  represented  by  the  right  and  religious  parties,  and  those  in  favor  of  Oslo,  largely
congruent with the left, which had initiated the peace process in the first place (Hermann and
Yuchtman-Yaar 2002). The intensity of the conflict between these blocs ebbed and flowed in
tandem with the rise and fall in terrorism, and the progress or regress of the peace process.
In late 1995, the anti-Oslo camp was on the rise. They organized huge protests demanding the
resignation of the Labor government led by PM Yitzak Rabin and Oslo I signatory and foreign
minister Shimon Peres. In the aftermath of one such huge protest against the government, in
the evening on November 4 in Tel Aviv, a lone gunman and religious extremist named Yigal
Amir managed to get past the bodyguards and kill PM Rabin. The assassination initially led to
a backlash against  the anti-Oslo protestors,  and acting PM Shimon Peres called for  early
elections in the hopes of gaining renewed confidence in the peace process.
However, the run-up to the May 1996 elections coincided with the string of suicide bombings
that Hamas carried out in revenge for the assassination of  Yahya Ayyash. As a result,  the
Israeli anti-Oslo camp again gained in strength. The increased violence was taken as proof of
the futility of making peace with the Palestinians (Bloom 2004). Consequently, Shimon Peres’
initially  promising  lead  in  the  polls  diminished  dramatically,  and  in  the  end  he  lost  the
premiership to Benjamin Nethanyahu from the right-wing Likud party  (Peretz and Doron
1996).
It is noteworthy that the victory of Nethanyahu took place under quite distinctive electoral
rules. The Israeli Basic Law of 1992 introduced a unique electoral system in which the PM
was elected directly  (Hazan 1996). In the PM elections, Benjamin Nethanyahu won against
Shimon Peres by the smallest margin possible; he received just under 30 000 more votes than
Peres, less than 1 percent of the votes cast. And in the elections to the Knesset, the Israeli
parliament, it was the pro-Oslo Labor party led by Peres that won the plurality, winning 34
278 According  to  Singh  (2011,  60),  Hamas  only  carried  out  four  low-casualty  operations  from  then  to
December 2000.
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seats against Likud’s 32.279
Regardless  of  the  peculiarities  of  the  electoral  system and  the  narrow margin  by  which
Benjamin Nethanyahu won, his mandate as PM was not disputed (Peretz and Doron 1996).
And  although  the  parliament  was  rather  fragmented,280 he  managed  to  form  a  majority
coalition government with four parties in addition to his own Likud. Although these parties
differed in terms of ideology, all were opposed to the peace process to varying degrees. Some
opposed only the way in which the agreements with the PLO had been negotiated, but the
coalition  included  parties  and  parliamentarians  opposed  to  anything  from the  division  of
Jerusalem and the removal of the Israeli settlements from the occupied territories (which are
illegal according to international law), to those opposed to the establishment of a Palestinian
state and the withdrawal of the so-called “outposts” built in the Palestinian territories (which
are deemed illegal even by Israeli law) (Peretz and Doron 1996, 545–56).
Himself a staunch opponent of the Oslo Accords, the rise to power of Nethanyahu and his
anti-Oslo  coalition  government  proved  disastrous  for  the  peace  process  and  the  overall
conditions in the occupied territories. The positions adopted by the Nethanyahu government
and  the  policies  it  implemented  effectively  and  efficiently  worked  to  revert  any  positive
developments and undermined the chances for any solution to come about.281
  De-development
The continued violence  and the  ascendance  of  Nethanyahu worked to  obstruct  the  peace
process, and thus had indirect implications for conditions in the occupied territories. Both
factors, however, also had direct consequences for the situation there. For one, the violence
provoked the Israelis to adopt a policy of widespread closure of the territories. And second,
Nethanyahu and his right-wing coalition allowed and enabled the settler movement in Israel to
intensify the expansion of old and establishment of new illegal settlements. Combined, the
closures and the building of  settlements led in  turn to a  de-development  of the  occupied
territories (Roy 1999, 2002). 
279 With 120 seats in the Knesset, 61 are needed for a majority. The Labor and Likud parties were by far the
largest parties, with the third largest party, the religious Shas party, winning ten seats  (Peretz and Doron
1996, 534).
280 Eleven parties were represented in the parliament following the 1996 elections.
281 Note, however, that the policies of the Nethanyahu government vis-à-vis the Palestinians by and large were
continued after the left leaning electoral alliance led by Ehud Barak won the 1999 elections.
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The Israeli closure policy is divided into three levels of intensity. General closure refers to the
restrictions  of  movement  between  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza,  and  between  the  occupied
territories and Israel;  total closure  is the complete prohibition of any movement at all; and
internal closure restricts movement within the West Bank (Roy 1999, 69). As a response to
real  or  anticipated attacks from Palestinian liberation movements,  the  occupied territories
were under total closure for almost a third of the period from 1993 to 1996. For most of the
remaining time, general or internal closure were in effect (Roy 2002, 13).
The  closures  obviously  had  negative  consequences  for  the  economic  development  in  the
occupied territories—to say nothing of the human costs.282 During the supposed heydays of
the Oslo years (1993 to 1996) the World Bank estimated that the closure policy led to a loss in
the Palestinian gross national product of between 20 to 70 percent  (1999, 51). Employment
figures also suffered greatly, as the number of unemployed Palestinians inside the occupied
territories increased from around 3 percent in 1992, to almost 30 percent in 1996 (Roy 2002,
13; World Bank 1999, 53).
Israel also expanded its illegal settlements in the occupied territories during Nethanyahu’s
rule. Whereas there were 115 000 settlers living throughout the West Bank in 1993, that figure
increased to almost 200 000 by the end of 1999. In addition, Israel continued its “Judaization”
program of occupied East Jerusalem, increasing the number of settlers in the Arab quarters of
the city by 30 000 people, to a total of 173 000 in 1999 (Roy 2002, 9; Usher 2003, 22).
The  expansion  of  settlements  exacerbated  the  already  difficult  infrastructure  and
communication situation on the West Bank. To accommodate the rising settler population,
Israel  built  over  400 km of  new roads,  reserved for  Israeli  citizens.  Built  on confiscated
Palestinian land, the roads crisscross around Palestinian villages and further disconnect the
different regions of the West Bank. In short, rather than pulling out of the would-be territories
of a future Palestinian state as stipulated in the Oslo Accords, the Israelis instead spent the
interim years intensifying its confiscation of Palestinian land, making it increasingly difficult
to find a solution to the conflict and rendering the everyday life of ordinary Palestinians ever
harder.
The continued violence, the election of Benjamin Nethanyahu, and the de-development of the
occupied  territories  all  worked  to  undermined  the  peace  process  and  led  to  deteriorating
political, economic, and social conditions in the occupied territories. Added to this was the
282 See Human Rights Watch (HRW 1996) for details on the human costs of the closure policy.
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lackluster performance of the PA, whose defining characteristics had become administrative
mismanagement,  political  repression,  and  endemic  corruption.  Instead  of  developing  and
institutionalizing  a  state-like  bureaucracy,  the  PA was  exposed  as  a  mere  security  and
repression tool of Israel (Moussalli 1996, 56; Rabbani 1996, 6). In sum, the overall situation
deteriorated dramatically throughout the latter half of the 1990s, and as a result, hope for
peace, development, and a sovereign state faded among the Palestinians (Roy 1999, 64, and
2002, 9, 13).
 5.2 Arrested development—Hamas in the new system
How did Hamas cope with the emergence of a new political system and the de-development
of Palestine? And how did these developments affect Hamas’s transmutation from movement
to party and the process of  institutionalization? As discussed in  the previous chapter,  the
raison d'être for the establishment of Hamas had been the  intifada itself, and its legitimacy
hinged largely on it being an opposition party; it was its condemnation of the negotiations
between Israel and the PLO and its violent resistance against the occupation that provided
Hamas with its legitimacy and popularity. The signing of the Oslo Accords and the end of the
intifada therefore represented a double challenge for Hamas: First, the incipient peace process
turned the Palestinian public opinion away from the absolutist goals and oppositional rhetoric
of Hamas, and second, the post-intifada situation and the establishment of the PA introduced a
new tactical and political logic for Palestinian liberation movements.
For,  notwithstanding  the  problematic  institutional  designs  and  the  effectiveness  by  which
Arafat and the PLO undermined and curtailed the development and functioning of the PA, the
introduction of  limited Palestinian self-government  opened an opportunity  to  grab “state”
power  through  elections.  This  produced  a  fundamental  change  in  the  logic  of  political
mobilization in the  occupied territories.  Whereas politics  previously was divided between
different strategies and tactics adopted to liberate parts or all of historic Palestine, e.g., violent
(militant or popular), non-violent (popular, negotiation), the PA introduced the possibility to at
least manage the occupied territories. In short, the establishment of the PA altered the political
opportunity structures in occupied Palestine for the political actors; and the existence of the
PA proto-state  led  many  of  the  liberation  movements—including  Hamas—to  begin  their
transmutation toward political parties (Brown 2012).
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Both Hamas’s stated goals and its operational logic were at odds with these new realities. As
such,  it  had to decide on whether  or  how it  should reformulate its  ideology and adopt  a
rhetoric suited to this new situation, and how—or indeed if—it should adapt its operational
logic  in  response  to  the  new political  system.  And it  had to  face  these  challenges  while
suffering persecution from both the Israelis and the PA.
 5.2.1  From movement toward party and the legacy of violence
A  defining  characteristic  of  political  parties  is  their  participation  in  formal  and
institutionalized politics.  Whether  their  goal  is  to influence politics  by setting the agenda
during  electoral  campaigns,  to  influence  governments  and  the  legislative  process  from a
parliamentary position,  or  actually govern by winning office,  makes no difference in this
regard;  these  are  only  different  forms  of  conducting  institutional  politics.  And  although
liberation movements are unlike conventional social movements in many respects, they have a
common feature in that neither are established to take part in institutional and formal politics.
Where social movements rely on a repertoire of largely non-violent tactics aimed to mobilize
people  and  influence  the  power  that  be  indirectly  (Tilly  and  Wood  2009),  revolutionary
liberation movements such as Hamas also rely on non-institutional politics to reach their aims
—even if theirs is to replace the status quo with their own political system. The conventional
movement-to-party  thesis  is  therefore  expected to  have  relevance  for  explaining Hamas’s
development.  However,  it  has  also  been  theorized  that  movements  such  as  Hamas  with
militant  roots  take  a  somewhat  different  route  when  shifting  toward  institutional  politics
(Close and Prevost 2008).
In general, movement organizations are expected to have flexible structures, providing their
members with substantial leeway in terms of participatory strategies and tactics. Parties, on
the other hand, organize themselves hierarchically and demand far greater discipline from
their  members  (Close  and  Prevost  2008,  9).  In  essence,  then,  the  conventional
movement-to-party  thesis  is  focused  on  organizational  routinization  and  the  associated
moderation of  goals  (Close and Prevost  2008;  Zald and Ash 1966).  Yet  movements  with
militant origins do not necessarily comply with these expectations. Their operational logic
requires command structures and discipline from the outset, as orders must be followed—
preferably without question. Such movements are therefore not characterized by their flexible
structures. Rather, they are organized vertically from the beginning, with top-down command
structures and high degrees of discipline. Because of this, when militant movements transform
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into political parties, the process is not necessarily defined by increased routinization or the
introduction of vertical command structures; instead, they must become increasingly flexible
and develop their intra-party democracy to attract new members (Close and Prevost 2008, 9).
The expected moderation of ideology associated with a move from movement to party also
differs  for  those  with  a  militant  legacy.  Different  from  conventional  social  movement
organizations, militant movements are predisposed to maximalism, that is, the tendency to
seek an unconditional victory.283 As noted by Close and Prevost, “people seldom take up arms
to negotiate the finer points of a contract” (2008, 10). Rather, people resort to violence when
aiming to replace the  ancien régime with one built according to their own ideology.284 And
such a violent and maximalist outlook is associated with polarization, i.e., the tendency to
adopt a dichotomous worldview where people are either “for us” or “against us.” Finally,
violent tactics, maximalist aims, and polarized perspectives go hand in hand with ideological
rigidity; fighters willing to shed blood for the cause seem unlikely candidates for ideological
flexibility. They are expected to be reluctant to change, remaining instead committed to the
movement’s initial goals even in the face of great challenges  (Close and Prevost 2008, 10;
Ishiyama and Batta 2011).
Whereas the conventional movement-to-party thesis emphasizes organizational routinization
and ideological moderation, a movement with a militant legacy is expected to already have a
highly  routinized  and  vertical  command  structure,  and  to  be  less  inclined  to  ideological
moderation—features that in turn are expected to make militant movements less receptive to
ideas of internal democracy and deliberative processes in policy formulations associated with
political parties. And  Hamas shares qualities with both conventional social movements and
militant movements. For, although Hamas itself was established as a militant proxy, it was
created  by  the  Muslim  Brotherhood,  which  itself  was  more  of  a  conventional  social
movement  organization.285 The  question,  then,  is  how  such  a  dual  legacy  affected  the
ideological  and  organizational  development  of  Hamas  as  it  began  its  transmutation  from
movement to political party.
283 A militant legacy is also expected to affect the behavior and development of a movement when or if it
eventually  obtains  power  differently  than would  be  the  case  for  pro-democracy movements  (Grodsky
2012).
284 Theoretically,  it  does  not  matter  if  the  ideology  is  Marxist,  religious,  nationalist,  or  ethnic.  The
predisposition  toward  maximalism  is  common  for  revolutionary  and  liberation  movements  of  all
ideological hues.
285 In addition, Hamas had a rather short stint as a militant movement before the PA was established and
prompted Hamas to begin its transmutation. As such, hypothesized effects of having a militant legacy could
be expected to apply only to a limited degree for Hamas.
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If Hamas was mainly a conventional social movement organization, one could expect it to
have  developed into a political party following a trajectory similar to those of the socialist
movements in Europe in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Przeworski and Sprague 1986),
in other words, to have turned into a mass-based, organizationally broad, strategically and
electorally oriented,  and ideologically flexible party.  If  the militant  legacy was dominant,
however,  Hamas  is  expected  to  have  followed  a  different  path.  Then,  it  would  probably
develop  into  an  ideologically  rigid  cadre  party,  with  exclusive  membership  and  a
revolutionary and totalitarian strategy.
Irrespective of the impact Hamas’s social and militant legacies have had on its transmutation,
“the shift from a movement to a party implies a significant change of organizational culture
and operational  logic” (Close  and Prevost  2008,  9). For,  as  further  argued by Close  and
Prevost, “the hard part of changing from movement, civil or armed, to party is that it requires
developing a new and quite distinct institution” (2008, 9). To investigate the development of
Hamas from movement toward party in this period, then, the analysis will be broken into two
interrelated  parts.  First,  Hamas’s  ideological  development  will  be  analyzed.  Here,  the
overarching question is whether Hamas came to tilt toward either ideological  flexibility  or
rigidity,  and the degree to which it  altered its goals in response to the changing political
conditions in occupied Palestine.
Next, Hamas’s organizational development will be analyzed. Here, the question is how or if
Hamas  managed  to  further  develop  and  adapt  its  organizational  structure  in  the  face  of
widespread persecution and deteriorating environmental conditions, and the degree to which it
remained a  united  organization at  the  end  of  the  Oslo  years.  Relevant  issues  that  aid  in
illuminating these questions include recruitment requirements and advancement procedures;
internal democracy and decision-making procedures; formal and informal routinization; and
factionalism and organizational dominance.
 5.2.2  The question of identity and ideology
Hamas’s identity as a religious liberation movement was cemented by its performance in the
intifada years. And for much of the Oslo years, Hamas remained committed to liberating the
whole of historic Palestine, framing its strategies and tactics in religious terms. As mentioned,
Hamas’s legitimacy and popularity hinged in large parts on its violent and vocal opposition to
Israel, denunciation of all negotiations between Israel and the PLO, and refusal to forgo any
territorial claims (ICG 2004, 7–8; Usher 1995b, 68). Arguing that the PLO had sold out the
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Palestinian  national  project  by  signing the  Oslo  Accords  (Kristianasen 1999,  22),  Hamas
attracted followers not only from the religious segments of the population, but also from those
that opposed the negotiations for nationalistic reasons (Mishal and Sela 2000, 67–68; Usher
1995a, 68–69).286 In short,  Hamas was identified as a major  opposition movement  on the
Palestinian  political  scene,  pursuing  an  Islamist  agenda  and  committed  to  the  violent
liberation of all of historic Palestine.
  Continued commitment 
In  the first  years  of  the  Oslo  period,  Hamas’s stated goals  and behavior  indicate  that  its
ideological “hunting grounds” remained largely unchanged from that of the intifada years and
the  1988 Charter. As mentioned above, Hamas carried out numerous suicide missions and
other violent operations against Israel throughout the 1990s, demonstrating commitment to its
official  goals.287 A  statement  from  the  Hamas  Political  Bureau dated  April  16,  1994,  is
indicative of the thinking within the movement at the time.288 Though a considerable part of
the document is dedicated to explaining and defending Hamas’s suicide operations, most of it
is  spent  on heaping  hate  and  scorn  on  the  Rabin  government,  and  accusing the  PLO of
“shameful capitulation” by signing the Oslo I agreement. The statement ends by reiterating its
religiosity and maximalist goals:
Hamas, as it clarifies its position to refute the allegations and utterances of the
prime minister of the enemy, pledges to our people to continue on the road of holy
struggle  (jihad)  and  martyrdom  until  Palestine—all  of  Palestine—is  liberated
(Hroub 2000, 305).
Despite being consistent in both ideology and behavior, however, Hamas paid the price for
clashing with the public sentiment. As  can be seen from  Figure 5 below, which gives an
overview  of  factional  support  in  the  occupied  territories  from  1994  to  1999,  Hamas’s
popularity fluctuated somewhat throughout the Oslo period. At the beginning of the period,
when the intifada was a recent memory and the outcome of the newly signed DOP remained
uncertain,  Hamas  was  supported  by  some  16  percent  of  Palestinians  in  the  occupied
territories. For the first couple of years, and even after Arafat and the PLO leadership returned
286 A number of the interviewed Hamas members stated explicitly that they had left Fatah for Hamas in the
mid-1990s because of the negotiations with Israel. 
287 Note that Hamas prefers the term “martyrdom operation” for its suicide missions. The latter is considered
more accurate and less apologetic, and is consequently the term adopted in this thesis.
288 The document is titled  Important Statement by the Political Bureau, and was translated into English by
Hroub (2000, 302–05).
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Figure 5: Factional support in the occupied territories, 1994–1999
(Source: CPRS 2000).
to the occupied territories, Hamas held its ground in the polls. However, following the suicide
missions  Hamas  carried  out  in  retaliation  to  the  Israeli  assassination  of  its  al-Qassam
commander Yahya Ayyash in early 1996, Israel closed down most of the occupied territories. 
And while most Palestinians blamed “Israel for the difficult conditions imposed on them in
the aftermath of the suicide attacks,” close to 31 percent held Hamas accountable  (CPRS
1996).  As a consequence,  Hamas plummeted in the polls,  and had the support  of  only 6
percent of Palestinians in March 1996. And although Hamas gained in the polls toward the
end of the 1990s, it was only supported by around 9 percent of Palestinians by December
1999.289
Such a drop in support can be taken as an indication that Hamas chose to—or had to—stay
true to its ideological roots. Hamas in essence refused to adapt its ideology for the sake of
attracting  support  from  a  public  whose  sentiments  and  opinions  were  developing  in  the
opposite direction. This would be in line with the assumptions stipulated by Close and Prevost
289 All polling data, unless otherwise stated, are from the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research
(PSR), formerly known as the Center for Palestine Research and Studies (CPRS). See chapter 2 for a
discussion on the polls conducted by CPRS and PSR.
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(2008) regarding the effect of a militant legacy on ideological rigidity. It would be difficult—
if not tantamount to organizational suicide—for Hamas to discard its ideological roots for
short term gains in the polls. Its members had already suffered a lot by committing to the
goals and strategies of Hamas, and would be loath to see their sacrifices sold out for uncertain
political gains.
This  effect  was  further  strengthened  by  the  fact  that  Hamas  initially  was  externally
legitimated (Panebianco 1988, 51–52). As an outgrowth of a social movement with a clear
ideological message, and whose leadership was overlapping, it was difficult  for Hamas to
change its ideology and rhetoric. The religious dimension of its ideology had to be retained
for reasons of continuity and credibility, and because the old guard in the Palestinian Muslim
Brotherhood still wielded a certain amount of influence over the movement. And the national
liberation  aspect  had  to  be  kept  as  it  had  become  a  crucial  identity  marker  for  the
rank-and-file  of  Hamas.  This  last  factor  became  increasingly  important  for  Hamas  as  it
recruited  new  members,  many  of  whom  were  former  Fatah  members  who  had  become
disillusioned with the peace process (Robinson 1997, 171). 
Such a commitment to original goals, when reaching these seems either highly unlikely or
impossible—or even in the face of defeat, as was the case for Hamas—is also to be expected
from a young party. Relevant theoreticians such as Panebianco (1988) and Harmel and Janda
(1994) agree that young parties are more likely to be seen by their members as vehicles for
reaching certain stated goals. Even if Hamas mobilized only a limited share of the Palestinian
population, those that did commit to its cause did so out of proper conviction, with the aim of
realizing the goal of Hamas, namely the liberation of historic Palestine and the establishment
of an Islamic state (Panebianco 1988, 20).290 As such, Hamas closely resembled the ideal type
ideology-advocacy party as defined by Harmel and Janda, i.e., a party for which ideological
purity was a primary strategic concern  (1994, 270). Or, in other words, Hamas was still a
means  toward  a  political  end  and not  an  end in  itself,  and  had thus  not  yet  become an
institution.
  Toward moderation
This commitment to the original goals did not last throughout the Oslo years, however. In
particular, its top political leadership labored to adapt the strategic goals of Hamas to better
290 As such, they qualified as  believers  in the lingo of Panebianco, i.e.,  activists that were part of Hamas
because they bought into the collective incentives of organizational identity (1988, 26).
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suit  the  new  and  changing  circumstances  (Tamimi  2007,  156–59;  Usher  1995a,  31–33).
Maybe the most important attempt to moderate Hamas’s ideology came when the imprisoned
Hamas founder, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, and the General Secretary of the Political Bureau in
Amman, Mousa Abu Marzook,  almost simultaneously suggested a long-term ceasefire with
Israel in early 1994. The offer asked Israel to withdraw from the territories occupied in 1967,
dismantle all its settlements, and release Palestinian prisoners (Usher 1995a, 31). Yassin and
Marzook probably knew that this would not happen, but the offer itself is taken as evidence of
a moderating effort undertaken by certain Hamas leaders.
Another  early  and  important  example  of  these  efforts  can  be  found  in  a  memorandum
published by Hamas on March 13, 1996.291 In it, it is reiterated that Hamas is a “political
movement  resisting  occupation,”  and  it  echoes  previous  communiqués  by  spending
considerable portions of the text on attempting to legitimize its military operations. However,
the document in effect also turns its prioritized strategies upside down, claiming that it now
strives to end the occupation first through politics, and only second through military means.
Furthermore,  the  document  is  riddled  with  references  to  international  law,  including  the
Fourth  Geneva Convention  and the  Universal  Declaration  of  Human Rights,  and  it  even
makes explicit reference to UNSCR 242, which stipulates that Israel must withdraw from the
areas it occupied in 1967.
The references  to  international  law are  important  indications that  Hamas labored to  gain
international  legitimacy  and  rid  itself  of  its  reputation  as  a  radical,  Islamist,  terrorist
movement.  However,  it  is  in  particular  the  emphasis  placed  on  UNSCR  242  that  is  of
relevance here. By calling on the international community to “pressure Israel to implement
UN  resolutions  and  respect  international  conventions  pertaining  to  the  occupied  Arab
territories and force it to withdraw,” Hamas in essence conceded that Israel is there to stay.
Yet,  note  that  Hamas  refrained from calling  an  Israeli  withdrawal  to  the  1967 borders  a
“solution,” preferring instead the term “cease-fire,” echoing the wording from the earlier offer
made by Yassin and Marzook (Hroub 2000, 311).
291 Titled  An  Important  Memorandum  from  the  Islamic  Resistance  Movement  (Hamas)  to  the  Kings,
Presidents, and Minsters Meeting at Sharm al-Sheikh, the document was translated by Hroub (2000, 306–
12). It is noteworthy that this memorandum had a different intended audience than the document discussed
on page  159. It is assumed that Hamas will adopt different rhetorics vis-à-vis Palestinians living under
occupation, as these are potential recruits with specific hopes and grievances, than toward an international
political elite from which Hamas hopes to gain respect.
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It  is  worth mentioning that  Hamas’s offer of a  cease-fire within the 1967 borders can be
interpreted as a strategic response to its declining popularity and fear of becoming politically
irrelevant. In short, elements within the movement thought it made sense for Hamas to trade
some of its more absolutist positions with flexible ones in exchange for increased domestic
popularity  and  strategic  maneuverability.  Furthermore,  by  limiting  its  territorial  claims,
Hamas might also have hoped to convince parts of the international community that it was a
pragmatic and increasingly moderate movement, and through this obtain a certain amount of
international legitimacy and thus increased relevance.
In  any  event,  these  moderating  efforts  are  considered  key  to  understanding  Hamas’s
ideological development. As mentioned, Hamas relied heavily on its vehement opposition to
the ongoing negotiations for its legitimacy and popularity. Its strong-worded condemnation of
how the PLO “sold out Palestine” by accepting the two-state solution had long been one of
Hamas’s more important sources of legitimacy. But the offer from Marzook and Yassin, later
reiterated in the 1996 document, implied that Hamas also accepted—at least in the short to
medium  term—that  the  solution  to  the  conflict  would  be  two  neighboring  states,  one
Palestinian and one Israeli. Although Hamas’s version of the two-state solution is worded as a
temporary  measure,  defended  ideologically  through  the  Islamic  concept  of  hudna,  or
long-term truce,292 it does imply  an acknowledgment of Israel’s long-term existence, and is
therefore considered a major ideological break (Hroub 2000, 73–86).293
Importantly, the moderating efforts exemplified by the offer of a long-term cease-fire—both
verbally by Hamas leaders, and officially through different documents—remained in effect for
the  remainder  of  the  1990s.  Late  in  the  decade,  yet  another  document  was  produced  by
Hamas, this time on the request of Western diplomats in Amman.294 In it, Hamas reiterated
most of its positions from the 1996 document, again devoting ample space to defending its
military operations. But the documents went even further in the moderating direction, stating
that if Israel
292 See Tuastad (2010) for a thorough analysis of Hamas’s use of the concept hudna.
293 Even if Hamas officially remained committed to the eventual liberation of historic Palestine at some later
stage, this move from complete to sequences liberation was conspicuously similar to how the PLO changed
from complete to sequenced liberation some twenty years earlier (PNC 1974). And that change was in turn
a prerequisite for the peace process initiated in the early 1990s (Muslih 1990).
294 The document titled “This is What We Struggle for” is reproduced in Tamimi (2007, 265–70). Although no
date except “late in the 1990s” is provided by Tamimi, it is assumed that it was published sometime prior to
the expulsion of Hamas from Jordan in 1999. For details on this, see below.
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1. withdraws all its troops from the West Bank and Gaza;
2. evacuates all Jewish settlements illegally erected on both the West Bank and Gaza;
3. releases all Palestinian prisoners; and
4. recognizes the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination,
Hamas  would  be  willing  to  “enter  into  negotiations  about  the  details  of  the  settlement”
(Tamimi 2007, 269–70). Admittedly, Hamas did not explicitly state that such negotiations
were intended to end the conflict once and for all. But the mere fact that Hamas saw itself as
potentially negotiating with Israel must be considered an important step for a movement that
at the same time remained committed to the destruction of this same state through violent
means if necessary.
  Confused ideology
Despite  these  moderating  efforts,  the  Oslo  period  did  not  see  Hamas  complete  its
transmutation from movement to party in terms of ideological moderation. Its militant legacy
arguably proved too influential. Although Hamas in effect limited its territorial claims from
historic Palestine “from the River to the Sea” to a state within the 1967 borders—a reduction
of some 78 percent—its military wing continued to carry out suicide operations within Israel
with  the  blessing of  its  political  leadership  (Tamimi  2007,  268).  And even if  there  were
indications  that  elements  within  the  top  leadership  pushed  for  further  moderation,  the
behavior of Hamas demonstrates unequivocally that the movement as a whole was reluctant to
stray too far away from its origins.
One important and powerful indication that Hamas did not complete its transmutation from
movement  to  party  was its  boycott  of  the  1996 elections to  the PLC.295 In  short,  Hamas
calculated that participating in elections to any PA institution in effect would mean retracting
its  stated  aims  while  at  the  same  time  lending  credibility  to  negotiations  it  vehemently
opposed, which in turn would lead to loss of legitimacy and support (Mishal and Sela 2000,
127). As succinctly summarized by a  Hamas cadre, they opted for boycott  because “[t]he
election in 1996 was seen by Hamas as a referendum over Oslo” and Hamas’s boycott was its
“no-vote.”296 By participating, Hamas would not only lend support to a set of agreements and
295 See Løvlie (2013) for a discussion on Hamas’s electoral strategy.
296 Senior Hamas cadre interviewed in Ramallah, August 22, 2007.  Hamas leader and Speaker of the PLC,
Aziz Dweik, corroborated this explanation of the 1996 boycott, emphasizing that Hamas has no quarrels
with  the  democratic  procedures  as  such,  but  that  it  was impossible for  them to  participate  under  the
framework of the Oslo Accords. Interviewed in Hebron, April 13, 2011.
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a process it had firmly opposed from the outset, but it risked doing so without gaining any
political power. For one, the polls suggested that Hamas would have won very few seats in the
legislative council if it had participated.297 Second, the power balance between the PLC and
the presidency was highly skewed in favor of the latter. And third, Arafat governed the PA as
an authoritarian proto-state, basically ignoring whatever powers the PLC had on paper. As
summed up by respected expert on Palestinian politics, Dr. Iyad Barghouti, Hamas boycotted
the elections because “there was a high degree of institutional uncertainty, the outcome of the
elections was predictable, and there was no chance for Hamas to gain access to real legislative
power.”298
Despite these straightforward reasons to boycott, Hamas seriously considered running in the
elections.  Already  in  1992,  a  year  before  the  first  Oslo  agreement  was  signed,  Hamas
anticipated the establishment of a some sort of Palestinian self-rule governed by democratic
principles.  In  response,  a  policy  paper  was  circulated  among  Hamas  members,  inviting
“knowledgeable people” to voice their opinions so that “a decision acceptable to the widest
possible  basis  of  [their]  ranks”  could be taken.  The question was whether  Hamas should
participate in elections that “might be held in the [West] Bank and the [Gaza] Strip” (Mishal
and Sela 2000, 122–30).299 And a number of important Hamas leaders advocated participation,
including such personalities  as  Mahmoud al-Zahhar,300 Abu Marzook,  and Sheikh Ahmed
Yassin.  The  latter  is  even  on  the  record  promising  that  the  movement  would  run  in  the
elections because it  “wanted to have an influence on the daily lives of Palestinians in the
territories” (Robinson 1997, 171).
In response, and as if to underline the ongoing tensions within Hamas, another influential
leader,  Abd al-Aziz  Rantisi,  was  quoted  saying that  Hamas  would  “not  take  part  in  any
self-rule institution” (Robinson 1997, 171). Eventually, it was Rantisi and his allies that were
proven correct. Following an internal referendum in Hamas, it was decided that the movement
should  boycott  the  1996  elections.301 Despite  this,  some  Hamas  leaders  apparently  felt
297 Hamas commanded the support of some 6 percent in 1996 (CPRS 2000).
298 Dr. Iyad Barghouti, interviewed August 28, 2007, in Ramallah.
299 This internal Hamas document was obtained by and reproduced in Mishal and Sela (2000). It is one of very
few leaked and translated Hamas policy papers available.
300 Hroub reasons that  he advocated participation based on personal  communication from March 1996 in
which al-Zahhar stated that “[m]y personal opinion differs from the opinion of the movement, and I do not
wish to state it” (Hroub 2000, 225, fn. 41). Note that most observers consider Mahmoud al-Zahhar to be a
Hamas hard-liner.
301 See below for details on the internal referendum. Most interviewed Hamas members emphasized that the
decision to boycott the elections in 1996 was a democratic one, for example senior Hamas cadres Dr.
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participation to be of such importance that they put forward their candidacy as independents.
Among these were Ismail Haniyeh, who would later become the first prime minister from
Hamas. They were eventually forced to withdraw from the elections by the top leadership in
Hamas  (Caridi  2010,  120–22),  but  not  before  highlighting  the  ideological  and  strategic
inconsistencies within Hamas.
  Inconsistent identity
Based on the above, Hamas’s ideological development throughout the Oslo period can be
divided into two phases. At first, Hamas remained committed to its original goals, pushing its
maximalist agenda even at the cost of legitimacy and popularity. This was partly due to the
uncertain outcome of the Oslo Accords, which prompted Hamas to stay the course, and partly
a result of the influential position of its religious cadres and absolutist nationalists. Then, a
shift  can  be  observed,  after  which  Hamas—at  least  to  some  degree—followed  the
hypothesized  trajectory  of  ideological  moderation  as  specified  in  the  movement-to-party
thesis. Despite moderating, however, Hamas did not complete its transmutation to political
party. Even if some of its most influential leaders advocated electoral participation, its militant
legacy and ideological  rigidity proved too powerful,  and Hamas in the end boycotted the
elections  and  as  such  remained  a  militant  liberation  movement.  In  sum,  then,  Hamas’s
ideological development is considered to have been somewhat inconsistent throughout the
Oslo period. On the one hand, it remained committed to its initial goals of establishing an
Islamic state throughout all of historic Palestine, by violent means if necessary. But on the
other, it also tried to maneuver as a pragmatic political movement in an ever-changing and
increasingly hostile political landscape. In particular, its offer of a long-term cease-fire, the
hudna, is considered a salient example of the incomplete, but important moderating efforts.
 5.2.3  Organizational development under persecution
One  important  reason  for  Hamas’s  inconsistent  ideological  development  and  incoherent
strategy throughout the Oslo years can be found in its poor organizational state. Although
Hamas initially was a rather well-run organization, its organizational coherence and capacity
had  suffered  serious  setbacks  during  the  first  intifada as  its  members  and  leaders  were
imprisoned and deported  en masse.  And as  Israel—now aided by the  PA—intensified  its
persecution  of  Hamas  throughout  the  Oslo  period,  both  with  crackdowns  on  its  militant
Mohammad Ghazal interviewed in Nablus, April 17, 2011 and Dr. Aziz Dweik interviewed in Hebron,
April 13, 2011. See also Gunning (2008, 112), ICG (2004, 11), and Usher (1995b, 73).
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activists and the continued imprisonment of its top leader, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, its efforts to
build and develop its organizational structure was seriously obstructed. The situation made it
exceedingly difficult for the movement to respond to environmental shocks and challenges
and develop its organization in a well considered and coherent manner. This, in turn, had
ramifications both  for  the  way in  which it  recruited  new members,  mobilized its  current
members, and the efficiency and effectiveness of its decision-making procedures.
  The formal structure and intra-party democracy
Although detailed in the previous chapter, a brief recap of Hamas’s organizational structure is
in order before delving into the development in the Oslo years. In short, Hamas inherited the
organizational structure of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood. And while the branches in
Gaza and the West Bank at first differed somewhat, having been associated with the Egyptian
and Jordanian Brotherhoods respectively, their organizational makeup soon came to be rather
similar. By the end of the first intifada, Hamas was organized in a federated and hierarchical
—if  stratified—manner,  as  indicated  in  Figure  6 below.302 The  description  of  Hamas’s
organizational structure is based on data from the relevant literature, in particular Gunning
(2008), Mishal and Sela (2000), and Tamimi (2007), supplemented by information provided
by interviews with current and former Hamas members. As for the organogram depicted in
Figure  6,  various  versions  based  on  information  gleaned  from the  literature  were  shown
during interviews with Hamas members, and based on their input the one below was created.
Note that because the bylaws and exact organizational structure of Hamas are kept secret for
reasons  of  security,  both  the  description  and  the  organogram  should  be  considered  as
suggestive.
At the bottom of the pyramid was the usra, or family. These can be thought of as cells, and
are the basic organizational units in Hamas. Each cell has approximately four members, one
of which is the elected leader, naqib. He, in turn, represents his cell at the district assembly,
called the shuba. The Gaza Strip is divided into seven districts, while the West Bank has five.
The leaders of these district assemblies in turn make up the regional shura councils, one on
the West Bank and one in Gaza. Together with Hamas representatives abroad and the prisoner
committees,  these  regional  councils  elect  the  Consultative  Council,  called  the  Majlis
al-Shura. The Consultative Council is the topmost body in Hamas, responsible for deciding
302 The  stratified  characteristic  of  Hamas’s  hierarchical  structure  refers  to  the  high  degree  of  autonomy
enjoyed by the lower organizational units.
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Figure 6: Hamas organogram at the end of the 1990s
(Source: Based on interviewed Hamas members and supplemented by information gleaned from the relevant
literature. Usra is Arabic for family, shuba means division, and shura translates into consultation.)
on overarching political aims and strategies. Finally, this council elects the Political Bureau,
which in essence is the executive branch in Hamas, tasked with the day-to-day management
of the organization (Ma’an 2009c).
Hamas’s  military  wing,  the  al-Qassam  Brigades,  is  suspected  to  operate  as  a  parallel
organization, with its own infrastructure and decision-making capabilities. Given the obvious
need for the Brigades to operate in secret, the details of its organizational makeup are difficult
to ascertain. And while the Brigades ostensibly has no direct ties to the political organization,
it is widely assumed that it is subordinate to the political leadership, and more specifically the
Political Bureau.
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Importantly, the organizational design of Hamas is one in which legitimacy and authority are
derived from the bottom-up.  Advancement  from one level  to another  takes  place through
elections. This provides the leadership with a high degree of internal legitimacy. In addition,
Hamas has adopted the Brotherhood tradition of consulting its rank-and-file when deliberating
on important decisions.303 Such an inclusive decision-making procedure also gives legitimacy
for the final decision, even among those that initially were opposed. The strong emphasis on
internal elections and consultation is taken as evidence that Hamas highly valued internal
democracy.  And by placing a  premium on intra-party  democracy and internal  legitimacy,
Hamas  has  managed  to  avoid  the  fragmentation  and  fractionalization  so  common among
Palestinian liberation movements (Gunning 2008, 112).304
It is also pertinent to note here that there are a number of challenges intrinsic to Hamas’s
organizational design. For one, the procedures by which candidates rise up through the rungs
of Hamas are deemed to be somewhat problematic. Briefly, to be voted into a higher position,
a  member  must  first  be  nominated  by  an  election  committee  established  by  the  local
leadership.  Members cannot put forward their own candidacy  (Gunning 2008, 107). After
nomination, a candidate must be endorsed by the leadership at the level to which he can be
elected. This means that a candidate challenging the position of a current leader is unlikely to
succeed. In essence, the upwards mobility of Hamas cadres takes on a centripetal motion, in
that the only way for a member to advance is by allowing himself to be co-opted by the
leadership (Panebianco 1988, 60–61). As such, Hamas does not allow for truly open and free
competition for leadership positions (Gunning 2008, 108–9). These limits that Hamas places
on its democratic procedures, however, made it more closely conform to the cadre structure
associated with revolutionary and militant movements than that of truly democratic movement
organizations (Close and Prevost 2008).
Also,  the  inclusive  decision-making  procedures  through  consultation  are  associated  with
certain challenges. It is assumed that there is a tradeoff between democracy and legitimacy on
the  one  hand,  and  decisiveness  and  efficiency  on  the  other.  As  long  as  Hamas’s  overall
strategy allows for a suitable response to a given challenge, there is no need for consultation.
303 The decision to boycott the 1996 elections was, for example, taken in consultation with its base, although,
as will be covered below, the dominance of the Political Bureau and the al-Qassam Brigades influenced the
outcome of the internal referendum (Gunning 2008, 110–12).
304 This might also be due to the fact that Hamas originated from a social movement with a clear ideological
grounding  and  identity,  a  legacy  many  of  the  other  Palestinian  liberation  movements  lack.  It  is  also
noteworthy that such an emphasis on internal democracy is not a characteristic Hamas shares with the
typical militant and revolutionary movement (de Zeeuw 2008b, 14–15).
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Yet,  when  Hamas  has  faced  more  fundamental  challenges,  the  consultative  nature  of
decision-making has negatively affected its responsiveness. Furthermore, these consultative
procedures have at times given rise to intra-party competition (Gunning 2008, 110–10). For,
although Hamas leaders both outside and inside the occupied territories stress the unity and
coherence of their organization, tension and competition between the branches have emerged
numerous times—in particular when the movement has faced principally important  issues
such as the question of electoral participation in 1996 and the merit of suicide operations
(Gunning 2008, 40–41, 114; Mishal and Sela 2000, 163–66).
The  federated  structure  of  Hamas  has  contributed  to  this  tendency  of  organizational
infighting. Power struggles between the branches have emerged and intensified partly because
they operate under widely different conditions: Israel frequently targets the Gaza wing; the
West Bank branch,  those in the refugee camps abroad, and the prisoners’ committees are
fragmented and at times marginalized; whereas the external leadership has largely been out of
reach  from Israeli  persecution  (ICG  2004,  11).305 In  addition,  the  branches  might  adopt
different positions because of their distinct legacies. This is particularly relevant for the Gaza
and West Bank branches. Because of its historical links to the Egyptian Brotherhood, which
has been outlawed by the Egyptian government for large parts of its history, the Gaza branch
has experience in running a decentralized and clandestine organization (Robinson 2004, 120).
Furthermore, the long history of persecution has forced the Gaza leaders to adopt pragmatic
policies  simply  to  survive.  However,  this  same  persecution  has  also  worked  to  instill  a
commitment to the cause among its leaders. And finally, it has robbed them of the political
experience enjoyed by their West Bank brethren. As related by Dr. Mohammad Ghazal, 
throughout our history, during the rule of the Egyptians and Jordanians,  we in
West Bank were more relaxed than Gaza. We in West Bank, we were politically
active while those Gaza weren’t. So, we were more advanced in politics. Due to
their situation, the Gazans were more militant.306
However,  as  a  consequence  of  being  allowed  to  run  its  network  of  religious  and  social
institutions  openly,  the  West  Bank  branch  has  less  experience  in  operating  underground
(Robinson 2004, 120). And having suffered comparatively less from Israeli persecution, many
of the traditional West Bank leaders were more focused on the absolutist and religious aims of
305 An important exception was the failed assassination attempt in 1997 on the leader of the Political Bureau of
Hamas in Amman, Khaled Meshaal. See McGeough (2010).
306 Dr. Mohammad Ghazal, interviewed in Nablus, April 17, 2011.
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the movement, and arguably less inclined to pragmatism and compromise. 
The above should not be taken as evidence that the branches can be categorized as more or
less pragmatic, moderate, or hard-line; they have all at one time or another adopted positions
that can be defined as either of these. Rather, it is assumed that their distinct  organizational
legacies  and  the  respective  environments  in  which  they  operate  can  shed  light  on  their
thinking and strategizing behind positions adopted on specific issues. Combined with analyses
of overall organizational developments, such as changes in the composition of Hamas, as well
as investigation of the power balance between the different branches, the above factors can
thus aid in explaining the behavior of Hamas.
  A new composition: persecution, recruitment, and defection
Initially, Hamas relied on the recruitment procedure inherited from the Muslim Brotherhood.
In short, this was a three-tiered system in which prospective members first were asked to sign
on as supporters and donate a small amount of money. Through education and training, they
could  first  advance  to  become  cell  members  with  limited  voting  rights,  before  finally
becoming established members allowed to stand for election to higher positions and with full
voting rights  (A. Cohen 1982, 159; Mitchell 1969, 183). In the days of the Brotherhood, it
would take up to five years to advance from prospective to established member (IkhwanWeb
2007;  Trager  2011).  Such  an  elaborate  recruitment  procedure  worked  to  indoctrinate  and
homogenize  the  rank-and-file,  and  as  long  as  Hamas  kept  with  these  recruitment
requirements, it was almost guaranteed a disciplined and committed membership. However,
already  at  the  end  of  the  intifada,  it  was  evident  that  Hamas  had  begun  recruiting  new
members in a different fashion, allowing recruits to rise through the ranks more rapidly than
previously  (Robinson 1997, 173). This continued throughout the 1990s, and arguably had
negative ramifications for the discipline of the rank-and-file.
There were both pull- and push-factors forcing Hamas to change its recruitment procedures.
For one, Hamas needed new recruits. This demand for new members was primarily created by
the  intensified  persecution  of  Hamas  activists.  As  hundreds  of  its  members  were  either
imprisoned, assassinated, or deported from the occupied territories,  the organizational and
military capacities  of Hamas were seriously weakened  (Tamimi 2007, 195).  Hamas could
therefore not allow itself to remain too picky when recruiting new members. The demand for
new members was also partly a result of a number of Muslim Brothers defecting from Hamas.
While it is hard to get an exact overview of why they defected and how many there were, the
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reasons given by a former high-ranking leader of the Brotherhood and Hamas, Dr. Mahmoud
al-Habbash, can be informative. In short, al-Habbash said he left Hamas because the religious
project of the Brotherhood had been replaced by a political one:
I discovered that they just to use Islam as a bridge to achieve political victories, or
serve their political interests. I have said it in the past, and I say it now: There is a
difference between those who serve Islam and those who use Islam. There is a big
difference.  So,  in  1994,  I  made the  decision to  leave  Hamas and the  Muslim
Brotherhood, to become an independent, and to serve my religion.
A long-time member of the Brotherhood and a religious scholar, al-Habbash also indicated a
certain frustration with the new leadership in Hamas:
Most of the current leaders in Hamas are not religious men. If you ask them “what
about your teaching, what did you learn in the school or at university?,” they are
all doctors, engineers, or have other regular professions. Few of them are religious
teachers or religious thinkers.307
Such a reason for leaving lends credence to the argument that these defections from Hamas
might partly have been a side effect of the way in which Hamas was established. As argued by
Robinson  (1997),  the  establishment  of  Hamas  can  be  seen  as  a  palace  coup  within  the
Brotherhood,  in  which  a  younger,  more  radical,  and  impatient  generation  took  over  and
changed the Brotherhood’s  modus operandi (McGeough 2010, 234). Naturally, those on the
losing end, the old guard from the days of the Brotherhood, grew disgruntled as their religious
project became undermined by “petty” politics. In addition, they were surpassed by a younger
generation of leaders without religious training. Finally, the intense persecution of anyone
associated with Hamas of course made the potential cost of remaining a member high, making
an exit strategy far more inviting than both loyalty and voice (Hirschman 1970). In short, they
had plenty of good reasons to defect.
There  was  also  an  external  push  to  make  Hamas  change  its  recruitment  procedures.  By
signing the Oslo Accords, the Fatah leadership in effect replaced resistance with negotiations.
This move did not sit well with many Fatah cadres. And as mentioned above, Hamas had
positioned itself as the main resistance movement following the signing of the Oslo Accords.
As a consequence, those in Fatah who were disenchanted with their own leadership looked to
Hamas for a new home in which they could continue their resistance to the occupation. As
307 Interviewed in Ramallah, May 25, 2011.
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summed up  by  Hamas  MP Dr.  Ayman Daraghme,  “I  was  a  member  of  Fatah  because  I
admired its resistance to the occupation. But in those days, in the mid-1990s, it was Hamas
that focused on resistance. And I joined Hamas because of that.”308 And it was activists such
as Daraghme from Fatah who provided the supply of recruits for Hamas  (Robinson 1997,
170–71).
It is noteworthy that the Fatah cadres who joined did so for ideological reasons. In terms of
Hamas’s  institutionalization,  they  joined  out  of  conviction  for  a  cause,  i.e.,  a  liberated
Palestine, not to reap any personal benefits. Hence, their incentives to join might have been
collective, which stands in contrast to the selective incentives associated with institutionalized
organizations.  In  the  lingo of  Panebianco,  they were  believers,  at  least  in  the  nationalist
element of Hamas’s ideology, if not equally convinced of the religious aspects  (1988, 24–
27).309
In sum, the composition of Hamas’s rank-and-file changed quite dramatically throughout the
Oslo  period.  At  first,  the  legacy  from the  Muslim  Brotherhood  provided  Hamas  with  a
disciplined and committed membership base, in effect making it a cadre movement, sharing
characteristics  with  the  militant  movements  described  by  Close  and  Prevost  (2008).
Responding to endogenous and exogenous challenges, however, Hamas eased its recruitment
procedures and requirements. Membership recruitment into Hamas extended beyond Muslim
Brotherhood affiliates to include many from Fatah. Instead of the Sheikhs and imams, the
base of Hamas came to be increasingly made up of entrepreneurs, engineers, doctors, and
shop  owners  (Kristianasen  1999,  22).  And  as  the  membership  swelled,  Hamas  lost  its
distinctive  organizational  characteristic,  turning  from a  disciplined  and  dedicated  militant
movement, into a less cohesive, mass-based, umbrella movement (Robinson 1997, 173).
  The dominance of the Bureau and the Brigades—electoral boycott and violence
In contrast to the rank-and-file, the composition of the top echelons in Hamas did not change
much for most of the 1990s. The founding fathers and the first generation of leaders largely
remained  in  charge.  What  did  change,  however,  was  the  balance  of  power  between  the
different leadership branches, as it oscillated back and forth in tandem with external shocks
and challenges.  Despite attempts to compartmentalize its organizational structure so that the
308 Interviewed in Ramallah, April 10, 2011.
309 It should be mentioned that the military wing of Hamas often relied on volunteers, not recruits, to carry out
suicide operations. As one Hamas leader relayed to Nasra Hassan  (2001), “[o]ur biggest problem is the
hordes of young men who beat on our doors, clamoring to be sent [as human bombers].”
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leaderships in Gaza and on the West Bank could operate independently of each other and with
a high degree of autonomy, the effectiveness by which Israel and the PA persecuted Hamas in
effect decapitated the organization inside the occupied territories (Kristianasen 1999, 21, 28).
As a consequence, the situation for the domestic leadership had become precarious by the
mid-1990s.
It  was  therefore  the  Political  Bureau  in  Amman that  constituted  the  dominant  faction  in
Hamas from its  establishment  in 1992 and well  into the 1990s.  In the words of  Ousama
Hamdan,  a  long-standing  member  of  the  Political  Bureau,  “there  was  no  other  political
leadership  in  Hamas  when  the  Political  Bureau was  established.”  According  to  him,  the
persecution of the internal leadership at the hands of Israel and the PA was so ferocious that
they lost most  of their operational capacities.  This argument  is corroborated by numerous
sources,  both  primary  and  secondary  (e.g.,  Mishal  and  Sela  2000,  160–66).310 And
furthermore, Hamdan claimed that even the topmost body in Hamas, the Shura council, which
is made up of leaders both from within the occupied territories and the diaspora, was not
functioning properly at the time.311 In part, this was because many of its members also were
imprisoned  or  exiled,  and  in  part  because  the  mentioned  consultative  decision-making
procedure  rendered  the  Consultative  Council  into  a  rather  slow  moving  and  inefficient
governing body.
Added to the above, the ability of the Consultative Council to exercise its authority had been
further  circumscribed  by  the  fact  that  it  relinquished  control  of  what  Panebianco  termed
“zones of uncertainty” when it delegated the day-to-day management to the Political Bureau
(1988, 33–35). And in Hamas, as in other organizations, authority ultimately rests with the
faction in control of these “zones of uncertainty.” Crucially, the Political Bureau controlled
much of the financial flow in Hamas (Gunning 2008, 115), often considered to be one of the
most important zone of uncertainty for any organization (Panebianco 1988, 33–35).
Added to this, the Political Bureau has for long been assumed to be the leadership branch that
exercises the most influence over the al-Qassam Brigades (Gunning 2008, 115). Admittedly,
the  mentioned clandestine  nature  of  the  Brigades  makes  it  difficult  to  ascertain  its  exact
relationship  with  the  Political  Bureau.  However,  partly  because  of  the  latter’s  control  of
Hamas’s finances, and partly because of ideological and strategic similarities, it is argued here
310 Numerous interviewees from Hamas reiterated this claim.
311 Current member of the Political Bureau in Hamas, Ousama Hamdan, interviewed in Haret Hreik, southern
suburb of Beirut, November 18, 2011.
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that throughout much of the 1990s, the Brigades operated as if subordinate to the Political
Bureau. Crucially, the militant wing mounted operations seemingly in accordance with the
preferences of the Political Bureau, but in contrast to and without the official approval of the
other political  leadership circles,  be it  the  Consultative Council  or  the domestic  branches
(Gunning 2008, 115).
In  short,  the  dominant  position  of  the  Political  Bureau  and  the  al-Qassam Brigades  had
consequences for the strategy and behavior of Hamas in the mid-1990s. Crucially, it helps
explain Hamas’s continued use of suicide bombers and its boycott of the 1996 PLC elections,
both of which were contentious issues within the organization (Gunning 2008, 112–13).
With regard to the use of suicide operations as a resistance tactic,  certain prominent Hamas
figures have been outright opposed to it. For example, Sayyed Abu Musameh, PLC member
and long-time Gaza leader was opposed “to violence perpetrated against civilians”  (Caridi
2010, 140). Ahmed Youssef, another Hamas leader from Gaza, was likewise opposed to such
operations,  although  for  strategic  and  not  ideological  reasons.  He  advised  the  Hamas
leadership  that  another  way  of  fighting  the  occupation  should  be  found,  as  the  suicide
operations had become a public relations problem; otherwise sympathetic voices throughout
the  world  condemned  Hamas’s  suicide  operations,  as  these  also  target  innocent  civilians
(Caridi 2010, 140–41).312
By and  large,  those  opposed to  suicide  bombings  resided inside  the  occupied  territories;
because  Hamas  members  in  Gaza  and  on  the  West  Bank  are  vulnerable  to  Israeli
repercussions, its leaders there have always had to carefully consider the merit of any military
action, and in particular the suicide operations as these provoke the harshest responses. The
leaders outside the territories, however, rarely suffer the inevitable repercussions from Israel,
and have as a consequence traditionally been more inclined toward military actions (Gunning
2008, 212; Hroub 2000, 59; Mishal and Sela 2000, 166). And as violence is its raison d'être,
the al-Qassam Brigades would be expected to advocate for suicide operations.
In short,  the dominance of the Political  Bureau and the Brigades led to continued use of
suicide operations despite internal opposition. And not only did these suicide operations take
place without the consent of the leaders inside the territories, but some even undermined the
political efforts of Hamas. One important instance of this was the wave of suicide attacks
312 According to Caridi, Hamas co-founder Sheikh Jamil Hamami left the organization in protest of the suicide
operations (2010, 123).
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perpetrated by Hamas in the wake of Israel’s assassination of its bomb-maker Ayyash in 1996.
These attacks “effectively put an end to the tentative rapprochement between the internal
leadership and the Palestinian Authority” (Gunning 2008, 113).
Similarly,  when  Hamas  discussed  whether  to  participate  in  the  1996  PLC elections,  the
dominant position of the Political Bureau and the al-Qassam Brigades again swayed Hamas in
their  preferred  direction.  Both  were  opposed  to  electoral  participation,  and  together  they
shared sufficient organizational clout to overrule the participatory strategy advocated by many
domestic political leaders  (Gunning 2008, 112; ICG 2006, 5–6; Mishal and Sela 2000, 88,
152, 163).
Their ideological argument was that Hamas should not join “a system they hoped to replace
for the sake of coexistence with a state they hoped to destroy”  (ICG 2006, 5–6), i.e., that
joining the political system was tantamount to forfeiting its opposition against negotiations
and thereby defaulting on their aim to liberate historic Palestine. This, it was argued, would
lead  to  loss  of  support  and  a  subsequent  decrease  of  Hamas’s  influence.  Although  they
appealed to ideology and legitimacy, another likely reason for the Political Bureau and the
military commanders to advocate boycott was a shared concern for power and positions. If
political participation superseded armed resistance, many of the al-Qassam commanders could
be rendered redundant. And if Hamas participated in elections it would be the domestic cadres
that ran as candidates and reaped the political benefits, gaining organizational influence at the
expense of the external leadership.313
In short, and in line with the theoretical stipulations  (Harmel and Tan 2003), it matters for
party behavior who is in charge; the dominance of the Political Bureau and its alliance with
the al-Qassam Brigades help explain crucial aspects of Hamas’s behavior. It is important to
underline, however, that the division was never a simple hard-liner outside vs. soft-liner inside
dichotomy, neither with regard to electoral participation, nor the merits of suicide operations.
With  regard  to  the  former,  it  was  evident  that  Hamas  co-founder  Sheikh  Ahmed  Yasin
advocated participation. Others, however, such as West Bank Hamas leader Bassam Jarrar,
argued against it  (Caridi 2010, 121). And although most in the Political Bureau argued for
boycotting the elections, its deputy, Abu Marzook, advocated for participation (Gunning 2008,
112; McGeough 2010, 124).
313 Gunning argues that the Political Bureau also opposed participation for ideological reasons. Many in the
external leadership are refugees, a crucial but often sidelined issue in the peace processes (2008, 207; ICG
2004, 6).
176
  Gaza obtains factional dominance—renewed moderation
The dominance of the Political Bureau and the al-Qassam Brigades did not last, however.
Three factors are identified as having disrupted the power balance within Hamas in the last
years of the 1990s to the benefit of the leadership in Gaza. For one, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin,
co-founder  of  Hamas and arguably its  most  charismatic  leader,  was  released from Israeli
prison and returned to Gaza in 1997; second, the Political Bureau was expelled from Amman,
Jordan, in 1999; and third, the sustained and intense persecution of the al-Qassam Brigades at
the  hands of  the  PA and Israel  eventually  curbed its  operational  capabilities.  These three
factors  were all  to the benefit  of  the Gaza leadership,  and will  be accounted for  in what
follows.
First, the Gaza leadership capitalized on the return of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin. In 1997, Yassin
was  eight  years  into  his  life  sentence  in  Israeli  prison.  That  year,  the  Israeli  national
intelligence agency, Mossad, tried to assassinate the head of Hamas’s Political Bureau, Khaled
Meshaal, who resided in Amman, Jordan. The Mossad agents failed in their mission, however,
and were captured by the Jordanians. Unsurprisingly, King Hussein of Jordan was furious at
the Israelis for mounting an assassination operation on Jordanian soil. He requested Yassin’s
release from prison in exchange for the captured Israeli agents, calculating that by demanding
a high price for the safety of her agents, Israel would abstain from such operations in the
future. He also hoped that Yasin could counterbalance radical elements within Hamas and
moderate  the  party  (Mishal  and  Sela  2000,  111–12;  Tamimi  2007,  110).314 The  Israelis
eventually complied, and with the return of Yassin to Gaza, the leadership there enjoyed a
burst of legitimacy and increased organizational influence.
Second, the Gaza leadership indirectly benefited from the Political Bureau’s expulsion from
Jordan in 1999. Hamas’s relationship with the Jordanian regime had always been strained,
from the establishment of its Political Bureau in Amman in 1992 onward. But, it took a turn
for the worse when King Hussein passed away early in 1999 and was succeeded by King
Abdullah  II.  Whereas  Hussein  was  famous  for  successfully  combining  pragmatism  and
integrity,315 his heir Abdullah II was more susceptible to international pressures. In particular,
Abdullah II’s ascension to the throne meant that the prolonged demand from military and
economical donors such as the US for Jordan to “do something” about Hamas finally came to
314 See McGeough’s book Kill Khalid (2010) for an in-dept and detailed account of the Israeli operation and
its aftermath.
315 See Shlaim (2007) for a comprehensive biography of King Hussein.
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fruition. By the end of 1999, he had expelled all senior Hamas cadres from Jordan. After
temporarily  operating  from  Doha,  the  Political  Bureau  eventually  settled  in  Damascus
(Kumaraswamy  2001;  McGeough  2010,  247–66).  This  forced  relocation  hampered  the
Political  Bureau’s operations and allowed the leadership in Gaza to further  increase their
dominance of Hamas.
Third, the al-Qassam Brigades was weakened following prolonged and intense persecution.
For  the  PA,  in  coordination  with  the  Israelis,  had  become  increasingly  effective  in  their
persecution of Hamas’s militant cadres in the latter years of the 1990s, and by the summer of
1999, the al-Qassam Brigades was all but neutralized. And as Hamas’s military capabilities
were weakened, so were the  al-Qassam commanders’ position within Hamas  (Bloom 2004,
68; Hroub 2004, 23; ICG 2006, 9). Importantly, and despite the fact that the political leaders
also suffered under the widespread persecution,  Hamas’s organizational  roots provided an
alternative strategy to violent resistance: its wide network of associated social and welfare
institutions inherited from the Muslim Brotherhood. As the operational  capabilities  of the
al-Qassam Brigades diminished, Hamas increasingly focused its efforts on services provision.
The demand for welfare services in the occupied territories had increased proportionally to the
failure of the PA to provide for its population, and Hamas gained followers by filling parts of
this welfare vacuum (Gunning 2008, 39, 48; Hilal 2006; ICG 2006, 6; Roy 2003). 
This tactical reorientation also provided the political leadership with increased organizational
influence.316 In sum, and combined with Yassin’s return to Gaza, the expulsion of the Political
Bureau from Amman, and the diminishing capabilities of the al-Qassam Brigades, the above
factors all worked to benefit of the Gaza leadership, who had obtained dominance of Hamas
by the end of 1999. As stipulated by relevant theories, external shocks and environmental
challenges produced a change of dominant faction within Hamas, which, as hypothesized by
the same theories, is expected to have had consequences for the behavior of Hamas (Harmel
and Janda 1994; Harmel and Tan 2003; Panebianco 1988, 244).
To summarize, the harsh conditions under which Hamas operated throughout the Oslo years
posed  serious  challenges  for  its  organizational  functioning  and  development;  despite
inheriting a rather well-developed organizational infrastructure from the Palestinian Muslim
316 Note  that  the  expulsion  of  the  Political  Bureau  from  Amman  led  to  a  shortfall  in  funds,  and  as  a
consequence, Hamas had to scale back its welfare services. This, in turn, had negative ramifications for
Hamas’s popularity, as indicated in Figure 5 on page 160. However, the dominance of the Gaza leadership
remained intact.
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Brotherhood,  the  intense  persecution  of  Hamas’s  domestic  leadership  and  rank-and-file
undermined its organizational  coherence. This, in turn, led to increased factionalism at its
topmost  levels,  which  helps  explain  Hamas’s  inconsistent  and  ambiguous  ideological
development and strategic behavior.
 5.3 Hamas after Oslo—still more movement than party
The above sections have detailed the development of Hamas during the Oslo years, indicating
that it responded both ideologically and organizationally to the various environmental changes
and challenges, but fell short of completing its transmutation from movement to party.
As argued in the preamble to the above analyses of Hamas’s ideological and organizational
development throughout the Oslo years,317 its dual legacy as a conventional religious social
movement and a militant revolutionary movement would influence its transmutation toward a
political  party  in  contradictory  directions.  Following  the  path  of  a  conventional  social
movement organization, Hamas could be expected to turn into a mass-based, organizationally
broad,  electorally  oriented,  and  ideologically  flexible  party.  However,  depending  on  the
influence of its militant legacy, Hamas would probably remain ideologically rigid, retain its
revolutionary ideology and totalitarian strategy, with a top-down command structure, and an
exclusive membership. 
As will  be further  demonstrated in  the coming sections,  this  dual  legacy exacerbated the
already  challenging  situation  in  which  Hamas  found  itself,  in  essence  obstructing  its
transmutation from movement to party. In short, Hamas remained more of a movement than a
party at the end of the Oslo years, although it had also come to share qualities of the latter.
 5.3.1  Partial ideological moderation
Ideologically,  Hamas  entered  the  period  in  question  still  committed  to  its  original  goals,
pushing a maximalist agenda at the cost of internal legitimacy and domestic popularity. This
is taken to indicate that its identity initially remained that of a religious and militant liberation
movement,  with  aims  more  akin  to  that  of  a  revolutionary  movement  than  that  of  the
incremental changes associated with political parties.
From around 1996, elements within the Hamas leadership attempted to push the organization
in a moderating direction, however, for example by offering Israel a long-term cease-fire, the
317 See section 5.2 Arrested development—Hamas in the new system on pp. 155ff.
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hudna,  along  the  1967  borders.  In  later  communiqués,  Hamas  even  opened  for  future
negotiations with Israel, although without admitting that such negotiations would lead to a
final solution to the conflict (Tamimi 2007, 269–70).
Despite  such  moderating  tendencies,  Hamas’s  militant  legacy  and  ideological  rigidity
remained  dominant,  and  powerful  sections  within  its  leadership  stayed  committed  to  its
revolutionary goals. In short,  Hamas’s dual legacies meant that its ideological development
took on a somewhat contradictory quality throughout the Oslo period. On the one hand, it
remained committed  to  its  initial  goals  of  establishing  an  Islamic  state  throughout  all  of
historic Palestine, by violent means if necessary. But on the other hand, it tried to maneuver in
an ever-changing and increasingly hostile  political  landscape,  moderating its  rhetoric  and
adopting pragmatic positions to ensure continued survival.
In sum, it is argued that while Hamas did become more ideologically flexible throughout the
Oslo years, its legacy as a militant liberation movement remained too influential for it to fully
discard its maximalist and revolutionary outlook. The result was an uneasy combination of
ideological  rigidity  and  flexibility.  As  such,  it  is  concluded  that  Hamas  emerged  as  an
ideologically inconsistent organization at the end of the period in question, qualifying neither
as a pure movement nor as a proper political party.
 5.3.2  Patchy organizational development
With regard to the development of Hamas’s organizational structure and order throughout the
Oslo  years,  the  picture  that  emerged  in  the  above  analyses  also  points  in  contradictory
directions. At the beginning of the period, Hamas was still very much a militant liberation
movement.  It  kept  with  its  strict  requirements  and  comprehensive  indoctrination  of  new
recruits,  which provided a  disciplined and committed rank-and-file  suitable  for  a  militant
organization. Combined with Hamas’s federated and stratified structure, these organizational
characteristics  arguably  helped  the  organization  to  survive  the  sustained  and  intense
persecution  it  suffered  at  the  hands  of  the  PA and  Israel.  Furthermore,  its  centripetal
advancement procedures ensured a homogeneous leadership, which for a while seemed to be
united behind a common message and strategy. Finally, the leadership apparently retained the
capability to enforce organizational discipline and issue orders down the command line.
Nevertheless, the increasingly effective persecution of Hamas cadres eventually forced the
organization to ease its recruitment procedures to compensate for the shortfall of militants.
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And the ensuing influx of new members—many of which were motivated to join solely to
fight  Israel,  not  to  establish  an  Islamist  state—had  negative  ramifications  for  the
rank-and-file’s  discipline.  As  a  result,  and  in  a  short  time span,  Hamas  lost  much  of  its
characteristics  as  a  disciplined  militant  movement.  Instead,  it  developed  into  a  more
mass-based, less cohesive movement with a heterogeneous membership base.
Added to this,  the federated structure that  initially helped Hamas to retain its  operational
capabilities  increasingly  turned  into  a  liability  toward  the  end  of  the  1990s.  Despite  the
homogenizing effect of Hamas’s centripetal advancement procedures, its geographic branches
operated under widely different conditions.318 This, in turn, explains part of the reason why its
various  leadership  circles  disagreed  on  crucial  strategic  decisions.  Consequently,  Hamas
suffered  a  heightened  degree  of  factionalism at  its  topmost  levels,  as  various  leadership
branches vied for organizational influence.
This  factionalism,  in  turn,  had  ramifications  for  Hamas’s  behavior.  As  argued,  Hamas’s
decision not  to contest  the  1996 PLC elections can largely be attributed to the dominant
position of the Amman-based Political Bureau and the al-Qassam Brigades, both of which
favored  boycott  over  participation.  The  process  leading  up  to  this  decision  also  revealed
reduced organizational cohesion;  different leaders publicly discussed the pros and cons of
participation, openly expressing their differences. While disagreements are to be expected in
any political movement, some high-ranking Hamas members not only publicly expressed their
discord with the decision to boycott, but even broke line by putting forward their candidacy in
the elections. Although these were forced to withdraw their candidacy, such behavior strongly
suggests that Hamas no longer had a cohesive and united leadership (Caridi 2010, 120–22).
In sum, it  is  argued here  that  Hamas lost  much of the  organizational  characteristics of  a
militant  movement  by  the  end  of  the  1990s,  such  as  its  committed  and  disciplined
rank-and-file and cohesive leadership. However, it did not fully replace its old organizational
logic  with  a  new one;  rather  than  transmuting  into  a  mass-based  political  party,  Hamas
retained  its  cell-based  organizational  structure.  Furthermore,  Hamas  only  reluctantly  and
partly  adapted  to  the  new  political  realities  in  occupied  Palestine.  Its  militant  legacy
seemingly  remained  too  influential  for  Hamas  to  be  able  or  willing  to  restructure  its
organization and take the leap from movement to party.
318 Cf. section The formal structure and intra-party democracy on pp. 167ff.
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 5.3.3  Still movement, not yet party
To  summarize,  Hamas  seemed  rather  ill-prepared  and  ill-equipped  to  cope  with  the
developments of the 1990s. Although the organization survived intense persecution and a host
of  environmental  challenges,  Hamas  emerged  at  the  end  of  the  1990s  still  more  of  a
movement than a political party. But, given the circumstances, such an arrested development
was unsurprising. The immense pressure put on Hamas by both the PA and Israel forced it to
prioritize survival over politics. Combined with its dual legacies as a militant movement and a
religious movement, such a prioritization prompted Hamas to become reactive rather than
proactive with regard to both ideological and organizational development. In short, Hamas
struggled  to  retain  its  identity  as  a  religiously  motivated  liberation  movement  as  the
Palestinian political system developed toward a logic of party politics.
Although a tendency toward ideological moderation could be detected, the indicators were not
conclusive.  Despite  downplaying  its  most  radical  goals  and  opening  up  for  increased
pragmatism,  partly  in  an  attempt  to  increase  its  public  appeal,  Hamas  simultaneously
remained  committed  to  the  establishment  of  an  Islamist  state  in  the  whole  of  historic
Palestine. Hamas’s unclear ideological commitments were in turn partly explained by its poor
organizational state; persecution of its rank-and-file combined with its federated and stratified
structure led to intensified factionalism, which in turn undermined its organizational cohesion
and decision-making procedures. Such a state of affairs led to public infighting among its
various leadership branches. This was especially evident when Hamas decided to boycott the
1996 PLC elections, and in discussions regarding its interim aims, allowing for a temporary
solution along the 1967 borders, and the long-term goal of erecting an Islamist state in the
whole of historic Palestine.
In  conclusion,  Hamas  did  take  steps  both  ideologically  and  organizationally  on  its
transmutation from movement to party during the Oslo years, but the combined effect of the
listed  exogenous (various environmental  challenges and shocks) and endogenous (its  dual
legacies) factors account for why it did not complete this process. By boycotting the 1996
PLC elections, and failing both to develop its organization and to unite behind a consistent
ideological message, Hamas remained more of a movement than a political party at the end of
the 1990s.
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 5.4 Hamas’s level of institutionalization at the end of the 1990s
Based on the findings from the above analyses and supplemented by data gleaned from the
interviews and the extant literature, an overall assessment of the degree to which Hamas had
institutionalized by the end of the Oslo period is  offered. The analysis  below utilizes the
analytical framework outlined in the introductory chapter and estimates Hamas’s degree of
institutionalization  by  measuring  its  respective  scores  in  the  four  attributes,  namely
systemness, decisional autonomy, value infusion, and reification.
 5.4.1  Systemness
Hamas’s systemness is considered to have reached a medium level by the end of the 1990s.
Although the persecution of Hamas throughout the Oslo years undermined its organizational
coherence, it had nevertheless routinized its behavior and structure sufficiently to survive as a
united organization.
Hamas inherited the organizational infrastructure of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, and
could initially rely on a federated, stratified, and hierarchical organizational structure suitable
to operate under the dire conditions of occupied Palestine. However, the organizational logic
of the Brotherhood, a religious social movement, was arguably incompatible with the militant
strategy  that  remained  the raison  d'être of  Hamas.  As  explicated  above,  such  dual
organizational legacies negatively affected its organizational development.
Furthermore, any attempt by Hamas to homogenize and further develop its organization was
obstructed by the harsh and persistent persecution it suffered throughout the Oslo years. At
times, Hamas was completely governed by the Political Bureau in Amman, as most of its
political leaders and military commanders in occupied Palestine were either arrested by the
PA or expelled or assassinated by Israel. Given the fact that the Consultative Council was
meant to constitute the topmost leadership, such a state of affairs indicate that Hamas for long
periods  abandoned  its  formal  structure.  It  should  also  be  reiterated  that  Hamas  suffered
factionalization throughout the Oslo years, in part as a result of the challenging circumstances.
And the intensity of the organizational infighting, in particular between the Political Bureau
and the Gaza leadership, is a powerful indication that Hamas had still not reached a high level
of systemness.
However,  the fact  that  Hamas had instituted an organizational  structure that  enabled it  to
continue operating and surviving in the face of widespread and intense persecution, is also
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indicative of systemness. For, even if the powerful position and crucial role played by of the
Political  Bureau  was  in  breach  of  the  formal  structure,  it  suggests  routinization  of  the
informal  structure.  In  short,  although  the  state  of  Hamas’s  formal  structure  deteriorated
somewhat throughout the Oslo era, all of what it lost in terms of systemness was compensated
for by the routinization of its informal structure and behavior. Hamas’s level of systemness is
therefore considered to have increased to a medium level by the end of the 1990s.
 5.4.2  Decisional autonomy
The degree of decisional autonomy can be measured by examining whether the organization
in  question  depends  on  external  sponsors  to  such  an  extent  that  it  would  forgo  its  own
interests to the benefit of one or more of its benefactors. For Hamas, two main groups of
external  actors  are  expected to  have  had the  possibility  to  influence its  decision-making,
namely the network of auxiliary religious welfare institutions, and its international sponsors,
such as Iran and the Jordanian Brotherhood.
With regard to  the  former,  it  should be noted that  while  Hamas apparently  relied on the
services  provided  by  the  Islamic  charitable  organizations  to  increase  its  popular  support
throughout  the  Oslo  years,  the  ties  between  Hamas  and  these  organizations  were  never
formalized.  Although some overlap  in  personnel  have  been documented,  e.g.,  with  board
members from certain Islamic charities also serving as leaders in Hamas  (Gunning 2008,
115), there were no indications that these organizations had any effect on decision-making in
Hamas (Roy 2011, 141–42).319
The various international donors had a somewhat similar relationship with Hamas, i.e., one of
ideological affinity and overlapping strategic and tactical interests, but without obvious signs
of interference. Hamas certainly capitalized on its ties to the Jordanian branch of the Muslim
Brotherhood,  as  it  for  long  enabled  the  Political  Bureau  residing  in  Amman  to  procure
weapons  and  transport  these  to  the  West  Bank  (Tamimi  2007,  73–74).  However,  and  as
discussed in chapter 4,320 the Brotherhood itself relied on the acceptance of the Jordanian
regime to operate freely. This chain of delicate relations led Hamas to carefully consider the
consequences of its decisions for the Jordanian Brotherhood, limiting its decisional autonomy.
Other  international  sponsors  include  Iran  and  various  Gulf  states.  These  traditionally
319 Nor,  for  that  matter,  were  there  any  indications  that  Hamas  exercised  any  undue  influence  on  the
decision-making in these organizations. See S. Roy (2011) for a thorough and comprehensive analysis of
the relationship between Hamas and Islami charitable organizations.
320 See section 4.4.2 on page 140.
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supported the PLO, but after Yasser Arafat sided with Saddam Hussein in the First Gulf War,
support for the Palestinian cause was channeled to Hamas instead (Roy 2011, 138). There was
nothing to indicate that this financial and political support came with any strings attached
apart from Hamas’s persistent resistance to the Israeli occupation—something Hamas was set
on doing regardless.
It is concluded that Hamas had a medium level of decisional autonomy throughout the Oslo
years. While Hamas was relatively free to determine its own policies and strategies, its close
ties to the Jordanian Brotherhood made it sensitive to the priorities of the Jordanian regime,
thus limiting its level of decisional autonomy.
 5.4.3  Value infusion
Two interrelated factors suggest that Hamas only to a limited degree had become infused with
value by the end of the Oslo era. For one, both its old and new members remained committed
to the goals of Hamas, seeing it as a vehicle to resist Israel and Islamize occupied Palestine.
For example, and as discussed, Hamas experienced an influx of new recruits throughout the
Oslo years,321 who, by and large, joined Hamas to resist the occupation (Robinson 1997, 170–
71). As such, their motivation to join can be said to have been  instrumental, thus strongly
suggesting that they saw membership in Hamas as a way to resist the occupation, and not a
goal in itself.322
Second, a number of those in the rank-and-file who disagreed with the strategies and tactics
Hamas adopted to achieve its goals defected. Mainly, such defections were in protest of the
use of suicide operations as a tactic from 1994 and onward.323 As the degree to which the
rank-and-file remain loyal and disciplined when the leadership alters or replaces ideological
elements and adopts new and controversial strategies is a good litmus test of value infusion,
the above is taken to indicate that Hamas had not become infused with value by the end of the
Oslo years.324
321 See section A new composition: persecution, recruitment, and defection on pp. 171ff.
322 As mentioned, not all those who joined necessarily agreed with Hamas’s Islamist project. However, this
just further underlines the instrumental nature of their motivation to join, thus strengthening the argument
that Hamas was not infused with value.
323 For example, after Hamas retaliated to the assassination of its bomb-maker Yahya Ayyash in 1996 with a
string of suicide operations inside Israel, one of its co-founders on the West Bank, Sheikh Jamil Hamami,
left the organization in protest (Caridi 2010, 123).
324 This point should not be overstated, however, as most Hamas members remained loyal and did not opt for
the exit strategy.
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In sum, the instrumental motivation of Hamas’s new recruits, and the defections of some of its
old members, are both taken to indicate that the organization was still seen a means toward an
end, and not an end in itself, and thus was still infused with value only to a low degree.
 5.4.4  Reification
As most relevant indicators point in the positive direction, Hamas’s level of reification at the
end of the Oslo years is considered to be high. For one, Hamas was the second most popular
faction in occupied Palestine throughout the period in question.325 This is taken to indicate that
Hamas was highly reified in the public imagination. Second, and despite the fact that support
for Hamas declined, it arguably managed to monopolize the identity as the Islamic alternative
in Palestinian politics, thus entrenching its position in the public imagination. And third, given
the attention granted to Hamas from both Israel and the PA-PLO-Fatah nexus throughout the
1990s, it seems safe to conclude it was recognized as a force to be reckoned with. In short,
Hamas was highly reified at the end of the Oslo years, in the public imagination, among its
domestic competitors, and by its enemy.
Summarized,  Hamas  scored  low  on  value  infusion,  medium  on  both  systemness  and
decisional autonomy, and high on reification. Hamas was recognized both by its supporters
and by its  competitors  as a  force to be reckoned with,  and enjoyed a  medium degree of
autonomy from its environment. However, it remained underdeveloped organizationally, and
had to rely on informal routines and improvisation simply to survive the ordeal of the 1990s.
Furthermore, as its new and old members still saw it as a means toward an end, it is argued
that Hamas was only infused with value to a low degree. Overall, it is concluded that Hamas
had reached a medium level of institutionalization at the end of the Oslo years.
325 See Figure 5: Factional support in the occupied territories, 1994–1999 on page 160.
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Chapter 6:  Hamas and the second intifada (2000–2006)
This chapter is dedicated to detailing Hamas’s development in the six year period from the
outbreak of the second intifada up until the 2006 elections to the PLC. Despite being a highly
volatile  and  violent  period,  Hamas  continued  to  evolve  throughout  these  years;  it  finally
adopted a coherent  ideological  message,  it  matured and stabilized organizationally,  and—
largely  because  of  its  prominent  role  in  the  second  intifada—enjoyed  increased  popular
support. In short, it emerged as a rather mature and confident political organization by the end
of the period.
A number of important environmental developments took place in this period, including the
much overdue ratification of a Palestinian constitution in 2002 that empowered the PLC, and
then  the  death  of  Yasser  Arafat  in  2004,  which  finally  allowed  the  PA  to  begin
institutionalizing.  In combination with a number of additional  endogenous and exogenous
factors, these developments prompted Hamas to take part in the local elections in occupied
Palestine in 2004 and 2005. After performing well in these, Hamas also decided to run in the
2006 elections to the PLC, which—to its own and most others’ surprise—it won.
The chapter will begin by providing a necessary historical context of the period, focusing in
particular on the lead-up to the second  intifada  in September 2000 and the  intifada  itself,
including sections on Hamas’s return to violence and the inevitable reprisals this provoked
from Israel. Next follows a section on the development of the Palestinian political system.
Although the outbreak of the intifada spelled the suspension of the stumbling peace process,
the institutions created by the Oslo Accords not only survived, but also institutionalized while
the uprising raged.
The  chapter  then  turns  to  Hamas,  first  investigating  its  strategic-ideological  and  then  its
organizational  developments.  While  Hamas’s  ideological  development  will  be  covered  in
some  detail,  the  movement  evolved  less  ideologically  than  in  prior  periods,  as  no  new
ideological elements or goals were introduced. However, Hamas left behind the ideological
ambiguity of the late 1990s as it cemented its identity and rhetorical frames. And because
Hamas  suffered  massive  persecution  throughout  the  second  intifada,  which  naturally
hampered  any  organization-building  efforts,  there  are  indications  that  it  had  to  rely  on
previously instituted organizational structures simply to survive the onslaught. Yet, the mere
fact that it did survive the mass arrests of its rank-and-file and the targeted assassination of its
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domestic leadership—including that of its founder Sheikh Ahmed Yassin—is here taken to
indicate that Hamas had developed into a stable, mature, and adaptable organization in this
period.
As in previous chapters, this one also has a section discussing how far Hamas came in its
transmutation toward a political party in the period in question. In brief,  it  is  argued that
Hamas came close but stopped short of qualifying as a political party. On the one hand, and
because running in elections is deemed a  sine qua non  for political parties in much of the
relevant literature, Hamas’s decision to participate in the 2006 parliamentary elections is taken
to  indicate  that  it inched  ever  closer  to  qualifying  as  a  party  rather  than  a  movement.
However,  Hamas  was  not  prepared  for  electoral  victory  and  was  initially  not  willing  to
assume government after winning the 2006 elections. At the end of the period covered, Hamas
was no longer a pure movement, but neither did it qualify as a proper political party.
Also as in previous chapters, this one will likewise conclude with a brief account of Hamas’s
degree of institutionalization at the end of the period in question. Overall, Hamas’s level of
institutionalization increased slightly from the end of the Oslo years to the end of the second
intifada. Because of the intense persecution Hamas suffered throughout the second intifada,
both its level of systemness and its level of decisional autonomy suffered. With regard to the
former,  the persecution made it  all  but  impossible for Hamas to develop and improve its
organizational state. This left the organization in a vulnerable state, rendering it sensitive to
the  priorities  and preferences of  its  donors,  in turn limiting its  decisional  autonomy.  Yet,
Hamas increased its level of value infusion noticeably, indicated by the fact that it adopted a
more pragmatic and moderate ideology without seeing members defect. Finally, with regard
to reification, Hamas’s rise in the polls and eventual victory in the 2006 PLC elections is
taken as proof that it remained highly reified and had cemented its position as one of the main
contenders for political power in the occupied territories.
 6.1 The second intifada and the death of Oslo
As detailed  in  the  previous  chapter,  the  situation  in  the  occupied  territories  deteriorated
steadily from the signing of the first  Oslo agreement in 1993 until  the end of the 1990s.
Although numerous meetings aimed at keeping the peace process alive took place between
Israel and the PLO throughout this period,326 it was obvious by 2000 that the Oslo process was
326 For example, the Wye River Memorandum in 1998 and the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum in 1999.
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in  danger  of  failing  completely.  In  a  last-ditch  attempt  to  revive  the  peace  process,  US
President Clinton hosted the Camp David summit in July 2000.327 No agreement was reached,
however, leaving the  conditions in occupied Palestine to deteriorate further, now combined
with  evermore  widespread  disillusionment  and  frustration  on  the  part  of  the  Palestinian
populace (Baroud 2006, 19–22; Tamimi 2007, 199).
The situation proved explosive when the leader of the conservative Likud party in Israel, Ariel
Sharon,  visited  the  Temple  Mount  (Haram-esh-Sharif)  in  Jerusalem  on  September  28,
2000.328 Frustrated  by  the  lack  of  progress  in  the  peace  process  and  the  overall
de-development  in  the  occupied territories,  Sharon’s  visit  to  the  Temple Mount  provoked
widespread Palestinian protests.329 The initial heavy-handed response by the IDF against the
protesters  failed to  curb the  demonstrations,  and the  violence rapidly escalated  into what
became known as the al-Aqsa  intifada  (Baroud 2006,  23).330 The outbreak of this second
intifada was widely perceived as marking the end of  the Oslo era.  While  the institutions
created by the Oslo Accords survived, the negotiations continued only in principle under the
framework of the Accords.
The failure at Camp David, the breakdown of the peace process, and the outbreak of a second
intifada  had  consequences  for  both  Israeli  and  Palestinian  politics.  In  Israel,  these
developments  helped  Ariel  Sharon  win  the  PM  elections  on  February  6,  2001,  beating
incumbent  Ehud  Barak.  By  pointing  to  Barak’s  failure  to  reach  an  agreement  with  the
Palestinians at Camp David and campaigning on a promise to secure Israel by cracking down
on Palestinian protesters  (Eid 2001), Sharon won 62.4 percent of the votes against Barak’s
37.6  percent.  Because  there  was  no  simultaneous  election  to  the  Israeli  parliament,  the
Knesset, Sharon had to establish a government while Barak’s Labor party remained the largest
party in the Knesset.331 This forced Sharon to establish a national unity government, with
parties  from  both  sides  of  the  aisle.  Importantly,  Sharon  included  extreme  right-wing,
327 For a detailed and first-hand account of the Camp David summit, see The Camp David Papers by Hanieh
(2001).
328 The Temple Mount in Jerusalem is the third holiest place in Islam after Mecca and Medina in Saudi Arabia.
329 Ariel Sharon was nicknamed “the butcher of Sabra and Shatila” after his involvement in the slaughter of
some 3 000 Palestinian refugees during the Lebanese civil war in 1982. This exacerbated the symbolism of
his visit to the Temple Mount in Jerusalem.
330 Proposed explanations for the outbreak of the second intifada abound, with some focusing on the personal
responsibilities of the Israeli and/or Palestinian leadership  (see e.g., Pressman 2003), and others giving
credence  to  historical  and  political  developments  (Hammami  and  Tamari  2001).  Most  authors,
nevertheless,  agree that  Sharon’s  visit  to  the  Temple  Mount  was the  immediate  catalyst  or  triggering
mechanism for the outbreak of the intifada, if not the underlying reason.
331 This was the last direct PM election in Israel.
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nationalistic  parties  in  his  government,  such  as  Yisrael  Beiteinu  and  the  National  Union
(Butler 2009, 110). Combined with Sharon’s election promise of securing Israel in 100 days,
the  influence  of  these  right-wing  parties  had  ramifications  for  the  way  in  which  Israel
responded to the Palestinian demonstrations; in essence, it led Israel to adopt an even more
heavy-handed approach toward the Palestinians than what was typical. The IDF closed down
borders,  arrested Palestinian activists indiscriminately,  and resumed its  policy of so-called
“targeted assassinations” (Singh 2011, 60–61).
In the occupied territories, the outbreak of the intifada also had dramatic ramifications for the
Palestinian  leadership.  The  Fatah-led  PA  was  already  considered  a  failure  by  many
Palestinians, partly because of widespread corruption and mismanagement, but maybe more
importantly because it had failed to provide security and services for the Palestinians (Hilal
2006). By insisting on continued negotiations in the face of disproportionate Israeli responses
to the uprising, the Palestinian leadership’s already frayed legitimacy continued to suffer. As
the  intifada  gained momentum, the sorry state of affairs in the PA led to a change in the
operational logic in Palestinian politics. Whereas the political landscape had been dominated
by the wobbly peace process led by Fatah’s old guard since the signing of the first  Oslo
agreement in 1993, the  uprising allowed a younger generation of Palestinian activists and
opposition movements to mobilize.  Disillusioned by the lack of progress,  calls  to resume
popular and violent resistance against the Israeli occupation could be heard even from within
Fatah’s own ranks (Usher 2000).
The high level of discontent even among its own rank-and-file, coupled with demands from
Israel to put an end to the Palestinian violence, render a difficult position for Fatah and the
PA. In essence, the Palestinian leadership found itself with dual and contradictory loyalties.
On  the  one  hand,  Arafat  and  his  compatriots  needed  to  appease  the  Israelis  and  the
international community in order to maintain at least the illusion of still being able and willing
to negotiate. Without the support of the international community and tax transfers from Israel,
the PA would probably go bankrupt in a matter of weeks, which in turn would spell the end of
the Palestinian regime.332 On the other hand, the PA had to take into account the pressures
from its  own rank-and-file  and constituency to respond to the Israeli  aggression  (Tamimi
2007, 201). Apart from the option of becoming totalitarian, there are limits as to how long a
332 The PA has always been highly dependent on aid (see in particular More 2008). According to figures from
the World Bank, international donors provided almost half of the total expenditures of the PA in the first 27
months of the second intifada (2003, 21).
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regime can survive without being at least somewhat responsive to its own subjects.
The  IDF’s  indiscriminate  and  hard-handed  treatment  of  Palestinian  activists  made  it
increasingly difficult for Arafat and the PA to cooperate with the Israelis while not alienating
its own constituents.  In late October 2000 the Palestinian leadership succumbed to public
pressure.  It  released some 350 Palestinian activists from its  prisons, many of whom were
Hamas members  (Tamimi  2007,  200).  The release  of  these  prisoners,  combined with  his
continued efforts  to  negotiate  with Israel,  is  taken as an indication that  Arafat  adopted a
two-pronged and contradictory strategy early on during the second intifada. While officially
remaining  committed to the negotiation track with Israel,  Arafat also released activists he
knew would take part in the violent uprising against the occupation (Tamimi 2007, 200–1).
 6.1.1  Palestinian violence and the rise of Hamas
Following a classic tit-for-tat logic, the Palestinian demonstrations and attacks provoked harsh
Israeli responses, prompting further, more violent attacks from the Palestinians, in turn giving
Israel an excuse to revive its policy of “targeted assassinations.” And with a new, right-wing
government  in  Israel  set  on  ending  the  intifada  rapidly  and  with  violent  means,  and  a
Palestinian leadership unwilling—and probably unable—to crack down on its own population
for the sake of Israeli security, the violence spiraled out of control (Caridi 2010, 147).
On  the  Palestinian  side,  Hamas  was  the  first  to  up  the  ante,  moving  from  popular
demonstrations to military activities. On October 30, 2000, just over a month after Sharon’s
visit to the Temple Mount, Hamas carried out its first suicide operation in two years. The
bomber set off his explosive belt in a piazza in Jerusalem, killing 15 and injuring some 130
(Singh  2011,  60,  139).  Then,  on  January  1,  2001,  Hamas  carried  out  a  second  suicide
operation, followed by three operations in March 2001, two in April, one in May, and two
more in June. This trend continued for the rest of 2001. In total, Hamas carried out 19 suicide
operations that  year,  killing 80 Israelis  and injuring 907 more.  And in the  five  years  the
al-Aqsa intifada lasted,333 Hamas carried out some 50 suicide operations, leaving over 2 000
injured and 325 dead (Singh 2011, 137–41).
Other Palestinian movements also took active part  in the uprising and carried out suicide
operations. It is particularly noteworthy that tanzim, a Fatah-organization largely made up of
333 Whereas the first intifada ended with the signing of the DOP in September 1993, there is no agreed upon
end date of the second intifada. However, by 2005 the intensity of the conflict had abated to such an extent
that it makes little sense to talk about an uprising anymore (Baroud 2006, 120–21).
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veterans from the first  intifada and Fatah’s  Shabiba youth movement was allowed—at least
implicitly—by the PA and Fatah leadership to fight in the intifada.334 Although Fatah’s loose
and incoherent organizational structure makes it difficult to accurately map out its command
structure  and  specify  the  relationship  between  its  different  sub-units  and  associated
organizations (Usher 2000), the tanzim played a prominent role during the early years of the
second  intifada.  Furthermore,  many of  the  activists  from  tanzim  later joined  the  al-Aqsa
Martyrs Brigade, another Fatah-associated militia established to fight in the intifada (Bloom
2004, 78).335 Other factions playing prominent roles in the intifada included Islamic Jihad, the
DFLP, and the PFLP.
Israel  was of course the common enemy to all  the Palestinian factions taking part  in the
uprising,  prompting  cooperation  between  them  even  across  the  previously  important
secular-religious cleavage (Caridi 2010, 147). According to the details in the list compiled by
Singh of the 50 suicide operations Hamas carried out throughout the second intifada, seven
were collaborations with either Islamic Jihad and/or the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (2011, 139–
42). However, given the nature of suicide operations, it is often difficult to ascertain who was
actually responsible for a given operation after  the fact.  During the second  intifada,  as is
common  also  elsewhere,  these  difficulties  were  exacerbated  because  different  Palestinian
militias at times claimed responsibility for the same operation (Bloom 2004, 73–75).336
In total, the Palestinian militias carried out 138 suicide operations from 2000 to 2005, killing
657 and injuring 3 682 (Brym and Araj 2006, 1970).337 And while it claimed responsibility for
only  50  of  these,  it  was  Hamas  that  apparently  capitalized  the  most  from  the  intifada.
Throughout the period, Hamas saw its popularity rise to unprecedented levels, from around 10
percent in 2000, to almost 30 percent by the end of 2005. Although the polling data from PSR
shows that the popularity of the various movements fluctuated somewhat, the trend in Figure
7 below is clear; Hamas inched closer to Fatah throughout the period.338
334 Shabiba translates roughly to “youth,” whereas tanzim means “organization” in Arabic.
335 It is assumed that the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade fill the same role for Fatah as the al-Qassam Brigades does
for  Hamas,  i.e.,  that  of  a  clandestine  armed  wing,  operating  largely  independently  from,  but  still  in
accordance with, the goals and priorities of the political leadership.
336 In 2011, the al-Qassam Brigades claimed that they had carried out a total of 87 “martyr operations” since
the establishment of Hamas (Al-Qassam Brigades 2011).
337 As would be expected, there is no consensus as to how many Israeli and Palestinian lives were claimed by
the second  intifada,  with estimates varying quite  widely  (see e.g.,  JPS 2004).  Most sources,  however,
indicate that for every Israeli killed, three to four Palestinians were killed. One source deemed trustworthy
is Milton-Edwards and Farrell, who estimate that  1 080 Israelis and  3 570 Palestinians were killed from
2000 to 2005 (2010, 107).
338 Consult  the  methodology  chapter  for  a  discussion  of  the  polling  data  used.  The  pollsters  from PSR
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Figure 7: Factional support in the occupied territories, 2000–2005
(Source: PSR 2011).
Hamas’s prominent role in the second  intifada  was not the only reason for this increase in
popularity.339 For one, Hamas’s politico-religious message had come to resonate well among
Palestinians.  Although  difficult  to  measure  accurately,  there  are  strong  indications  that
religion came to play an increasingly important role in Palestinian politics from the mid-1990s
onward (Hilal 2006).340 And as Hamas was established as a religious alternative to the secular
PLO, it was well positioned to capitalize politically on this trend.341
Hamas also benefited from the PA’s shortcomings. Even if the failures of the PA in part can be
explained by its circumscribed mandate, continued Israeli aggression, and a steady stream of
speculated that “Hamas’ loss of support [in late 2004 and early 2005] may be due to the fact that the
Islamist  movement  had  decided  to  boycott  the  upcoming  presidential  elections  while  the  increase  in
support for Fateh might be explained by the appreciation people have for the way Fateh dealt with the
succession issue [following the death of Arafat]. A bandwagoning [sic] effect may have also helped Fateh
as new supporters might be expecting gains from supporting the faction that is most likely to win the
upcoming elections” (PSR 2004).
339 See Abu-Amr (2007, 169–71) and Hilal (2006) for detailed accounts of Hamas’s rising popularity.
340 Polling numbers and student council election results from the 1980s indicate that this trend of increased
religiosity  among Palestinians already began then.  See in  particular  Smith  (1982),  Shadid  and Seltzer
(1988a, 1988b, 1989), and Robinson (1997, 19–27).
341 This tendency even led the staunch secularists in Fatah to adopt a religious language in an attempt to retain
support from the increasingly religious Palestinian populace (Frisch 2005; Løvlie 2014).
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impossible to fulfill  demands from the international community,  the PA did  default  on its
contract as a welfare and security provider for its constituents, and it did suffer from rampant
mismanagement and widespread corruption.342 By filling the welfare vacuum created by the
PA’s failure to provide for its constituents, Hamas gained new followers from most segments
of society. In addition, disappointment and disillusionment with the Palestinian leadership had
become a fixture in the minds of Palestinians within the occupied territories. The corruption
and mismanagement  on part  of  the  Fatah-PLO-PA nexus thus  indirectly  lend credence to
Hamas’s claim for credibility, and many Palestinians came to consider the movement as the
only viable contender to the incumbent regime. Naturally, this materialized as gains in the
polls  for  Hamas  (Hroub  2004,  22).  And  finally,  Hamas  profited  from  Israel’s  unilateral
withdrawal from Gaza in 2005—a move perceived by many Palestinians as a victory for
Hamas’s resistance strategy over the negotiation strategy of the PLO (Milton-Edwards 2005,
131).
It should be noted that it was not only Hamas that gained in popularity during the second
intifada. As indicated in Figure 7 above, Fatah likewise became more popular throughout the
period. Support seems to have flowed to both from the “All others combined” category, which
is mainly made up of different leftist factions and independents of various ideological hues.343
This is taken to indicate that the Palestinian political system developed in a bipolar direction.
While  the  Palestinian  party  system  since  the  early  1990s  most  closely  resembled  the
predominant party system as described by Sartori (1976, 173–74), by late 2005 it had for most
intents and purposes turned to a polarized two-party system (Hilal 2006).
 6.1.2  The institutionalization of the Palestinian political system
While the years of the second intifada were marked by political chaos, unprecedented levels
of violence, and the emergence of a new power-configuration in Palestinian factional politics,
the period also saw the eventual institutionalization of the Palestinian political system.  As
detailed in the previous chapter, the PA was flawed by design and suffered from both formal
and informal weaknesses. De jure, the PA was set up as a pure presidential system from the
outset, with most of the powers concentrated in the office of the president. The highly skewed
power balance between the different branches of government was exacerbated by the strong
342 See Chêne (2012) for an overview of corruption issues in occupied Palestine.
343 The “All others combined” category is the combined support enjoyed by the PFLP, the DFLP, the Palestine
Democratic Union (known as Fida), the Palestinian People’s Party (PPP), Islamic Jihad, and independent
candidates, both nationalists and Islamists.
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position of  Yasser Arafat and his compatriots. Holding the positions of President of the PA,
Chairman of the PLO, and Commander-in-Chief of Fatah, he was in more ways than one the
personification of Palestinian politics. From his return to the occupied territories in 1994 and
onward, Yasser Arafat did his utmost to exploit and maintain the institutional weaknesses of
the  PA,  tying  its  powers  to  his  own  person.  Whatever  institutional  arrangements  were
theoretically in place, the PA was  de facto dependent on Arafat, whose leadership has been
characterized as an antithesis of institutionalization. Arafat refused to ratify laws drafted by
the PLC, rendering the legislature into a consultative body, and used a set of security courts to
sideline the official judiciary (Abu-Amr 1997, 91–94; Mushtaq Husain Khan, Giacaman, and
Amundsen 2004; Rabbani 1996, 6).
  From presidentialism to semi-presidentialism
Already in 1997, the PLC drafted an interim constitution aimed at securing separation of
powers and to limit the unchecked power of the presidency. It was first ratified by Arafat in
2002, and then only after immense international pressure. In 2003 a range of amendments in
the Basic Law were introduced and ratified, again only after continued international pressure.
The interim constitution and subsequent  amendments  strengthened the  PLC’s  position by
introducing the  office  of  the  PM and parliamentary  rules,  in  effect  giving the  legislature
indirect control over the PM and thus the government. Importantly, the president retained the
power  to  dismiss  the  PM  and  the  government,  meaning  that  the  Palestinian  proto-state
qualified  as  a  president-parliamentary  form of  semi-presidentialism,  “which  is  where  the
prime minister is responsible both to the legislature and to the president” (Cavatorta and Elgie
2010, 27).
Semi-presidential systems such as the one introduced in occupied Palestine might face what
has  been termed the  problem of “cohabitation.”  Initially  used to  describe  the  unintended
consequences  of  the  new electoral  system introduced  in  France  in  1986  (Poulard  1990),
cohabitation refers to the political deadlock that might arise when the PM and the president
are from different parties or for other reasons pursue radically different agendas. And the PA
did indeed suffer such problems following the introduction of semi-presidentialism. The first
PM of the PA,  Mahmoud Abbas, a  founding member of Fatah and long-time compatriot of
Arafat, was appointed in March 2003, but resigned already in September the same year over
disagreements  with  President  Arafat  regarding  control  of  the  security  services.  He  was
succeeded by the speaker of the PLC, Fatah cadre Ahmed Qurei, who also disagreed with
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Arafat on numerous issues, including the problem of who should control the security services.
Qurei also tendered his resignation over the matter, after which Arafat gave in and agreed to
give over some control of the security services to the government.344 
While the new constitution on paper introduced power-sharing mechanisms and strengthened
the position of the PLC vis-à-vis the presidency, it initially did little to curb the skewed power
balance in the  PA, or  improve the efficiency and effectiveness  of  the  proto-state  for  that
matter. For one, the rampant corruption and systemic mismanagement of the PA was deeply
entrenched and continued unabated despite calls from Palestinians and international donors to
improve the situation. And second, the introduction of semi-presidentialism exacerbated the
problems as the PA now also suffered from intense infighting between the two executive
offices. It was not until Yasser Arafat passed away in 2004 that the PA could institutionalize
properly. As noted by Palestinian scholar Dr. Giacaman, “Arafat was the glue that bound first
Fatah,  and  secondly  the  PA.”  Because  his  style  of  leadership  effectively  had
“deinstitutionalized Fatah [and] deinstitutionalized the PA,” his death left Fatah and the PA
without their strongman.345
Following his passing, Arafat was first succeeded as president of the PA by the speaker of the
PLC, Rawhi Fattouh. He was in turn replaced by the former PM of the PA, Mahmoud Abbas,
after the latter won the January 2005 Palestinian presidential elections with 62.52 percent of
the votes.346 Abbas had already succeeded Arafat as the Chairman of the PLO, and although he
did not immediately succeed Arafat as the Chairman of Fatah,347 he was—and indeed is—
widely considered the heir of Arafat. Arafat, however, had been the personification of the
Palestinian  national  struggle  for  nearly  four  decades,  dominating  the  Palestinian  political
scene by strength of his charisma. As is well established in the social science canon, inheriting
a position of authority based on charismatic legitimacy is considered to be challenging, to say
the least (Jarbawi and Pearlman 2007).348
344 Qurei had a short hiatus as PM when he planned to run in the PLC elections in January 2006, during which
senior Palestinian negotiator and Fatah cadre Nabil  Shaath was appointed Acting PM for nine days in
December 2005. Although Qurei served out his term as PM, stepping down in March 2006, the PLC at
times had little confidence in him. This was partly because of serious accusations of corruption, such as the
infamous “cement gate” incident, when Qurei’s family business was accused of selling cement to Israeli
firms responsible for building the separation wall (Harnden 2004).
345 Interviewed in Ramallah, August 16, 2007.
346 Multiple candidates ran in the presidential elections in 2005. Mustafa Barghouti, a former member of the
Palestinian People’s Party, member of the PLO Central Council, and leader and founding member of the
Palestinian National Initiative (PNI), came in second, winning 19.48 percent of the votes.
347 The Fatah Central Committee elected Faruq al-Qaddumi as their new Chairman (Usher 2005b, 43).
348 See Weber for a thorough and general treatment of the challenges associated with succeeding a charismatic
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Although attempts were made to keep Fatah and the PA disciplined and united behind the new
leadership  led  by Abbas,  the  vacuum left  in  the  wake of  Yasser  Arafat’s  demise  seemed
impossible to fill. No one in the Palestinian leadership could hope to successfully exercise the
same degree of independent decision making as Arafat (Jarbawi and Pearlman 2007). Nor, for
that matter, could any of them continue to resist both international and domestic pressures for
change and improvement in the PA without risking their positions. In short, the passing of
Arafat threatened that the Palestinian leadership would fragment and lose the control of the
PA institutions  (Usher 2005b).349 Lacking the charisma of Arafat, the Palestinian leadership
under Abbas was forced to look for alternative sources of legitimacy to remain in power. One
obvious  recourse  was  to  transition  the  PA from  a  system  of  charismatic  legitimacy  to
legal-rational  legitimacy,  or,  in  other  words,  to  stop  back-paddling  and  implement  and
effectuate the power-sharing principles of the new constitution and reform and democratize
the  PA.  In  short,  after  the  demise  of  Arafat,  the  interests  of  Abbas  and  the  Palestinian
leadership finally aligned with the demands from its constituents and international donors to
institutionalize and democratize the PA (Jarbawi and Pearlman 2007).
  A new electoral system
As part  of  the  effort  to democratize the  PA, a  new election law introducing fundamental
changes  to  the  electoral  system  in  occupied  Palestine  was  adopted  in  2005.  Under  the
previous election law from 1995,350 elections to the PLC were conducted according to the
block vote system; the PLC was made up of 88 representatives elected according to plurality
rules from 16 multi-member districts of varying sizes,  with each voter allowed to cast as
many votes as his or hers district would elect to the PLC (IDEA 2005, 44–47).351 As often is
the case in such electoral systems, the largest party, Fatah, won the 1996 elections with a
landslide victory, securing two thirds of the PLC seats.352
leader  (1978, 246ff.), and Panebianco for a similar discussion specifically regarding charismatic parties
(1988, 143–47).
349 The chaotic situation created by the death of Arafat worked to strengthen the impression that the Fatah-led
PA was unsuited to lead the Palestinians, in turn providing Hamas with more supporters.
350 For details, consult the translation of the Palestinian Election Law No. 13 of 1995 (PLC 1995) available at 
http://www.elections.ps. 
351 Consult  Table  Table  4 on page  339 for  an overview of  the  districts  and allocation of  seats.  See also
Butenschøn and Vollan for a discussion on the block voting system as used in the 1996 elections to the
PLC (1996, 57–62).
352 Specifically, Fatah won 55 seats directly, with a further seven seats secured by Fatah loyalists (see Table 5
on page 340 in Appendix C: Election data in occupied Palestine for details).
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Although  the  elections  in  1996  by  and  large  were  judged  free  and  fair  by  international
observers  (see  e.g.,  NDI  1997),  and  Palestinians  largely  considered  the  election  results
legitimate, the electoral system used in 1996 had obvious deficiencies. In particular, the block
vote system was seen as a potential  problem by both international donors and Palestinian
NGOs, as it can produce even more disproportionate results than in single-member plurality
and majority systems (Butenschøn and Vollan 1996, 29–30). However, it was also noted that
the block vote system permitted candidates independent from political movements and parties
to win a seat, which, because of the underdeveloped party system and extraordinary situation
in occupied Palestine, was seen as a plus (Butenschøn and Vollan 2006, 87–88).
The legislative process for the new electoral law therefore saw the PLC divided into two
camps; on the one hand, there were those in favor of keeping with the block vote system, and
on the other hand, those wanting to introduce a proportional representation list vote system.353
In the end, the new electoral law of 2005 must be seen as a compromise between the two
camps.  It  introduced  a  parallel  electoral  system  combining  the  block  vote  and  list  vote
systems.  The  new  law  also  increased  the  number  of  seats  in  the  PLC  from  88  to  132
(Butenschøn  and  Vollan  2006,  25–26;  Usher  2005a,  47).354 Under  the  new  law,  66
representatives  were elected in  a block vote system from 16 electoral  districts,355 and the
remaining 66 representatives were elected from national  lists  with the  whole of  occupied
Palestine as one electoral district, using the Saint-Legüe method to allocate seats (CEC 2006a,
15–17). Each voter would cast two ballots; one on the district level following the same rules
as in the 1996 elections, and one on the national level by picking one of the multiple party
lists.356 In this way, the legislators tried to accommodate both those wanting to retain a pure
block vote system, and the reformers advocating increasing the representativity through a
proportional representation system.357
Summarized, the introduction of semi-presidentialism, the institutionalization of the PA, and
the new electoral  law,  all  worked to change the operational  logic of  Palestinian factional
politics.  With real  power-sharing mechanisms now in place,  and an empowered PLC, the
353 For a detailed account of the various positions adopted by the actors involved in writing the new electoral
law, see Butenschøn and Vollan (2006, 89–101).
354 A translated version of the Palestinian Election Law No. 9 of 2005 is available at http://www.elections.ps.
355 Consult Table 7 on page 341 for details of the electoral districts and the number of seats in each.
356 The list ballots were closed, meaning that the voters had no influence on the ranking of the candidates
(Butenschøn and Vollan 2006, 72).
357 See  the  section  below titled  Internal  deliberations,  decision-making,  and  the  limits  of  intra-party
democracy pp. 226ff. for a discussion on the nomination and selection of candidates in Hamas.
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previously unchecked power of the presidency was curbed. In addition, the new electoral law
democratized Palestinian politics. Such institutional change, it has been hypothesized, “can
lower barriers to entry for the rebels, thereby lowering the costs of participation for them”
(Shugart  1992,  125).  And  as  will  be  covered  in  following  sections,  both  the  discussed
institutional  changes  of  the  PA,  and  the  various  environmental  developments  and  events
covered above did indeed have consequences for the development and behavior of Hamas.
 6.2 Hamas developing—reactive progress
How  and  in  what  ways  did  the  aforementioned  developments  affect  Hamas’s  continued
transmutation  from  movement  to  party  and  its  process  of  institutionalization?  Or  more
specifically, what were the main consequences of the outbreak of the second  intifada,  the
suspension of the peace process, and the changes and institutionalization of the Palestinian
political  system  for  Hamas’s  strategic  deliberations  and  organizational  (structural)  and
ideological (attitudinal) developments?
Even if the second intifada was the most violent and destructive period in recent Palestinian
history,358 the political developments throughout these years could be construed as positive
from the standpoint of Hamas. Whereas the Oslo years had been one long challenge for the
movement,  with  the  overall  political  opportunity structures  being to  the  disadvantage  for
Hamas, the developments throughout the years of the second intifada permitted the movement
to evolve organizationally, ideologically, and strategically.
For one, the outbreak of the intifada saw the return of violent resistance as a major source of
legitimacy and popularity in Palestinian politics, allowing Hamas to again take center stage on
the Palestinian political scene as a major liberation movement. While this return to violence
can be seen as a step back with regard to Hamas’s transmutation from movement to party, it
was arguably an important reason for Hamas’s increasing popularity and the influx of new
recruits, both of which worked to elevate Hamas’s confidence as a political actor. Second, the
Oslo process was all but declared dead by late 2000. This “death of Oslo” was also important
for  Hamas’s  popularity  and  confidence;  Hamas  had  in  effect  tied  its  identity  to  its
condemnation  of  the  peace  process  and  could  now capitalize  politically  by  having  been
358 See Baroud  (2006) for a general account of the second  intifada,  and  Ajluni  (2003) for a report on its
economic consequences for the Palestinians. For statistics on casualties, consult the Palestinian Centre for
Human Rights (PCHR 2011), the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories
(B’Tselem 2012), and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)—occupied
Palestinian territory (OCHA 2007).
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proved right in its predictions that the Oslo Accords were flawed and doomed to fail. And
third, following first the ratification of the interim Basic Law of the PA and then the demise of
Arafat,  the  Palestinian  political  system  finally  began  to  institutionalize.  Crucially,  the
institutionalization  process  of  the  PA included  the  introduction  of  proper  power-sharing
mechanisms,  which hitherto had been conspicuously absent  from this state-like construct.
This, in turn, was important for the integration of Hamas into the political system, as it was
one decisive factor inspiring the movement to contest the 2006 elections for the legislative
council of the PA (the PLC).
In brief, the period saw Hamas develop from the somewhat conflicted liberation movement of
the late 1990s, caught between contradictory or at least ambiguous strategic aims, to a much
more  confident  and  mature  political  movement  capable  and  willing  to  take  part  in
institutionalized  politics.  In  sum,  Hamas  took  important  steps  in  its  transmutation  from
movement toward party in the years of the second intifada. The following sections will first
outline  how  Hamas  responded  ideologically  to  these  developments,  before  tracing  and
analyzing its organizational development in the same period.
 6.2.1  The eventual adoption of a pragmatic ideology
As discussed in the previous chapter, certain elements of Hamas’s domestic leadership had
tried throughout the latter part of the 1990s to moderate the movement’s message to make it
conform more closely with the political realities on the ground. One crucial aspect of this
moderating effort  was the suggestion that  Hamas could agree to an interim solution with
Israel  based  on  the  1967 borders.  But  as  was  concluded,  these  moderates  in  the  Hamas
leadership  did  not  have  enough  organizational  clout  to  succeed  in  their  effort.  Powerful
factions  and  persons  within  Hamas  were  still  set  on  keeping  with  the  maximalist  and
subversive ideology as spelled out in the 1988 Charter.
Only  months  before  the  outbreak  of  the  second  intifada,  the  Political  Bureau of  Hamas
published a memo detailing the movement’s history and goals. An authoritative document, it
is a good indicator of the ideological and strategic thinking within Hamas at the time. And in
it, Hamas reiterates that “military action … constitutes the strategic means for the liberation of
Palestine,” and that  its goal is “the total liberation of Palestine from the sea to the river”
(Tamimi 2007, 278–79). In short, Hamas officially preferred violence to other strategies, and
remained  convinced  that  such  a  strategy  was  the  best  way  to  eventually  achieve  total
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liberation.359
The  unsuccessful  attempt  to  moderate  Hamas’s  positions  on  key  issues  is  taken  as  an
indication that Hamas had not completed its transmutation from movement to party by the
beginning of the second intifada. In essence, the power of the hard-liners meant that Hamas
remained  a  movement  in  that  it  still  represented  an  exclusive  segment  of  Palestinians
committed to the pursuit of its originally stated, absolutist, and subversive goals. As theorized,
to  qualify  as  a  political  party  Hamas  would  have  to  adopt  a  more  centrist  message  and
articulate  and  take  a  position  on  most  if  not  all  policy  issues  which  mobilize  voters  in
occupied Palestine (de Zeeuw 2008b, 15).
On the face of it, the political opportunity structures during the second  intifada  seemed to
favor the hard-liners in Hamas; violent resistance was again the preferred strategy of most
Palestinian liberation movements, and the somewhat accommodating line characteristic of the
Oslo years had all but been replaced by absolutist positions by the involved parties. Despite
such developments, the years of the second intifada saw Hamas adopt a more centrist political
message, in essence replacing the radical position from its years as a militant movement with
the pragmatism of a political party.360
Theoretically,  then,  the  ideological  moderation  Hamas  underwent  in  this  period  was
somewhat paradoxical. Most theories purporting to explain the moderation of radical parties
rests on various iterations of the inclusion-moderation thesis. Briefly and somewhat crudely
put, this thesis states that the inclusion of radical parties into the political system eventually
will  lead to  their  moderation because the  operational  logic  of  being  within  the  system is
qualitatively  different  from  staying  outside  the  system.  Also  according  to  this  thesis,
repression will most often lead to further radicalization (Schwedler 2011).361
Under certain conditions,  however,  the repression of radicals can also lead to moderation
(Turam 2007).362 At the most basic level, if the repression is of such a severity that it threatens
the survival of the organization, it can lead to ideological moderation. Furthermore, if the
359 Importantly, the leader of Hamas’s Political Bureau, Khaled Meshaal, was a steady and strong proponent of
violence and suicide bombings as the preferred strategy of Hamas—even when such operations went out of
vogue among Palestinians (McGeough 2010, 404).
360 See, in particular, the section The (re)articulation of ends pp. 204ff. for details.
361 See,  for  example,  Scwedler  (2007a,  2007b,  2011),  Przeworski  and  Sprague  (1986),  Wickham  (2004),
Brocker  and  Künkler  (2013),  and  Tezcur  (2010) for  various  analyses  and  reviews  of  this
inclusion-moderation thesis.
362 In her analysis of the moderation of Islamist parties in Turkey, Turam argues that it was state repression
that forced the various incarnations of the Islamists to incrementally moderate (2007).
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political organization in question aims to retain or increase its popularity and legitimacy, it
must be responsive to changes in popular opinion. And as will become clear in the following
analyses  of  the  ideological  and  organizational  development  of  Hamas,  both  of  these
conditions were present throughout the second intifada.
In brief, the persecution of Hamas during the second intifada was at times of such a scale and
intensity that it indeed threatened the very existence of the organization. This indirectly led to
increased  ideological  coherence  within  Hamas,  as  the  various  branches  of  its  leadership
realized that they had to agree on crucial issues to survive as one organization. Combined
with the ambition in Hamas to not only retain its popularity and legitimacy, but eventually
take  what  it  saw as  its  rightful  place  at  the  center  of  the  Palestinian political  scene,  the
leadership in Hamas opted to leave behind its most unrealistic goals to the benefit of a more
pragmatic ideological message.
  Continued ambiguity 
However, the back-and-forth between the hard-liners and moderates within Hamas continued
for some time into the 2000s, in part because the power balance between the different factions
oscillated in tandem with political  developments in the occupied territories  and the wider
Middle  East  region.  Whereas  the  last  years  of  the  1990s saw both the  release  of  Sheikh
Ahmed Yassin from Israeli prison and the expulsion of the Political Bureau from Amman,
both of which empowered the domestic leadership at the expense of the external one, the
outbreak of the second intifada threatened to reverse this.
Primarily this reversal in the power balance was due to the reintroduction of violent resistance
as  the  preferred  and  most  popular  strategy  for  Palestinian  resistance  movements.  The
operational  logic  of  the  second  intifada  meant  that  it  was  through violent  resistance  that
Hamas had reclaimed its role as a major political player. And the military strategy in vogue
for much of the second  intifada  years had for long been advocated by those within Hamas
subscribing to its initial maximalist aims. As such, the resumption of violent resistance meant
that  it  was the  militant  wing,  led by the exiled Political  Bureau,  that  again made up the
dominant faction in Hamas. Because of this, the power balance between those working toward
more moderate aims and alternative strategies,  and those married to the idea of complete
liberation  of  historic  Palestine  by  violent  means,  tilted  in  favor  of  the  latter,  in  effect
threatening  the  moderating  efforts  undertaken  by  Sheikh  Yassin  and  his  allies  from  the
mid-1990s.
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It is pertinent to reiterate here that the schism between the various factions within Hamas was
not a simple matter of hard-liners vs. soft-liners or “moderates” vs. “radicals.”363 Individual
leaders and different branches and factions adopted various positions on issues such as the
importance of religion in the struggle for Palestinian liberty, the use of violence, and how
much of  historic  Palestine  to  liberate.  And  as  will  be  shown below,  the  previously  tight
association between having a maximalist territorial position and favoring violent resistance
was weakened, allowing Hamas leaders to continue advocating violent resistance while also
arguing for an interim solution based on the 1967 borders.
  The reinterpretation and demotion of the 1988 Charter
The 1988 Charter for long remained the reference point for analyses of Hamas’s ideology,
despite  the  fact  that  the  organization  has  published  a  number  of  later  documents  and
communiqués, often outlining much more accommodating and pragmatic positions on various
issues.364 This was partly because Hamas has refused to rewrite the Charter, and because it is
written in a clear but harsh language, leaving little doubt that the writers indeed advocated the
absolutist claims and racism against Jews. This, in turn, has led many observers to conclude
that Hamas remains an extreme, absolutist, and uncompromising movement (see e.g., Levitt
2006).
In the early 2000s, however, it became clear that the Charter began losing its status as the de
facto ideological framework for Hamas. Although the more moderate elements in Hamas had
advocated positions contradicting the Charter for many years,  now a number of prominent
Hamas  leaders—including  the  head  of  the  Political  Bureau,  Khaled  Meshaal—distanced
themselves from it. In the words of senior Hamas cadre on the West Bank, Dr. Mohammad
Ghazal,
[w]hat was declared by Hamas in 1988 [the Charter] was not really Hamas. It was
a declaration made by people who grew up in the Muslim Brotherhood, and who
were more theoretical than practical. Many of the positions in the Charter, such as
Hamas  being  against  the  peace  process,  were  conditioned  on  the  specific
circumstances of the first  intifada. But if there was to be an international peace
conference now, we might not be against it. We have made many declarations, but
363 Generally, moderates can be defined as “those who seek gradual change by working within the existing
political system” whereas radicals are those who “seek to overthrow that system in its entirety” (Schwedler
2011, 350).
364 See, for example, Hroub (2006a) and Tamimi (2007, 265–316).
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only  some of  them are  still  relevant.  Hamas  is  a  political  group  which plays
politics; when the conditions change, so do we.365
In short, the Charter was reinterpreted and its status weakened to suit the needs of Hamas in a
new situation. Most Hamas leaders now argued that it was never intended as an authoritative
document for instructing the movement’s goals and strategies  (Tamimi 2007, 149–56), but
that it rather should be seen as “a proclamation for jihad directed at the Palestinian people and
formulated in the context of the 1987௅1993 intifada”  (Usama Hamdan paraphrased in ICG
2004, 13).
  The (re)articulation of ends
This demotion of the 1988 Charter allowed Hamas to articulate new or at least adjusted goals.
And  the  leadership  in  Hamas  made  a  concerted  effort  to  reformulate  their  ideological
discourse and pick positions more in line with the public opinion in occupied Palestine, both
in an attempt to increase Hamas’s reach and to obtain a position as a major political—and not
only militant or social—actor.
Arguably,  the  most  important  development  in  Hamas’s  ideology  in  this  period  was  the
apparent consensus reached between the different leadership factions that Hamas could agree
to a temporary two-state solution with Israel based on the 1967 borders. As discussed, this
idea of an interim solution was initially floated by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin in the mid-1990s.
Since then, the idea had divided the leadership into two camps, with most of those in favor
belonging to the political leadership inside the occupied territories, and those against coming
from the exiled leadership and the militant wing. Sometime in the early 2000s, however, these
various factions seem to have come to an understanding that the suggested interim solution
was a more fruitful—and realistic—approach than keeping the goal of liberating the whole of
Palestine in one go (Janssen 2009, 82).
And although Hamas’s version of the two-state solution is worded as a temporary measure,
defended ideologically through the Islamic concept of hudna, or long-term truce, it arguably
implies an acknowledgment of Israel’s long-term existence (Hroub 2000, 73–86). Considering
how important the liberation of Palestine from “the river to the sea” initially was for Hamas,
this  acceptance of  the  1967 borders,  if  ostensibly only as  a  temporary measure,  must  be
considered a major ideological development and in effect a re-articulation of its ends as a
365 Interviewed in Nablus, April 17, 2011.
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political organization (Panebianco 1988, 16).366 
By redefining its final objective into a vague goal to be reached “later” and concentrate on
current issues, Hamas conforms to the theoretical expectations both as an institutionalizing
party and as a case of movement-to-party transmutation; as a strongly ideological movement
obviously unable to fulfill its stated goals, Hamas had either to respond by articulating more
pragmatic goals, accept marginalization, or even risk collapse (Harmel and Janda 1994, 281).
Importantly, such an adaptation rarely amounts to a complete ideological reorientation, but
implies a reduced focus on the more idealistic goals and the introduction of temporary or
additional, pragmatic goals (Panebianco 1988, 16). Hamas’s distinction between an “interim
solution” within the 1967 borders and a “final goal of liberating historic Palestine” is here
interpreted as such a re-articulation of ends. And interviewed Palestinian analysts and Hamas
cadres support such an interpretation. They ascribed changes in the immediate political goals
and the strategies adopted to reach these to changing political and security conditions.367 As
summed up by a Palestinian scholar, the changing discourse in Hamas came about because of
changing political conditions, but it  did not constitute a surrender of the ultimate goals.368
These interim goals nevertheless enabled Hamas “to justify its position in normative terms,
defining [the] ‘concessions’ as tactical moves” (Mishal and Sela 2000, 86).
And interviewed Hamas leaders remain officially committed to the complete liberation of
Palestine, although they admit that this goal cannot be reached today. As explained by Dr.
Mohammad Ghazal, 
[t]he goal of Hamas is to liberate Palestine. That is our goal. To give the right for
people to live freely, and to give the right to the refugees to return back to their
homes.  This  is  our  goal.  It  did  not  change.  But  how  to  achieve  it?  I  don’t
personally think that we can achieve it now. We never thought that we can apply it
at once. Before, we spoke theoretically about the final goal of complete liberty.
But, in practice, I know that we can not reach it at once. So I know that it needs
366 By redefining its final objective of the complete liberation of historical Palestine into a vague goal to be
reached “later” and by accepting an interim solution based on the 1967 borders, Hamas in effect emulated
the ten-point program ratified by the PLO in 1974 that opened for an interim solution and negotiations with
Israel as a “supplement” to guerrilla warfare (R. Hamid 1975; PNC 1974).
367 This explanation was offered by most interviewed Hamas members when the topic came up, including an
anonymous activist  interviewed on the West  Bank in August  2007,  Hamas  MP Dr.  Ayman Daraghme
interviewed in Ramallah on August 26, 2007, and Hamas cadre Dr. Mohammad Ghazal interviewed in
Nablus on April 17, 2011.
368 Dr. Iyad Barghouti, interviewed in Ramallah, August 28, 2007.
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time.369
In a similar vein, some lower-ranking Hamas members thought of the interim solution  as a
tactical  ploy suggested by the leadership solely to buy time. In the words of  one Hamas
activist,
I believe that when Sheikh Ahmed Yassin proposed the hudna, he was just using
the same language that the occupation is using. Israel is calling for peace. Hamas
is calling also for peace. Hamas is buying time. Israel is buying time. The main
difference between them is that the Israelis have guns, they have the power to
force  everything  they  want  on  the  ground.  Hamas  doesn’t.  That’s  the  main
difference between them, but both of them are using the same language in order to
buy some time for the situation to change.370
While some analysts and observers apparently are convinced by Hamas’s official commitment
to liberate the whole of Palestine,371 the distinction between an interim and final solution is
considered here to be pure rhetorical maneuvering. In the words of Dr. Giacaman, Hamas has
to  remain  committed  to  the  complete  liberation  of  Palestine  simply  because  it  would
otherwise have had to “abdicate what was previously a fundamental principle.” However, on
the level of political reality,
only people who are completely misunderstanding the politics will not understand
what a truce for 20 or 30 years means. It means a permanent situation once the
facts  are  established.  And  that  means  a  de  facto  acceptance  of  the  two-state
solution as being a permanent solution.372
In addition to the interim solution becoming official Hamas policy, the organization turned
increasingly  pragmatic  and  decreasingly  religious.  Whereas  the  Charter  and  other  early
communiqués were riddled with religious rhetoric and quotations from the Koran, documents
from the early 2000s focus almost exclusively on practical politics. Although there are still
verses  from  the  Koran  in  Hamas’s  communiqués,  an  analysis  of  three  official  Hamas
documents  from  2005  and  2006  concluded  that  such  religious  overtones  had  decreased
369 Interviewed in Nablus, April 17, 2011.
370 Conversation with anonymous Hamas member on the West Bank, May 2011.
371 Few of the interviewed Palestinian analysts lend any credence to Hamas’s official positions, but certain
scholars  with  a  neo-Orientalist  bend,  such  as  Levitt  (2006),  as  well  as  other  political  movements  in
occupied Palestine, continuously focus on the original goals of Hamas, probably in an attempt to demonize
the organization.
372 Interviewed in Ramallah, April 5, 2011.
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dramatically,  constituting  a  “‘new’ discourse  of  diluted  religious  content  [which]  reflects
genuine and cumulative changes in Hamas” (Hroub 2006a, 26).
Importantly, one of the documents indicating a decreased focus on religion within Hamas was
found in its electoral platform for the 2006 PLC elections, which Hroub argues “constitutes
without a doubt the broadest vision that Hamas has ever presented concerning all aspects of
Palestinian life”  (2006a,  9).  Although Islam is  referenced and verses  from the Koran are
quoted in the preamble,  in the  first  section (titled “Our Essential  Principles”),  and in the
conclusion  of  the  electoral  platform,  religion is  otherwise  conspicuously  absent  from the
document. Instead, the platform focuses on pragmatic politics and realistic policies. In total
the platform contains 18 sections, each dedicated to one policy area, from overarching issues
such as domestic policy, external relations, and public liberties and citizen rights, to more
specific  policies  regarding,  for  example,  youth  issues,  housing  and  health  policies,  and
transportation. As summarized by Gunning, the electoral platform of Hamas was one focused
on “law, order, and social welfare” (2008, 1).373
The pragmatism and policy-oriented nature of the electoral platform are considered important
indicators that Hamas no longer saw itself as an Islamist liberation movement, but rather that
the  organization now thought  of  itself  and acted  like  a  political  party.374 By focusing  on
practical politics in its campaign rather than staying true to its maximalist, subversive, and
Islamist roots, Hamas in essence evolved as predicted by the relevant theories. As a strongly
ideological  liberation  movement,  Hamas  had  pursued  rather  narrowly  defined  goals,
representing a  small  but  vocal  segment  of  the  Palestinian  population inside  the  occupied
territories.  By  articulating  pragmatic  policy  goals  on  most  important  political  issues  for
Palestinians and leaving its more absolutist demands behind, Hamas moved toward the center
of  the  political  spectrum and  maximized  its  support.375 In  sum,  the  years  of  the  second
intifada  saw  the  ideology  of  Hamas  undergo  a  significant  shift  away  from  the  rigidity
associated with movements toward the more moderate and pragmatic ideology of a party (de
Zeeuw 2008b, 15).
373 Consult Appendix VI in Tamimi  (2007, 292–316) for a translation of the Change and Reform election
manifesto.
374 See also the section The campaign on pp. 230ff. for further details.
375 As argued by Haboub (2012), Hamas’s electoral success in 2006 was attributable exactly to its increasingly
moderate and centrist ideological message.
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 6.2.2  Organizational survival under persecution
As discussed above, a number of the developments during the second intifada were seemingly
to the benefit of Hamas. The “death of Oslo” and the return of violent resistance as a major
source  of  legitimacy  were  both  important  for  Hamas’s  increased  popularity,  whereas  the
institutionalization  of  the  PA created  openings  in  the  political  opportunity  structures  for
Hamas to exploit. But at the same time, Hamas suffered unprecedented levels of persecution.
A concerted and multi-pronged effort to destroy or at least marginalize Hamas was sponsored
by the US and carried out by Israel and the PA. Hamas leaders, cadres, and rank-and-file were
all targets of Israel’s assassination policy; both Israel and the PA conducted mass arrests of
real  and  suspected  Hamas  members;  the  PA closed  down  Islamic  charitable  institutions
assumed to be associated with Hamas; and under US pressure, the international community
blocked  funding  channels  and  froze  assets  that  belonged  to  various  Islamic  charitable
institutions accused of being auxiliary to Hamas (Hroub 2004, 21–22).376
Suffice it to say, the extent of the persecution seriously hampered any organization-building
efforts on the part of Hamas. Indeed, and as will be discussed, the intensity of the harassment
and oppression threatened the very existence of Hamas. However, and as covered in previous
chapters,  Hamas  has  suffered  persecution  throughout  its  history,  and  therefore  had  the
necessary experience to survive the onslaught even during the second intifada. From its initial
organization-building efforts during the first intifada, when Israel carried out mass arrests and
deportations  of  its  members,  Hamas  responded  by  compartmentalizing  its  organization
functionally (e.g., by isolating the political leadership from the armed wing), hierarchically
(through  stratification,  i.e.,  granting  the  lower  organizational  units  a  high  degree  of
operational autonomy), and geographically (by instituting a federated structure, i.e., granting
the various geographic branches a high degree of strategic autonomy). As such, it  was by
design well suited to survive the onslaught throughout the second intifada.
This  is  not  to  say  that  the  persecution  Hamas  suffered  in  these  years  was  without
consequences. As will be demonstrated in the following sections, the mass arrests of Hamas
members throughout the second intifada and the re-occupation of the West Bank by Israel in
effect decimated much of Hamas’s military capabilities and indirectly led to a decrease in the
discipline of its rank-and-file. Furthermore, the targeted assassination policy pursued by Israel
376 See Benthall  (2010) and S.  Roy  (2011,  97–100) for thorough analyses of the US court  cases brought
against the Holy Land Foundation, at the time the largest Islamic overseas aid organization raising funds
for the Islamic charities in the occupied territories, accused but not proven to be a front for Hamas.
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against  Hamas leaders seriously threatened the survival of the organization, and prompted
fears that it would re-radicalize as the power balance shifted toward the presumed radical
external leadership in Damascus.
However, as will be explicated below, the predicted re-radicalization failed to materialize.
Hamas not only survived the massive onslaught, thus proving its high degree of adaptability,
but emerged at the end of the second intifada as a mature and confident political organization.
In short, it effectively demonstrated that it would remain a force to be reckon with  (Hroub
2004).
  Mass arrests and the rank-and-file
The persecution of Hamas during the second intifada followed the logic of the 1990s: Using
some Israeli aggression against Palestinians as pretext, Hamas carried out suicide operations
inside Israel in revenge, prompting the PA to arrest Hamas members and/or provoking Israel
to retaliate with targeted assassinations, thus in turn providing Hamas with a new excuse for
carrying out further operations  (Brym and Araj 2006). Locked in this tit-for-tat pattern, the
level  of  violence  and the  intensity  by which Israel  and the  PA cracked down on Hamas
oscillated in tandem throughout the second intifada (Singh 2011, 62).
Two examples of this pattern took place in 2001. First, in late July, Israel assassinated two
West Bank Hamas leaders. In response, Hamas carried out a suicide operation in early August,
killing 20 Israelis, and in retaliation, Israel pressured the PA to arrest two senior Hamas cadres
(Tamimi 2007, 201). Similarly, in November 2001, Israel assassinated a number of Hamas
military commanders, prompting Hamas to retaliate with a series of suicide operations. This
time around, however, Israel was adamant that Arafat and the PA demonstrate the capacity to
control the Palestinian factions, and not only arrest a couple of Hamas members for show. So,
while Arafat previously had been reluctant to crack down too hard on Hamas, he now placed
its  founder  and  spiritual  leader,  Sheikh  Ahmed  Yassin,  under  house  arrest  in  Gaza,  and
imprisoned some 200 Hamas activists (Tamimi 2007, 201).
But Israel remained unconvinced, claiming that the PA only had arrested low-level activists,
and that  Hamas remained capable of planning and carrying out suicide operations  (Singh
2011, 61). In addition, the house arrest of Sheikh Yassin was cut short. Hamas dispatched
armed activists to fight the PA police, successfully freeing him after a brief skirmish. This
event demonstrated that Hamas had the capability to effectively project its own power within
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the occupied territories, something the PA at times apparently lacked (Singh 2011, 62; Tamimi
2007, 201–2).
Naturally,  this  left  Israel  dismayed,  as  it  yet  again  proved  that  Arafat  was  unable  to
monopolize violence in the occupied territories, and therefore that the PA could not be relied
upon  to  provide  security  for  Israel.  In  essence,  and  as  discussed  above,  Arafat  and  his
compatriots  had  tried  and  failed  to  reconcile  two  contradictory  goals,  namely  that  of
appeasing the international community by cracking down on military movements to protect
Israel, while simultaneously appearing responsive to popular demands by freeing these same
militants  and  reacting  to  Israeli  aggression.  As  a  consequence,  the  suicide  operations
continued, eventually provoking Israel to take matters into its own hands.
And Israel  did so on March 29, 2002, when it  launched the full-scale military Operation
Defensive  Shield  (Hammami  2002).  The  operation  was  launched  with  the  stated  aim of
dismantling  the  Palestinian  “terrorist  infrastructure,”  and  it  was  the  most  comprehensive
military operation on the West Bank since the Six Day War of 1967 (Brym and Araj 2006,
1981; Hammami 2002, 19; Singh 2011, 62). To achieve this, Israel reoccupied large swathes
of the West Bank, including territories nominally under PA control such as the important cities
Nablus and Ramallah, as well as scores of villages. By the time the operation nominally ended
on  May  1,  2002,  Israel  had  carved  up  the  West  Bank  into  disconnected  enclaves,  and
effectively controlled movement between Israel and the West Bank as well as within the West
Bank. As a result, the number of suicide attacks originating from the West Bank declined
noticeably in the following years (Brym and Araj 2006, 1978).
While Hamas’s West Bank wing undoubtedly suffered serious setbacks during and following
the Israeli operation, the operation’s geographic focus left Hamas’s command structure more
or less intact on the Gaza Strip. This stands in stark contrast to the fate of the PA and Fatah.
For Hamas was not the sole target of Israeli persecution during Operation Defensive Shield.
Israel also targeted the PA and the Fatah-associated tanzim and al-Aqsa movements, as well as
other  Palestinian groups taking part  in  the  uprising.  And by reoccupying the West  Bank,
traditionally the stronghold of the PA and Fatah, Israel inadvertently weakened the domestic
standing of its presumed negotiating partner in the dormant peace process to the benefit of
Hamas, its sworn enemy (Hammami 2002, 23).
Overall, however, findings in the extant literature and the impression from various interviews
indicate  that  it  was  Hamas  that  suffered  the  brunt  of  the  harassment  and  persecution
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throughout the second intifada (Hroub 2004, 28).377 And the imprisonment of large numbers
of its rank-and-file naturally circumscribed Hamas’s organizational and military capabilities,
in turn leading to a greatly increased demand for new recruits (Hroub 2004, 33).378
This  demand  for  new recruits  was  more  than  saturated  by  the  available  supply.  For,  as
outlined above, the combined effect of Hamas’s prominent role in the second  intifada,  its
politico-religious identity, its role as a welfare provider, and the failures of the Fatah-PLO-PA
nexus, all led to an increase in popularity in the period from 2000 to 2005, a popularity that
translated into a steady stream of potential recruits (Hroub 2004, 22). In fact, Hamas leaders
even claimed that the organization at times was “unable to absorb all the volunteers” (Hroub
2004, 35).
Importantly, many of these new recruits joined Hamas solely to fight the Israeli occupation. In
her analysis based on interviews with 15 preempted Palestinian suicide bombers, for example,
Argo finds that the motivation for volunteering had everything to do with personal motivation
and nationalism, and little to do with religion or ideology.379 Resisting the occupation and
exacting revenge on Israel for its humiliating and violent treatment of Palestinians was what
provoked  ordinary  people  to  join  the  resistance.  Loyalty  to  Hamas  or  any  of  the  other
liberation movements was not that important; these only facilitated suicide operations, e.g., by
providing logistical support (2004, 14).380
The motivation for joining a political organization is important because it is expected to have
a bearing on cohesion and discipline. More specifically, an ideologically motivated recruit,
indoctrinated for months or even years—as was previously the case for Hamas—is expected
to toe the party line, even when in disagreement. These recruits are invested in the survival of
the organization beyond their personal interests. Someone joining for opportunistic reasons,
such as those joining Hamas solely to resist the Israeli occupation during an ongoing uprising,
however,  is  expected  to  be  less  disciplined.381 In  short,  they  are  not  as  invested  in  the
377 Except for a few female Hamas members, all interviewees from Hamas had been imprisoned at one time or
another, some having spent decades in Israeli jails.
378 However,  it  should  be  noted  that  at  least  some  imprisoned  cadres  were  not  cut  off  from  the
decision-making  procedures.  As  previously  discussed,  one  of  the  main  branches  within  Hamas  is  its
prisoner committees, who traditionally have enjoyed a high degree of legitimacy within the organization.
379 According to  Argo,  while  close  to  90 percent  of  the  bombers  she  interviewed considered themselves
religious, they all justified their actions in terms of this world, i.e., as revenge and defense against Israeli
aggression. None of them alluded to any next-world rationale (2004, 11).
380 Specifically,  Argo  concludes  that  for  “none  of  the  subjects  was  organizational  loyalty  a  necessary  or
sufficient factor in recruitment or attempted action” (2004, 14).
381 An Egyptian official with in-depth knowledge about Hamas claimed in an interview with the International
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organization’s survival, but see the organization only as a vehicle to pursue their personal
aims. When the interest of the organization as expressed by the leadership clash with their
own personal interests, the opportunists are more likely to defect or at least defy the party
line.
Due to lack of reliable data, it is difficult to measure organizational cohesion and discipline
directly. And as to be expected, interviewed Hamas members would almost never admit that
the organization had any problems with rogue elements. Instead, they prided themselves with
being a cohesive and democratic organization, echoing what has for long been the received
wisdom  even  among  Hamas  analysts  and  observers  (see  e.g.,  Hroub  2006b,  119–21).
However, some Hamas cadres did admit that “operational mistakes” in breach of the political
line  did  take  place.382 And  in  particular  with  regard  to  suicide  operations,  there  were
indications that the discipline of Hamas did indeed suffer as the influx of volunteers altered
the composition of its rank-and-file.383
For example, Hamas at times claimed responsibility for operations most likely carried out
either by other liberation movements or by individuals without ties to any organization. This
could indicate that the Hamas leadership was not informed about what operations its armed
wing really carried out. Such claims of responsibility might also have been opportunistic. At
times, a number of groups issued competing claims of responsibility for a given operation.
Simply because the nature of suicide operations can make it difficult to ascertain with any
degree  of  confidence  which  group  was  responsible,  various  groups  competed  to  be  the
responsible party and through this bolstered their popularity (Allen 2002; Bloom 2004).384
That  known Hamas  militants  carried  out  suicide  operations  without  sanctioning from the
leadership is, however, an even stronger indication of decreased levels of discipline. Given the
extensive persecution of Hamas throughout the second intifada, it seems likely that the chain
of command sometimes broke down. This left various cells to operate without coordination,
Crisis Group that “[d]uring the intifada, the Qassam Brigades mobilised the youth, without giving them the
religious training, which used to last seven years. For some their only creed is their guns and their monthly
stipends. It will require time to convince them to integrate” (quoted in ICG 2006, 7, fn. 35).
382 A few  free-spoken  interviewees  from  Hamas  alluded  to  this,  in  particular  Dr.  Mohammad  Ghazal
interviewed in Nablus on April 17, 2011, and Dr. Ayman Daraghme interviewed in Ramallah on April 10,
2011.
383 The stratified nature of Hamas probably exacerbated the decrease in discipline following the influx of new
recruits.
384 For example, both Islamic Jihad and Hamas claimed responsibility for an attack carried out on August 9,
2001; Hamas and the PFLP issued competing claims for responsibility for a suicide operation carried out
on May 19, 2002; and four different groups took the credit for a bus bombing on July 17, 2002 (Bloom
2004, 73).
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which in turn can explain that some operations were executed without official sanctioning.
Furthermore, certain operations are known to have been personal vendettas, carried out in
breach of Hamas’s official policy  (ICG 2004, 11). One noteworthy example of this was the
suicide  operation  carried  out  by  a  Hamas  member  in  Jerusalem on  August  19,  2003  in
Jerusalem that killed 23 Israelis. The Hamas leadership at first repudiated the attack, but later
had to admit that it indeed was a Hamas member who had taken it upon himself to revenge
the Israeli  assassination of  a  senior  Islamic Jihad leader  (Hroub 2004,  37).  Crucially,  the
operation  was  executed  at  a  time  when  Hamas  had  declared  and  observed  a  unilateral
ceasefire  in the fight  against  Israel,  and as such it  was particularly damaging to Hamas’s
reputation for cohesion and discipline.
This  is  not  to  say that  Hamas disintegrated into an undisciplined and rogue organization
during the second intifada. By and large, the political leadership remained in firm control of
the organization. But the mass arrests of Hamas members did take its toll. Despite the influx
of volunteers, the number of suicide operations mounted by Hamas decreased in the aftermath
of Operation Defensive Shield (Hroub 2004, 33). As indicated in Figure 8 below, there was a
steady decrease in suicide attacks from 2002 onward, indicative of a circumscribed military
capacity.385
Figure 8: Number of suicide attacks and the share of Hamas, 2000–2005
(Sources: Benmelech and Berrebi 2007; Singh 2011, 139–42).
385 Note that this was not only due to the admittedly effective anti-terror policy pursued by Israel, but also a
result  of  the  decreasing  popularity  of  such  attacks  among  Palestinians  inside  the  occupied  territories
(Bloom 2004).
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  Targeted assassinations and the dominant faction
Although the operational  capabilities of Hamas were hampered by the mass arrests,  what
really threatened the survival of the organization was the assassination strategy pursued by
Israel.  On November  9,  2000,  only a  month after  the  outbreak of  the  second  intifada,  it
became the official policy of Israel to target Palestinian activists and militants for liquidation
(Butler  2009,  110).  After  assuming  office  in  early  2001,  Israel’s  PM  Ariel  Sharon  even
presented an exhaustive list to the Knesset of Palestinian activists marked for assassination (or
“targeted killings,” as it was labeled) (Baroud 2006, 25–26).
In the year following the adoption of this policy, Israel assassinated 33 Palestinian activists.
The next year, 37 such targeted assassinations were confirmed (Singh 2011, 62), and by 2004,
around 200 officially sanctioned assassinations had been carried out (Hroub 2004, 28). At the
end of the second intifada, the total official number was 418 assassinations, with an additional
122  widely  attributed  to  Israel  (Butler  2009,  110).386 Again,  Hamas  was  not  the  sole
Palestinian group targeted by this policy, but estimates indicate that approximately half of
those assassinated by Israel were cadres from Hamas. According to Hamas’s own records,
Israel assassinated upwards of 320 of its members during the second intifada (Hroub 2004,
28).
It seems intuitive to assume that the systematic liquidation of its political leaders and military
commanders would negatively affect Hamas, both organizationally and operationally. Also,
theoretically,  the  replacement  of  leaders  has  been  hypothesized  to  affect  party  behavior
(Harmel and Janda 1994; Panebianco 1988, 239ff.). But whatever incremental change might
have  come  about  as  a  result  of  the  systematic  assassination  of  Hamas’s  leadership  was
overshadowed by the twin assassinations carried out in the spring of 2004. First, on March 22,
Israel killed Hamas founder and spiritual leader, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, with a missile fired
from a military helicopter.387 Then, on April 17, Israel killed Yassin’s successor, Dr. Abdel
Aziz al-Rantisi, in a similar attack (Hroub 2004).
Although the assassination of Yassin would seem the more serious loss for Hamas, it has been
argued that it was in fact more of a blessing in disguise. Yassin had for long been critically ill,
and been more of a figurehead than a day-to-day manager of affairs in Hamas. As such, his
death was of little practical consequence for Hamas’s organizational functioning. However, by
386 According to Butler, 295 bystanders were killed in these operations (2009, 110).
387 Yassin’s two bodyguards and nine bystanders were also killed.
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assassinating him as they did to Palestinian military commanders, the Israelis inadvertently
made Yassin a martyr, resulting in an outpouring of support for Hamas (Gleis and Berti 2012,
147; Hroub 2004, 31). 
The assassination of Rantisi, on the other hand, seriously undermined the factional dominance
within Hamas that was enjoyed by the Gaza leadership. Considered a “skillful organizer, field
leader, and talented orator, he enjoyed both great popular and unquestioned legitimacy as one
of the original founders,” his passing left a vacuum that was difficult to fill (Hroub 2004, 31).
Combined with the decimation of much of Hamas’s infrastructure on the West Bank during
Operation  Defensive  Shield,  large  parts  of  Hamas’s  domestic  leadership  was  either
incapacitated or killed by early 2004 (Singh 2011, 63).
As detailed in previous chapters, the topmost leadership structure in Hamas is made up of the
larger Consultative Council in charge of overall strategy, and the executive Political Bureau,
tasked with the day-to-day management of the organization. Membership in both bodies is
divided in roughly equal shares between those residing inside the occupied territories and
those from outside (Gleis and Berti 2012, 144–46). According to Hroub, the inside leadership
have traditionally enjoyed somewhat greater legitimacy and thus power, partly because of
Yassin’s  presence,  but  probably more importantly  because they are in  fact  on the  ground
(2004, 2006b, 117–19).388 And while the overall persecution of Hamas leaders had weakened
the domestic leadership since the outbreak of the second intifada, the assassinations of Yassin
and Rantisi led to a marked shift in the power balance within Hamas. By mid-2004, Khaled
Meshaal and his companions in the Political Bureau residing in Damascus emerged as the top
leaders of Hamas, both effectively and officially (Gleis and Berti 2012, 147; Hroub 2004, 31–
32; Singh 2011, 63).
This shift in power balance arguably constituted a change of dominant faction within Hamas,
and could have spelled a re-radicalization of the organization. For one, the external leadership
has for long been considered the more radical and militant of the various branches within
Hamas  (Hroub 2004, 32). This was partly because they rarely had to suffer the inevitable
consequences of Israeli repercussions, but also because they were in control of the al-Qassam
Brigades. In some ways, the two could even be seen as factional allies, although the latter—at
388 Although, as discussed,  the power balance between the various branches and leadership factions have
oscillated back and forth in tandem with various environmental shocks and challenges. For example, in
1996, the dominant faction keeping Hamas out of the elections to the PLC was made up of the al-Qassam
Brigades and the external leadership.
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least  nominally—were taking its orders from the former.389 Furthermore,  and according to
former  Minister  Mohammad Barghouti,  a  close  associate  of  Hamas,  the  assassinations of
Yassin and Rantisi prompted even moderate voices within Hamas to call for violent retaliation
against Israel.390 Finally, and theoretically, change of dominant faction has been identified as
an important source for party change (Harmel and Janda 1994; Panebianco 1988, 247–50).391
In  sum,  the  shift  in  power  balance  following  the  decapitation  of  the  domestic  political
leadership in  early  2004 prompted well-founded fears  that  the  increasingly moderate  line
espoused in Hamas’s communiqués and official  statements were at  risk  (Hroub 2004, 33;
Knudsen 2005a, 1373).
  Demonstrating maturity and stability
Despite the fundamental challenges facing Hamas and the change in dominant faction, the
expected  and  hypothesized  re-radicalization  did  not  materialize.  A number  of  interlinked
factors are identified for explaining why. For one, the expectation was itself based on the
widespread  assumption  that  the  external  leadership  is  more  radical  than  the  domestic
leadership.  This  assumption  is  in  turn  based  on  the  previously  mentioned  argument  that
because Hamas has a  federated structure and its  various branches operate under  different
conditions, they also think and behave differently. To recap, the Gaza leadership is considered
to be ideologically radical, but politically pragmatic because of the precarious situation there.
Interviewed Hamas members on the West Bank would often characterize their fellow cadres
in Gaza as more hard-headed than themselves. According to Abderrahman Zaidan,
[t]he  people  in  Gaza  have  been  living  in  a  ghetto  for  20–25 years.  They are
isolated, living as in a pressure-pot. There is no way you can keep such pressure
internal, or avoid that it affects your thinking or your feelings! It will affect you! I
mean, their chances for education are slimmer than the West Bank, they live in a
very limited area, and they cannot leave. These are the circumstances they live in.
We here on the West Bank at least have a more widespread area, with scattered
villages and cities, and we have more freedom of movement to go to Jordan or the
389 The rationale for making the external leadership responsible for the al-Qassam Brigades was in part to
shield the domestic political leadership from Israeli retaliation following armed operations.
390 Barghouti was a minister both in Hamas’s first government formed early in 2006, and in the short-lived
National Unity Government in 2007. He was interviewed in Ramallah, August 26, 2007.
391 In short, the existence of factions presupposes differences in ideology or policy within the party. And when
a new faction obtains  dominance of a  party,  it  will  use  its  newly won power  to  change the party in
accordance with its own convictions (Harmel and Janda 1994, 266–67).
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Gulf, to see the world. Of course this affects how we feel, how we think. It’s a
different situation, and the situation affects the person.392
Along the same lines, Dr. Ghazal claimed that “although we are all Palestinians, it’s easy to
see the difference between the Gazans and the West Bankers. Their [the Gazans] personality is
different, and this is why Hamas traditionally has been stronger there than here.”393 Similar
sentiments surfaced in a number of other interviews. In short, the Gazans are considered to
have a stronger mentality and be more radical because they live under such dire conditions
(Hroub 2004, 32).394
The West Bank is considered to be too fragmented and heterogeneous for any meaningful
inferences to be drawn regarding the ideological and strategic outlook of Palestinians residing
there. In the words of Dr. Ghazal, “the people here are different. Those in Hebron have a
different tradition and history than those in Nablus,  whereas Palestinians in,  for example,
Jenin are different from both Hebronites and Nabulsis.”395 This, however, has not prevented
analysts and Hamas cadres to claim that the West Bank leaders are the real moderates in
Hamas. In fact, the same Dr. Ghazal traced the organizational lineage of Hamas on the West
Bank back to the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, which was active in electoral politics prior
to the Israeli  occupation in 1967, and used this to explain why the West Bank branch of
Hamas traditionally has been more moderate and disposed toward conventional politics than
their brethren in Gaza.396
Finally, it is widely assumed that the external leaders are the true radicals and militants in
Hamas  (Hroub 2004,  32).  The explanation for  this  goes  roughly as  follows:  Because  the
external leadership largely is out of reach of the inevitable Israeli repercussions following in
the aftermath of any armed operation,397 combined with the fact that it controls the al-Qassam
Brigades, Hamas’s military wing, it has traditionally been more inclined to advocate armed
resistance  over  politics  (Kristianasen  1999,  29,  35,  fn  33;  Mishal  and  Sela  2000,  166).
Furthermore, most members in the external leadership are refugees, either from 1948 or 1967,
392 Interview with MP Zaidan in Ramallah, April 17, 2011.
393 Interviewed in Nablus, April 17, 2011.
394 Also, Dr. Nashat Aqtash, a previous Muslim Brother who ran the media campaign for Hamas during the
2006 elections, noted that the distinct mentality of Gazans was reflected not only in Hamas, but also among
Fatah cadres and members of Islamic Jihad. Interviewed in Ramallah, April 11, 2011.
395 “Hebronite” and “Nabulsi” are the demonyms for Hebron and Nablus, respectively.
396 Interviewed in Nablus, April 17, 2011.
397 The mentioned failed assassination attempt by Mossad, the Israeli intelligence agency, of Khaled Meshaal
in 1997 is of course a noteworthy exception (McGeough 2010).
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which in turn is expected to have a radicalizing effect (see e.g., Knudsen 2005b).
According to Khalid Amayreh, a Palestinian journalist and analyst close to Hamas, “it is no
secret  that  the  exiled  leadership  of  Hamas  is  probably  more  militant  than  the  Gaza
leadership.” However, he went on to argue that “this is not a constant, but depends on the
situation.”398 Although a seemingly obvious observation, it is noteworthy that the tendency
when using these various classification schemes is to omit any temporal variation, i.e., that the
various branches change their position on different issues over time and depending on the
changing circumstances. As summarized by Hamas cadre Abderrahman Zaidan, 
[w]hen we are talking about categories of radicals and moderates, you will find
that in one instance, the Gaza leadership are the radicals and the West Bank are
the moderates, and then, at another sensitive point, you will find that the West
Bank is radical and Gaza became a moderate. With the outside leadership, it is the
same. It  is  sometimes radical,  sometimes moderate.  Therefore,  in my opinion,
these categories are not real.399
An illustrative example of how these simplified dichotomous or trichotomous classification
schemes fail to accurately describe the positions of the various Hamas branches is found when
looking at the origin of most of the suicide missions carried out by Hamas during the second
intifada. For, rather than originating from Gaza, the Hamas wing often considered to be the
most radical and militant, most of Hamas’s suicide bombers in the second intifada came from
the West Bank (Brym and Araj 2006, 1981). Again in the words of senior Hamas cadre Dr.
Mohammad Ghazal,
[a]lthough Hamas always has seemed stronger in Gaza, you have to remember
that most of the suicide operations and military operations that harmed the Israelis
were carried out from West Bank. So, Hamas on the West Bank gave a lot for the
cause, but also sacrificed a lot as they paid a bigger price.400
This “bigger price” Dr. Ghazal referred to was Operation Defensive Shield, which focused
mainly  on  the  West  Bank  exactly  because  this  was  where  most  suicide  operations  were
launched from. And as discussed above, the widespread persecution of Hamas on the West
398 Interviewed in Dura, April 9, 2011. In the interview with Hamas leader Dr. Aziz Dweik, he referred to
Khalid Amayreh as one “very close to Hamas,” claiming that there were plans to make Amayreh an adviser
to Hamas PM Ishmael Haniyeh (interviewed April 13, 2011 in Hebron).
399 Interviewed in Ramallah, April 17, 2011.
400 Interviewed in Nablus, April 17, 2011.
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Bank seriously undermined the organization’s military capacity. This,  in turn, was also an
important reason why the expected re-radicalization of Hamas did not take place. Even if the
Political Bureau was the more radical branch at the time, and even if it wanted to retaliate for
the assassinations of Yassin and Rantisi, the organization simply did not have the capacity to
carry  it  out.  Any  planned  retaliatory  operation  was  in  essence  prevented  by  Israel’s
increasingly effective persecution of Hamas cadres (Gunning 2008, 226; Hroub 2004, 33).
The above should not be taken as a dismissal of the existence of tensions within Hamas. The
federated structure of Hamas has at times led to organizational infighting and the formation of
factions  (see e.g., Gunning 2008, 107–16; Mishal and Sela 2000, 166). However, when the
shift in power balance occurred following the decapitation of the domestic leadership, the
political  leadership was probably more cohesive and homogeneous than expected.  For,  in
contrast  to  the  eased requirements  to  become a  member,  which  led  to  an  influx of  new
members and produced a less disciplined rank-and-file, advancement to the topmost echelons
of Hamas was still very much a regulated affair. As discussed, the way in which a Hamas
cadre rises upward through the rungs of the organization is essentially through co-optation;
although  the  regular  members  in  a  local  cell  (usra)  elect  their  own  leader,  any  hopeful
candidate is vetted extensively by the leaders in the district assemblies (shuba) before being
allowed to put forward his candidacy. The same goes for those wanting to advance from the
district level to the regional council (regional shura); although he must be elected by those in
the  district  assembly,  this  only  happens  at  the  discretion of  the  members  in  the  regional
council.401
Such advancement procedures render Hamas as a rather less democratic organization than
what its members prefer to portray it  as  (Gunning 2008, 108–9). However, the centripetal
motion of advancement has mitigated the tendency for factions to emerge, since any new
leader becomes so at the discretion of the existing leadership (Panebianco 1988, 60–61).402 In
other  words,  while  the  composition  of  Hamas’s  leadership  might  change,  i.e.,  that  the
individuals  making  up  the  leadership  change,  it  is  theorized  that  advancement  through
401 According to Sheikh Hassan Yousef, the security situation on the West Bank at times forced Hamas to
deviate from its bylaws and directly appoint members for advancement (interviewed in Ramallah, October
16, 2011).
402 Centripetal advancement procedures are associated with a high level of systemness, and thus indicative of a
high level of institutionalization. However, it should be noted that high levels of systemness somewhat
paradoxically also can pose a risk for the organization, since it might be more vulnerable to environmental
challenges and shocks. In short, a disciplined and homogenous leadership has fewer alternative strategies
and resources to draw on should it be exposed to fundamental challenges (Panebianco 1988, 57–61).
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co-optation only “produces a molecular change [of the leadership], but it does not change
internal group power relations and thus does not produce a change in organizational order”
(Panebianco  1988,  247–48).  So,  while  the  composition  of  Hamas’s  leadership  changed
following  the  assassination  of  Yassin  and  Rantisi  in  that  the  power  balance  shifted
geographically in favor of the Damascus leadership, its conformation, i.e., the structural order
and “distribution of  power  relationships  among the party’s  division leaders”  (Harmel  and
Janda 1994, 274), underwent less change. In short, the centripetal advancement procedures in
Hamas have been conducive to reproducing ideological coherence, and thus alleviated the
expected  factionalization that  otherwise  could  have  been  the  result  of  Hamas’s  federated
structure. 
Also, Hamas’s inclusive decision-making procedures aided the organization in overcoming
leadership  fragmentation  and  factionalization,  which  has  been  so  common  among  other
Palestinian  liberation  movements  (Gunning  2008,  112).  By  consulting  widely  in  the
organization and by instituting transparent  and fair  decision-making procedures,  decisions
made enjoy a high degree of internal legitimacy. As explained by Hamas MP Zaidan,
[a]t crucial points and regarding important decisions, our people fight and discuss
amongst themselves. At the stage of discussion, we are free to debate vigorously
and disagree. We are free to have different opinions. However, when we reach an
agreement or make a decision, we are all in favor. It means that we have finished
the stage of discussion. Even when the decision is taken by the leadership without
consulting  the  base,  it  is  a  legitimate  decision  because  the  leadership  is
democratically chosen. And so we abide by the decision, even if we disagree. It is
no  question.  We  go  straight  forward,  and  we  apply  the  position  or  decision
without hesitation.403
Similar narratives were echoed by a number of interviewed Hamas members, who all focused
on how the organization by design is both democratic and inclusive. There is of course a very
real and likely chance that Hamas members—as members in any political organization—will
tend to portray their organization in an overly positive light. And given the fact that Hamas
keeps its bylaws secret,404 and that data on its internal discussions and workings are scarce, it
403 Interviewed in Ramallah, April 17, 2011.
404 West Bank Hamas leader Sheikh Hassan Yousef explained that the bylaws are kept secret for security
reasons. If Israel and the PA obtained intimate knowledge about its inner workings, it would be easier for
them to target Hamas. Interviewed in Ramallah, October 16, 2011.
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is  difficult  to  measure  directly  and  accurately  the  degree  to  which  Hamas  really  is  as
democratic as its members claim. However,  some Hamas leaders offered a more nuanced
account of the decision-making procedures. For example, the Speaker of the PLC and senior
Hamas cadre Dr. Aziz Dweik, admitted that
[o]f course, we have a leadership, and the leaders at some points just have to make
a decision. Say for example when you find yourself under attack, there is no time
for consultation, you have to react very quickly. But in terms of decisions which
move the movement from one stage to another stage, you have to go back to the
grass roots. You have to ask the people their opinion. So, like in any organization,
any  party,  there  are  two types  of  decisions:  first  the  decision  which makes  a
turning point in the strategy. This takes time because you have to go back to the
grass roots. But then there is the rapid decision, when you have to respond quickly
and take action. In such circumstances, you don’t have time to go back to the
grass roots. You’ll just have to make a decision and take action.405
In  any event,  it  should be noted that  there  is  widespread agreement  among scholars  and
analysts that Hamas indeed is far more democratic than most other political movements in
Palestine  (see e.g., Caridi 2010; Gunning 2008; Hroub 2000; Mishal and Sela 2000). Also,
empirically, there are indications that both Hamas members and leaders indeed observe and
respect  decisions even if  they disagree with them. For example,  one high-ranking Hamas
member claimed to have been against the decision to participate in the 2006 elections, but was
later elected and now serves as a member of parliament.406
The tradition for consultative decision-making within Hamas means that the dominance of
any given faction or coalition is circumscribed, because decisions and changes in policy need
a majority decision in the topmost  shura  council and cannot be taken at the whim of one
leader or one leading faction. This,  in turn,  helps explain why Hamas did not change its
behavior  or  experience  any  organizational  splits  as  a  consequence  of  the  shift  in  power
balance to Damascus following the assassinations of Yassin and Rantisi. It also helps explain
why the already ongoing process of moderating its ideology and strategy continued on the
course set out early in the 2000s.
405 Interviewed in Hebron, April 13, 2011.
406 The interviewed Hamas member preferred to stay anonymous for security reasons. Interviewed on the West
Bank, August 2007 and April 2011.
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Despite  the  predictions  that  the  moderating tendency observed when the  Gaza  leadership
enjoyed  factional  dominance  would  be  reverted  following  the  shift  in  power  balance  to
Damascus, no such reversal took place. Instead, the eventual formulation and adoption of a
coherent and pragmatic ideological message as discussed above was finalized at a time when
the greatest organizational clout was wielded by the Damascus branch.407 At the very least,
this is taken to indicate that the Damascus leadership was less radical than the mentioned
dichotomous or trichotomous classification schemes would suggest. However, it seems likely
that  the  centripetal  advancement  requirements  and  the  inclusive  and  democratic
decision-making  procedures  produced  a  Hamas  leadership  far  more  coherent  and
homogeneous than assumed.
In the final analysis, the organizational state of Hamas at the end of the second  intifada  is
deemed to have been surprisingly mature and stable. The mere fact that Hamas survived the
massive onslaught during the second intifada is indicative of organizational adaptability and
stability. Furthermore, that the Hamas leadership emerged united and disciplined at the end of
the  intifada,  despite  losing numerous  important  leaders  to  Israel’s  assassination policy,  is
taken to indicate organizational maturity. And in addition to this, in a time of serious distress,
Hamas  was  capable  of  further  developing,  formulating,  and  finally  adopting  a  coherent
ideological message. In short, when responding to the host of challenges during the second
intifada, Hamas demonstrated a high level of organizational development.
 6.3 The dual roles of Hamas—between movement and party
As  this  chapter  has  demonstrated  so  far,  Hamas  developed  both  ideologically  and
organizationally away from that of a movement toward becoming a political party in the years
of the second intifada. And as will be discussed below, when Hamas decided to contest the
2006 PLC elections, it took yet another crucial step on its way to becoming a political party.
However, Hamas was not prepared to complete its transmutation from movement to party;
instead of willingly assuming office, Hamas expressed reservations and reluctance to fulfill its
role as a responsible and mature political party when it unexpectedly found itself the victors
of  the  elections.  As  such,  Hamas  stopped  short  of  completing  its  transmutation  from
movement  to  party  by  the  end  of  the  period  in  question,  remaining  influenced  by  the
operational logic of both movements and parties.
407 Consult the above section The eventual adoption of a pragmatic ideology, pp. 200ff. 
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 6.3.1  A political party will participate in elections …
Running in elections is a defining characteristic of political parties. The decision to run in the
2006 PLC elections could therefore be seen as a crucial step in Hamas’s transmutation from
movement to party.408 The following section is dedicated to analyzing Hamas’s reasons for
finally  entering  institutionalized  politics,  first  briefly  analyzing  the  effects  of  the
institutionalization of the PA, then discussing a number of factors pushing Hamas toward
participation, before finally covering the internal deliberations culminating in the decision to
contest the 2006 elections.
  The effects of institutions
If parties are organized expressions of interests formed to take part in formal and institutional
politics, it is clear that the formal and institutional makeup of the PA has implications for the
way Hamas would organize and behave.409 In particular, two intertwined dimensions of how
the political  system in occupied Palestine  institutionalized during the second  intifada  had
consequences for Hamas’s behavior and eventual decision to participate in the 2006 elections;
for  one,  the  PA turned  from a  presidential  system  to  a  president-parliamentary  form  of
semi-presidentialism,  and next,  the electoral  system changed from a majority system to a
mixed  majority-PR  system.  Both  of  these  developments  radically  changed  the  political
opportunity  structures  available  to  Hamas,  and  are  considered  crucial  external  factors
prompting Hamas to take part in the 2006 elections.
For, already when discussing the possibility of taking part in the first elections to the PLC in
1996,  Sheikh Ahmed Yassin stated that Hamas’s “participation in the PA [is] conditional on
the extent of the independent legislative powers it enjoys” (Usher 1995b, 73). As covered in
the previous chapter, Hamas eventually decided to boycott the 1996 elections, at least in part
because the power of the PLC was seriously circumscribed. With the ratification of the Basic
Law,  the  consecutive  amendments,  and  the  new election  law,  the  PLC was  strengthened
considerably, and to a large degree fulfilled Yassin’s conditions for participation. As such,
these institutional changes are all considered important for Hamas’ decision to participate in
the 2006 elections. Real power was attainable, and as argued by a Hamas MP in the PLC, they
408 For two complementing analyses of Hamas’s decision to run in the 2006 elections, see Løvlie (2013) and
Bhasin and Hallward (2013).
409 See Cavatorta and Elgie for the consequences of semi-presidentialism on the operational logic of Hamas
(2010). See also Samuels and Shugart for hypotheses on how semi-presidentialism is expected to affect
Hamas (2010).
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could now influence not only the political development in Palestine, but also use “[t]he PLC
to stop the PA from being a servant for Israel.”410
  Push factors and political opportunism
As discussed in the earlier sections of this chapter, numerous developments took place prior to
and  during  the  second  intifada  that  might  be  considered  positive  from  the  Hamas’s
perspective, most importantly the suspension of the Oslo Accords following the breakdown of
the Camp David talks in the autumn of 2000 and the eruption of the second  intifada soon
thereafter. With the end of the “Oslo era,” one of the major ideological obstacles for Hamas to
run in elections to a PA institution was removed. Most interviewed members from Hamas
underlined the importance of this “death of Oslo” when discussing their participation in the
2006 elections.411 As  MP Dr.  Daraghme explained,  Hamas  could  now participate  without
straying too far away from its long-term goals, i.e., without altering position on the peace
process and without explicitly recognizing Israel. The suspension of the Oslo Accords allowed
Hamas to pursue a participatory strategy without staking too much legitimacy, popularity, or
ideological  capital.412 As  such,  the  demise  of  the  Oslo  Accords  is  considered  a  factor
contributing  to  Hamas’s  decision  to  participate  in  the  2006  elections  (Hamas  campaign
manager Yahya Nasr quoted in ICG 2006, 5).
The ideological development discussed above added to this, as it made it easier for Hamas to
opt for participation. In particular, Hamas’s distinction between an “interim solution” within
the 1967 borders and a “final goal of liberating historic Palestine” is considered crucial in this
regard, as it  allowed elements within the organization to advocate a participatory strategy
while apparently remaining committed to the ultimate aims. And interviewed Hamas cadres
support such an interpretation, ascribing changes in Hamas’s strategy to altered political and
security conditions.413 Or, as summed up by a Palestinian scholar, the changing discourse in
Hamas came about because of changing political conditions, but did not constitute a surrender
of the ultimate goals.414 By focusing on present problems and postponing its ultimate goals for
410 The interviewee wished to remain anonymous. Interviewed on the West Bank, August 2007.
411 Including the  speaker  of  the  PLC,  Dr.  Aziz  Dweik  (interviewed  in  Hebron,  April  13,  2011)  and  MP
Abderrahman F. Zaidan (interviewed in Ramallah, April 17, 2011).
412 Interviewed in Ramallah, August 26, 2007.
413 This explanation was offered by most interviewed Hamas members when the topic came up, including an
anonymous activist  interviewed on the West  Bank in August  2007,  Hamas  MP Dr.  Ayman Daraghme
interviewed in Ramallah on August 26, 2007, and Hamas cadre Dr. Mohammad Ghazal interviewed in
Nablus on April 17, 2011.
414 Dr. Iyad Barghouti, interviewed in Ramallah, August 28, 2007.
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the future, Hamas attracted an increasing number of followers while keeping its hard-line
activists,  and  could  supplement  violent  tactics  with  electoral  participation  without
compromising on its ultimate aims. This succession of ends is therefore considered a crucial
factor for Hamas’s decision to participate in the 2006 elections (Hroub 2006b, 21; ICG 2004,
13; Panebianco 1988, 16; Strøm 1990).
The  decision  to  contest  the  elections  was  not  only  the  product  of  a  softened  ideology,
however. Dr. Aqtash, a former Muslim Brother who was hired to run the media campaign for
Hamas, identified fear as a major reason for why Hamas decided to run in the elections. He
quoted an unnamed Hamas leader as saying, “[w]e are participating in the election to save our
neck. If Fatah rules alone as before, they are going to slaughter us in the name of democracy.
Fatah will outlaw us, and we will be jailed or killed. So we are participating to survive.”415
Notwithstanding the various motivations for Hamas to contest the elections, its increasing
popularity was also a contributing factor. Its efforts in the social sector during the Oslo years,
its  role  in  the  second  intifada, and  disillusionment  among  Palestinians  regarding  the
Fatah-PLO-PA nexus, all added to Hamas’s popularity. Finally, Hamas capitalized greatly on
the unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in 2005—a move perceived by many Palestinians
as a victory for Hamas’s resistance strategy. Hamas came to be seen as a viable alternative to
the ancien régime, with polls indicating that the party would win considerable influence in the
PLC  if  it  took  part  in  the  elections.416 And  as  a  political  organization  proud  of  its
responsiveness to the grass roots, Hamas could not afford to ignore these implicit demands for
it to participate in the elections.
The polling data gave Hamas confidence that real power was obtainable through the ballot
box. And Hamas’s confidence was further elevated by how well it performed in the municipal
elections arranged in 2004 and 2005.417 Consistently securing just above a third of the votes in
each of the four rounds of elections, Hamas for the first time proved that it could rival Fatah
in  terms  of  measurable  popularity.418 This,  in  turn,  has  been  taken  by  both  analysts  and
415 Interviewed in Ramallah, April 11, 2011.
416 See Figure 7 on page 193.
417 Note that Hamas has never objected to municipal elections because these were not the creation of the Oslo
Accords and thus did not entail any implicit recognition of Israel or acceptance of the negotiation track
pursued by Fatah. This position is somewhat paradoxical, however, as the two pre-Oslo municipal elections
(in 1972 and 1976) arranged on the West Bank were both organized by Israel with the intent “to delegate
management of civil services to locally elected Palestinian figures, betting that the elite that emerged from
the voting booths would be satisfied with the organization of the elections and would therefore not be
fiercely hostile to them” (Signoles 2010, 16).
418 For more details, see Table 6 on page 340 in Appendix C: Election data in occupied Palestine.
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informed Hamas cadres to be a crucial factor in the decision to run in the 2006 elections to the
PLC (Usher 2005b). For instance, Zaidan, MP and former Minister of Transportation in the
first Hamas government, emphasized the local election results for the decision to run in the
2006 PLC elections, stating that “our participation in the local elections was important for our
decision to run in the national elections, because after the results came in, our people started
to realize that we could do very well in the general elections.”419 In short, the 2006 elections
provided Hamas with an opportunity to become a relevant player in institutionalized politics
(Hilal 2006; Milton-Edwards and Farrell 2010, 232–34 and 244–45; Shikaki 2006).
  Internal deliberations, decision-making, and the limits of intra-party democracy
The above could be taken to indicate that Hamas’s decision to participate in the 2006 elections
was  a  straightforward  one.  However,  there  were  many  cadres  vehemently  opposed  to
participation, fearing that  Hamas would be co-opted into the PA by this and thus lose its
identity as a liberation movement truly working for a free Palestine. Many of the interviewed
Hamas cadres admitted as much, and as recounted by Dr. Ghazal,
[p]rior to the elections, in 2005, there was a lot of disagreement. We had many
voices who said no, and many who said yes to participating. We had campaigns
representing the various positions, aiming to convince our people. I was in favor
of participating in the elections, and I made many speeches internally to convince
people to say yes. And I have friends who were against, and they made an effort to
convince people to be against. This is the way we are. We discuss things in our
movement; it’s matter of freedom of thought, and everybody is entitled to his own
opinion.
This freedom of opinion within Hamas was emphasized by most interviewed cadres, both in
general,  but in particular when the topic of the 2006 elections arose.  Furthermore,  it  was
repeatedly claimed that when the decision to participate was made, it was a democratic and
legitimate one. Again according to Dr. Ghazal,
[w]e have institutions,  and we have ways of making decisions.  After  the long
debates and discussion, where we found what are the benefits, what are the costs,
what are the advantages, and what are the disadvantages, we had a vote and the
outcome was to participate. At that time we had the decision of Gaza, and they of
419 Interviewed in Ramallah, April 17, 2011.
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course took it based on the opinions of their regional branches and local cells.
Similarly, we had the decision of the West Bank, and we had the prisoners’ idea.
And, added to all these ideas, we have the idea of the people outside, and then all
of them went to the majlis shura [the Consultative Council] and Political Bureau,
and then the decision was made. And when we finally reached our decisions, and
once  we  announced  it,  that  was  it;  it  became  the  decision  of  the  whole
movement.420
Despite such seemingly democratic decision-making procedures, it is difficult to get an exact
understanding of how widely the base in Hamas was consulted, and whether the opinions of
those  consulted  counted  equally  in  the  final  decision.  Ousama  Hamdan,  member  of  the
Political Bureau and responsible for Hamas’s external relations, focused on the hierarchical
structure of the organization when explaining the procedures leading up to the decision to
participate, admitting that not all members were consulted: 
When we talk about Hamas, we are talking about an organization which has a
hierarchy, and at the top of this hierarchy is the internal parliament, the  majlis
shura. This parliament is responsible for making strategic decisions, and can do so
without consulting the wider base.  Regarding the question of participation, we
discussed more widely, and I believe the highest five or six levels in the hierarchy
were asked about their position. This means that everyone was asked in some way,
and if someone wasn’t asked it means that at that time he wasn’t in position to be
asked.421
It is to be expected that the higher echelons of Hamas wield more organizational influence
than the rank-and-file, but for an organization so proud of its grassroots credentials, any such
limitations on intra-party democracy is noteworthy. And while it remains difficult to ascertain
the degree to which regular members influence decision-making within Hamas, its process for
selecting candidates to run in the elections reveals crucial information in this regard. And as
will be explicated below, the nomination process instituted in Hamas also indicates that it
strategized and behaved as a political party.
420 Interviewed in Nablus,  April  17, 2011. Note that  there is  no consensus in the literature or among the
interviewees regarding which branch of Hamas advocated what. According to Dr. Nashat Aqtash, the West
Bank was against participation, whereas the external leadership and the Gaza branch were in favor. Other
sources  claim  that  the  “outside”  and  the  West  Bank  were  against,  with  Gaza  the  sole  advocate  of
participation, and others yet say that each of the three branches were split, but with the majority coming out
in favor of participation.
421 Interviewed in Beirut, November 18, 2011.
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In the theoretical framework of candidate selection proposed by Rahat and Hazan (2001, 300–
1),  candidacy  in  Hamas  seems  to  be  the  exclusive  end;  potential  candidates  must  have
obtained a seat at least at the district level (shuba) to be allowed to run.422 More crucially,
however,  is  the  question  of  the  selectorate,  i.e.,  who  decides  which  of  the  nominated
candidates eventually will run in the elections  (Rahat and Hazan 2001, 301–3). Also here,
Hamas is  rather exclusive,  for,  as  relayed by various interviewed Hamas cadres,  it  is  the
district  level  leadership that  nominates candidates to run in the elections.423 And, because
self-nomination  is  frowned  upon  within  the  organization  (Caridi  2010,  187),  the  district
leaders also have the prerogative to identify and recruit potential candidates. Added to this,
the  various districts  can only nominate  candidates from within their  territory,  making the
nomination process within Hamas decentralized (Rahat and Hazan 2001, 304–6).
The decentralized nomination process was probably instituted in response to the electoral
system regulating the 2006 PLC elections; recall that in the new electoral system, half of the
132 MPs were to be elected from 16 district elections in a block vote system.424 Given the fact
that the block vote ballots allowed for ranking candidates,  it  was important for Hamas to
nominate persons in the districts the respective electorates would recognize. In part because
many of Hamas’s own profiles were imprisoned or assassinated, and in part because not all of
its district leaders were well known, the candidates running in the district elections were not
all from Hamas. In the Tulkarem district, for example, Hamas MP Abderrahman Zaidan ran
alongside an independent Islamist initially from Fatah.425
The remaining 66 MPs in the PLC were to be elected in a national list PR election. And for
this list, Hamas selected many of its most profiled and well-regarded leaders as candidates.
Given the fact that the ballots in the national list were closed, meaning that the voters could
not change the ranking of the candidates, it made sense for Hamas to place those it deemed
most important on the national list.426 Doing so suggests that Hamas—as other parties—used
422 The exact requirements are, however, unknown. Note also that the Election Law of 2005 stipulates that
candidates running in the PLC elections must  be Palestinian,  at  least  28 years  of  age on polling day,
registered in the final voter register, and reside permanently within the Palestinian territories (PLC 2005,
article 15).
423 Both Ayman Daraghme and Abderrahman Zaidan claimed that this was the case (interviewed in Ramallah,
April 10, 2011 and April 17, 2011, respectively). The relevant legislation in occupied Palestine leaves the
nomination procedures to the parties. However, the Election Law of 2005 requires the national lists to
include no less than one woman among the first three names, then one among the next four, and at least one
for each five additional names (PLC 2005, article 4).
424 See section A new electoral system on pp. 197ff. for further details.
425 Interviewed in Ramallah, April 17, 2011.
426 Personalities such as Ishmael Haniyeh, Mahmoud Zahhar, Muhammad Abu Tir, and Fathi Hamad all ran on
228
its safe seats, i.e., the seats it expected to win regardless of the overall electoral outcome, to
ensure the presence of its topmost leaders in the legislative council (Rahat 2007, 159).
It should be noted, however, that even if interviewed Hamas cadres repeatedly emphasized—
and arguably overstated—the bottom-up nature of the nomination process, the leadership at
the regional and national levels retained the right to veto nominees suggested by the district
levels. As detailed by Hamas MP Daraghme, 
[i]t  is  the  district  that  nominates,  but  the  nominees  need  the  approval  of  the
leadership of Hamas. For example, the leadership might know something which
the district people don’t know about a given candidate. So the leadership can veto
the nomination, if for example the leadership knows a secret about this person, or
if they have something against him. So it is democratic, but the leadership has the
right to veto.427
As such, Hamas had a multi-stage candidate selection process; to ensure geographical and
hierarchical intra-party legitimacy, the district levels were the initial selectorate, nominating
candidates to run in the election. Then, ostensibly to safeguard the quality, but probably also
to vet the ideological commitment and discipline of these candidates, the higher leadership
retained the right to veto the nominees (Rahat and Hazan 2001, 303).428
In  brief,  the  procedures  to  nominate  candidates  to  run  in  the  elections  resemble  the
aforementioned  centripetal  advancement  procedures  in  Hamas,  in  that  it  was  marked  by
mechanism likely  to  lead  to  co-optation  and  homogenization.  Although  such  nomination
procedures break with the picture of Hamas as a highly democratic, grassroots organization, it
does ensure a high degree of party discipline among its legislators, just as the advancement
procedures do.  In any event,  and despite  the circumscribed power of  the rank-and-file  in
Hamas’s  decision-making  procedures  and  nomination  processes,  both  the  decision  to
participate and the candidates eventually selected to represent Hamas enjoyed high degrees of
legitimacy  within  the  organization.  So  when,  on  March  12,  2005,  Dr.  Ghazal  officially
announced Hamas’s decision to contest the 2006 elections, it is considered the expressed will
of the organization to finally integrate itself and become an intrinsic part of the institutional
the national list (CEC 2006b).
427 Interviewed  in  Ramallah,  April  10,  2011.  Note,  however,  that  when  possible,  Hamas  of  course  ran
well-known candidates in the district elections, e.g., Hassan Yousef in the Ramallah list and Aziz Dweik in
the Hebron list.
428 Although interviewed Hamas cadres refused to go into detail regarding the exact procedures for selecting
candidates, it was alluded to that some sort of voting system was used, and not a system of appointment.
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Palestinian political system (ICG 2006, 5).429
  The campaign
That the decision to run in the 2006 PLC elections enjoyed internal legitimacy was made
apparent by the quality and professionalism of Hamas’s electoral  campaign. Hamas relied
partly  on  its  own  expertise  from  the  local  elections  in  2004  and  2005,  and  also  hired
professionals  to  create  what  has  been  labeled  as  “the  most  professional,  disciplined  and
calculating electoral team in the Palestinian territories” (ICG 2006, 8).
To coordinate and manage the campaign, Hamas employed Dr. Nashat Aqtash, a professor in
marketing at Birzeit University. He taught Hamas candidates how to speak and behave in
ways  to  increase  their  popularity,  both  domestically  and  in  the  eyes  of  the  international
community. With regard to the latter audience, he instructed Hamas candidates “not to talk
about destroying Israel,” avoid “celebrating suicide bombings,” “to emphasise that they are
not anti-semitic or against Israelis because they are Jews,” but rather focus on Palestinian
suffering and the need for the occupation to end (McGreal 2006).
Of course, the international community was of secondary importance, as it was the Palestinian
electorate within the occupied territories that would cast their ballots. And to sway the voters,
Hamas made sure to have a three-member electoral team in every city and town of a certain
size. These teams were ready to mobilize on short notice, and organized campaign activities
such as running public rallies and raising funds. In this way, the Hamas campaign managed to
reach the whole of occupied Palestine,  including areas traditionally loyal to Fatah  (Caridi
2010, 187). Hamas candidates also went door-to-door, meeting potential  voters in person,
something its  competitors  in  the  elections  did  not  do.  And finally,  Dr.  Aqtash  devised  a
comprehensive media strategy, making sure that Hamas became a fixture in the public media
throughout  the  campaign,  through political  adverts  in  TV,  radio,  and newspapers,  and by
dictating  that  the  Hamas  candidates  said  yes  to  giving  interviews  to  all  media  outlets,
including the smaller local ones (Milton-Edwards and Farrell 2010, 254).
Although resistance to the occupation featured as one element in the electoral campaign, it is
noteworthy that Hamas’s manifesto and message centered mainly on immediate and domestic
political issues (Milton-Edwards and Farrell 2010, 254–55). As mentioned in the analysis of
429 Apparently,  Dr.  Ghazal,  a  prominent  Hamas  leader  from Nablus,  was  selected  to  announce  this  new
strategy to “demonstrate that even though opposition to participation had been highest among cadres in the
Nablus  region,  the  debate  was  finished  and—in  the  best  traditions  of  democratic  centralism—the
movement now stood united behind the decision reached by the leadership” (interviewed in ICG 2006, 5).
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Hamas’s  ideological  development  above,430 the  electoral  manifesto  contained  elaborate
statements regarding most policy areas, including domestic policy, external relations, health
services,  public  education,  and  agricultural  development—all  marked  by  pragmatic  and
practical policies. Furthermore, Hamas campaigned on issues of good government, promising
to  reform the  administrative,  legislative,  and  judicial  sectors  as  anti-corruption  measures
(Caridi 2010, 186–87).431
In essence, the way in which Hamas conducted its electoral campaign was reminiscent of a
seasoned  political  party  (Caridi  2010,  188);  professionalized  and  streamlined,  Hamas
seemingly did its utmost to maximize support, attempting, as it were, to capture the median
voter  by  promising  uncontroversial  policies  such  as  improved  service  provision  and
anti-corruption, issues favored by all or at least most Palestinians (Haboub 2012).
 6.3.2  … but a movement might refuse to govern
Participating  in  and  winning  elections  are  what  political  parties  do.  The  above  therefore
indicates  that  Hamas  took  crucial  steps  in  its  transmutation  from movement  to  party  by
contesting the elections. However, there were also indications that Hamas had not completed
this  transmutation  despite  running  in  the  elections.  In  particular,  Hamas’s  immediate  and
ambiguous reaction to its unexpected victory, and subsequent reluctance to assume office,
seems to suggest that the organization was not ready to take on the role of a responsible
political party.432
  Surprise victory
Hamas  emerged  victorious  from the  elections,  winning  74  of  the  132  seats  in  the  PLC
(Shikaki 2006, 116).433 Although the consequences of this watershed event will be covered in
detail in the next chapter, it is pertinent to note here that the victory came as a surprise for all
430 See section The (re)articulation of ends on pp. 204ff.
431 See Tamimi (2007, 291–316) for a translation of Hamas’s electoral manifesto.
432 Hamas’s continued—and indeed intensified—use of terrorist tactics throughout the second intifada could
also  be  an  argument  against  classifying  it  as  a  party,  as  violent  resistance  and  terrorism  rarely  are
considered  key  functions  of  political  parties.  However,  and  as  discussed  in  the  introduction  chapter,
terrorism is defined as a strategy or tactic available to any political organization (Weinberg, Pedahzur, and
Perliger 2008, 3). Rather than disqualifying as a political party, its use of terrorist tactics has led analysts to
lump Hamas together with other parties that maintain “armed operations alongside their electoral actions”
(Close and Prevost 2008, 4), such as Hezbollah, the Herut party of Israel, M-19 from Columbia, and the
Basque ETA (Weinberg, Pedahzur, and Perliger 2008, 75–104).
433 Hamas won 29 of the seats by securing 44.45 percent of the votes on the national lists, while the remaining
45 seats were won in the 16 electoral districts with majority elections. For a complete breakdown of the
election results, see the various tables in Appendix C: Election data in occupied Palestine.
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involved parties.  Prior  to the  elections,  the Israeli  military intelligence agency Aman had
confidently predicted that Fatah would win (Chehab 2007, 2). Fatah itself had also expected
to win a comfortable majority in the PLC. And most, if not all, national and international
observers had also anticipated a Fatah victory (Chehab 2007, 3). One important reason for this
was that they all relied on the polling numbers from the Palestinian Center for Policy and
Survey Research, which consistently had indicated a Fatah victory (PSR 2011).
But, as argued by Ramallah-based pollster Jamil Rabah, these polls were flawed for a number
of reasons. For one, the new electoral system introduced complexities not accounted for in the
polling.434 Because the polls failed to take into consideration that the number of elections
actually carried out was 17 (one national and 16 districts) when sampling respondents, the
margins  of  error  widened  dramatically.  The  electoral  system  also  meant  that  when  a
respondent answered “Fatah” to the question of which party he or she would vote for, that
could mean either the Fatah list in the PR-elections, a bona fide Fatah candidate in one of the
16 districts, or someone the respondent associated with Fatah, but who did not actually run on
any Fatah ticket.
In addition, Fatah suffered factionalization, which in turn led the party to field competing lists
in the elections. In essence Fatah split its own ticket, losing seats to Hamas that it otherwise
would have won  (Shikaki 2006). This was a well-known risk prior to the elections, as the
internal problems in Fatah was widely publicized  (Usher 2006, 22–26). Still, according to
Rabah, it could have been accounted for in the polling if more effort had been spent analyzing
the  specific  responses.  And finally,  almost  a  fourth of  the  respondents  refused to  answer
which party they would vote for, which naturally had consequences for the predictive value of
the  polls.  However,  by  looking  at  respondent  profiles,  i.e.,  how  these  respondents  had
answered the other questions, Rabah claims that the polls would have revealed that most of
these non-respondents probably would vote for Hamas.435
The  outcome  of  the  election  came  as  a  surprise  even  to  Hamas.  Although  some  Hamas
members and certain authors claim that the organization expected to win,436 well-informed
analysts, such as Caridi (2010) and Hroub (2006a), and more importantly most senior Hamas
434 See the section A new electoral system on pp. 197ff. for details.
435 Jamil Rabah interviewed in Ramallah, March 23, 2011.
436 Chehab (2007) makes the rather far-fetched claim that Hamas choreographed its own victory by instructing
its supporters to hide that they intended to vote for Hamas when asked by pollsters, and thus “fly under the
radar” as it were throughout the election campaign. Such a theory lacks credibility, and is, in the words of
Jamil  Rabah,  “a  conspiracy  theory  logistically  impossible  to  carry  out  in  the  real  world,”  and  thus
considered naïve in the extreme (interviewed in Ramallah, March 23, 2011).
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members refute this. For example, the Speaker of the PLC, Dr. Aziz Dweik, stated that “very,
very few people expected Hamas to win,” and that he himself only expected Hamas to win 50
out of 132 seats in the PLC. He even likened the victory to “an earthquake which caused a lot
of upheaval [inside the movement].”437 Also, Dr. Aqtash, who ran the media campaign for
Hamas, claims that he warned Hamas not to field too many candidates because they surely
would  win—advice  Hamas  did  not  heed,  according  to  Dr.  Aqtash,  because  they  were
convinced they would not win a majority.438
  A reluctant winner
Hamas  could  be  accused  of  being  somewhat  naïve  for  not  even  being  prepared  for  the
possibility that it could win the elections. Although the polls were flawed, they did indicate
that  Hamas  closely  trailed  Fatah  in  terms  of  popular  support.  Likewise,  Hamas’s  strong
showing in the 2004 and 2005 municipal elections demonstrated that it could rival Fatah in
the  national  elections.  And  finally,  as  briefly  covered  above,  Hamas  ran  a  highly
professionalized media campaign, something it knew Fatah did not manage. With the benefit
of  hindsight,  it  therefore  seems  somewhat  surprising  that  the  election  outcome  caught
everybody by surprise.
More important, however, was the fact that Hamas initially was unwilling to take the power it
had won, thus casting doubt both on its motivation for running in the elections and whether it
indeed was mature enough as a political organization to qualify as a political party. There are
of course parties that contest elections without the aim of taking office (see e.g., Harmel and
Janda  1994;  Strøm  1990).  However,  Hamas’s  electoral  campaign  resembled  that  of  a
mass-based, vote-seeking party rather than the typical single-issue or ideology-advocacy party
that seeks to influence politics without governing (Milton-Edwards and Farrell 2010, 252–56).
Moreover, Hamas’s electoral program suggests a vote-maximizing strategy, as it focused on
pragmatic policies aimed at rectifying the many public grievances expressed with the current
government,  i.e.,  issues  resonating  well  among  the  Palestinian  median  voter,  rather  than
speaking to its own base (Haboub 2012; Løvlie 2014).
This  begs  the  question  of  why  Hamas  expressed  such  reluctance  to  take  power  after
seemingly  working  so  hard  to  win  the  elections.  One  explanation  would  be  that  Hamas
437 Interviewed April 13, 2011 in Hebron.
438 Interviewed April 11, 2011 in Ramallah.
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wanted to avoid the political costs associated with governing (Deschouwer 2008b).439 As the
Palestinian proto-state is less of a governing body than an entity set up to manage the Israeli
occupation, the costs of ruling the PA are considerable. For, despite the institutionalization of
the PA, it was still essentially the tool of Israel, meaning that the party that assumed office
would be perceived as collaborators of the occupation. In short,  the  costs  of office in the
Palestinian context far exceeds the benefits (Strøm and Müller 1999).
Such a straight-forward cost-benefit analysis explains part of Hamas’s immediate and peculiar
reaction. Furthermore, and as argued by S. Hamid, this logic resembles that of other Islamist
parties elsewhere in the Arab region  (2011). In brief, fear of state repression has prompted
Islamist parties under regimes as diverse as those in Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, and Bahrain to
systematically contest less than half the seats in parliamentary elections to avoid running even
the risk of challenging the regime (S. Hamid 2011).440 Although somewhat different from the
situation in occupied Palestine, the logic is largely the same; the cost associated with winning
elections is so high that parties actively seek to avoid electoral victories. And as argued above,
also S. Hamid speculates that Hamas won the 2006 elections by accident (2011, 78).441 
Also  relevant  for  the  movement-to-party  thesis  is  S.  Hamid’s  analysis  of  the  electoral
behavior  of  Islamist  parties,  which  provides  additional  clues  to  Hamas’s  reaction  after
winning the elections. In the same way that Hamas emerged as the armed and political wing
of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood during the first  intifada, most Islamist parties in the
region were established as the political arm of various Islamist social movements. And, as
discussed in previous chapters, the operational logic of movements at times diverge from that
of parties. To recap, a movement is expected to remain ideologically rigid and married to its
initial goals rather than follow the electoral calculus of political parties, i.e., adapt goals and
ideology in order to maximize electoral support. This, in turn, helps explain why Islamist
parties subordinate to their parent movement “act in ways that contradict expectations of how
traditional political parties normally behave” (S. Hamid 2011, 74–75).
439 The volume edited by Deschouwer contains a number of chapters analyzing the costs of office specifically
for new parties.
440 Most regimes in the region are to varying degrees authoritarian (Diamond 2009), and usually respond to
any threat  to  their  position  with  extensive  and  hard-handed  persecution and  repression  (Albrecht  and
Schlumberger 2004).
441 Yet another explanation offered by S. Hamid for this peculiar behavior is that Islamist parties “do not
necessarily need to rule in order to fulfill their original objective—the Islamization of society” (2011, 71).
For Hamas, however, this explanation lacks relevance. As detailed above, Hamas became less religious
during the second intifada, and in its electoral platform focused on political issues such as anti-corruption
and good governance and not Islamization.
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This observation is instructive for the behavior of Hamas, even if it is easier to distinguish
between most Islamist parties and their respective parent movements than between the party
Hamas and the movement Hamas. As discussed in the chapter covering the emergence of
Hamas, it early on eclipsed the Palestinian Brotherhood and has since the mid-1990s filled the
role of  a  social  movement,  an Islamist  movement,  a  resistance movement,  and,  from the
mid-2000s, that of a political party. This fusion of roles and functions makes it difficult to
disentangle the potentially contradictory goals of Hamas the movement and Hamas the party. 
However, it seems likely that Hamas’s reaction to its own electoral victory in part can be
explained by its multifaceted organizational nature. Hamas’s initially ambiguous response to
its own electoral victory seems to indicate that the goals of the  movement  Hamas—at least
initially—overruled the goals of the party Hamas. Instead of immediately assuming office as
would be expected of a political party winning such a comfortable parliamentary majority,
Hamas tried  in  various  ways  to  avoid  governing alone,  e.g.,  by  inviting  Fatah and other
Palestinian  movements  to  join  in  a  coalition  government  (Usher  2006,  21–22).  Such
maneuvering suggests that Hamas was not prepared to fully integrate into the political system.
Rather, it seems as if it wanted to leave Fatah with the ungratifying task of governing while
limiting itself to a watchdog role in parliament (Klein 2007, 447).
In short, Hamas wanted political power, but not the responsibility associated with governing.
Governing means compromise, and Hamas was reluctant to take office because it knew doing
so would force it to retract on important issues, notwithstanding the fact that it had adopted
rather pragmatic goals and proved to have stabilized as an organization. In conclusion, then,
Hamas seemingly remained influenced by the operational  logic of  movements,  i.e.,  being
ideologically rigid and averse to compromise,  even after  participating in and winning the
elections as a party. As such, it is difficult to definitely define Hamas as either a movement or
a party even after the 2006 elections. Instead, this analysis of Hamas’s transmutation from
movement to party agrees with the somewhat inconclusive but telling definition offered by
MP Dr. Ayman Daraghme:
It is like a cocktail—you can’t say that it is a real movement and you can’t say
that  it  is  a  pure  political  party.  Hamas  is  working  as  a  political  party,  as  an
underground resistance movement, and as a charitable organization.442
442 Interviewed in Ramallah, September 27, 2011.
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 6.4 Hamas’s level of institutionalization at the end of the second
intifada
Based on the above analyses and supplemented with data from interviews and the existing
literature, the following section will briefly outline Hamas’s degree of institutionalization at
the end of the second intifada. Employing the analytical framework discussed in chapter 1,
the  respective  scoring  of  the  four  attributes  identified  by  Randall  and  Svåsand  (2002a)
suggests that Hamas overall still was institutionalized to a medium degree.
 6.4.1  Systemness
By the end of the second intifada, Hamas remained at a medium level of  systemness. On a
general level, and as covered in the above analyses, Hamas proved to have developed into a
mature and adaptable organization by surviving the massive onslaught it suffered throughout
the second  intifada.  More specifically,  Hamas survived after  losing much of  its  domestic
leadership, including its founder and spiritual leader, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, without suffering
factionalization or outright organizational splits. This is suggestive of an organization with
internally legitimate routines for leadership alternation, and in turn indicative of a rather high
degree of systemness.
Furthermore,  and notwithstanding the apparent democratic  deficits  in the decision-making
procedures,  Hamas  successfully  organized  referendums  on  crucial  strategic  issues,  most
prominently the decision to participate in the 2006 elections. The fact that even the vocal
opponents to the adoption of an electoral  strategy respected the decision to participate, is
taken  as  an  indication  that  Hamas  had  routinized  legitimate  decision-making  procedures.
Also, the internal legitimacy of the Hamas candidates running in the election is suggestive of
a routinized candidate selection process, and in turn a positive indicator for systemness.
While Hamas survived the onslaught, the intensity of the persecution did negatively affect its
level  of  systemness.  In  particular,  and  as  covered  above,443 the  extensive  persecution  of
Hamas on the West Bank effectively broke its chain of command there. This left the many
new recruits without clear instructions and the leadership without control, leading to a number
of unsanctioned suicide operations. Such a state of affairs is indicative of a rather low level of
systemness.
443 See section Mass arrests and the rank-and-file on pp. 209ff.
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In terms of material resources and financial independence, the picture is somewhat blurred.
Data on the financial and material resources of Hamas are scarce and often unreliable. Some
sources claim that Hamas “never had any problems with money,”444 but this seems to be a
rather naïve or a selective interpretation of events. For example, on April 9, 2004, Hamas
organized its first ever fund-raising drive in Gaza, appealing to the public for donations to
continue its political and military work. According to Hamas sources, they collected USD 3
million in that one day, despite the fact that 60 percent of the population in Gaza lives below
the poverty line (Hroub 2004, 35–36). Resorting to such methods to raise funds seems to
indicate  a  certain  level  of  financial  vulnerability,  suggestive  of  an  organization  not  as
autonomous from its environment as a high degree systemness would require. However, and
despite the best efforts of Israel, the US, and the PA to the contrary, Hamas was able to find
alternative sources of income and secure continued operations, demonstrating that it had the
ability to remain more or less financially self-sufficient.
In sum, it is argued here that although Hamas did slightly increase its level of systemness
from the late 1990s, it  did not reach a high level. While most criteria point in a positive
direction, the extensive persecution of Hamas at the hands of Israel and the PA undermined its
organizational structure and hampered further organization-building efforts to such an extent
that its level of systemness is still measured to be medium.
 6.4.2  Decisional autonomy
As there were only a few indications that Hamas suffered “interference in determining its own
policies and strategies”  (Randall and Svåsand 2002a, 14), the organization is considered to
have remained at a medium level of decisional autonomy by the end of the second intifada.
Traditionally,  this  issue  has  been  discussed  in  relation  to  Hamas’s  various  sponsors  and
patrons. In particular, its close ties to the regime in Iran has prompted various analysts to
claim that Hamas—at least at times—operates as a proxy (see for example Levitt 2006, 172–
78;  Schanzer  2009,  182–83).  Iran  has  for  long  been  suspected  to  be  Hamas’s  “largest
supporter and supplier of money, weapons and training” (ICG 2012, i). Together with Syria
and Hezbollah, Iran and Hamas make up the so-called Axis of Resistance, a loose  alliance
“based almost exclusively on the rejection of Israeli and US hegemony in the region”  (El
Husseini 2010, 812). 
444 Dr. Nashat Aqtash, interviewed in Ramallah, April 11, 2011.
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Given the clandestine nature of much of Hamas’s activities, it is impossible to ascertain with
any certainty  whether  it  acted on behalf  or  at  least  in  accordance with the  wishes  of  its
patrons, e.g., carrying out military operations it would otherwise not have embarked upon.
However,  the  amount  of  financial  and  material  support  provided  by  Iran  and  the  other
members of the Axis of Resistance was substantial, and because of the intense persecution,
Hamas dearly needed the assistance. As such, it seems more likely than not that its patrons,
and in particular Iran, held some sway over Hamas. Whether Iran had to actively exercise its
influence is, however, doubtful. Hamas probably acted in accordance with the priorities of its
main patron on its own accord, prompting observers to conclude that it  worked  with  Iran
rather than for Iran (ICG 2012, 11).
Another discussion relevant for Hamas’s decisional autonomy relates to its ties to various
Islamic  charitable  societies.  The alleged close  relationship  was  what  prompted the PA to
freeze the bank accounts of numerous Islamic charities on the West Bank and in Gaza during
the second intifada. The idea was that by cutting off the funding to these charities and welfare
organizations, the PA could harm the operational capabilities of Hamas (Hroub 2004, 30–31).
Despite the fact that Hamas capitalized on the welfare services provided by these Islamic
charities in terms of popularity, official ties have been the exception, not the norm (Gunning
2008, 115, fn. 8). According to Dr. Ghazal, “most of the time there was no official connection,
there  were  no  ties.  People  connect  them  to  Hamas  simply  because  they  are  religious
organizations, but many of them don’t even like Hamas!”445 And as discussed in previous
chapters, it is more fruitful to see Hamas and these charitable organizations as part of the
same “Islamic trend”  (Høigilt 2010, 7), rather than being part of the same organization or
network.  In  this  regard,  the  observation  that  ideological  affinity  does  not  equal  official
affiliation is considered instructive (Roy 2011, 141–44).
In sum, the various civil society organizations probably had no or little influence on Hamas’s
strategizing and decision-making during this period, whereas some of its sponsors might have
to a limited degree interfered with or at least influenced Hamas in particular operations. As
such, it is concluded that Hamas remained at a medium level of decisional autonomy by the
end of the second intifada.
445 Interviewed in Nablus, September 29, 2011.
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 6.4.3  Value infusion
In terms of value infusion, most relevant criteria also point in a positive direction for Hamas
during the period under scrutiny. The years of the second  intifada  saw Hamas adopt rather
pragmatic and moderate goals.  And these changes in Hamas’s ideology departed radically
from its original objectives; Hamas was founded as an armed liberation movement aiming to
free  the  whole  of  historic  Palestine  and  erect  an  Islamist  state  in  the  territory.  By  the
mid-2000s,  however,  Hamas  had  distanced  itself  from the  founding Charter,  accepted an
“interim” solution to the conflict with Israel along the 1967 borders, and focused less and less
on the  role of  religion.  In  short,  Hamas left  behind many of  the  issues  and goals  which
initially had attracted supporters. Despite these fundamental changes, there were few recorded
defections in the years of the second intifada, suggesting that the instrumental incentives that
had prompted recruits to join Hamas in the first place had been superseded by the value of
Hamas itself.  In other words, it seems as if Hamas had become increasingly infused with
value.
Still,  the  lack  of  defections  following  the  adoption  of  a  more  pragmatic  and  moderate
ideology can be a somewhat misleading indication of value infusion. Many of the new recruits
joining Hamas in this period did so not because of its ideological outlook, but rather for its
role as a liberation movement; for some, loyalty to the organization was contingent solely
upon its resistance to the Israeli occupation. And it seems likely that this was the case also for
existing members. Some might initially have joined for ideological reasons, but stayed for the
sake of the resistance. As such, it is concluded that Hamas had reached only a medium level
of value infusion by the end of the second intifada.
 6.4.4  Reification
There is little doubt that Hamas still scored high in terms of its level reification. Already prior
to the second intifada Hamas enjoyed a steady level of support, and as discussed above and
indicated in Figure 7 on page 193, this rise in the polls continued unabated in the years of the
second  intifada,  demonstrating  that  Hamas  indeed  had  become  a  fixture  in  the  public
imagination. Finally, its electoral victory in 2006 is taken as definitive proof that Hamas had
not only reached a high level of reification, but cemented its position as one of the main
contenders for political power in the occupied territories.
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Summarized, Hamas scored medium on three of the four elements of institutionalization, and
high on reification. Hamas was recognized both by its members, supporters, and competitors
as a force to be reckoned with, despite obvious changes in its ideology. Moreover, it enjoyed a
relatively high degree of autonomy from its environment, even if it remained dependent on its
external sponsors. Hamas also proved to be rather well organized and adaptable, despite the
fact  that  its  systemness  suffered  somewhat  under  the  persecution  of  the  second  intifada.
Overall, it is concluded that Hamas had reached a medium level of institutionalization by the
end of the second intifada, and as such was well positioned to retain its role at the center of
Palestinian domestic politics for the coming years.
240
Chapter 7:  Hamas—between  government  and  resistance
(2006–2011)
The focus of this penultimate chapter is on Hamas’s first five years in government, from its
electoral victory in 2006 until the Arab Spring spread to occupied Palestine in 2011. Hamas
crossed  a  crucial  threshold  in  its  development  as  a  political  party  by  assuming  office;
governing is an end-point in the evolution of a political party, as it ostensibly means that it
finally has obtained the power to implement its political program. Governing, however, also
poses a host of unique ideological and organizational dilemmas and challenges. And in its
effort to respond to and solve these, Hamas was forced to both alter its mode of thinking and
restructure  its  organizational  order,  which  in  turn  affected  its  behavior  and  future
development.
The  chapter  will  begin,  however,  by  providing  a  contextual  backdrop  of  the  period  in
question, focusing mainly on the immediate aftermath of the 2006 elections. Although Hamas
won  a  clear  parliamentary  majority,  the  organization  feared  assuming  office  alone,
anticipating an international  backlash if  it  did. Yet  Hamas’s overtures to other Palestinian
factions to establish a coalition government were rebuffed, forcing it to do exactly that. As
expected, the international community subsequently boycotted the PA, creating a deteriorating
situation in the occupied territories. To rectify this, Fatah agreed under the Mecca Agreement
to form a National Unity Government with Hamas, in the hopes that international aid would
be  resumed.  The  unity  government  was,  nevertheless  short-lived,  and  the  rising  tension
between the two factions culminated in an all-out civil war in the summer of 2007. Hamas
emerged victorious after a few days of fighting, having taken complete control of the Gaza
Strip, leaving the West Bank in the hands of Fatah. In sum, the Palestinian political system
degenerated from what had promised to become an increasingly well-functioning democratic
statelet to a completely disintegrated, territorially and politically divided system, in the course
of less than two years.
The  chapter  then  turns  to  Hamas’s  development  while  in  power,  first  outlining  some
theoretical  expectations  regarding  the  consequences  of  assuming  office,  most  saliently  of
which include ideological moderation and organizational restructuring. These aspects are then
dealt  with  in  turn,  beginning  with  an  analysis  of  the  assumed  ideological  moderation.
Although Hamas’s behavior while in power suggests that it conformed to the hypothesized
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ideological moderation to some degree, the trend was far from clear-cut. Arguably, its legacy
as a religious nationalist resistance movement remained too influential, effectively curbing the
expected tendency; both with regard to resistance and to the role of religion in politics, Hamas
acted  rather  incoherently.  In  essence,  the  behavior  of  Hamas  in  power  indicated  that  its
leadership prioritized self-preservation over policy implementation, but that its  ideological
legacy and the commitment of its activists stopped Hamas from adopting a wholly pragmatic
and responsible behavior.
Next follows an analysis of how Hamas coped with the multitude of organizational challenges
and dilemmas facing the organization as a first-time office holder. Initially, a brief review of
the inadequacies of Hamas’s decision-making procedures is provided, before covering some
of  its  fumbling attempts  to  rectify  this.  Then the horizontal  power  struggles  between the
Hamas  government  and the  Hamas  organization  will  be  analyzed,  demonstrating that  the
resources  of  office  provided  those  in  government  with  the  means  to  obtain  factional
dominance. However, being in office also gave rise to intensified vertical power struggles,
with activist groups demanding the implementation of various policies lest they defect from
Hamas.  And that  the leadership partly caved in to  the pressure from the activists in  turn
explains the mentioned erratic and contradictory behavior of Hamas in government.
Based  on  the  analyses  of  Hamas’s  ideological  and  organizational  development,  the
second-to-last section briefly discusses how far Hamas had transmuted from movement to
party by the outbreak of the Arab Spring in occupied Palestine. In brief, it is concluded that
neither its ideology nor its organizational structure developed sufficiently away from the logic
of  a  liberation  movement  toward  that  of  a  political  party  for  the  transmutation  to  be
considered complete. Instead, Hamas added yet another function to its repertoire, which now
included that of liberation movement, governing party, and party-state. As such, Hamas had
turned into an ideologically awkward, but organizationally sustainable entity, containing its
various factions and ideological strains behind a united front. 
The chapter ends with a brief section outlining Hamas’s level of institutionalization at the end
of  the  period  in  question.  Based  on  the  findings  of  the  chapter  and  supplemented  with
additional analyses, the section concludes that after five years in office, Hamas had increased
its overall level of institutionalization somewhat since 2006. Crucially, its level of systemness
remained largely unchanged, as the erratic behavior Hamas displayed while in office was
strongly suggestive  of  insufficiently  routinized decision-making procedures  and command
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structures  when faced  with  the  demands  of  governing.  And,  by  not  actively  pursuing its
Islamist  agenda  while  in  government  and  by  brokering  ceasefires  with  Israel  instead  of
resisting the occupation, Hamas provoked a number of its members to defect. However,  the
fact that so many members remained loyal, despite its broken promises, suggests that Hamas
was similarly infused with value as in the previous period. In terms of decisional autonomy,
its level increased slightly, as the organizational and financial resources made available to
Hamas  as  the  sole  authority  in  Gaza  decreased  its  reliance  on  external  sponsors,  and
conversely undermined any influence such actors might have had.446 Finally, being the second
most powerful political faction in occupied Palestine and the sole authority in the Gaza Strip
was taken as proof that Hamas remained highly reified.
 7.1 The disintegration of the Palestinian political system
As outlined in the previous chapter, the PA had just recently institutionalized properly when
the elections of 2006 were held. From the outset, the PA had suffered a number of formal and
informal design problems. After international  pressure to remedy these, and following the
passing of Yasser Arafat in 2004, long overdue power-sharing mechanisms and various other
improvements  of  the  PA  were  finally  implemented.  And  as  previously  argued,  this
institutionalization  of  the  PA was  crucial  for  Hamas’s  decision  to  contest  the  2006  PLC
elections in the first place.  In the years following Hamas’s 2006 electoral victory, however,
many of these improvements were undone. The international response to Hamas’s electoral
victory eventually caused Palestinian factional  infighting,  which in turn divided the Gaza
Strip and the West Bank into two political as well as geographic entities, governed by Hamas
and  Fatah,  respectively.  This  split  deepened  divisions  inside  occupied  Palestine,  and  the
various  attempts  at  reconciling  the  two parties  have  all  failed  (Ezbidi  2013;  Hilal  2010;
Tuastad 2013).
This  new  situation,  with  two,  parallel,  occupied  “Palestines,”  proved  detrimental  to  the
Palestinian cause in multiple dimensions. The split between the West Bank and Gaza lowered
the cost of the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories, as a divided Palestine is easier
to occupy and dominate than a united one (Milton-Edwards and Farrell 2010, 289, 291–92).
The stalemate also worked to halt  the peace process,  partly because the two parties have
different sponsors and pursue different strategic and tactical goals, partly because a divided
446 Added to this, the number of donors increased, as various Arab regimes stepped in to compensate for the
shortfall of aid following the international boycott of the Hamas government.
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Palestine  has  little  clout  to  bring  to  the  negotiating  table,  and  partly  because  a  solution
negotiated by one of the leadership factions would have insufficient legitimacy to succeed in
lieu of a united Palestinian leadership.
In short, the Palestinian political system disintegrated, which naturally had consequences for
the development of Hamas as one of the two governing factions. In the following, the process
of this disintegration will  be traced,  beginning with the immediate aftermath of the 2006
elections and the international boycott of the Hamas government, followed by a brief account
of the short-lived National Unity Government, before ending with a more detailed discussion
of the background for and consequences of the Palestinian civil war.
 7.1.1  Failed government negotiations and international boycott
Immediately following Hamas’s victory in the 2006 PLC elections, the Middle East Quartet, a
diplomatic outfit consisting of the US, Russia, the EU, and the UN, put forward their so-called
Quartet Principles, which require any Palestinian faction seeking international support to first
recognize Israel, adhere to previous agreements, and renounce violence. Although not overtly
expressed,  it  was  fairly  clear  that  failure  to  comply  with  these  principles  would  have
ramifications for the Palestinians, for example by reduced or even halted aid. As such, the
principles were an obvious attempt to threaten Hamas into compliance with the diplomatic
track led by the US (Goerzig 2010, 7).
But Hamas was not willing to submit  to these principles. Doing so would in effect mean
retracting  three  of  its  defining  strategic  positions,  i.e.,  its  refusal  to  recognize  Israel,  its
condemnation of the Oslo Accords, and its insistence on the right to utilize whatever strategic
method it sees fit to achieve Palestinian liberty, including violence. These positions were and
are  crucial  sources  for  Hamas’s  organizational  legitimacy  and  political  popularity,
notwithstanding  the  adoption  of  rather  pragmatic  and  moderate  short- to  medium-term
political  goals  discussed  in  the  previous  chapter.  Succumbing  to  external  pressure  and
relenting on such fundamental issues could spell the end of the organization or at least render
Hamas as a second Fatah, only with a more Islamic bend (Hovdenak 2009, 70).447
Hamas took the implicit threat in the Quartet Principles seriously, however. Combined with
the fact that Hamas was unprepared to govern alone, the threat prompted it to seek to include
other Palestinian factions in a national unity government.  Already on January 28, only days
447 See also Baumgarten (2005) for a similar argument.
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after the election results were official, Khaled Meshaal held a press conference in Damascus,
inviting all Palestinian factions—including Fatah—to come together and agree on an inclusive
government platform (Tamimi 2007, 224). As mentioned, Hamas had not expected to win the
elections, and Fatah had not expected to lose. It therefore made sense for Hamas to reach out
to Fatah and look for a way to form a coalition government, and thus divide the responsibility
—and inevitable costs—of governing.
Hamas’s attempt to establish a coalition government is noteworthy, given the fact that it had
won  a  comfortable  majority  in  the  PLC.  Taking  into  account  the  parliamentary  rules
introduced  when  the  new Palestinian  Basic  Law recreated  the  PA as  a  semi-presidential
system, the 2006 electoral outcome can be seen as the Palestinian people’s expressed wish for
a  Hamas  government.  However,  Hamas’s  reluctance  to  form a  government  alone  is  also
understandable given the fact that it never intended to win the elections and probably foresaw
some of the likely repercussions from forming government alone while lacking international
recognition. In addition, the circumscribed powers of the PA might have played into Hamas’s
calculations;  despite  the  strong  symbolic  effect  of  being  in  government  of  the  PA,  it  is
arguably more a management position than an executive position. As such, the costs of being
in office of the PA can easily exceed the benefits.448
In any event, Hamas’s overtures vis-à-vis Fatah were rebuffed. For one, Fatah saw itself as the
rightful  ruler  of  the  Palestinians,  regardless  of  the  outcome  produced  by  the  democratic
process  (Milton-Edwards and Farrell 2010, 263). Even those Fatah cadres expressing some
interest in the overtures from Hamas were “cajoled and threatened by their leadership not to
join any” coalition government with Hamas  (Tamimi 2007, 228). And second, Fatah soon
came under strong pressure from the international community to stay away from Hamas. As
long as Hamas refused to accept the Quartet Principles, major donors to the Palestinians—and
most crucially the US—explicitly instructed Fatah to refrain from joining any government
containing Hamas members (de Soto 2007, 21).
Fatah was not content with leaving Hamas to form a government, however. The election’s
losers also went to great lengths to undermine the coming Hamas government. For example,
only  days  before  the  new  parliament  was  sworn  in,  the  outgoing  Fatah-dominated  PLC
introduced a number of crucial pieces of legislation in an effort to sabotage the incoming
Hamas-dominated  parliament.  Fatah  mainly  focused  on  empowering  the  office  of  the
448 In  short,  Hamas’s  behavior  following  its  electoral  victory  goes  to  demonstrate  that  politics  under
occupation at times can be quite different from the ordinary experience.
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president at the cost of the PM, in effect reversing the checks-and-balances introduced in the
early 2000s.449 Hamas overturned these laws and regulations after the new parliament was
sworn in  on February  18,  2006.  But  Fatah still  had the  presidency and exploited  this  to
undermine the Hamas government by issuing a number of decrees aimed at strengthening the
office of the President (Tamimi 2007, 227–29).450
  International boycott
Such  behavior  from  the  political  opposition  was  hardly  a  promising  start  for  the  new
parliamentary period. Added to this, Hamas also faced a debilitating international boycott.
When Hamas eventually took office alone on March 29, 2006, Western aid to the PA was
promptly cut as punishment for its failure to accede to the aforementioned Quartet Principles.
With international aid quickly drying up, and given the degree to which the PA always has
been  dependent on foreign aid, the newly formed Hamas government faced a dire financial
situation, with the Gaza economy on the verge of collapse and Hamas unable, for example, to
pay  its  public  servants  (Qarmout  and  Béland  2012,  41).451 Instead  of  supporting  the  PA
government, the Quartet decided to channel funds through the PA President. The West was
thus perceived as propping up Fatah and the presidency, in effect ignoring the expressed will
of the Palestinian people  (Caridi 2010, 248–49; Hovdenak 2009, 70). This further polarized
the already precarious domestic political situation.
Hamas was not surprised by the US-led boycott, although the intensity was unexpected. In the
words of Khaled Meshaal,
[w]e perhaps did not anticipate the level of severity of the U.S. and international
reaction,  which  violates  known  norms  and  values.  We  knew  that  democracy
ultimately is not a serious issue for Americans, that in Bush’s greater Middle East
scheme, democracy is only an instrument for maintaining control of the region.
The proof is that regional leaders are not dealt with on the basis of whether or not
they  are  democratic  … If  it’s  a  dictator  who supports  U.S.  policy,  there’s  no
449 See the previous chapter for details.
450 Crucially, President Abbas claimed control over the various police and security forces. As discussed in the
previous chapter, Abbas had served a short stint as PM under President Arafat in 2003, but resigned after
failing to  obtain shared control  of  the security forces.  By reclaiming control  of the security forces as
President  and  when  faced  with  a  non-Fatah  government,  Abbas  demonstrated  that  the  power-sharing
mechanisms he had fought for  had little  to  do with institutionalization,  but rather  was about personal
power, influence, and status (Tamimi 2007, 228–29).
451 According to some sources, Iran responded by increasing its funding of Hamas, although not to the extent
that it compensated fully for the shortfall (Milton-Edwards and Farrell 2010, 224–253).
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problem, but if it’s a democratic leader who’s against U.S. policy, he’s treated as
an enemy (interviewed by Rabbani 2008, 72).
However, a number of Hamas cadres are on record expressing disappointment and to a certain
extent surprise at the European participation in the boycott. In essence, they had expected the
EU to take a different stance than the US. Nasr al-Din al-Shaer, deputy PM in the first Hamas
government, argued that “Europeans prefer to talk with the whole Palestinian people. And
they prefer an agreement to be signed by all Palestinian factions, including Hamas. They see
that  if  there  is  an  agreement  without  Hamas,  it  will  not  work.”  Another  Hamas  cadre
complained  that  “[t]hey  [the  Europeans]  defended  democracy  everywhere,  but  when
democracy brought Hamas to power, they changed their position” (both quoted in Hovdenak
2009, 73).
Without delving into a detailed analysis of the power balance within the Quartet or between
the US and the EU, it should be noted that Hamas—and indeed most Palestinian factions—
share unrealistically high expectations from EU foreign policy. Although things have changed
since the EU was described as “an economic giant, a political dwarf, and a military worm”
(Whitney 1991), the US remains a much more powerful  international player than the EU
(Jervis 2009; Toje 2011). Furthermore, and as detailed in the leaked End of Mission Report of
UN official Alvaro de Soto,452 the US has a long tradition for exercising undue influence on
the Palestinians in general and Fatah in particular. In the report, de Soto goes on to label the
Quartet as “pretty much a group of friends of the US—and the US doesn’t feel the need to
consult closely with the Quartet except when it suits it”  (de Soto 2007, 24). Whatever the
Quartet used to be or nominally is, de Soto argued that it had come to be little more than a
“grouping  that  operates  on  the  basis  of  consensus  at  the  mercy  of  the  lowest  common
denominator, and that denominator is defined by the US” (2007, 25).
  Persecution
On  top  of  the  international  boycott,  Hamas  legislators  and  cabinet  ministers  were
continuously harassed, both by the Fatah-controlled security forces and the Israeli occupation.
In some ways, this was “business as usual” for Hamas. For, as detailed in previous chapters,
Hamas has throughout its existence suffered persecution at the hands of both Israel and the
452 The secret report was obtained by The Guardian newspaper in the summer of 2007 (McCarthy 2007). The
former full title of Alvaro de Soto was Under-Secretary-General of the UN, Special Coordinator for the
Middle  East  Peace  Process  and  Personal  Representative  of  the  Secretary-General  to  the  Palestine
Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Authority, and Envoy to the Quartet. In short, he was a person
with unique access and overview of the developments and situation.
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PA. But in contrast to earlier periods, Hamas now found itself in a position of power, which
paradoxically meant that its domestic political leadership was more vulnerable (Tezcur 2010,
71). Whereas Israel and the PA previously had arrested real and alleged Hamas members,
often indiscriminately, many senior Hamas cadres were now elected officials and therefore
also publicly known.
This allowed Israel to easily round up and arrest  64 Hamas officials, including members of
parliament and cabinet ministers, on June 29, 2006. The arrests were a direct response to the
kidnapping of the Israeli corporal Gilad Shalit from a military base close to the Gaza Strip on
June 25.453 Israel also shelled various targets in Gaza, including the office of the Hamas PM,
Ishmael Haniye, as well as bridges and a power station (Caridi 2010, 238–39). As covered in
previous chapters, this tit-for-tat pattern was established soon after the signing of the Oslo
Accords, as Israel since then had held the PA responsible for its own security. However, the
consequences for  Hamas were more intense than before.  From taking office in 2006 and
onward, senior Hamas cadres and legislators have routinely been arrested and imprisoned by
Israel as punishment for a military operation, regardless of whether Hamas was involved.454
 7.1.2  The Mecca Agreement and the National Unity Government
Although it was the Israeli occupation and the international response to the election results
that were to be blamed for the steadily deteriorating situation  (de Soto 2007), most of the
diplomatic effort aimed at alleviating the perilous development was focused on breaking the
stalemate between Hamas and Fatah  (Caridi 2010, 240–41). Probably the most  noteworthy
attempt to reconcile the two parties was the so-called Prisoner’s Document. Officially titled A
Covenant for National Reconciliation and published in May 2006,455 the document was a joint
statement by imprisoned leaders of Hamas, Fatah, and other Palestinian political movements,
calling  for  reconciliation  and  national  unity  (Caridi  2010,  230–31).  While  there  was  no
reconciliation  as  a  direct  consequence  of  this  document,456 it  holds  a  unique  position  in
Palestinian politics. While numerous other failed attempts were made to reconcile the two
453 The kidnapping was itself a response to the arrest of two Hamas members by Israeli forces on the day
before.  The kidnapping was a joint venture led by Hamas’s al-Qassam Brigades together with two other
Palestinian factions (Tamimi 2007, 241–44).
454 Since the 2006 elections, the PLC has for long spells not been able to operate because too many of its
legislators  have  been  in  Israeli  jails.  See  the  website  of  Addameer  (http://www.addameer.org/)  and
B’Tselem (http://www.btselem.org/) for more details on Palestinian legislators in Israeli jails.
455 Consult JPS (2006) for the full text of the Prisoner’s Document.
456 The initiative laid out in the Prisoner’s Document failed largely because the US pressured Fatah not to
reconcile with Hamas (Caridi 2010, 242).
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parties, most had been carried out with regional or international sponsors  (Milton-Edwards
and  Farrell  2010,  225;  Tamimi  2007,  254).  The  Prisoner’s  Document,  however,  was
negotiated by imprisoned cadres from all the major Palestinian parties and factions without
any external meddling, and as such enjoys a high degree of legitimacy among Palestinians.457
As a testament to its importance, the Prisoner’s Document is still referred to by Palestinian
politicians today as an authoritative document outlining the official consensus of the various
factions (JPS 2011). But more immediately important, the document was the basis on which
the successful Mecca Agreement was negotiated in early 2007  (ICG 2007, 16). Under the
auspices of King Abdullah Ben Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia,458 the Agreement was negotiated
by Khaled Meshaal and Ishmael Haniye from Hamas, and Mahmoud Abbas and Mohammed
Dahlan from Fatah  (Caridi 2010, 244–46). Signed on February 8 in Mecca, the Agreement
promised to end the intra-Palestinian fighting, form a national unity government, and reform
the PLO (JPS 2007).459
Three distinct factors are identified that explain why the Mecca Agreement succeeded where
other  reconciliation  attempts  had  failed.  First,  the  Palestinians  in  the  occupied  territories
demanded  reconciliation  (ICG  2007,  16).  The  quarrel  between  Fatah  and  Hamas  had
descended into armed fighting already in the summer of 2006, and by late October of that
year,  “the  intra-Palestinian  violence  had  begun to  take  on  characteristics  of  a  civil  war”
(Butler 2009, 118).460 Also, the international boycott threatened to cripple the economy. In
short, widespread fatigue and frustration with the situation put pressure on the parties to stop
the armed infighting and establish a national unity government to end the boycott. Second, the
Mecca Agreement was sponsored by the Saudi king. This was important because Saudi Arabia
is a regional power, a close ally of the US in the Middle East, and has a good relationship with
the European powers. Also, because of its religious authority, Saudi Arabia commands respect
among the Islamists in Hamas—at least compared to other likely mediators in the region, such
457 One can speculate that the Prisoner’s Document never would have seen the light of day had it not been for
Israel’s intense persecution of Hamas legislators.
458 Saudi  Arabia  decided  to  get  involved  partly  because  Egypt—traditionally  the  regional  mediator  of
intra-Palestinian  conflicts—was  busy  dealing  with  domestic  issues,  and  partly  because  they  feared
increased Iranian influence in Palestinian politics, a very real possibility given that the Iranian regime had
boosted their financial support of Hamas in the wake of the international boycott (Caridi 2010, 245–46).
459 According to de Soto, “a National Unity Government with a compromise platform along the lines of Mecca
might have been achieved soon after the election … had the US not led the Quartet to set impossible
demands, and opposed a NUG [National Unity Government] in principle” (2007, 21).
460 Stories of Hamas members tortured at the hands of Fatah militias abound. See for example the testimonies
retold in Rose (2008).
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as Egypt or Jordan  (ICG 2007, 19).  Neither the international  community nor the warring
parties could ignore the agreement without rebuffing an important political player. Third and
finally, both Hamas and Fatah had come to realize the urgency of the situation, and seemed
more motivated to avoid a civil war rather than pursue more short-sighted political interests
(Tamimi 2007, 257).
The  Mecca  Agreement  succeeded  in  creating  a  period  of  relative  calm  in  the  occupied
territories. Although skirmishes between militias from the two ruling factions continued, the
intensity  of  the  fighting  declined  considerably  (Tamimi  2007,  258).  Furthermore,  the
Agreement led to the establishment of the National Unity Government, which was sworn in
on  March  17,  2007,  after  a  month  of  negotiations.461 Following  the  establishment  of  the
National Unity Government, President Abbas asked the international community to lift the
boycott against the PA. The response from the Quartet was cautious and somewhat disparate,
with Russia seemingly intent on lifting the sanctions, whereas the US remained reluctant. The
European donors, such as France, Sweden, Norway, and Switzerland, were largely willing to
end the boycott and resume their funding of the PA (Tamimi 2007, 262).462 Israel for its part
refused to deal with any Palestinian government in which Hamas played a part.
Despite  the  initial  decline  in  Palestinian  infighting  and  the  resumption  of  at  least  some
international funding of the PA, the National Unity Government did not survive. Only three
months  after  its  establishment,  in  June  2007,  it  broke  down  amidst  intensified  fighting
between Fatah and Hamas on the Gaza Strip (Milton-Edwards 2008b, 1586–87).
 7.1.3  A Palestinian civil war and the political-territorial split
Already in May, clashes again broke out in Gaza between PA security forces loyal to Fatah
and Hamas’s own Executive Support Force (Caridi 2010, 258).463 The fighting intensified in
the following weeks, and on June 11, Hamas launched a full-scale military campaign with the
aim of taking control of the Gaza Strip. After five days of fighting, Hamas emerged victorious
in assuming control  of the Gaza Strip.  By then,  some 145 Palestinian militants had been
461 Ishmael Haniye continued as PM and Mahmoud Abbas as President in the National Unity Government.
Hamas retained eight ministerial posts, Fatah got six, with a further five going to independents, and four to
other political groups.
462 Norway was one of  the  first  states  to  recognize the  National  Unity  Government  (UD 2007),  and the
Norwegian  Deputy  Foreign Minster,  Raymond Johansen,  traveled  to  Gaza  and  met  with  PM Ishmael
Haniye as the highest-ranking European official to do so (BBC 2007).
463 The Hamas government established the Executive Support Force as its own police corps in 2006, because
the various existing PA forces all were loyal to Fatah (Butler 2009, 117–18).
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killed, and Fatah had fled Gaza (Milton-Edwards and Farrell 2010, 286).464
  Background for the war
Retrospectively, the civil war in Gaza might appear inevitable; Hamas and Fatah had been on
a collision course ever since the time of former’s founding, and their ideological and political
goals have always been irreconcilable (Cavatorta and Elgie 2010, 24). And while both parties
have gone to great lengths to avoid military clashes, realizing that this would undermine the
Palestinian national project,465 their rivalry became increasingly difficult to contain following
Hamas’s  victory  in  the  2006  elections  (Milton-Edwards  2005,  311).  In  particular,  two
exogenous factors are identified here as having contributed to the outbreak of the civil war:
the institutional design of the PA, and undue interference from the US.
Cavatorta and Elgie (2010) convincingly detail how the PA’s institutional design contributed
to the intensification of the conflict. Their analysis shows that the semi-presidential system
introduced in the 2003 Basic Law helps explain why the competition between Hamas and
Fatah culminated in an all-out war. In brief,  they argue that the challenge of cohabitation
associated with semi-presidentialism, i.e., the problems arising from having two executives
from opposing parties, took the competition between the two parties to a new, institutional
arena.
Whereas the two previously had competed on an unequal footing, with Fatah in control of and
forming the backbone of the PA and the PLO, and Hamas as an outside opposition group, both
parties could now claim a popular and democratic mandate to rule the PA, Hamas because it
had won a parliamentary majority and thus the right to form government, and Fatah because it
retained control of the presidency. In essence, the PA’s semi-presidential system increased the
chances of armed conflict between Hamas and Fatah because “it provided the opportunity for
both  actors  to  use  constitutional  prerogatives  and  popular  legitimacy  to  validate  their
respective positions and demands” (Cavatorta and Elgie 2010, 34).466
While  the  semi-presidential  system  of  the  PA cemented  the  conflict  lines  and  made  it
increasingly difficult for Hamas and Fatah to escape their differences, it was interference from
464 For accounts of the Palestinian civil war of June 2007, see Caridi (2010, 254–62) and Milton-Edwards and
Farrell (2010, 286–88). For a day-to-day chronology, consult the Conflicts Forum report The Failure of the
Palestinian National Unity Government and the Gaza Takeover (CF 2007).
465 Consult chapter 4 in Mishal and Sela (2000, 83–112) for a detailed analysis of how Hamas and Fatah/PLO
previously had avoided armed conflict despite their irreconcilable differences.
466 Note that Cavatorta and Elgie make no claim to explain the whole reason for the Palestinian civil war, only
that the semi-presidential system helps explain the “timing and scale of the confrontation” (2010, 38).
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the US that proved to be the immediate catalyst for the outbreak of the war in Gaza. Having
effectively halted all  previous reconciliation attempts, the US was surprised by the Mecca
Agreement  in  February  2007,  and  dismayed  by  the  establishment  of  the  National  Unity
Government in March. In the wake of the 2006 elections, the US had spent considerable effort
undermining Hamas and propping up Fatah (Hogan 2008; Rose 2008; de Soto 2007).467 The
developments in early 2007 were thus seen as setbacks to US policy, and it tried to remedy the
situation by increasing its pressure on Fatah and redoubling its efforts to topple Hamas.
As  detailed  in  a  number  of  confidential  documents  left  behind  by  US State  Department
officials in Ramallah, the US and Fatah discussed various ways in which the National Unity
Government could be replaced by a government without Hamas.468 In essence planning a
coup d'état  in occupied Palestine, the US administration covertly transferred funds to train
and equip an expanded Palestinian security force loyal to President Abbas and Fatah. And
aided by Israel and Egypt, US-funded military equipment found its way into the otherwise
isolated and closed Gaza Strip (Milton-Edwards and Farrell 2010, 283; Rose 2008).
Rumors spread that “something” was brewing, and on April 30, excerpts from one of the
secret US-Fatah documents were leaked to the Jordanian newspaper  al-Majd (Rose 2008).
What would otherwise have been refuted as a conspiracy theory suddenly seemed like a real
possibility; the US and Fatah apparently did have something nefarious planned for Hamas and
Gaza. And  when 450 Egyptian-trained Fatah militants entered the Gaza Strip in mid-May,
what had been a suspicion became a certainty.469 Ostensibly there to maintain law and order,
Hamas saw the troop movement as a thinly veiled preparation by Fatah to take over the Gaza
Strip (Caridi 2010, 258).
Against  this  background  and  from Hamas’s  perspective,  launching  a  preemptive  military
campaign to take over the Gaza Strip seemed like the only viable option. In breach of the
Mecca  Agreement  and  ignoring  the  existence  of  the  National  Unity  Government,  Fatah
pursued an obviously subversive strategy aimed at reclaiming the power of the PA. In essence,
Fatah and the US forced Hamas’s hand. They did so probably feeling confident that Fatah
467 The  articles  by  Hogan  and  Rose  cited  here  were  published  in  Vanity  Fair. Although  not  necessarily
recognized as the most reputable source in the social sciences, the articles are based on documents left
behind in Ramallah by the US State Department, and are therefore considered to give unique insights into
the events leading up to the 2007 Palestinian civil war.
468 See Hogan (2008) for a brief presentation of the various leaked documents.
469 It should be noted that the Gaza Strip at the time was isolated, with its border crossing controlled by either
Israel or Egypt. All movement of troops and equipment would necessarily need the permission of these
states, which in turn indicated US involvement.
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would be victorious in a military confrontation with Hamas; officially, Fatah had some 70 000
loyal forces in Gaza, compared to approximately 17 000 militants under Hamas’s command
(Milton-Edwards and Farrell 2010, 286). When the fighting commenced, however, the forces
loyal  to  Fatah  proved  badly  organized  and  without  any  clear  command  structure;  they
belonged to a plethora of security services, all with their own mandate, officers, and strategic
goals.470 Faced  with  the  highly  disciplined  Hamas  militants,  believers  in  the  cause,  and
fighting for the survival of their organization, the outcome seemed all but given. Already on
the second day of fighting, Fatah soldiers began fleeing Gaza, and Hamas rapidly gained
control of crucial parts of the Strip. By the fifth day, Hamas had successfully rooted out Fatah
and taken complete control of Gaza (Milton-Edwards and Farrell 2010, 288).471
  Consequences of the war
Immediately  following  Hamas’s  takeover  of  Gaza,  President  Abbas  declared  a  state  of
emergency,  dissolved  the  National  Unity  Government,  fired  Ishmael  Haniye  as  PM,  and
swore in a new cabinet of technocrats (Roy 2011, 45). The international community labeled
the takeover as a coup d'état, sided with Abbas, and declared him “legitimate president of all
Palestinians”  (Butler 2009, 119). Hamas for its part  rejected the dismissal of PM Ishmael
Haniye as unconstitutional, maintained that the parliament was still in session, and that the
Gaza government consequently was the legitimate one (Roy 2011, 45). 
Notwithstanding the legal wrangling, the civil war  de facto  produced a situation with two
competing PA governments; Hamas was in firm control of the Gaza Strip, and after spending
the remainder of the summer of 2007 working with Israel in removing Hamas there, Fatah
was in control of the West Bank (CF 2007, 58). The international community responded to the
new situation by suspending all humanitarian and development aid to Gaza, and lifting the
boycott of the Fatah-led PA on the West Bank. This policy—to politically and financially
support one side and boycott  the other—arguably exacerbated the political-territorial  split.
International backing also emboldened President Abbas, prompting him to order 70 000 PA
470 Reportedly, Hamas had also infiltrated various forces thought to be under Fatah command, and a number of
assumed PA and Fatah loyal militants switched sides when it became clear that Hamas would be victorious
(Milton-Edwards and Farrell 2010, 289–90).
471 It can be little doubt that the US policy of sponsoring Fatah with the aim of toppling the Hamas-dominated
National Unity Government backfired badly. Instead of weakening or removing Hamas from the equation,
the organization has been in control of the Gaza Strip since the summer of 2007. As such, the US policy
pursued seems to fit with the blowback theory, i.e., “the [negative] unintended consequences of the …
government’s international activities”  (Johnson 2001). Consult Johnson’s book  Blowback: the costs and
consequences of American empire (2000) for a thorough analysis of this effect.
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public servants in the Gaza Strip to not serve under the Hamas government. Finally, Israel
sealed off the borders of Gaza, leaving the coastal enclave in close to total isolation (Brown
2012, 10; Butler 2009, 119; Qarmout and Béland 2012, 36–37).
In short, Hamas found itself the state-bearing party of the Gaza Strip, but—as a result of the
almost unanimous international boycott—without the necessary political and financial support
needed to govern effectively. What Hamas did have, however, was the capacity to monopolize
violence, and it used this capacity to effectively uphold law and order. Initially, the increased
security proved popular among Gazans (Roy 2011, 47), as the population still placed the brunt
of the blame for their hardships on the Israeli blockade and on the international community
for sponsoring Israel (Milton-Edwards and Farrell 2010, 292).
  Losing ground …
The positive effect of upholding law and order for the legitimacy of Hamas’s rule did not last,
however, and soon its popularity began to suffer. Despite widespread consensus that Israel
was to blame for the sorry state of affairs in Gaza, Hamas was the governing party and thus
also in a position of responsibility. Consequently, it had to take an increasing share of the
blame for the lackluster economic performance and the failure to secure even the most basic
needs for its constituents, apart from security  (ICG 2008, 20–21). Also, as documented by
various  human  rights  organizations,  Hamas  exploited  its  military  supremacy  in  Gaza  to
enforce a strict security regime, effectively curbing internal dissent  (Roy 2011, 48).472 As a
result, Hamas came to be seen as increasingly authoritarian and corrupt, which worked to
discredit the organization in the eyes of regular Palestinians (ICG 2012, 14).473 In addition, the
lack of Palestinian reconciliation was naturally partly blamed on Hamas, leaving increasing
numbers of Palestinians in Gaza disillusioned with both Palestinian leadership factions. The
results  can  be  discerned  from  Figure  9 below,  which  trace  factional  support  among
Palestinians in the occupied territory from 2006 to 2011.474 
In short, and although support for Hamas fluctuated somewhat, the trend is clear; in early
2006, Hamas enjoyed the support of approximately 38 percent of Palestinians in the occupied
472 Consult  the various publications from Human Rights  Watch  (HRW 2008, 2009, 2011),  the Palestinian
Independent  Commission  for  Citizens’  Rights  (PICCR  2007),  and  its  successor,  the  Independent
Commission for Human Rights (ICHR 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012), for detailed reports on the state of
human rights under the Hamas government in Gaza. See also Mukhimer (2013) and Allen (2013, 157–84)
for analyses of Hamas and human rights.
473 Sa’id Siyam, minister in the Hamas government, admitted on record that mistakes had been made by the
security forces when consolidating its control over the Gaza Strip (Ma’an 2008).
474 Consult the methodology chapter for details regarding the polling data used.
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Figure 9: Factional support in the occupied territories, 2006–2011
(Source: PSR 2011).
territories. By the end of 2011, this figure had dropped by around half, to about 19 percent.475
And as indicated in Figure 9, Fatah held steady and at times gained somewhat in this period.
Note also that approximately half the score of the “all others combined” category are different
Islamist movements, crucially including the various Salafi jihadists.476 In essence, Hamas lost
support to Fatah and the Salafi jihadists because it pursued three contradictory goals: remain
in power, attain international legitimacy, and implement its political program.
Hamas became increasingly authoritarian in order to stay in power. This proved unpopular in
the longer run, and support flowed from Hamas to both the previous rulers, Fatah, and the
new opposition, the Salafi jihadists. To attain international legitimacy, Hamas used its military
supremacy to stop rogue resistance fighters from firing rockets into Israel, and in the summer
of  2008,  it  even  brokered  ceasefires  with  Israel  (Butler  2009,  120).  This  also  proved
475 The sudden and temporary increase in support in early 2008 was explained by the pollsters as a result of
Hamas tearing down the wall between Gaza and Egypt, thus breaking the siege. Although the wall was
rebuilt and Gaza again became isolated, it demonstrated determination and ability on the part of Hamas to
actually do something, while simultaneously underlining inability of the Fatah government on the West
Bank to change “the bitter reality in the West Bank or ending Israeli occupation through diplomacy” (PSR
2008).
476 Salafism is an umbrella term for a literalistic and puritanical sect of Sunni Islam. Salafi jihadists, in turn,
are adherents of  Salafism  who employ violent tactics to achieve a return to the pure form of Islam as
“practiced by the Prophet and his Companions” (Wiktorowicz 2001, 20).
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unpopular,  in  particular  among  Palestinians  supporting  violent  resistance  as  a  means  to
liberate Palestine.477 Again, Hamas lost support to both Fatah and the radicals from the Salafi
jihadist movements.478 
Hamas also tried—to a limited extent—to implement parts of its Islamist ideology, e.g., by
prohibiting  alcohol  and  prostitution,  deciding  how  weddings  should  be  conducted,  and
pressuring women to wear the veil  (ICG 2008).479 However, Hamas did not go very far in
these  attempts,  partly  to  avoid  a  domestic  backlash,  and  partly  to  demonstrate  to  the
international community that it could govern responsibly  (Brown 2012, 12). And yet again,
this meant that Hamas lost support to both Fatah and the radical Salafists. Secular Palestinians
felt  that  Hamas  went  too  far,  and  thus  left  Hamas  to  support  Fatah.  More  religious
Palestinians felt that Hamas did not go far enough, and they shifted their allegiance to the
more radical  Salafists  instead  (Roy 2011, 221–22). In brief, as a first-time holder of office,
Hamas fell victim to the expectation gap; as the governing party in a violent and volatile
milieu, it was forced to balance opposing interests, and saw its support and legitimacy erode
regardless of which strategy it opted for.
With the benefit of hindsight, then, Hamas’s 2006 victory can be construed as having been a
curse in disguise. Although Hamas hardly can be blamed alone for the sorry state of affairs in
occupied Palestine following the political-territorial split in 2007, it can all be traced back first
to  the  decision  to  participate,  and  then  to  its  watershed  victory  in  the  2006  elections.480
Naturally, interviewed Hamas members refused to admit as much, as it would be tantamount
to taking the blame for the current impasse. Responding to the assertion that it might have
been a mistake to run in the elections given the aftermath, Hamas MP Zaidan said that
I don’t think that Hamas committed a strategic mistake by going full power into
the elections. We did not expect to win 60 percent! Not a full majority like that.
But we expected to do well. And I don’t see that as a mistake. I think that we are
making history here, and you cannot make history when you are hesitant. So I’m
477 See Shamir and Shikaki for in-depth analyses of Palestinian support for violent resistance (2010, 76–77,
162–64).
478 By emulating Fatah and leaving behind most of its resistance tactics, some of those supporting Hamas
because of its resistance became disillusioned and went back to supporting Fatah.
479 It should be reiterated, however, that Hamas’s Islamist ideology was largely absent in its electoral platform.
As such, these efforts to enforce an Islamist order were probably done to placate its activist members, and
not the electorate as such.
480 Importantly, the international boycott of the election results has had negative consequences for the position
and allure of democracy in occupied Palestine, as the experience for many Palestinians is that electoral
outcomes are only respected if they are to the liking of the donor community.
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not sorry for what happened, even if I know that the election produced a lot of
hardship for Palestinians.
Instead, he claimed that the experience gained from running in the elections and governing the
Gaza Strip has been good for the development and maturity of Hamas as a political party:
I think that the whole experience has lots of bright sides, and will bear a lot of
fruit. While they are not all clear now, they will be in the future, in the next five to
ten  years.  For  we  have  not  lost,  we  have  won,  and  I’m  talking  about  the
Palestinian issue as a whole. If things continued like they were in 2005, it would
all be worse. Fatah had already failed back then, having nothing more to give to
the people or to the Palestinian issue. There had to be some changes. And Hamas
could not live forever “on the shore.” It had to go into the water and learn to
swim. The people would not accept Hamas to stand on the shore and just look at
the people swimming and drowning! Hamas had to go into deep water and we
knew that some of us would drown, and that only some of us would learn how to
swim. And we did, and we reached the other side safely. This is life. I’m not sorry
for it, I think things are coming in a good way.481
Khaled  Meshaal,  leader  of  the  Hamas  Political  Bureau,  expressed  similar  sentiments,
admitting that “I am not going to claim that the experience has been all positive, but it also
cannot be claimed to have been all negative, and at the end of the day we do not regret the
experience.” Rather, he claimed, “if Hamas had not participated, things would perhaps have
been even worse … The circumstances in which we operate today are not the product of our
participation in the elections. Our present circumstances result from the fact that we have an
enemy that wants to eliminate us” (Rabbani 2008, 69).
Of course, the leaders of any given party would be loath to admit that their mistakes are what
led to such a precarious situation as the one in occupied Palestine post-2007. It is therefore
noteworthy that Ghazi Hamad, a well-known Hamas leader from Gaza, labeled the takeover
of Gaza as a “strategic error” that “produced a thousand other political problems that Hamas
could  have  done  without”  (Caridi  2010,  262).  Also,  Hamas  MP Dr.  Ayman  Daraghme
admitted that the takeover had produced a difficult situation:
The split of course harmed both Fatah and Hamas. We both lost because of the
split.  For  one,  the  Palestinians,  especially  the  young,  are  not  happy,  are  not
481 Interviewed May 19, 2011, in Ramallah.
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pleased with this  situation.  They want unity.  They want  people  to  come back
together. And they don’t blame Hamas alone, or Fatah alone. They blame both.
The second thing is that Hamas in Gaza will lose because the situation there is
very bad, and Hamas is responsible.482
  … but surviving nevertheless
Suffering from a debilitating international boycott, political isolation from the rest of occupied
Palestine, fraying popularity and legitimacy, and domestic competition from both Fatah and
Salafi jihadists, the challenges facing Hamas seemed insurmountable. Added to this, Israel
launched  a  massive  military  offensive  against  Gaza  on  December  27,  2008.  Dubbed
Operation Cast Lead, the campaign included continued airstrikes, bombardment from the sea,
and a limited ground invasion into Gaza. Lasting for three weeks, the offensive left Gaza in
ruins, the population destitute, and the international community with a humanitarian disaster
on its hands. Indeed, 1 417 Palestinians were killed, most of whom were civilians, and over
five thousand were wounded (Roy 2011, 226–27). In short, the campaign inflicted enormous
destruction on Hamas’s territory, killed many of its  constituents,  and left  the organization
severely weakened (Caridi 2010, 288). 
Hamas, however, not only survived the Israeli onslaught, but managed to hold on to its power
over Gaza. In sum, ever since it won the 2006 PLC elections, Hamas has faced off relentless
attempts by the US, Israel, and Fatah to topple it in Gaza. And as Hamas continues to rule
Gaza in the face of such enormous challenges, it strongly signals that it has the organizational
and  strategic  capabilities  to  remain  in  power  and  continue  to  play  a  key  role  in  the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
 7.2 Hamas—a reluctant rebel in power
How and in what ways have the developments following in the wake of Hamas’s electoral
victory affected its process and degree of institutionalization? More specifically, what were
the  consequences  for  Hamas’s  ideological  and  organizational  development  after  first
unexpectedly winning the elections, then forming government while suffering international
boycott, and finally taking control of the Gaza Strip? 
As was to be expected, the developments and events in occupied Palestine from 2006 onward
have  had  fundamental  consequences  for  Hamas’s  development,  both  ideologically  and
482 Interview with Dr. Ayman Daraghme in Ramallah, April 10, 2011.
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organizationally, not least because it found itself in  position  rather than  opposition. For, as
succinctly summarized by Deschouwer,
being in government is a different role and position than being in opposition. A
governing party needs to defend policies rather than criticize them. A governing
party needs to defend compromises rather than criticizing the concessions that
were  made  to  strike  the  agreement.  Being  in  government  creates  a  new
relationship with the voters,  with the different party organs and with the other
parties (2008a, 10).
In short, assuming office is expected to force about changes in political parties both at the
ideological and organizational levels. Ideologically, a party in government is hypothesized to
adjust its behavior and rhetoric to fit the political realities. This, more often than not, means
compromise and moderation, as implementing a political program inevitably is more difficult
than articulating one (Deschouwer 2008a, 4–5). Governing also entails being held responsible
by the electorate and the party activists alike, both of whom expect something in return for
either their vote or their efforts and sacrifice.483 These demands, in turn, force the government
into a balancing act, prompting further compromise and moderation.484
The  expected  ideological  moderation  also  hinges  on  certain  organizational  developments
forced about by the role of governing. In particular, for political organizations such as Hamas
that  operate  in  volatile  and  violent  conditions,  the  threat  of  repression  and  persecution
prompts the leadership to tame their ideological commitments in the interest of organizational
survival (Tezcur 2010, 71).485 Furthermore, the spoils of office—however limited—are to be
distributed among the various factions within the organization. This tends to produce new and
escalate old horizontal power struggles between the various leadership bodies. In addition,
governing means implementing actual policies, which means that the battle for which policy
to  prioritize  intensifies,  pitting  the  demands  of  the  electorate  against  those  of  the  party
activists and forcing the government into a delicate balancing act. Added to this, the role of
government  demands  rapid  responses,  which  inevitably  empower  the  government  at  the
expense  of  the  party  leadership.  In  short,  and  although  parties  only  change  reluctantly
483 Consult Przeworski and Sprague (1986) for illuminating analyses of the various dilemmas facing socialist
parties when entering institutionalized politics for the first time.
484 See also the below section Organizational challenges and dilemmas on pp. 272ff. for analyses of how the
role of governing affects the organization itself.
485 Threat of repression and persecution is not a condition for party leaders to prioritize organizational survival
over other aims. This is a tendency in most parties after reaching a certain level of institutionalization, as
there is no point in staying true to the cause if it spells the end of the organization.
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(Panebianco 1988, 243–47), being in government—and in particular for the first time—tends
to produce alterations in the organizational structure and introduce new and intensified power
struggles, both of which affect party behavior (Deschouwer 2008a).
It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  in  contrast  to  the  conventional—or  European—party
experience, in which some time is spent acquiring political skills in opposition before forming
government,  Hamas went straight from outside the electoral arena to government.  This is
expected to have had consequences for Hamas’s development and institutionalization, both
ideologically and organizationally. In essence, the normal and incremental development of a
political  party  was  compressed,  robbing  Hamas  of  the  experience  of  being  in  opposition
before being forced into government (Svåsand 2013, 7–8). And although Hamas has matured
rapidly, and skillfully maneuvered in a highly volatile and challenging political milieu, this
lack  of  experience  in  institutionalized  politics  meant  that  the  intrinsic  conflict  observed
between a party’s stated ideology and the political realities of government, as well as the
numerous organizational challenges facing any party forming government for the first time,
all affected Hamas to a larger extent than might otherwise have been the case.
The section is divided into three parts. First, the ideological development of Hamas while in
government will be detailed. Then, Hamas’s responses to the organizational challenges and
dilemmas from being in government are covered. And finally, a concluding section analyzing
the degree to which Hamas had transmuted from movement to party by the end of the period
in question will be provided.
 7.2.1  Governing for survival, not politics
As the sole authority and state-bearing party on the Gaza Strip since its takeover in 2007,
Hamas has arguably been well positioned to implement its ideological program. As such, an
analysis of Hamas’s behavior during its years in power is assumed to be illuminating in terms
of its ideological development for the period in question. Crucial clues regarding Hamas’s
ideological rigidity will  also be revealed by contrasting its actual behavior with its stated
goals.
When  Hamas  initially  assumed  office  and  subsequently  took  over  the  Gaza  Strip,  the
organization was expected to develop in one of two directions. In one version, as Israel, Fatah,
the US, and many others anticipated and feared, Hamas would use its newly won power to
enforce its Islamist liberation ideology as closely as possible, and thereby prove to be the
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radical and extremist party its detractors assume it to be. This could have meant that Hamas
would establish the “Islamic Republic of Hamastan” in Gaza (Milton-Edwards 2008b, 1586),
i.e., implement a radical Islamist ideology and use the infrastructure of the PA to intensify its
violent resistance against the Israeli occupation.
In  another,  more  theoretical  version,  the  expectation went  in  the  opposite  direction.  It  is
commonly  hypothesized  that  when  a  party  assumes  office,  it  will  moderate.  Somewhat
simplified, this is because a party in government must deal with actual political realities, and
if failing to do so, will be held responsible by the electorate, i.e., lose its position in power
(Deschouwer  2008a).486 For  Hamas,  this  would  mean that,  when faced with  the  political
realities of occupied Palestine as the party in government, it would be forced to leave parts of
its  stated  positions  and  ideological  legacy  behind  in  favor  of  pragmatism  and  realistic
policies.487 And  according  to  parliamentarian  Dr.  Daraghme,  this  was  more  or  less  what
happened to Hamas in this period:
There  are  changes  inside  Hamas  regarding  our  ideological  theory.  When  any
movement starts, they will be  radical. But with the time, you will find that they
are changing. They will become more realistic as they discover the realities as
they are on the ground, and they have to deal with the world. Before, Hamas was
dealing only with Palestinians and with the enemy, Israel. But now, when Hamas
is in government, it deals with the international community, with the Arab states,
and with the Europeans. And so, Hamas has to take the opinions of all of these
into considerations.488
A brief  look  at  the  behavior  of  Hamas  while  governing  Gaza  provides  an  appropriately
blurred and ambiguous picture. While there were indications that Hamas tried to implement
certain Islamist policies, it did not go very far in those efforts. And although Hamas continued
to resist the Israeli occupation, it also negotiated ceasefire agreements with Israel and went to
great lengths to stop other liberation movements from mounting resistance operations from
486 Also, governing parties often move toward the center of the political spectrum to avoid alienating too large
a part of the electorate, as this would undermine its legitimacy and thus reduce its chances of reelection.
This, in essence, is part of the median voter theorem put forward by Downs  (1957), and assumes that
centrist policies rather than radical positions have public appeal (Tezcur 2010, 71).
487 Parties are not unbounded utility maximizing actors, however.  As argued by Deschouwer, the ideological
profile  of  a  party  “is  not  a  peripheral  attribute.  It  is  an  important  reference point  for  party  militants,
members, voters and party elites,” meaning that their ideological profile has a bearing on their behavior,
making sudden and dramatic moderation unlikely and rare (2008a, 13).
488 Interviewed in Ramallah, April 10, 2011.
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the Gaza Strip. Furthermore, while Hamas revealed a tendency toward pragmatism while in
power,  e.g.,  as  indicated  in  the  way it  organized  public  service  institutions,489 it  retained
crucial elements of its resistance ideology and remained officially committed to the liberation
of Palestine. In short, Hamas behaved somewhat in accordance both with the anticipation that
it would prove to be a radical party when given the chance, and that it would moderate as a
consequence of being in government.
It is pertinent to note that, as with all parties in government, Hamas was also constrained by
both organizational and environmental factors (Strøm and Müller 1999). Hamas could neither
freely  implement  its  political  program even  if  it  had  wanted to,  nor  could  it  completely
discard its ideology for the sake of moderation. For one, the environmental conditions were
hardly  conducive  for  Hamas  to  implement  its  political  program;  an  almost  unanimous
international community boycotted the Hamas government, and both Israel and Egypt closed
their  respective  borders  to  Gaza.  Given  how dependent  the  PA is  on  aid,  no  Palestinian
government  can  provide  for  its  constituents  without  the  support  of  the  international
community. In short, Hamas simply did not have the necessary political and financial support
it would need for governing effectively. 
Second,  both  Hamas’s  rank-and-file  and  its  constituency  had  legitimate,  but  sometimes
contradictory, demands that the leadership tried to accommodate. In particular Hamas’s legacy
as a violent  liberation movement  and its  new role as  a governing party,  produced widely
divergent demands. Combined with Hamas’s effort to hold on to power, the various demands
help explain Hamas’s ambiguous behavior. And finally, as discussed above, Hamas did not
expect to win the elections, and took over the Gaza Strip preemptively in anticipation of a
US-sponsored coup d'état. As such, Hamas assumed power only reluctantly, and its behavior
in office might therefore not conform to that of a conventional party in government.
The  above  points  to  some  reasons  why  Hamas  at  various  times  behaved  radically,
pragmatically,  and  moderately  while  in  power.  Next  follows  three  sections  dedicated  to
providing a deeper analysis of Hamas’s ideological development and rigidity from 2006 to
2011. First, Hamas’s efforts to balance the contradictory aims of resisting the occupation and
governing  Gaza  will  be  discussed.  Then,  the  religious  aspects  of  Hamas’s  ideology  as
espoused in actual politics will be analyzed. And finally, the degree to which the stated and
official goals of Hamas became relegated to a tool for organizational survival, rather than
489 See Brown (2012) for a discussion on how Hamas dealt with public education, and ICG (2008) and Sayigh
(2011) for analyses of Hamas’s efforts in public policing.
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ends in themselves, will be investigated.
  Reconciling governing and resistance
After  winning the  2006 elections,  assuming office,  and  taking control  of  the  Gaza  Strip,
Hamas found itself caught between its traditional role as a resistance movement and its new
role  as  a  governing  party.  Both  because  the  respective  operational  logics  and  goals  of
resistance and governing diverge, and because their sources of legitimacy differ, the two roles
are irreconcilable  (Close and Prevost  2008; de Zeeuw 2008b).  As will  be outlined below,
Hamas nevertheless attempted to combine the two roles, leading the organization to behave
somewhat  erratically  and  contradictorily,  and  leaving  questions  regarding  its  ideological
development and rigidity difficult to answer.
With regard to legitimacy, Dr. Ziad Abu-Amr summed it up nicely: “Resistance used to be
Hamas’s  main  source  of  legitimacy.  But  suddenly,  the  election  was  their  source  of
legitimacy.”490 Although  Hamas  ventured  into  conventional  politics  only  after  careful
considerations, and despite winning a clear democratic mandate to form government, Hamas
did not leave behind its role as a resistance movement. In part, this can be explained by the
fact that Hamas did not expect to win the 2006 elections, and only assumed office reluctantly
and  later  took  over  Gaza  preemptively.  Added  to  this,  Hamas’s  traditional  source  of
legitimacy had been crucial for the survival of the organization; much of its rank-and-file as
well  as  its  most  loyal  followers  support  Hamas  because  of  its  resistance  to  the  Israeli
occupation.
To complete the transition from resistance movement to governing party could therefore have
led to organizational splits within Hamas, and quite certainly to a dramatic loss of popularity.
Consequently, Hamas did not discard its traditional source of legitimacy, but tried instead to
combine governance and resistance.491 According to Hamas MP Dr. Daraghme, this was the
official strategy adopted by the political leadership from the outset:
Meshaal used to say that we will show people, we will show the world, that we
can combine the two; the resistance and the government. So I think this was the
message from Meshaal and the political wing to the armed al-Qassam Brigades,
490 Dr. Ziad Abu-Amr, interviewed in Ramallah, April 27, 2011.
491 In the words of Dr. Ali al-Sartawi, Minister of Justice in multiple PA governments, “Hamas went from
resistance to politics—or more correctly, to politics and resistance.” Interviewed at An-Najah University in
Nablus, August 27, 2007.
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that the resistance would continue even if we took office.492
Notwithstanding the seemingly sound rationale and understandable political calculus behind
Hamas’s attempt to combine the two roles, the operational logic and goals of governing differ
from that of resistance. As a government, Hamas was tasked with the protection of its citizens
in  Gaza.  But  as  a  liberation  movement,  Hamas  felt  obliged  to  continue  resisting  the
occupation,  inevitably  provoking  Israeli  repercussions  against  the  same citizens  it  should
protect. Furthermore, as a government, Hamas would be expected to provide various public
services for its constituency, but as long as it also remained a liberation movement, it would
not  receive the  aid or  political  support  needed to  fulfill  this  role.  As summarized by  Dr.
Giacaman, 
Hamas cannot  be both a  resistance movement  and in  government  indefinitely.
That’s their dilemma. They can be in government, but they cannot continue to
claim to be a resistance movement while not resisting occupation, and they cannot
realistically resist the occupation while being in government.493
Rhetorically, the contradictory goals of Hamas as governing party and Hamas as a resistance
movement became particularly visible with regard to its commitment to the proposed interim
two-state solution along the 1967 borders. As established in previous chapters, the official
positions of Hamas on these crucial issues were well established by the time it took power in
2006.  And as  reiterated  by  Ousama Hamdan in  a  2011 interview,  these  positions  are  as
follows:
[C]omplete Israeli withdrawal to the June 1967 lines, including East Jerusalem;
the dismantling of settlements; the refugee right of return; and an independent
sovereign Palestinian state. This is still the Hamas position—we have signed on it
and repeatedly declared it. This is one of Hamas’s clearest positions.  (quoted in
JPS 2011, 66).
Despite the unequivocal framing of these positions,494 Hamas’s commitment to the interim
solution  along  the  1967 borders  seemingly  waned  after  the  organization  assumed  power.
492 Interviewed in Ramallah, April 10, 2011.
493 Interviewed in  Ramallah,  April  5,  2011.  Palestinian  analyst  Hani  al-Masri  argued along  similar  lines,
stating that “Hamas thought they could mix participation in the PA and resistance, but resistance it is not
suitable  for  the  PA. You cannot  mix the two.  If  you want  resistance,  you have to  dismantle  the PA”
(interviewed in Ramallah, March 31, 2011).
494 Interviewed by  The Economist  in 2009,  Hamas leader Ahmed Yousef repeated that “[w]e have said we
accept a Palestinian state in the 1967 borders” (2009).
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Interviewed three months after Hamas had formed its first government, Usama al-Mazini, a
senior Hamas leader in Gaza, stated that
[w]e accept a state on the 1967 borders without recognizing the legitimacy of the
occupation.  They  [Israel]  can  have  their  state  on  the  1948  lands,  but  I  don’t
recognize it … That is not a recognition of Israel, and there is no acceptance of the
two-state solution. We will not recognize its legitimacy. We will deal with them on
daily matters, but not at a practical level  (quoted in Milton-Edwards and Farrell
2010, 263).
Such  statements  and  rhetorical  gymnastics  indicate  that  the  official  positions  adopted  by
Hamas were at odds with crucial stakeholders within the organization, despite the inclusive
and  democratic  decision-making  procedures  assumed  to  produce  internally  legitimate
decisions and strategies.495
It is noteworthy that these positions were all articulated and adopted as the official line prior
to Hamas’s electoral victory and ascension to power. As discussed, being in opposition is
generally easier  in terms of ideological maneuverability and commitment to official  goals
than being in position  (Sánchez-Cuenca 2004). This is often taken to mean that opposition
parties are more ideologically rigid and committed to their initial—and sometimes unrealistic
—goals than parties in office. The same goes for movements prior to transmuting into parties;
they are assumed to be committed to their initial aims, as their leaders and members still see
their organization as a vehicle to reach these aims, rather than an end in itself. It is somewhat
puzzling, therefore, that Hamas moderated when in opposition, and then backpedaled when in
position. 
This peculiarity can in part be explained, however, by Hamas’s motivation for contesting the
elections in the first place. Hamas ran hoping to do well and be part of a strong opposition
able to rein in the corrupt and too accommodating Fatah-dominated PA. To maximize its
electoral chances and thus strengthen its future position in the PLC, Hamas behaved as a
Downsian party; it moderated its most radical and absolutist goals, and moved to the center of
the political spectrum in the hopes of capturing the median voter (Downs 1957; Løvlie 2014).
But Hamas did not envisage or wish for an electoral victory, and was therefore not prepared to
act in accordance with these moderated goals. Hamas aimed for influence, not responsibility,
but having obtained both, its various leaders felt compelled to try—with limited success—to
495 See Klein (2007, 453–58) for further examples of what he labels Hamas’s “heterogeneous discourse.” 
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strike a credible rhetorical balance between its interim and long-term goals.
Also, in practical terms, Hamas’s dual roles as a government party and resistance movement
led to contradictory behavior. On the one hand, and as briefly discussed above,496 Hamas used
its authority in Gaza to stop other liberation movements from mounting attacks against Israel
and even negotiated ceasefire agreements with Israel (Butler 2009, 120). In part, Hamas did
so in an attempt to appease the international community and obtain some legitimacy, and in
part to establish a monopoly of violence on the Gaza Strip and thus ensure its continued stay
in  power.  On  the  other  hand,  however,  Hamas  remained  committed  to  the  liberation  of
occupied Palestine, and actively and violently resisted the occupation  (Milton-Edwards and
Farrell 2010, 294). Although Hamas understandably did so given the fact that resistance was
such an important  source of  legitimacy and popularity,  its  resistance activities  effectively
undermined its efforts to gain international legitimacy.
One event exemplifying the contradiction between governing and resistance took place in the
summer  of  2006.  On June  25,  together  with two other  Palestinian  liberation movements,
Hamas’s al-Qassam Brigades carried out “Operation Dispel Illusions,” entering Israel through
a tunnel from the Gaza Strip and kidnapping the Israeli corporal Gilad Shalit (Esposito 2007,
205). The operation drew international condemnation and provoked harsh Israeli responses;
Shalit was the first Israeli soldier kidnapped by a Palestinian movement since 1994, and to
punish Hamas and push for his release, Israel captured some 64 Hamas officials on the West
Bank  in  the  days  that  followed,  including  eight  minsters  and  scores  of  legislators  (BBC
2006).497
The operation naturally reduced Hamas’s chances of gaining international  legitimacy,  and
combined with the  Israeli  retaliatory policies,  its  governing efforts  were  made ever  more
difficult. Anticipating this, some political leaders from Hamas called for the release of Shalit
immediately  after  the  operation,  knowing  that  his  capture  would  spell  problems  for  the
organization  (Esposito  2006,  205).  However,  when confronting  Hamas  leaders  about  this
contradictory behavior in 2011, they remained adamant that governing and resistance were
compatible roles, and they refused to admit that the kidnapping of Shalit had created any
problems for the organization. Dr. Ghazal’s response was especially telling:
496 See Losing ground …, pp. 254ff.
497 Gilad Shalit  remained in  Hamas  captivity  for  over  five  years.  In  October  2011,  Hamas  freed  him in
exchange for the release of 1 027 Palestinians from Israeli prisons.
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When Hamas managed  to  arrest  Gilad Shalit,  it  was  after  at  least  fifty  failed
attempts. One of the main goals of the Qassam Brigades and Hamas since it was
founded was to kidnap Israeli soldiers, because this is the only way to for us to
liberate Palestinian prisoners. And as you know, our slogan was that we need both
government and resistance at the same time. This was the difference between us
and Fatah. Fatah said “either this or that, either government or resistance,” but we
said “no, we can do both together.” And the arrest of Shalit was an application of
having both together.498
Such inconsistent strategy and behavior stemmed in part from the fact that Hamas tried to
balance its role as a liberation movement and the associated long-term aim of erecting an
Islamic state in the whole of historic Palestine, versus its role as a governing party set on
staying in power (Brown 2012).
Finally,  it  should  be  reiterated  that  armed  movements  such  as  Hamas  do not  necessarily
follow the conventional movement-to-party trajectory in terms of ideological development,
i.e., that of softening and moderating its goals. Violent tactics and maximalist territorial aims
go hand in hand with ideological rigidity, at least in part because cadres willing to shed blood
for the cause seem unlikely candidates for ideological flexibility. Instead, they are expected to
be reluctant to change, remaining instead committed to the movement’s initial goals even in
the face of great challenges (Close and Prevost 2008, 10). As such, Hamas’s ideological and
organizational  legacy  as  a  liberation  movement  worked  to  counteract  the  hypothesized
moderating tendency of being in government, producing instead rather contradictory rhetoric
and behavior as it tried to reconcile governing with resistance.
  The unclear role of religion
Similar  to  how  its  legacy  as  a  liberation  movement  limited  the  maneuverability  of  its
leadership and led to the rather futile attempt to reconcile governing with resistance, so did its
role as a political-religious organization also pose ideological dilemmas for Hamas. Even a
cursory look at how Hamas has governed the Gaza Strip from June 2007 onward reveals its
intentions regarding the relationship between Islam and politics to be ambiguous. As the sole
ruler of Gaza, Hamas could be expected to have implemented its allegedly Islamist ideology.
And Hamas did at times enforce an Islamist social order. Examples of this include prohibiting
alcohol  and  prostitution,  instructing  how weddings  should  be  conducted,  deciding  which
498 Interviewed in Nablus, April 17, 2011.
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imams were allowed to preach, trying to pressure women to wear the veil, and giving the
Islamic  conciliation  committees  wide-ranging  powers  as  civil  arbitrators  (ICG 2008,  15–
16).499
Despite the above and some well-publicized events related to gender segregation,500 however,
Hamas did not labor hard to establish an Islamic state in Gaza. Even if some Hamas leaders
are on record admitting that they would prefer more Islamization, e.g., that the courts should
apply sharia, they openly expressed reluctance to force about any fundamental change in the
way Gaza is governed and organized for fear of popular opposition (Marwan Abu Ras quoted
in ICG 2008, 15). And although the political calculus behind Hamas’s behavior seems sound,
i.e., that remaining in power is a prerequisite for governing, its reluctance to implement its
ideology when given the chance still needs explaining.
When  confronted  with  this  apparent  contradiction,  interviewed  Hamas  members—senior
cadres, elected officials, and youth members—claimed that the organization in fact did  not
want to establish an Islamist  or Islamic state,  but  rather  a “civil  state.” Exactly what the
distinguishing characteristics of such a “civil state” are, however, remains somewhat elusive.
Some interviewed Hamas members seemed to interpret the concept as interchangeable with
an Islamic—but not theocratic—state, making references to the Prophet Mohammad and the
early Caliphs. Or, as outlined by Hamas MP Dr. Daraghme, “we want a civilian state, but
because  we,  the  Muslims  here,  are  the  majority,  we  will  take  the  Islamic  law  in  their
consideration.”501 Only on rare occasions did interviewees employ the term “Islamic state,”
however. 
Others  emphasized  qualities  such  as  democracy,  human  rights,  an  independent  judiciary,
equality before the law, and religious freedom.502 But they always stopped short of invoking
the  term “secularism,”  even if  what  they described easily  would  fit  the  bill  of  a  secular
democratic state. This reluctance to employ the term secularism might relate to the fact that it
499 According to the referenced International Crisis Group report, some of these attempts at Islamization in
Gaza were carried out by non-Hamas groups (ICG 2008, 16).
500 One example was when Hamas ruled that women would not be allowed to compete in the Gaza Marathon
in 2013, which led the UN organizers to cancel the event  (Akram 2013; BBC 2013; Greenwood 2013).
Another  example  was  when Hamas  allegedly  closed  down a  water  park  in  Gaza in  2010,  apparently
because  it  allowed  men  and  women  to  bathe  together.  The  water  park  was  subsequently  torched,
supposedly by Hamas-affiliated gunmen (Putz 2010; Sherwood 2010).
501 Interviewed in Ramallah, April 10, 2011.
502 Dr. Mohammad Ghazal was one interviewed Hamas leader expressing such sentiments, explaining that
“our [Hamas’s] understanding of Islam [is an] Islam which represent democracy, freedom of expression,
freedom of worship, an Islam that doesn’t harm any people, but in which all citizens are equal. This is the
Islam we will offer the people.” Interviewed in Nablus, April 17, 2011.
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is considered a Western concept, often conflated with atheism (Tamimi 2002).503 Furthermore,
many Islamists see no need to import such a concept, as Islam and  sharia  have dealt with
religious minorities for centuries through the  dhimmi system, which provides non-Muslims
with almost the same rights and responsibilities as Muslims (Bahlul 2004).504 In any event, the
interviewed Hamas members were by and large unable to clearly articulate what kind of state
the organization wants to establish, resorting instead to the rather ambiguous term “civil state”
seemingly without having agreed on what this really entails.
Hamas’s halfhearted attempts at Islamizing Gaza combined with its rather confusing rhetoric
with regard to its goals while in government both work to strengthen the hypothesis that when
faced  with  political  realities,  governing  parties  move  toward  the  center  of  the  political
spectrum and moderate  to  avoid  alienating  too  large  parts  of  its  constituency.  Instead  of
implementing its ideological program, Hamas focused its efforts on staying in power, which
—given the international boycott, strict Israeli blockade, and presence of powerful opposition
groups  within  Gaza—was no easy  task  (Brown 2012,  12).  In  essence,  Hamas  prioritized
security over politics and survival over ideology, monopolizing violence and persecuting all
opposition movements, both secular and Islamist, while only to a limited degree pursuing its
Islamizing agenda (ICG 2008, 8–12; Sayigh 2011).
However, Hamas could not leave behind its ideology or previously stated goals. As mentioned
above, the ideological profile of a given party is expected to have a bearing on its behavior
also  after  it  assumes  power,  to  various  degrees  counteracting  the  expected  moderating
tendency  associated  with  being  in  government  (Deschouwer  2008a,  13).  And  it  is
hypothesized that for religious parties, this resistance to change and moderation might be even
stronger. This is due to the fact that  religious parties do not enjoy a monopoly over their
ideological  and  rhetorical  frames,  but  must  rely  on  religious  institutions  and  authorities
outside the party organization for  their  religious credentials  (Gunther  and Diamond 2003,
182).  Despite  the  fact  that  it  did  not  fully  qualify  as  a  political  party  at  this  time,  this
resistance to change stemming from its religious legacy is expected to have had an effect also
on Hamas; it could not freely rephrase or re-frame the religious elements of its ideology to
make its governing efforts easier, but had to take into account its ideological inheritance from
the days of the Brotherhood. In short, there were limits as to how far Hamas could stray away
503 Atheism, or kafir in Arabic (meaning non-believer), has negative and even offensive connotations for many
in the Arab world.
504 Dhimmi translates roughly as “protected minority.” Such protected minorities often have to pay an extra tax
in exchange for residency, but are also exempt from certain duties.
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from its Islamist roots without losing credibility, legitimacy, and potentially power.
In sum, both the rhetoric and practice of Hamas leave its intentions regarding the role of Islam
in politics unclear. And these uncertainties regarding Hamas’s goals have ramifications for the
ability of observers and analysts to explain its behavior and ideological development. In turn,
these uncertainties have fostered both the perception that Hamas remains a religious extremist
movement, cleverly avoiding concepts with negative connotations in the West, and the view
that Hamas has matured and moderated, moving toward political pragmatism while leaving its
overly religious goals behind.
As  is  often  the  case  when  such  diametrically  opposed  interpretations  emerge,  the  truth
probably lies somewhere in between. Based on impressions from long-term fieldwork in the
occupied  Palestinian  territories  and  among  Palestinian  refugees  in  Lebanon,  and  through
careful  analysis  of  numerous  interviews with Hamas members  from these  localities,  it  is
argued  here  that  the  movement  has  indeed  matured  and  turned  increasingly  pragmatic.
However, it is equally obvious that there are limits to how far from its Islamic roots Hamas
can stray without  losing its  core  supporters.  As  such,  it  is  argued that  while  Hamas was
established as a religious-nationalistic liberation movement with absolutist territorial claims, it
has since developed into a more pragmatic political party with  a less pronounced focus on
religion (Hroub 2010).
  Self-preservation and -preparation
Based on the analyses in the previous two subsections, Hamas arguably did not take the leap
from resistance movement to governing party after assuming power. Its leaders were anxious
—and probably rightly so—that if Hamas did abandon resistance for governing, it might have
risked  organizational  splits,  and  certainly  a  loss  of  popularity.  Also,  Hamas’s  Islamist
credentials  took  a  blow after  it  assumed  office  and  took  control  of  the  Gaza  Strip.  The
organization  tried  only  to  a  limited  degree  to  enforce  an  Islamist  order,  fearing  both
international and domestic repercussions (Brown 2012, 12). But by hesitating to follow up on
its  Islamist  promises,  Hamas  left  its  more  religiously  inclined  members  and  supporters
disappointed.
The picture that appears, then, is that of a political organization caught between the divergent
strategic goals of a governing party, a resistance movement, and a religious movement. On the
one  hand,  Hamas’s  efforts  to  strike  a  balance  between  these  goals  and  roles  explain  its
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sometimes rather contradictory behavior. But on the other, they also indicate a high degree of
pragmatism and a strong sense of self-preservation.  As observed by Brown after his visit to
Gaza in May 2011, 
[m]uch  less  than  an  Islamic  emirate  or  a  guerilla  encampment,  I  found  an
emerging party-state that bore some resemblance to that  which emerged under
Fatah in the 1990s: unaccountable and authoritarian, with democratic mechanisms
atrophying (2012, 4).
Neither Islamizing nor utilizing its  control  over Gaza to intensify its  resistance activities,
Hamas  instead  prioritized  organizational  survival  in  the  face  of  both  exogenous  and
endogenous  challenges.  As  such,  the  behavior  of  Hamas  after  its  rise  to  power  partly
conforms to the hypothesized ideological development of a political party having reached a
high level  of  institutionalization.  Rather  than being a  vehicle  for  pursuing its  ideological
goals, Hamas seems to have become an end in itself as it only implemented as much of its
policies as needed for it to remain in power.505 Or, in other words, Hamas’s manifest ideology
—i.e., resistance, liberation, and Islamism—had seemingly become latent, as organizational
survival took precedence over ideology implementation (Panebianco 1988, 16, 54–65).
This should not be taken as proof that Hamas had abandoned its goal of a liberated Palestine
governed in accordance with Islam, however. As argued by Ezbidi and discussed above, the
harsh environmental conditions under which Hamas operated was a major factor explaining
why it prioritized maintaining organizational unity and to preserve its rule in Gaza rather than
implementing  its  political  program  (2013,  104).  And  prioritizing  self-preservation  over
policy-implementation when the organization’s survival is at stake does not signal that Hamas
had abandoned “its conception of ‘resistance’” or for that matter “accepted that its statelet in
Gaza is anything like an end point for its ambitions” (Brown 2012, 4).
Rather, there were indications that Hamas had ambitions beyond upholding the  status quo,
and that its focus on self-preservation was a necessary survival tactic. For the reason behind
Hamas’s sometimes contradictory and erratic behavior—i.e., its attempt to balance the role of
governing party,  liberation movement, and religious movement—also suggests that  crucial
elements within the organization remained committed to its ideological goals. As explained by
Dr. Aziz Dweik,
505 This is similar to the Downsian parties, which “formulate policies in order to win elections, rather than win
elections in order to formulate policies” (Downs 1957, 28).
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[w]e in Hamas say that “sometimes you must bow down to the wave.” But that
doesn’t mean you surrender to the wave. You just have to wait until the situation
changes, until things improve. And we in the Islamic movement are different from
the nationalist; they are living in a hurry all the time, trying to achieve something
now. We are just moving along steadily but slowly in order to achieve our goals.
In religion you shouldn’t be in a hurry. If you think of Moses, Jesus, Mohammad,
and the rest of the Prophets and messengers, they suffered very much before they
achieved their goals. We are also suffering and cannot reach our goal today, but in
the long run we will achieve what we want. But we are patient; we are not in a
hurry.506
In short, Hamas’s roots as a religiously motivated liberation movement meant that it only with
great difficulty could escape its ideological legacy. So, while Hamas’s stated goals appeared
to be relegated to tools for organizational survival rather than ends in themselves, it is argued
that it to a large extent was the environmental conditions that forced the organization to focus
on self-preservation rather than policy implementation. And while its ideological credentials
were weakened following its erratic behavior when in power, its manifest ideology became
latent  probably  only as  a  temporary  measure.  In  conclusion,  Hamas was  biding its  time,
prioritizing survival over ideology so that it still would be around as a political force to be
reckoned with if or when conditions improved, ready to again pursue its ideological goals.
 7.2.2  Organizational challenges and dilemmas
While  the  environmental  conditions  discussed  above  account  for  part  of  the  ideological
ambiguity exposed by Hamas while in government, various organizational challenges added
to its erratic and sometimes contradictory behavior. As stipulated by relevant theories, a party
assuming office—and in particular for the first time—is under immense pressure to adjust its
organizational  order  and  structure  to  better  accommodate  the  demands  of  its  new  role
(Deschouwer 2008a).507 And the way in and degree to which the party alters its organizational
structure  in  response  to  the  pressures  of  office  will  naturally  have  ramifications  for  its
506 Interviewed in Hebron, April 13, 2011.
507 Also, V. O. Key argued half a century ago that “[t]he party that runs the government is … a party different
from the one that won the elections” (1964, 651). In short, Key observed that political parties fulfill various
functions vis-à-vis the electorate, as an organization in itself, and in office  (see Dalton and Wattenberg
2000, 5–10 for a brief discussion of these functions). And as convincingly demonstrated by Katz, these
three “faces” of the party force the party in public office “to serve two masters [the electorate and the party
organization] with competing objectives and making incompatible demands”  (2014, 183), which in turn
has consequences both for the behavior of the government, and the development of the party organization.
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behavior.
For one, being in government entails a great deal of responsibility, which in turn necessitates a
different organizational  structure than that of the comparatively free and independent role
enjoyed by opposition parties or movements operating outside of institutionalized politics.
Governments—and  in  particular  in  violent  and  volatile  situations  such  as  in  occupied
Palestine—are at times required to react swiftly to rapidly developing situations, an ability
first-time  office  holders  such  as  Hamas  often  lack.  To  accommodate  this  need  for  rapid
decision-making,  the  organizational  structure  and  order  must  be  adjusted,  which  in  turn
threatens to upset existing horizontal and vertical relationships within the organization, and
thus leads to altered behavior.
Second, and somewhat related, assuming office tends to alter the established horizontal power
balance within the organization, away from the party leadership and toward the government
(Katz 2014, 188–89). This is partly because the agenda of the government increasingly takes
precedence over the agenda of the party itself, and partly because those in government by
nature  of  their  position  command  organizational,  political,  and  financial  resources  not
available to the party leadership.508
And  third,  the  role  of  government  gives  rise  to  vertical  power  struggles  within  the
organization. This is so because by assuming office, a party ostensibly obtains the power to
implement policies. As a consequence, the stakes become higher in the internal battles over
political prioritizations, thus intensifying these battles. Depending on the cohesion, discipline,
and organizational clout of the party activists, these battles can ebb back and forth and lead to
unpredictable behavior on part of the government.
The organizational dilemmas produced by assuming office and Hamas’s responses will be
analyzed  in  the  following  four  subsections.  First,  the  inadequacies  of  Hamas’s
decision-making procedures for its new role in government will be discussed briefly, followed
by a subsection covering its fumbling attempts to rectify these organizational deficiencies by
establishing  a  new  executive  committee.  Then,  the  horizontal  power  struggles  will  be
analyzed,  essentially  concluding  that  the  Hamas  government  in  Gaza  obtained  factional
dominance  by  asserting  control  of  certain  crucial  organizational  zones  of  uncertainty
previously in the hands of the Political Bureau. Finally, the vertical power struggle between
508 The intensity of these horizontal power struggles depends largely on the degree to which the leadership of
the party and those forming government overlap.
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the  Hamas  government  and  the  various  activist  groups  will  be  discussed,  focusing  in
particular  on  the  challenges  arising  from the  increasing influence  of  the  third  generation
radicals.
  Inadequate decision-making procedures
Interviewed  Hamas  cadres  frequently  expressed  pride  in  the  organization’s  inclusive  and
democratic decision-making procedures. As discussed in previous chapters, both the decision
to boycott the 1996 elections and the decision to participate in the 2006 elections were taken
after extensive consultation with the rank-and-file and the various organizational units within
Hamas.  However,  such  inclusive  and  democratic  decision-making  procedures  are
slow-moving. As such, one can argue that there is an inherent tradeoff between intra-party
democracy and efficiency, between the aims of organizational  legitimacy and the need to
sometimes respond rapidly to an environmental development or event. 
As long as Hamas operated outside the political system and without responsibility to anyone
but its own members, it made sense to consult the wider base before deciding on the way
forward. By and large, a social movement or a party in opposition does not have to make
rapid decisions in response to sudden political developments in the same way as governing
parties; it can rely on previously agreed upon strategies.
The above is not the case for parties in position, and consequently not for Hamas after it won
the 2006 elections. Quite suddenly, Hamas found itself in a situation for which its inclusive
decision-making procedures were ill-suited. In particular, the situation in the spring of 2007
was pressing. Hamas had to respond to the military buildup of Fatah forces in Gaza, but the
rapidly  escalating  situation  barred  the  organization  from  utilizing  its  inclusive
decision-making procedures; it had to decide then and there on how to act. And according to
Ousama Hamdan,
[t]he decision to fight Fatah was taken in the field, not in any committee. The
situation became worse very fast, and so someone had to make a decision. And it
was a  field  decision made by the Hamas leadership in  Gaza.  They didn’t  put
themselves in the position of the Political Bureau, but acted according to their
responsibility at that moment, which was to respond to a difficult situation. So
they have a mandate to do so, and to make a decision fast. But if they had decided
a  week in  advance  without  consulting the  rest  of  the  movement,  the  decision
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would not be accepted, because they don’t have the mandate to do so. But since
the situation was so bad, we had to react, and that was what the leadership in Gaza
did.509
Also, according to Dr. Nashat Aqtash, a former Muslim Brother and close associate of Hamas,
the takeover of Gaza was an exception to the regular decision-making procedures in Hamas.
“It was not a normal situation. It was a ‘to be or not to be’ situation for Hamas. That was the
problem there.”510 
The  mentioned  kidnapping  of  Gilad  Shalit  also  suggests  that  Hamas’s  decision-making
procedures and organizational design were badly suited for its new position in government.
As argued by Prof. Helga Baumgarten,
[t]hat very day [June 25, 2006] Hamas was supposed to sign the agreement with
Fatah based on the Prisoner Document. Now, this very day, this military operation
takes place. There is an obvious contradiction. The standard answer you get from
Hamas will be that “we are in government, we are using a political strategy, but
because we’re under occupation, we’re still following the option of resistance.”
And, number two, “we give a green-light to that operational wing, they decide
when  right  moment  comes.”  Now,  obviously,  this  can’t  be.  The  political
leadership would not green-light an operation of such a scale and importance at
such a critical juncture.511
In short, the kidnapping of Gilad Shalit at that exact point in time might have served the
interests of Hamas as a resistance movement, but was obviously not in the interest of Hamas
as a political party (ICG 2007, 27); while it is unlikely that the kidnapping had any role in the
failure to form a national  unity government  in the  summer of  2006,  it  did no favors for
Hamas’s efforts to gain international legitimacy or demonstrate political maturity, as indicated
by the immediate attempts by various leaders from the organization to secure the release of
Shalit (Esposito 2006, 205). 
Naturally,  interviewed  Hamas  members  by  and  large  refused  to  admit  any  mistake  or
miscalculation on their part, neither in relation to the kidnapping of Gilad Shalit in 2006 nor
the  takeover  of  Gaza  in  2007.  However,  both  events  strongly  suggest  that  Hamas  was
509 Ousama Hamdan, interviewed in Beirut, November 18, 2011.
510 Dr. Nashat Aqtash, interviewed in Ramallah, April 11, 2011.
511 Interviewed at Birzeit University, March 17, 2011.
275
ill-prepared organizationally  to  combine  its  new role  as  a  governing party  with that  of  a
resistance movement. The organizational design and decision-making procedures that for long
had served Hamas as a liberation movement operating outside the political system would have
to be adapted to better suit the needs of Hamas in government. As a liberation movement,
Hamas had benefited from having a federated and stratified organizational structure with its
various branches and cells at times operating autonomously, as this had secured continued
operations in the face of intense persecution  (Zaboun 2009). But as a governing party, the
leadership needed to assert control to ensure strategic consistency and a heightened degree of
discipline both to avoid acting against its own interests and to increase its credibility as a
governing party.
  Internal elections and organizational development
And Hamas ostensibly had a good chance to adapt its organization to better fit its new role in
government, when the organization arranged internal elections to its various leadership bodies
in 2009. However, although certain leaders were replaced in the election, meaning that the
composition  of  the  Political  Bureau  changed,  analysts  close  to  Hamas  argued  that  the
elections were unlikely to produce any political or organizational changes (Ma’an 2009c).512
Given Hamas’s centripetal advancement procedures, a lack of change despite alteration in the
leadership composition was to be expected. For, even if Hamas members rise through the
ranks by way of elections, any cadre aiming for advancement must let himself be co-opted by
those  above  him  even  to  become  a  nominee.  And  advancement  through  co-optation  is
expected to produce and reproduce a homogenous leadership, which in turn has a stabilizing
effect on the organization (Panebianco 1988, 249).
Added to this, there are no term limits for any position within Hamas.513 Khaled Meshaal was,
for example, reelected as leader of the Political Bureau for the fourth time in 2009. Without
term limits, the conserving tendency stemming from the centripetal advancement procedures
might be exacerbated, as the advantages of incumbency means that those already in powerful
positions within Hamas are likely to be reelected time and again.514
512 Khaled Meshaal was reelected as head of the Political Bureau, Mousa Abu Marzook stayed on as his
deputy,  and  Ousama  Hamdan,  Hamas’s  representative  in  Lebanon,  was  given  the  Political  Bureau’s
external relations portfolio. According to the source quoted in  Ma’an, a number of the members in the
Political Bureau reside on the West Bank and in Gaza, but their identities remain undisclosed for fear of
Israeli assassination (2009c).
513 The lack of term limits was confirmed by senior Hamas leader Ousama Hamdan, interviewed in Beirut,
November 18, 2011.
514 Advantages associated with incumbency include access to organizational resources, experience, and a lack
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In  sum,  the  effect  of  the  centripetal  advancement  procedures  is  expected  to  produce  an
ideologically homogeneous leadership that, because of the lack of term limits, is likely to be
reproduced in subsequent elections. And given the fact that leadership alternation is theorized
to be one of the main sources for internally initiated party change (Panebianco 1988, 248–50),
the opposite is expected to be true for Hamas; rather than initiating changes from the inside,
Hamas will largely change only in response to external challenges and shocks  (Harmel and
Janda 1994). 
Crucially,  elements  within  Hamas  realized  that  its  decision-making  and  advancement
procedures  potentially  could  pose  problems  for  the  organization’s  performance  and
adaptability. Specifically with regard to changes in the composition of the leadership and the
lack of term limits, Ousama Hamdan explained that
I would estimate that about 40 percent of the Political Bureau has been replaced in
the last 23 years without Hamas having any term limits. But I have to admit that
we’re discussing it. There is a debate about limiting some specific positions to, for
example, 2 or 3 terms. It’s an important discussion to have, and it might be an
improvement for the organization, but the institution which is supposed to make
this decision is the Shura Council [Consultative Council], and so far there’s no
decision.515
Although Hamas did not implement any term limits,516 the discussion referred to by Hamdan
indicates that  the organization had realized that  there were drawbacks associated with its
current decision-making and advancement procedures.517
What Hamas did to rectify its apparent organizational deficiencies was to establish a new
executive committee charged with tackling exactly the kind of rapidly escalating situations as
led to the 2007 takeover, i.e., situations in which Hamas could not rely on its traditional and
inclusive decision-making procedures. As with other aspects of Hamas’s internal workings
and leadership, however, few certain facts have emerged about this new committee, and its
exact role remains shrouded in secrecy (Yaari 2012). 
of  challengers  (Cox  and  Katz  1996).  Given  the  fact  that  Hamas  always  has  framed  itself  as  more
professional and legitimate than the sclerotic and personality dependent Fatah—which still suffers from the
passing of Arafat back in 2004—it is somewhat surprising that Hamas had not done more to rectify such an
obvious organizational deficiency.
515 Interviewed in Beirut, November 18, 2011.
516 Khaled Meshaal was reelected as head of the Political Bureau for a fifth time in 2013 (Al Jazeera 2013). 
517 Given the violent and volatile conditions under which Hamas for long has operated, it is not surprising that
the organization has placed a premium on leadership stability.
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Claims  both  about  the  Executive  Committee’s  size  and  relation  to  the  two  pre-existing
leadership  bodies  vary  according  to  different  sources.  Hamas  MP Nizar  Ramadan,518 for
example,  claimed  that  the  Executive  Committee  has  five  members,  all  drawn  from  the
approximately eleven members of the Political Bureau. According to a Hamas source quoted
in Ma’an (2009c), however, the new committee has 25 members, including all seven members
of the Political Bureau, the chair of the Consultative Council, his deputy and secretary, with
the rest elected from the approximately 50 regular members of the Consultative Council. And
finally, in a publication by PASSIA,519 it was claimed that the Executive Committee contains
15 members elected from the 70 representatives in the  Consultative Council,  and that the
seven-member Political Bureau in turn is elected by the Executive Committee from its own
members (2013, 9–10).520
Suffice it to say, confusion and uncertainty abound regarding the top echelons of Hamas. And
in lieu of verifiable details about the Executive Committee, it is difficult to ascertain with any
confidence its exact role, mandate, and composition. But by looking at what is known about
the  structure,  function,  and  behavior  of  the  leadership  prior  to  the  establishment  of  the
Executive Council, it is possible to deduce some of Hamas’s organizational needs, and based
on this evaluate the credibility of the various claims regarding the role and composition of this
new committee.
To recapitulate, the two pre-existing leadership bodies had complementary roles. Whereas the
Consultative Council was in charge of overarching ideology and strategy, the Political Bureau
was tasked with the day-to-day management of the organization. Faced with the need to make
rapid decisions with far-reaching consequences, such as the Gaza takeover in 2007, none of
these leadership bodies were suitable to respond; the Consultative Council would have been
too slow given that it is both large and geographically dispersed, whereas the Political Bureau
lacked both the mandate and legitimacy to react to such a fundamental challenge on its own.
This,  in  essence,  left  the  Gaza  leadership  to  its  own  devices,  which  obviously  was  an
unsatisfactory state of affairs for Hamas.
Based on the above, it is assumed that the new committee would be designed so that it struck
a balance between the efficiency of the Political Bureau and the legitimacy of the Consultative
518 Interviewed in Ramallah, May 8, 2011.
519 PASSIA is the acronym for the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs. See
www.passia.org.
520 The Consultative Council has somewhere between 50 and 90 members, depending on which source is
consulted (Ma’an 2009c; PASSIA 2013; Yaari 2012; Zaboun 2009).
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Council. For the Executive Committee to achieve the necessary degree of legitimacy, it would
have to include members from the Consultative Council, but it would obviously also need to
be  smaller  to  increase  efficiency.  The  source  quoted  in  Ma’an (2009c),  that  this  new
committee is a body made up of the Political Bureau and the leadership and a number of
members  from  the  Consultative  Council,  seems  to  fit  the  needs  of  Hamas  and  is  thus
considered  the  most  credible  claim.  Such a  committee  would  be  sufficiently  small  to  be
efficient,521 and by including members from the Consultative Council, it  would also enjoy
increased internal legitimacy.522
Too little is known about this new committee in particular and about the topmost leadership of
Hamas in general for the above deductions and speculations to be anything but suggestive of
the  composition  of  this  new  Executive  Committee.  Neither  the  secondary  literature  nor
interviewed Hamas members provide sufficient details regarding the internal workings of the
organization  for  any  categorical  claims  to  be  made.  However,  some  interviewed  Hamas
leaders would confirm and negate the validity of various alternative organograms presented to
them. Based on their responses and the above analysis, the organogram in Figure 10 below is
proposed as a schematic representation of Hamas’s organizational structure after the internal
elections in 2009.
In any event, the formation of this new Executive Committee is taken to indicate that Hamas
realized that the organizational structure that had served it well in the past was in need of a
revamp; Hamas’s  new role  as  a  governing party  demanded other  things than before,  and
although the organization struggled with conservative and self-perpetuating tendencies, the
leadership  still  proved  to  be  willing  and  capable  of  responding  to  this  new situation  by
restructuring  parts  of  the  leadership  so  that  the  organization  would  be  better  suited  for
handling the realities of being in government.
521 While  the  source  in  Ma’an claims the committee  had 25 members  (2009c),  Yaari  suggests  it  has  19
members (2012).
522 In short, the claim by Nizar Ramadan that the Executive Committee in essence is a sub-committee of the
Political Bureau is considered to be unlikely. The Political Bureau itself would have been efficient enough
to respond, but lacked the mandate and legitimacy to do so, something a sub-committee would do nothing
to  rectify.  Also,  the  claim  by  PASSIA that  the  new  committee  was  elected  by,  but  not  from,  the
Consultative Council,  and that  the  seven-member  Political  Bureau in  turn  is  elected  by and from the
Executive Committee, badly fits the needs of Hamas and is thus also considered unlikely. While such a
larger committee potentially might be more legitimate, it would resemble the Political Bureau in too many
respects, and thus seems to be a rather superfluous committee.
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Figure 10: Schematic organogram of Hamas, post-2009
(Source: Based on interviewed Hamas members and supplemented by information gleaned from the relevant
literature. Usra is Arabic for family, shuba means division, and shura translates into consultation.)
  The horizontal power struggle and factional dominance—from abroad to Gaza
By forming government and later taking over the Gaza Strip, Hamas went straight from being
a movement to becoming a party-in-government. As for most parties taking office for the first
time, this posed organizational challenges for Hamas  (Deschouwer 2008a, 10–12). In short,
assuming office—and in particular for the first time—often creates new power dynamics at
the  topmost  echelons  in  political  parties,  pitting  the  leadership  of  the  party  organization
against the cabinet ministers. For Hamas, this meant that new relationships had to be formed
between the government,  made up mostly of Hamas cadres from the Gaza Strip,  and the
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leaderships both on the West Bank and in exile. 
Similar to the conventional party experience, Hamas did not alter much of its structure as a
consequence  of  assuming  office.  Apart  from  the  creation  of  the  Executive  Committee
discussed above, the command structure formally stayed the same; the government in Gaza,
made up primarily of the senior leadership there, remained nominally subject to the existing
leadership, and primarily the Political Bureau (Rafat Nasif interviewed in Zaboun 2009).
However, the government in Gaza needed—and was given—ample leeway in the day-to-day
governance of the Gaza Strip. In the words of Dr. Daraghme, “our government should do
what the Political Bureau says when it comes to the larger political agenda and strategy of
Hamas, but it has the right to do as it pleases in questions related only to Gaza.”523 In short,
the Hamas government in Gaza was free to act according to its own prioritizations within the
parameters laid down by the topmost leadership.
Although the delegation of day-to-day management of Gaza to the Hamas leadership there
was an organizationally sound decision, the exact division of responsibilities and authority
between  the  various  branches  within  Hamas  remained  unclear.  And  the  political  realities
associated with governing inevitably clashed with the broader and more long-term interests of
the  larger  organization,  prompting  an  intensification  of  internal  power  struggles  within
Hamas. As discussed in previous chapters, most analysts have looked to Hamas’s federated
structure  as  the  main  source  of  disagreement  and  factionalism  within  the  organization,
assuming that because the respective branches operate under different conditions, they tend to
adopt divergent positions on various issues (see e.g., Y. Cohen and White 2009). And although
it was concluded in the previous chapter that the factionalizing effect of Hamas’s geographic
dispersions has been overestimated, tensions between its geographic branches did intensify in
the wake of its 2007 takeover of Gaza (ICG 2008, 26).
From 2007 onward, the internal power balance tilted heavily in favor of the Hamas leadership
in  Gaza,  whose  personnel  largely  overlapped  with  that  of  the  government.  The  external
leadership,  and  mainly  the  Political  Bureau,  constituted  the  other  main  contenders  for
organizational dominance. The West Bank branch, the other main power center in Hamas, was
weakened in the years after the 2007 takeover.524 Fatah-dominated Palestinian security forces,
523 Interviewed in Ramallah, April 10, 2011.
524 West Bank Hamas leaders interviewed by the International Crisis Group said that their weakened position
and  the  dire  conditions  under  which  they  operated  had  prompted  their  local  leaders  to  adopt  radical
positions more often associated with the Political Bureau (ICG 2012, 17).
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assisted by Israel and sponsored by the US, arbitrarily detained both assumed and bona fide
Hamas officials  en masse, looted their offices, and closed down organizations alleged to be
affiliated with Hamas (HRW 2008, 20).525 In short, the organizational influence of the West
Bank branch was severely reduced as a consequence of the suppression it suffered (ICG 2012,
16–17).526
Although the Hamas government was nominally subservient to the Political Bureau, it was in
firm control of Gaza. And controlling the Gaza Strip—however isolated and poor—provided
the leadership there with two crucial sources of authority and power, namely that of monopoly
of violence and the capability to extract taxes (Pelham 2012b, 3). These sources of authority
in turn had ramifications for the power balance between the Political Bureau and the Gaza
leadership.  Two  of  the  main  reasons  the  Political  Bureau  had  enjoyed  such  a  powerful
position within Hamas stemmed from its influence over the al-Qassam Brigades, and the fact
that  it  controlled much of the financial  flows. And as in other  organizations,  authority in
Hamas ultimately rests  with the  faction in  control  of  such crucial  “zones of  uncertainty”
(Panebianco 1988, 33–35).527
After assuming office in 2006, the Hamas government was naturally expected to uphold law
and order and ensure at least a semblance of domestic security. But, as the pre-existing PA
security  forces  were  filled  with  Fatah  loyalists  who  refused  to  serve  under  Hamas,  the
government had initially no way to fulfill its electoral promise of increased security. To rectify
this,  Hamas  founded  the  Executive  Force  in  May  2006  as  its  own,  parallel  police  force
(Sayigh 2011, 50).528 Initially 3 000 men strong, the Executive Force rapidly expanded to at
least some 5 800 men by mid-2007, most of whom were recruited from the ranks of Hamas
(Milton-Edwards 2008a, 666).
525 The head of Preventive Security in the West Bank explained that “our arrests and measures against Hamas
came  because  of  threats  to  our  existence  here  and  our  political  interests  …  we  are  concerned  that
something may happen here like in Gaza” (HRW 2008, 20).
526 Although Hamas’s Prisoners Committee traditionally has enjoyed a high degree of internal legitimacy, e.g.,
as indicated by the status bestowed upon the aforementioned Prisoners Document (see section 7.1.2 on pp.
248ff.), it has never been able to compete for organizational dominance.
527 Zones  of  uncertainty  refers  to  “areas  of  organizational  unpredictability  [on  which  the]  survival  and
functioning of an organization depend,” and the control of such zones, e.g., finance and the armed wing,
constitute a “resource that is ‘spendable’ in the internal power games” in an organization  (Panebianco
1988, 33–35).
528 According to Milton-Edwards, one reason for Hamas to establish a new force rather than rely on its own
armed wing for policing the Gaza Strip was that “Hamas saw a need to establish a domestic policing force
that, unlike its resistance arm, would have a public face and presence” (2008a, 665).
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Nominally, the Executive Force was created as a regular and neutral police force tasked with
upholding  law  and  order  in  Gaza.  However,  it  was  accused  of  partisan  policing  and
extra-judicial persecution, in particular targeting Fatah cadres (Milton-Edwards 2008a; Sayigh
2011).  Additionally,  it  played  an  important  role  as  a  paramilitary  group  supporting  the
al-Qassam Brigades when Hamas won the June 2007 war in Gaza. As such, the Executive
Force  seemed  to  be  neither  neutral  nor  purely  a  police  corps.  Despite  such  obvious
shortcomings, it was considered an effective and efficient police force, successfully reducing
both regular and violent crimes in Gaza and thereby restoring public confidence in the police
(Milton-Edwards 2008a, 672).
The creation of this Executive Force was what gave the Hamas government the capability to
project its power inside of Gaza, and a chance to monopolize legitimate violence. And while
the force itself was dissolved after it officially became part of the regular PA police forces in
Gaza in the fall of 2007, this restructuring and reorganization of the various police forces
effectively led to the integration of Hamas members and loyalists in the police force. Hamas
thus gained control of what had previously been Fatah strongholds, and kept in firm charge of
the Gaza Strip (Milton-Edwards 2008a, 669–70).
By first establishing its own police force, and later gaining control of the regular police forces,
the  Hamas  government  increased  its  powers,  not  only  within  Gaza,  but  also  in  Hamas’s
internal organizational power struggles. In essence, the police force broke the monopoly over
Hamas’s means of violence previously enjoyed by Political Bureau, and thus gave the Gaza
branch increased maneuverability vis-à-vis the exiled leadership of the organization (Pelham
2012b, 3).
Hamas also needed money to govern.529 But because of the international boycott, aid to the PA
institutions  in  Gaza  had  all  but  dried  up  (Qarmout  and  Béland  2012).  This  had  direct
budgetary consequences for the Hamas government, which had to look for alternative sources
of income to compensate for the shortfall in aid (Milton-Edwards 2007, 308). But tax hikes,
perhaps  the  most  obvious  recourse,  would  have  done  little  to  remedy  the  situation;  the
international boycott had severe ramifications for the tax base in Gaza, as the economy there
was highly dependent on the now reduced flows of international aid.
529 Even if Hamas as an organization had revenues of its own, these were far from sufficient to cover the
expenses of governing and managing the Gaza Strip.
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Paradoxically,  the boycott  and isolation of Gaza indirectly helped the Hamas government
avoid almost certain bankruptcy. In response to the embargo effectuated by Israel and Egypt,
Gazans  had  resorted  to  digging  smuggling  tunnels  into  the  neighboring  and  sparsely
populated Sinai region in Egypt. In 2010 it was estimated that 1 000 such tunnels were in
operation,  employing  some  7 000  people  (Zanotti  2010,  8).  Everything  from  weapons,
construction material,  electronic  appliances,  vehicles,  and livestock are  smuggled through
these tunnels  (Muhaisen and Ahlbäck 2012; Pelham 2012a). By collecting import duties on
goods smuggled through these tunnels, the Hamas government managed to keep afloat and
pay only somewhat reduced wages to its civil servants (ICG 2012, 34; Sayigh 2010).530
A side effect of being in charge of the economy and controlling crucial parts of the financial
flows within Hamas,  however,  was the inevitable accusations of cronyism and corruption
(McGreal 2011). Hamas’s various detractors, and in particular the Fatah government on the
West Bank, would be expected to level such accusations against the organization. And stories
like this one abound:
A Qassam guy [member of Hamas’s military wing] who used to be arrested by PA
intelligence now has several cars and everything he wants. You’re going to take
that from him? There are many interests in the status quo; I remember when those
involved in fuel smuggling through the Rafah tunnels arranged for mortar attacks
against  the  Nahal  Oz  fuel  terminal  bordering  Israel  because  they  didn’t  want
competition  (Egyptian official  interviewed in Cairo, 21 February 2012 by ICG
2012, 35).
Hearsay and accusations from the enemies of Hamas are hardly reliable proof of corruption,
but surveys conducted by the Palestinian branch of Transparency International did indicate
that bribery for public services was widely perceived to be a problem, in particular in areas of
Gaza  traditionally  loyal  to  Fatah  (Aman  2012,  18–19).  There  were  also  indications  that
government corruption was deemed a problem within Hamas,531 prompting some of its leaders
530 The so-called “tunnel economy” was estimated by local bankers in Gaza to have provided Hamas with
income in  the  range of  USD 150–200 million  in  2009  (Sayigh 2010,  6).  Estimates  by an economics
professor relayed in a report by the International Crisis Group in 2012 were a bit more conservative, at
somewhat below USD 100 million per year (ICG 2012, 34).
531 Critical voices were also heard from within the organization. In a leaked letter to the head of the Political
Bureau, Khaled Meshaal,  al-Qassam commander Ahmed Jabari warned that  a faction within the Gaza
leadership  “has taken a liking to governing and tasted its pleasures [and] amasses booty”  (Sayigh 2011,
124).
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to defect.532 In any event, it is considered likely that many of the leaders in Gaza did gain
personally from the spoils of office (ICG 2012, 34).
Notwithstanding  the  validity  of  these  accusations  of  corruption,  the  Hamas  government
remained  fiscally  responsible  and  continued  to  provide  most  public  services  for  its
constituency. According to various in-depth studies, public education  (Brown 2012), health
services (Malka 2012), and policing (Sayigh 2011) were provided at a level comparable to the
pre-2007 situation. In short, the Hamas government secured sufficient revenues from various
sources to continue operating as a statelet in Gaza, despite suffering international boycott and
almost complete isolation.
To summarize, the Hamas government in Gaza essentially robbed the Political Bureau of its
two most important assets for upholding its dominant position, namely control over financial
flows  and  monopoly  over  the  organization’s  means  of  violence.  And  as  control  of  these
crucial  “zones  of  uncertainty”  moved  from  the  Political  Bureau  to  Gaza,  so  did  the
organizational  power  balance.  In  short,  the  Hamas  branch  in  Gaza  became  increasingly
powerful from 2006 onward, and can be said to have obtained factional dominance of Hamas
after the 2007 takeover of Gaza.
  The vertical power struggle—the power of activists
As discussed above, the Hamas government behaved somewhat erratically and unpredictably,
as it tried to balance the immediate aim of remaining in power with its stated goals of resisting
the occupation and enforcing an Islamist order in Gaza. It is argued here that this behavior in
part can be explained by the competing aims of the leadership in Gaza and the activists within
Hamas. In essence, and in line with the moderation thesis, the leadership seemed to prioritize
organizational survival after assuming power, therefore taming their ideological commitments
(Tezcur 2010). However, the Hamas government could not act unencumbered; it had to take
into account the preferences of its rank-and-file to ensure continued internal legitimacy and
organizational survival. In particular, it had to accommodate the activists and believers within
the organization, as  these were the ones who had sacrificed the most  for  Hamas.  And as
theorized,  because  these  organizational  strata  are  expected  to  be  most  invested  in  the
collective identity of the organization, they are also hypothesized to be the most radical and
ideologically committed (May 1973; Panebianco 1988, 26–27).
532 One such defector implicitly compared the behavior of his own organization with that of Fatah, stating that
“[e]ven Hamas does not now represent the people … Four or five years ago we did. But now many are
against Hamas, especially in Gaza” (ICG 2012, 14).
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In addition to the political pragmatists in charge of Hamas, two ideologically and somewhat
overlapping groups can be identified, namely the religious radicals and the militants (Sayigh
2011,  119–20).  Prioritizing  Islamization  and  violent  resistance  respectively,  it  was  these
activist groupings who reined in the pragmatism of the leadership.  Crucially, these groups
partly coincided with the generational cleavages in Hamas, which in turn helps explain why
the infighting along these ideological  and strategic lines  intensified in the years  after  the
takeover  of  Gaza.533 In  a  somewhat  crude  categorization,  the  three  generations  and  their
associated ideological profiles are as follows:
The  first  and  oldest  generation  are  those  who  initially  were  members  of  the  Muslim
Brotherhood.  They have traditionally  been proponents  of  the religious aspect  of  Hamas’s
ideology  (Robinson 1996, 2004). The second generation came to the fore during the first
intifada  and the early Oslo years, and eventually came to prioritize pragmatic politics over
both religious credentials and maximalist territorial claims (Wikileaks cable 2010a). The third
generation were those who rose through the ranks in the latter part of the 1990s and during the
second  intifada.  These  have  been  credited  with  the  re-militarization  of  Hamas,  and
increasingly also associated with a radical interpretation of political Islam (Sayigh 2011, 119–
20).
The  leadership  essentially  belongs  to  the  second-generation  Hamas  cadres;  most  of  the
political  leaders  both  inside  the  occupied  territories  and  abroad  belong  to  this  cohort,
including head of the Political Bureau, Khaled Meshaal, and the Gaza PM, Ishmael Haniye.
By  and  large,  this  generation  has  been  considered  to  be  politically  motivated  and
pragmatically inclined, and have come—at least in part as a product of their elevated position
—to prioritize organizational survival over ideological aims  (Sayigh 2011, 119). Somewhat
simplified, it was these leaders and their preferred policies that were challenged by the first-
and third-generation cadres (Milton-Edwards and Farrell 2010, 127).
The first generation include personalities such as Hamas co-founder Abdel Fatah Dukhan and
former  leader  Dr.  Habbash.  These  Brothers  largely  constitute  the  religious  leadership  of
533 While various authors have advanced the argument about generational cohorts in Hamas (e.g., Robinson
2004), the former speaker of the PLC, Rawhi Fattouh, during communication with the American consulate
in Jerusalem, made an especially strong case for its relevance (Wikileaks cable 2010a). His analysis was
leaked by the whistleblower organization WikiLeaks as part of the so-called Cablegate incident, which saw
the release of 251 287 classified United States diplomatic cables. Various newspapers were involved in the
release  of  these  cables,  including  The  Guardian (http://www.theguardian.com/world/the-us-embassy-
cables),  The  New  York  Times (http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/world/statessecrets.html),  and  Der
Spiegel (http://www.spiegel.de/international/topic/wikileaks_diplomatic_cables/).  WikiLeaks  also
maintains a dedicated site for the release of these cables, found at https://wikileaks.org/cablegate.html.
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Hamas, but for many years they have lacked real influence in day-to-day decision-making
(Wikileaks cable 2010a). As Dr. Habbash explained, he left Hamas exactly because he and his
compatriots  from  the  Brotherhood  days  had  become  sidelined  by  the  second-generation
leaders,  who “are not  religious men” but  “just  use  Islam to achieve political  victories  or
political interests.”534 Importantly, Hamas’s takeover of Gaza further undermined the already
waning  influence  of  this  generation;  the  cost-benefit  analysis  underlying  the  political
pragmatism  adopted  by  the  Hamas  government  was  incompatible  with  the  ethical  and
religious principles advocated by these religious leaders (ICG 2008, 26).
Hamas’s halfhearted attempts to enforce an Islamic order in Gaza, as discussed above, can in
part be explained by the lacking influence of this generation of religious leaders; many of
their  attempts  to  Islamize  Gaza  were  successfully  stopped  by the political  leadership.  As
explained by second generation Hamas leader and speaker of the PLC, Dr. Aziz Dweik,
I was one of the people who asked the Gaza government not to apply sharia rules.
You know they tried to make the ladies inside in Gaza to cover their heads! And I
sent  a message saying this is  the wrong way to approach this  issue!  We need
people to accept the ideology as well as the religion itself from inside; we cannot
hope to convince anybody of the merits  of Islam by imposing it  from the top
down.535
In contrast to the first generation Hamas leaders, those in the third and youngest generation
saw  their  organizational  influence  increase  during  and  after  the  second  intifada.  This
generation is considered to be both the most militant and ideologically radical, and as those
from the  first  generation,  also  skeptical  of  the  political  leadership’s  accommodating  line
(Milton-Edwards and Farrell 2010, 129–30). Most third-generation activists are found among
the rank-and-file and commanders of the al-Qassam Brigades, and include leaders such as
Sheikh Nizar Rayan and Ahmed Jabari (Sayigh 2010, 4). In particular, Ahmed Jabari’s career
in Hamas is considered instructive and typical of the third-generation activists.
Initially a militant activist in Fatah, Jabari was recruited to Hamas while spending time in
Israeli prisons in the early 1990s. It seems likely that he joined Hamas because he—as with
many Fatah activists at the time—was unhappy with the accommodating line adopted by the
534 Interviewed in Ramallah, May 27, 2011.
535 Interviewed in Hebron, April 13, 2011.
287
Fatah leadership during the Oslo process.536 Steadily rising through the ranks of the al-Qassam
Brigades after his release in 1995, Jabari was eventually made operational head of Hamas’s
armed wing in 2002. From this position he planned a number of the most lethal suicide attacks
Hamas carried out inside Israel during the second intifada (Ginsburg 2012). Jabari has also
been credited as the mastermind behind the kidnapping of Gilad Shalit in 2006, and as the
strategist leading Hamas to victory over Fatah in the 2007 intra-Palestinian war over Gaza
(AFP 2011).
Jabari belonged to the first of a number of waves of new recruits in Hamas’s history that have
largely been  absorbed by the al-Qassam Brigades  (Argo 2004; Hroub 2004). And many of
these recruits joined to actively resist the occupation, not necessarily because they believed in
the  political  project  pursued by the leadership,  or  the  traditional  Islamist  ideology of  the
Muslim Brotherhood. It should also be reiterated that the al-Qassam Brigades was established
as a  distinct  and partly isolated organizational  unit  within Hamas,  complete with its  own
infrastructure and command structures. By design, it was intended to operate autonomously
from the political leadership (ICG 2007, 27).537 While such an organizational structure made
sense  as  long  as  Hamas  remained  a  liberation  movement,  it  was  incompatible  with  the
governing efforts of Hamas. In the words of Hamas MP Dr. Daraghme, “Hamas is responsible
for the lives of people in Gaza, and therefore we have to make truce with Israel. This means
there will be a contradiction between the ideology of resistance and the political program in
Gaza.”538 
Because  of  the  dominant  position  of  second-generation  Hamas  leaders,  their  pragmatic
political  program  took  precedence  over  this  ideology  of  resistance.  Consequently,  the
al-Qassam Brigades was asked to comply with the various short- and medium-term ceasefire
agreements  with  Israel  (Esposito  2010,  196,  2012,  237).  Although  some  “mistakes  were
made” by the militants (Ma’an 2008), most complied with the decisions made by the political
leadership.539 Given their commitment to violent resistance, the militants were naturally loath
to see their role in Hamas be sidelined; by upholding the ceasefires and moratoriums, the
al-Qassam Brigades thus demonstrated a high degree of discipline.540
536 See section A new composition: persecution, recruitment, and defection on pp. 171ff.
537 Note, however, that it for long has been widely assumed that the al-Qassam Brigades take its instructions
from the Political Bureau (Hroub 2006b, 121–22).
538 Interviewed in Ramallah, April 10, 2011.
539 The  previously  discussed  kidnapping  of  Gilad  Shalit  is  a  prime  example  of  how  Hamas’s  role  as
government clashed with its role as resistance movement.
540 It should be mentioned that rogue elements from the third-generation activists have been accused of taking
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A number of al-Qassam fighters did, however, leave Hamas because of the moderate line
adopted by the government  (Sayigh 2011, 124).  These defectors left not only because they
had been relegated to conduct border patrols instead of actively resisting the occupation, but
also  because  many  of  them were  adherents  of  Salafism,  a  radical  interpretation of  Islam
characterized by its  literal  reading of  the Koran  (Milton-Edwards and Farrell  2010,  129).
Similar to the religious leaders from the first generation, these  Salafists  were disappointed
with their government’s halfhearted efforts to enforce an Islamist order in Gaza  (ICG 2011,
19).  Those  who  left  Hamas  often  joined  one  of  the  smaller  Salafi  movements  that  had
surfaced in Gaza since the early 2000s.541 Most of these groups opposed Hamas for its lack of
religiosity,  and  many  also  actively  resisted  Israel  in  breach  of  the  various  ceasefire
agreements.542
In sum, the second-generation Hamas leaders in charge faced a number of organizational
challengers after  assuming control  of  Gaza.  While in opposition,  Hamas capitalized from
allowing for a wide range of divergent opinions to co-exist, as this meant it could recruit and
draw support from various constituencies. But once in position, Hamas could no longer “let a
thousand flowers bloom;” to stay in power and actually deliver on some of its promises, it had
to prioritize some aims over others, promising to disappoint not only a part of the electorate,
but  also activists  within the  organization.  And while  Hamas in  Gaza  indeed lost  popular
support  and  legitimacy  throughout  the  period  in  question  as  it  became  increasingly
authoritarian,543 it remained unchallenged and in firm control for the same reason. Rather than
from the electorate, then, the main challenge came from within the organization.
And the main challengers were the third-generation militant Salafists.544 Disatisified with both
the  accommodating line  adopted by their  government  vis-à-vis  Israel  and the  halfhearted
efforts to enforce an Islamist order in Gaza, some of these activists defected, and many of
those who stayed became increasingly vocal in their disapproval of the middle-of-the-road
it upon themselves to enforce an Islamist order in Gaza (ICG 2008, 16).
541 See Milton-Edwards (2014) for a thorough explication of the various Islamist groups operating in Gaza.
542 A plethora of such groups exist, including the al-Qaeda sympathizers in Jund Ansar Allah, which Hamas
tried to violently close down in 2009  (Ma’an 2009b), and the more nationalistic umbrella organization
Jaljalat, made up of movements such as the Swords of Truth Brigade, the Shari’a Council of the Army of
Islam, the Salafi-Islamic Jama’ah, and the Islamic Liberation Army (Ganor 2013, 123). See Cragin (2009)
for an analysis of the ideological differences between Hamas and those sympathetic to al-Qaeda. 
543 See Figure 9 on page 255.
544 The power struggle between the Political Bureau and the leadership in Gaza will probably also continue to
affect  the  organizational  and  ideological  development  of  Hamas.  Also,  the  first  generation  Brothers
continue to exercise a limited but crucial influence, pushing for further Islamization of Gaza.
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pragmatism  adopted  by  their  government.  The  rising  influence  of  these  third-generation
radicals thus pose a serious dilemma of the “damned if you do, damned if you don’t” type for
Hamas; if the leadership stay their course, they risk losing additional activists to the  Salafi
groups,  which  means  losing  its  most  committed  members  to  the  opposition.  But  by
accommodating  the  third-generation  activists,  Hamas  risks  not  only  provoking  the  more
moderate rank-and-file, but also losing additional popular support and domestic legitimacy, as
well as any hopes of gaining international recognition. 
In short, whichever response the leadership opts for, it will inevitably provoke protests and
discontent within the organization.  The way in which the Hamas leadership responds to or
manages to contain the challenges posed by the third-generation radicals will  thus have a
direct bearing on the future nature of  the organization. In the end, the particular ideological
nature  of  the  intra-Hamas  faction  that  comes  out  on top will  have  consequences  for the
willingness  and  ability  of  the  organization  to  reconcile  with  Fatah,  reunite  the  two
“Palestines,” and eventually become part of the negotiations with Israel (Sayigh 2011, 127).545
 7.3 The triple roles of Hamas—government, statelet, and liberation
movement
Based on the above analyses, it is concluded that, despite assuming office in 2006 and ruling
the Gaza Strip as the sole authority since 2007, Hamas did not complete its transmutation
from  movement  to  party  by  2011;  neither  its  ideology  nor  its  organizational  structure
developed sufficiently away from the logic of a liberation movement toward that of a political
party. For one, its erratic and contradictory behavior in government revealed a lack of the
ideological  and  strategic  consistency  expected  from a  party  in  government.  Rather  than
articulating a coherent political program, Hamas instead fell back on what Ezbidi has argued
is  its  “default  position  of  ambiguity  on  key  issues”  (2013,  104).546 And  second,  its
organizational structure remained underdeveloped and ill-suited for governing (Younis 2012).
Although Hamas tried to rectify its deficient decision-making procedures, unclear divisions of
responsibility  between its  various  leadership  bodies  remained,  and  certain  activist  groups
exercised a degree of influence that threatened to destabilize the organization.
545 The experience of Hamas thus resembles that of other Islamist movements obtaining power. As argued by
al-Anani, the responsibility of government threatens the “organizational cohesiveness and discipline that
seemed to characterize Islamist movements” (2012, 469).
546 According to Ezbidi, Hamas resorted to such ambiguity in an attempt to “maintain the movement’s internal
unity and to preserve its rule in Gaza” (2013, 104).
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Importantly,  Hamas’s  arrested  transmutation  had  consequences  for  its  behavior  in
government. Its legacy as a religious liberation movement remained such a crucial marker of
organizational  identity  that  it  arguably  led  Hamas  to  govern  Gaza  with  “a  movement’s
mentality,” which in turn sped up the “evolution of a ‘party state,’ where the government is
seriously confused with the political movement”  (Younis 2012). So, not only did confusion
reign supreme regarding where the Hamas  organization ended and the Hamas  government
began, but also the demarcation lines between the organization as such and the statelet of
Gaza were unclear.
Ostensibly,  Hamas  had  ambitions  of  avoiding  this  confusion.547 To  achieve  this,  Hamas
initially required that anyone taking up a government position had to resign their leadership
position within the movement (Brown 2012, 15). However, whether this requirement ever was
honored is difficult to say, for it was abandoned early on. As is often the case for political
parties  in  government,  ministers  from  Hamas  capitalized  on  their  positions,  translating
government  power  into  organizational  power  (Ware  1995,  349).  It  is  well  known,  for
example,  that Ishmael Haniye, by nature of his position as prime minister, also became a
powerful movement leader (Brown 2012, 16).
Crucially, such dual roles gave rise to dual loyalties, which in turn exacerbated the already
intensifying power struggle between the Hamas government in Gaza and the Political Bureau
in Damascus. For, as detailed above, after taking over the Gaza Strip in 2007, the Hamas
leadership there effectively broke the monopoly previously enjoyed by the Political Bureau
over  important  policy  portfolios,  such  as  diplomatic  relations  and military  and  economic
decision-making  (Pelham 2012b, 3). And as the Hamas leaders in Gaza enjoyed increasing
organizational influence, they curbed the maneuverability of the Political Bureau.
The dual roles and loyalties of the Hamas leaders in Gaza, combined with unclear divisions of
responsibilities  between  the  various  organizational  units  within  Hamas,  led  to  conflicting
interpretations of authority and mandates.  In particular, with regard to various attempts to
achieve national reconciliation with Fatah, the unclear mandate and internal squabbles within
Hamas had a negative bearing; whereas the Political Bureau officially remained the topmost
executive body within Hamas, and thus was mandated to negotiate with Fatah, the leadership
in  Gaza  proved  powerful  enough  to  stop  the  implementation  of  national  reconciliation
547 At least  in  part,  this  was motivated by the need for  Hamas to  prove that  it  could  do better  than the
Fatah-PLO-PA nexus, which for long had drawn severe criticism for failing to distinguish between its
various roles as proto-state, government, liberation organization, and political party.
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agreements negotiated by Khaled Meshaal on behalf of the movement (ICG 2012, 18).548 
By and large, the Hamas leadership in Gaza pointed to differences in ideology and strategy as
the major sticking points; reconciliation with Fatah would entail admissions along the line of
the Quartet Principles, i.e.,  recognition of Israel, adherence to previous agreements, and the
renunciation of violence. It would also mean integration of Hamas into the PLO, decisions
regarding the functioning of the PA, and, crucially, a joint Palestinian security strategy, in turn
implying a unification of the various factional security services. And while the Gaza branch
ostensibly  could  agree  to  some  of  these  points,  they  complained  that  they  had  not  been
sufficiently consulted during the negotiation process,  and thus that  the agreements  lacked
internal legitimacy (ICG 2012, 18).549 
Although lack of  internal  legitimacy,  differences in  ideology,  and disagreements  over  the
preferred strategy all might explain part of the reason why the Gaza branch proved reluctant
to agree to the reconciliation attempts,  it  seems likely that  these were mostly convenient
excuses hiding the real rationale behind their intransigence. For, the organizational interests of
the  Gaza  branch  and  the  Political  Bureau  diverged  at  the  most  basic  levels;  the  former
prioritized self-preservation and entrenchment of their authority in Gaza, whereas the latter
pursued national unity as a way to reclaim organizational dominance (Pelham 2012b, 3–4).550
Crucially, because of the failure to distinguish between Hamas the organization and Hamas
the government, the Gaza branch had obtained sufficient organizational clout to secure that
their  interests  were  not  encroached  upon.  If  the  ministers  in  Gaza  had  given  up  their
leadership positions within the organization as was initially intended, the Political Bureau
would probably have retained its dominant position.
In short, such a confusion of roles and mandates is strongly suggestive of an organizational
order insufficiently developed to bear the responsibility of real power and authority. Lacking
an established division of labor between the various leadership bodies, and without vertical
command  structures  being  honored  by  the  different  organizational  units,  the  divergent
interests of the Hamas leadership in Gaza and the Political Bureau were allowed not only to
play  out  and  affect  the  political  development  in  occupied  Palestine,  but  also  become
548 Note that Hamas leaders on the West Bank at times were also skeptical toward the reconciliation line
adopted by the exiled leadership (ICG 2012, 33).
549 The  respective  aspects  of  the  reconciliation  process  have  been  covered  by  various  scholars.  See  in
particular Tuastad (2013), Challand (2009), PASSIA (2013), and Ezbidi (2013).
550 In most reconciliation scenarios, the Hamas government would be replaced by a national unity government
populated with technocrats.
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increasingly entrenched, promising to remain a source of division for the time being.
Of course, the regional, domestic, and organizational developments might eventually force
Hamas  to  shed  the  mantle  of  resistance  and  continue  its  transmutation  toward  a  proper
political party (ICG 2012, 36).551 However, Hamas has managed to cling onto power in Gaza
in  the  face  of  domestic  discontent  and  decreasing  popularity,  international  boycott  and
territorial isolation, as well as the discussed organizational dilemmas and power struggles.
And  although  there  is  little  reason  to  believe  that  Hamas  has  abandoned  its  goals  of  a
liberated, Islamist Palestine, its overriding priority seems clearly to be the consolidation and
entrenchment  of  authority  and  territorial  control  of  Gaza,  and  continued  organizational
survival  (Sayigh 2011, 122).  In conclusion, Hamas seems to have reached an awkward but
apparently sustainable equilibrium between that of a liberation movement, a governing party,
and a party-state (Brown 2012, 15).
 7.4 Hamas’s level of institutionalization in 2011
As in previous chapters, the above analyses, supplemented with data from interviews and the
existing literature, form the basis for the following brief assessment of Hamas’s degree of
institutionalization at the end of the period in question, as measured in the four elements of
systemness, decisional autonomy, value infusion, and reification.
It is pertinent to note that being in power is assumed to affect the degree of institutionalization
for any given party. More specifically, being in power is expected to strain the degree of
systemness, exposing potential weak points in the routinization of the organization, whereas
the  decisional  autonomy probably  increase  when an  organization  obtains  real  power  and
access to the organizational and financial resources of office. In terms of value infusion, being
in office might lead to decreased organizational cohesion, as the governing party is forced to
make unpopular decisions. And finally,  being in power is  expected to increase or at  least
cement the degree to which a party is reified in the public imagination.
551 The end of the Israeli occupation would probably be a condition for Hamas to renounce its resistance
ideology.
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 7.4.1  Systemness
By 2011, Hamas’s level of systemness is seen as having remained more or less at the same
medium level as at the end of the second  intifada.  While a number of indicators, such as
becoming increasingly financially self-reliant, pointed in a positive direction,552 certain crucial
indicators patently indicated decreased systemness, most importantly the lack of routinization
in Hamas’s decision-making procedures revealed by its erratic behavior while in government.
Although data on Hamas’s financial situation traditionally have been scattered and unreliable,
this changed after it assumed office, as large parts of its budget became a matter of public
record.553 According to figures compiled by the Israeli domestic intelligence service, Shin Bet,
Hamas’s budget in 2010 totaled to some USD 390 million, divided between USD 200 million
for  government  operating  expenses,  USD  50  million  for  Hamas’s  civilian  and  political
organization,  and  USD  40  million  for  its  military  wing  (Wikileaks  cable  2010b).
Corroborating these figures, sources quoted in a report by the Palestinian newspaper  Ma’an
claimed that Hamas’s 2012 budget was around USD 540 million, a 13-fold increase since its
USD 40 million budget in 2005 (Ma’an 2011).
And while it  is  difficult  to trace the source of this money,  it  is clear that  being in office
provided the Hamas government with new sources of revenue. And even if various accounts
and speculations point in contradictory directions,554 it seems likely that Hamas did increase
its level of financial self-reliance after assuming office, and thereby decreased its dependency
on international sponsors.
However,  and  as  explicated  in  the  above  discussions  regarding  Hamas’s  organizational
developments while in power, both its decision-making procedures and command structures
were found wanting, indicating a decreased level of routinization. Its leaders in Gaza were
forced to improvise when faced with various challenges, as the topmost leadership proved
incapable of responding in time to rapidly escalating situations. And while the new Executive
Committee was established to rectify this organizational deficiency, it was too little, too late;
the  Gaza  branch  had,  by  way  of  its  access  to  financial  and  organizational  resources  in
government, obtained factional dominance and refused to let the exiled leadership continue to
552 Arranging internal elections is also indicative of routinization and thus systemness.
553 Given that Hamas had not completed its transmutation to a political party, certain budget posts nevertheless
remained secret.
554 According to Hamas leader Salah Bardawil, Iranian funding had, for example, decreased steadily from
2009 onward (quoted in ICG 2012, 10, fn. 83). Others sources, e.g., Sayigh, claims that the opposite was
the case, and that Iran increased its support for Hamas after its takeover of Gaza (2011, 18), 
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dictate the direction of Hamas. This was in breach of the assumed division of responsibility
between the government and the Political Bureau, as the former ostensibly was subjugated to
the latter. In short, the leadership of Hamas the organization had too little influence to force
the Hamas in government to comply with the formal organizational order. And such unclear
divisions of responsibility and defunct command structures are strongly suggestive of a lack
of systemness.555 In sum, these negative indicators  cancel  out  the positive ones,  and it  is
concluded that Hamas did not overall increase its level of systemness by 2011.
 7.4.2  Decisional autonomy
Although Hamas at times behaved erratically and incoherently throughout its first five years
in power, this was not due to the lack of decisional autonomy. As discussed, Hamas’s degree
of systemness, and in particular its routinization, was insufficiently developed to meet the
challenges of governing, which in turn helps explain this behavior. In short, it is argued that
Hamas’s  degree  of  decisional  autonomy  increased  to  a  high  level  by  2011,  despite  the
contradictory behavior.
In particular, its relationship with Iran has often been used to discredit Hamas’s autonomy.
However, while Iran for long has been suspected to be Hamas’s main sponsor, and probably
continued to provide crucial support after it assumed office, there is little to suggest undue
interference.  In short,  it  is  assumed that  Hamas’s relationship with Iran is  one of tactical
convenience, not ideological conviction, and consequently that the influence exercised by Iran
on Hamas is limited (Løvlie and Knudsen 2013, 57). As long as the interests of Hamas and
Iran  do  not  diverge,  there  is  little  to  suggest  that  its  dependence  on  Iran  will  affect  its
decisional autonomy. And if or when their interests do begin to diverge, Hamas has can rely
on the support of other sponsors, for example Qatar, and thus probably retain large parts of its
decisional autonomy.
Furthermore, and as also argued above, Hamas’s new role as a governing party reduced its
dependence  on  external  sponsors  and  thus  increased  its  decisional  autonomy.  The
organizational and financial resources made available to Hamas as the sole authority in Gaza
decreased its reliance on external sponsors, and conversely undermined any influence such
actors might have had.
555 Along similar lines, the intensity and mentioned consequences of the vertical power struggles also suggest
that Hamas was not sufficiently routinized organizationally to manage the challenges of government. 
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 7.4.3  Value infusion
In terms of value infusion, certain crucial indicators pointed in a negative direction. In short,
Hamas suffered increased defections after assuming office. And organizational cohesion is
arguably the litmus test of value infusion, measured as the degree to which the rank-and-file
remain loyal and disciplined after the leadership has made unpopular decisions. In particular,
the degree to which an organization is infused with value is tested if central elements of the
organizational ideology and identity are challenged.
As demonstrated throughout this chapter, the Hamas government did exactly that; both with
regard to resistance and Islam, the two core components of its  ideology and identity,  the
Hamas government essentially broke with its stated aims. Hamas refrained from upsetting the
established political order and did not actively work to Islamize Gaza. While the rationale
behind this was sound, as Hamas probably rightfully calculated that it would suffer both an
international  and  a  domestic  backlash  had  it  enforced  an  Islamist  order,  its  religiously
motivated cadres were naturally disappointed. Consequently, a number of the younger radicals
left. And rather than actively resisting the occupation, Hamas brokered ceasefires with Israel,
and also enforced unilateral moratoriums on fighting. This, in turn, proved unpopular with
parts of Hamas’s military apparatus, prompting additional defections (Sayigh 2011, 124).
Given the fact that Hamas was established as a strongly ideological social-religious liberation
movement, there are limits as to how much value it can be infused with, i.e., how much of its
ideological  legacy  it  can  leave  behind  without  losing  its  religiously  and  nationalistically
motivated members. It should, nevertheless, be noted that the problem posed by the defections
did not threaten the organization as such; there was never any chance that Hamas would not
survive as an organization despite adopting overly pragmatic and moderate positions on key
issues. Although the defections could be taken to suggest that Hamas’s level of value infusion
decreased, the fact that not more of its rank-and-file defected when the leadership so glaringly
broke with its stated aims indicate rather that it remained infused with value to a medium
degree.
 7.4.4  Reification
As for reification, the relevant indicators pointed largely in a positive direction; as the second
most powerful political faction in Palestine and the sole authority in the Gaza Strip, Hamas
was  arguably  highly  reified,  i.e,  its  existence  was  established  in  the  public  imagination.
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Despite Hamas’s erratic behavior, its position in the Palestinian public opinion as the major
Islamist liberation movement arguably remains secure.
It  is,  nevertheless, pertinent to note that Hamas did lose support throughout the period in
question,556 suggesting that its high degree of reification was under threat. And more crucially,
as indicated in  Figure 11, Hamas seemingly had lost its appeal to the increasing number of
Palestinians identifying primarily as Muslims. Although part of this can be accounted for as
the  cost  of  office,  it  seems likely  that  the  rise  of  various  Salafi  movements  undermined
Hamas’s near monopoly as the prime proponent of political Islam. This point should not be
overstated, however, as the question of reification is not about positive valence, but public
recognition. As such, loss of support and increasing number of competitors are not sufficient
to degrade Hamas from a high to a medium level of reification.
Figure 11: Religiosity and support for Hamas, 2007–2011
(Source: NEC 2010, 2011; PSR 2011).
In sum,  Hamas scored medium on both systemness and value infusion, and high on both
decisional autonomy and reification. Hamas was still recognized both by its supporters and
competitors as a force to be reckoned with, and it enjoyed a high degree of autonomy from its
556 See Figure 9 on page 255 for details on Hamas’s decline in the polls.
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environment with little proof that any external actors influenced its decisions. Hamas also
proved to be somewhat well organized, although the demands of government revealed that its
systemness—in particular with regard to routinization—was at a lower level than expected.
Being in government also had a cost for Hamas’s level of value infusion, as a number of its
activists defected in protest of its pragmatic and moderate behavior. Overall, it is concluded
that Hamas had reached a medium to high level of institutionalization after its first six years
in  power,  and  as  such  was  well  positioned  to  retain  its  role  at  the  center  of  Palestinian
domestic politics for the coming years.
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Chapter 8:  Conclusion
The aim of this dissertation has been to analyze the development of Hamas as a case of party
institutionalization.  It  was  advanced  in  the  introductory  chapter  that  such  theoretically
grounded analysis would contribute to an improved understanding of how Hamas developed
from its modest beginnings to the political force it is today.557
The overarching finding of the thesis is that Hamas’s development from its establishment as
the armed wing of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1987 to the governing body of the Gaza Strip
in 2011 closely followed the trajectory hypothesized by the theories employed, even if it has
yet to complete its transmutation from movement to party and instead reached an awkward
but  somewhat  institutionalized  equilibrium  between  that  of  a liberation  movement,  a
governing party, and a party-statelet. That Hamas has neither completed its transmutation into
a political party, nor institutionalized further, does not detract from the explanatory power of
the applied theories or the relevance of the findings; the theories have aided the analyses in
providing  a  de-exoticized  account  of  Hamas’s  development,  adding  nuance  to  the  extant
knowledge, as well as demonstrating that the theories employed can yield interesting findings
when applied outside their intended scope, provided that the need for contextual sensitivity is
properly appreciated.
To conclude the thesis, this chapter will set out with a summary of the analyses and findings
from the previous four chapters. First, the sequential element of the analysis will be covered,
i.e., the development of Hamas from its roots in the Muslim Brotherhood movement to its
establishment as a movement organization, and then on to the transmutation phase toward a
political party. Then follows a short section briefly detailing Hamas’s fluctuating but steadily
increasing degree of institutionalization. Next, a section purporting to explain the reasons for
Hamas’s arrested development is provided, including brief discussions on the applicability of
the theories employed, the ramifications of the occupation for the quality of the data used, and
certain context-specific reasons for Hamas’s state in 2011. Finally, the chapter ends with a
section briefly outlining the developments in occupied Palestine since 2011, looking at how
Hamas has handled the Arab Spring and the Israeli bombardment of Gaza in 2014, with a
specific view on how the findings of the thesis holds up.
557 Contribute and improve are the key words here, as it was recognized that the extant literature already has
mapped out and detailed crucial aspects of the history, development, and current state of Hamas.
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 8.1 Summary of findings
To analyze  the  development  of  Hamas  from  its  establishment  as  the  armed  wing  of  the
Muslim Brotherhood during the early stages of the first intifada to that of a governing party in
Gaza by 2011, an analytical framework combining theories of  social movements and party
institutionalization  was  adopted.  Theoretically,  the  process  was  divided  into  five  phases,
tracing Hamas from its roots in the Muslim Brotherhood movement to its establishment as a
social  movement  organization,  and  then  following  its  transmutation  process  from  social
movement  organization  to  political  party,  followed  by  the  three  phases  party
institutionalization, i.e., identification, organization, and stabilization.  As noted, no  a priori
thresholds  between these  phases  could  be  expected;  in  particular,  the  transmutation  from
social movement organization to political party overlapped with both the identification and
organization phase of the institutionalization process. Anticipating this, and given the need for
contextual sensitivity, the longitudinal comparison was organized according to the political
development in occupied Palestine.
At the most  basic levels,  the analyses focused on Hamas’s ideological  and organizational
developments.  Both  the  social  movement  literature  and  the  theories  dealing  with  party
institutionalization focus on and expect changes in these dimensions as political organizations
develop.  More  specifically,  it  is  commonly  hypothesized  that  as  political  organizations
develop, they go from being vehicles for pursuing some political aim to becoming ends in
themselves, i.e., they institutionalize. And as they do this, they tend to moderate ideologically
and formalize organizationally. Note that such a development seldom is linear, and as was
discussed at some length in chapter 5, organizations with a legacy of violence such as Hamas
might  develop  somewhat  differently  at  certain  stages.  Theoretically,  however,  the  overall
tendency  was  expected  to  be  that  of  ideological  moderation  and  organizational
bureaucratization.
 8.1.1  The first intifada—Hamas emerging
Chapter 4 covered the emergence of Hamas as a movement organization, based partly on the
account  provided  by  Robinson  (2004) and  supplemented  with  primary  data  and  original
research.  In  short,  the  analysis  found  that  by  the  end  of  the  first  intifada,  Hamas  had
successfully established itself as  the  religiously motivated Palestinian liberation movement,
albeit with an underdeveloped and weak organization.
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It is noteworthy that Hamas’s establishment and rapid rise to prominence had all but been
predicted  by  scholars.  Shadid  and Seltzer  concluded  their  analysis  of  the  rise  of  Islamic
fundamentalism in Palestine in the 1980s by cautioning that if the political strategy of the
PLO  failed to “produce tangible results” their  support  could be transferred to the Islamic
movement, which for its part “undoubtedly would shift its strategy to armed struggle and
violent confrontation with Israel” (1989, 297–8). And in her analysis of Hamas’s first years,
Taraki argued that both the establishment of the organization and its participation in the first
intifada  “should best be seen as part of the campaign of a prospective opposition Islamist
party in the future Palestinian state,” adding that “there is no doubt that Hamas should be
taken seriously” (1989, 177).
Both the emergence and rise of Hamas, then, was partly ascribed to its roots in the Muslim
Brotherhood; for one, Hamas inherited an almost ready-made ideology from the Brotherhood,
and  second,  this  ideology  found  a  ready  and  waiting  constituency  among  the  increasing
numbers  of  religious  Palestinians.  Added to  this,  Hamas  played  an important  role  in  the
intifada, which also helped elevate and cement its stature as a major resistance movement in
the opinion of the Palestinian public.
Although Hamas suffered persecution at the hands of the Israeli forces throughout the first
intifada,  the  young  movement  survived  the  onslaught  by  restructuring  and
compartmentalizing its organizational structure. And while Hamas emerged organizationally
weak at the end of the intifada, it had successfully established itself as a viable alternative to
the  PLO,  with  a  clear  identity  as  the  largest  religiously  motivated  Palestinian  liberation
organization.
 8.1.2  The Oslo years—commence transmutation
Chapter  5  detailed Hamas’s  development  during the  Oslo  years,  and found that  although
Hamas  responded  both  ideologically  and  organizationally  to  the  various  environmental
changes and challenges and began its  development in the direction of a political  party,  it
remained more of a movement organization at the end of the period.
In essence, the latter half of the 1990s saw Hamas suffer intense persecution at the hands of
both the PA and Israel, forcing it to prioritize survival over politics. Combined with its dual
legacies as a militant  and religious movement, this prioritization prompted Hamas to turn
reactive  rather  than  proactive  with  regard  to  both  its  ideological  and  organizational
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development.  In  short,  Hamas  struggled  to  retain  its  identity  as  a  religiously  motivated
liberation movement simultaneously as the Palestinian political system developed toward the
logic of party politics.
While  a  tendency  toward  the  hypothesized  ideological  moderation  was  detected,  the
indicators were not conclusive; although Hamas downplayed some of its most radical goals
and opened for increased pragmatism, it was still officially committed to the establishment of
an Islamist state in the whole of historic Palestine. Such an  ambiguous ideological rhetoric
was partly explained by Hamas’s poor organizational state. Persecution of its rank-and-file,
combined  with  its  federated  and  stratified  organizational  structure,  led  to  intensified
factionalism,  which  in  turn  undermined  its  organizational  cohesion  and  decision-making
procedures.  This  state  of  affairs  led  to  infighting  among  its  various  leadership  branches,
infighting which turned rather public both when Hamas decided to boycott the 1996 PLC
elections and with respect to its interim vs. long-term aims.558
In brief, Hamas did begin on its transmutation from movement to party in the latter half of the
1990s,  but  the  effect  of  the  harsh  conditions  of  the  Oslo  years,  combined  with  its  dual
legacies, account for why it did not come very far in this process. By boycotting the 1996
PLC elections, and failing both to develop its organization and to unite behind a consistent
ideological  message,  it  was  therefore  concluded  that  Hamas  still  remained  more  of  a
movement organization than a political party at the end of the 1990s.
 8.1.3  The second intifada—ideological pragmatism, organizational maturity
The  analysis  in  chapter  6  demonstrated—somewhat  counter-intuitively—that  Hamas
continued to develop both ideologically and organizationally in the direction of a political
party throughout the years of the second intifada. On the face of it, the political opportunity
structures during the violent second intifada would favor the radical elements in Hamas, i.e.,
those that subscribed to an absolutist and maximalist ideology and preferred armed resistance
as the main strategy.
Instead, Hamas came to finally adopt a coherent and rather pragmatic ideology, largely void
of  both  religious  absolutism  and  territorial  maximalism.  By  demoting  the  status  of  its
founding Charter and eventually adopting the interim solution along the 1967 borders as its
558 The interim aims would allow for a temporary solution to the conflict with Israel along the 1967 borders,
whereas the long-term goals of Hamas remained that of erecting an Islamist state in the whole of historic
Palestine.
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official position, Hamas took important steps in its transmutation from the ideological rigidity
of a movement to the pragmatism and ideological elasticity of a party. Also organizationally,
Hamas proved to have routinized and matured; despite losing a number of important leaders
to Israel’s assassination policy, its leadership emerged united at the end of the second intifada,
capable of enforcing discipline in its rank-and-file while radically altering its political strategy
by taking part  in  the  elections to the  PLC.  Both ideologically  and organizationally,  then,
Hamas spent the years of the second  intifada  inching closer to the behavior of a political
party.
And Hamas’s decision to contest the 2006 elections to the PLC could have been seen as the
final  step  of  this  process,  as  participating  in  elections  is  widely  considered  a  defining
characteristic  of  political  parties.  However,  it  soon  became  apparent  that  Hamas  had
miscalculated its own strength and popularity and the weakness of Fatah; instead of willingly
assuming office when it suddenly and unexpectedly found itself as winners of the elections,
Hamas expressed reservations and reluctance to fulfill its role as a responsible and mature
political party. As such, it was concluded that Hamas stopped short of having completed its
transmutation  from  movement  to  party  by  the  end  of  second  intifada.  It  was  still  too
influenced by the operational logic and identity of a movement organization to be considered
a political party.
 8.1.4  In power—between government and resistance
Chapter 7 analyzed Hamas’s development from its electoral victory in 2006 to the spread of
the  Arab Spring to  occupied Palestine  in  2011.  The analysis  demonstrated  that,  although
Hamas  assumed  office  in  2006  and  ruled  the  Gaza  Strip  as  the  sole—and  increasingly
authoritarian—authority  since  2007,  it  had  still  not  completed  its  transmutation  from
movement to party by 2011; neither its ideology nor its organizational structure developed
sufficiently away from the logic of a liberation movement toward that of a political party.
In summary, its erratic and contradictory behavior while in government revealed a lack of the
ideological  and  strategic  consistency  expected  from a  party  in  government.  Rather  than
articulating and pursuing a coherent political program, Hamas instead fell back on its “default
position  of  ambiguity  on  key  issues”  (Ezbidi  2013,  104).  Furthermore,  its  organizational
structure  remained  underdeveloped  and  ill-suited  for  governing;  unclear  divisions  of
responsibility  between  its  various  leadership  bodies  led  to  inconsistent  rhetoric,  erratic
behavior, and factionalism, whereas the influence of certain activist groups within Hamas at
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times threatened to destabilize the organization.
In  part,  Hamas’s  lackluster  performance  in  government  was  explained  by  its  failure  or
unwillingness to discard its identity as a religious liberation organization; without leaving the
operational logic and organizational identity as a movement behind, Hamas came to govern
Gaza as a movement and not as a party, which in turn led it to confuse the Hamas government
with the Hamas  movement. Added to this, the lines between the organization itself and the
statelet of Gaza became increasingly blurred.
In  addition,  power  struggles  between  various  leadership  branches  intensified  following
Hamas’s  ascent  to  power;  the  leaders  in  Gaza  were  the  ones  that  filled  the  government
positions  and  then  used  their  newly  won  power  to  seize  control  over  certain  zones  of
uncertainty previously held by the Political Bureau, such as external relations, command of
the military forces, and economic decision-making and fund-raising. In essence, the Hamas
government undermined the formal organizational hierarchy, leading to the conclusion that
the organization was  insufficiently developed to bear the responsibility of real power and
authority. Lacking an established division of labor between the various leadership bodies, and
without vertical command structures being honored by the different organizational units, the
divergent interests of the Hamas leadership in Gaza and the Political Bureau were allowed to
play out and affect both the political development in occupied Palestine and effectively block
the further development of Hamas.
However,  Hamas managed to cling to  power  in Gaza in  the face of  domestic  discontent,
international  boycott  and  territorial  isolation,  and  organizational  dilemmas  and  power
struggles.  While  there  is  little  reason  to  believe  that  Hamas  has  abandoned  its  religious
ideology and goal of liberating occupied Palestine,  its overriding priority in 2011 seemed
clearly to be that of consolidation and entrenchment of its authority and territorial control of
Gaza,  and  of  course  continued  organizational  survival.  Based  on  these  findings,  it  was
concluded  that  by  2011,  Hamas  had  reached  an  awkward  but  apparently  sustainable
equilibrium between that of liberation movement, political party, and party-statelet.
 8.1.5  Hamas’s level of institutionalization through the years
While the sequential element of the analytical framework made up the brunt of the analyses,
i.e., the institutionalization process of Hamas from movement to movement organization and
onward in the direction of a political party, each analytical chapter offered a measurement of
304
its degree of institutionalization at the end of the respective period covered. According to the
analytical  framework  employed,  institutionalization  as  a  property  is  defined  as  an
organization’s structural and attitudinal qualities in its internal and external dimensions, i.e.,
systemness, decisional autonomy, value infusion, and reification.
Relying on these four elements of institutionalization, the level of Hamas’s systemness in
each  period  was  scored  according  to  the  degree  to  which  it  had  routinized  leadership
alternation and decision-making procedures both formally and informally,  how closely its
bylaws  were  followed,  and  the  degree  to  which  it  was  financially  and  materially
self-sufficient. Its level of value infusion was measured through its degree of party cohesion,
i.e., how disciplined its members remained in the face of unpopular decisions taken by the
leadership, whereas its level of decisional autonomy was measured through investigations of
the nature of its relationship with and number of external sponsors. Finally, the degree to
which popular support  for Hamas fluctuated, and whether  its  political  opponents  came to
recognize it as a serious contender, indicated its level of reification.559
For want of higher quality data, the analysis of Hamas’s degree of institutionalization was
measured on an ordinal  scale from  low  to  high,  and without making any claims of score
comparability. Although this means that the assessments were rather rough and subjective, the
scores do provide a clear picture of the changing degree to which Hamas had institutionalized
in the various periods of analysis.
  Hamas’s degree of institutionalization at the end of the first intifada
The period-specific scoring of Hamas’s level of institutionalization is summarized in Table 2
below.  Starting  at  the  beginning,  and  as  could  be  expected  from  a  recently  established
organization, Hamas had only reached a low to medium level of institutionalization at the end
of the first intifada. The organization scored low on both systemness and value infusion in this
first period. In terms of systemness, it was clear from the analysis of Hamas during the first
intifada that the persecution it suffered, combined with its young age, meant that routinization
of various organizational procedures and the formulation and adherence to bylaws were rather
low on its list of priorities. As for its low level of value infusion, it was argued that Hamas had
existed for such a short time that there were no decisions its leadership could have made that
would test the cohesion and dedication of its rank-and-file, and it was further assumed that
because of Hamas’s young age, its members still saw it as a means to an end rather than an
559 See the section The criteria pp. 42ff. in the introductory chapter, and Appendix D, page 343, for details.
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end in itself.
Hamas’s level of decisional autonomy at the end of the first intifada was estimated to be of a
medium degree. It could have been expected that a young organization such as Hamas would
be  highly  autonomous  and  free  to  decide  and  prioritize  without  undue  interference  from
external actors. However, Hamas early on relied on support from the Jordanian Brotherhood,
which was taken as an indication of curbed decisional autonomy. Finally, Hamas’s level of
reification at the end of the period was measured to be of a high level, as it successfully had
monopolized  the  identity  as  the  religiously  motivated  Palestinian  liberation  organization
despite its young age.
Table 2: Scoring of Hamas’s degree of institutionalization, 1993–2011
Overall institutionalization Internal External
Systemness Value infusion Decisional autonomy Reification
1993 low to medium low low medium high
1999 medium medium low medium high
2005 medium medium medium medium high
2011 medium to high medium medium high high
  Hamas’s degree of institutionalization by the end of the Oslo years
By  the  end  of  the  Oslo  years,  Hamas  had  reached  an  overall  medium  level  of
institutionalization. Although its formal routinization was undermined because of the intense
persecution it suffered throughout this period, Hamas routinized informally and allowed its
Political  Bureau—formally subjugated to  the Consultative Council—to take charge of  the
organization, which in turn helped the organization survive this testing period. Hamas had
thus reached a medium level of  systemness. Because most of its members and new recruits
still saw it as a vehicle for resisting Israel and Islamize Palestine rather than as an end in itself,
its level of value infusion continued to be low.560
Hamas’s  decisional  autonomy remained at  a  medium level  by the end of  the  Oslo years.
Although Hamas increased its number of donors, and having multiple donors would decrease
its  dependence  on  any one  of  them,  its  close  ties  to  the  Jordanian  Brotherhood made  it
sensitive to the priorities of the Jordanian regime,  thereby blocking it  from increasing its
560 Added to this, Hamas suffered a number of defections, in particular following its 1994 adoption of suicide
operations as a tactic.
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decisional autonomy. As for Hamas’s degree of reification, it remained at a high level as it
retained  the  monopoly  as  the  religious  liberation  organization  in  occupied  Palestine,  an
argument further strengthened by its strong standing in the polls.
  Hamas’s degree of institutionalization by the end of the second intifada
Hamas remained at an overall medium level of institutionalization by the end of the second
intifada.  While  Hamas  had  routinized  procedures  for  both  leadership  alternation  and
decision-making, the persecution it suffered throughout the second  intifada  was of such an
intensity that it negatively affected its systemness; at times it operated without a functioning
chain of command, which in turn led to a number of unsanctioned suicide operations. In sum,
Hamas’s level of systemness therefore remained at a medium level. In terms of value infusion,
Hamas  increased  its  level  from  low  to  medium,  indicated  by  Hamas  adopting  a  more
pragmatic and moderate ideology without seeing members defecting. However, it was also
argued that many of its new members had joined not because of its ideological outlook, but
rather  for  its  role  as  a  liberation movement;  as  such,  loyalty  to  the  organization seemed
contingent solely upon its resistance to the Israeli occupation.561
The intense persecution Hamas suffered throughout the years of the second intifada made the
organization susceptible to appeasing its patrons to ensure continued support. While there was
no proof of direct interference, Hamas’s vulnerable position made the organization sensitive
to the priorities of its donors. As such, it is concluded that Hamas remained at a medium level
of decisional autonomy by the end of the second intifada. With regard to reification, Hamas’s
unabated rise in the polls throughout the years of the second  intifada demonstrated that it
remained  a  fixture  in  the  public  imagination.  Added  to  this,  Hamas  won  the  2006  PLC
elections, which was taken as definitive proof that it had not only reached a high level of
reification, but cemented its position as one of the main contenders for political power in the
occupied territories.
  Hamas’s degree of institutionalization by 2011
Hamas reached a medium to high level of institutionalization after its first five years in power.
Hamas’s  level  of  systemness  remained at  a  medium level,  despite  positive  signs  such  as
increased financial self-reliance. In short, Hamas’s erratic behavior while in office indicated
that much of the routinization became undone. Moreover, its command structures were found
561 Even those that initially had joined for religio-ideological reasons, the second intifada probably prompted
them to stay for the sake of the resistance.
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wanting, indicating a decreased level of routinization and thus systemness. In terms of value
infusion, Hamas remained at a medium level. While in government, Hamas largely avoided
pursuing its Islamist ideology, brokered ceasefires with Israel, and even enforced unilateral
moratoriums on resistance. Consequently, both Hamas’s religious activists and a number of its
militants defected and joined more radical and militant groups.
Hamas’s degree of decisional  autonomy increased to a high level.  The organizational  and
financial  resources  made  available  to  Hamas  as  the  sole  authority  in  Gaza  decreased  its
reliance on external sponsors, and conversely undermined any influence such actors might
have had. As for reification, the indicators pointed overwhelmingly in a positive direction; as
the second most powerful political faction in Palestine, and the sole authority in the Gaza
Strip, Hamas was highly reified.562
Summarized, Hamas’s level of institutionalization has gone from a low to medium level in
1993, to a medium to high level in 2011. Given the unpredictable nature of the Palestinian
political environment, it seems unlikely that Hamas could have institutionalized further. Its
organization-building  and  efforts  to  routinize  and  bureaucratize  have  consistently  been
hampered by the Israeli occupation and associated persecution, and the influential role played
by various international and regional actors have curbed the degree to which any Palestinian
faction could become independent from its environment.
 8.2 Transmutation interrupted
As  demonstrated  throughout  the  analyses  and  summarized  above,  the  first  25  years  of
Hamas’s existence saw the organization develop away from the operational logic and rigid
ideology  of  a  movement  organization  toward  that  of  a  strategically  opportunistic  and
ideologically  pragmatic  political  party.  Step-by-step,  Hamas  also  became  increasingly
institutionalized,  taking  on  value  in  and  of  itself.  In  short,  Hamas  seemed  to  follow the
hypothesized trajectory of a movement organization transmuting into a political party, and
then institutionalizing as a political party, i.e., becoming a valued end in itself, acquiring both
stability and persistence, and obtaining the organizational capacity to pursue its aims.
562 Note, however, that Hamas seemingly had lost part of its appeal to the increasing number of Palestinians
identifying primarily as Muslims. Although part of this can be accounted for as the cost of office, it seems
likely that the rise of various Salafi movements has broken Hamas’s near-monopoly as the prime proponent
of political Islam in occupied Palestine.
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It was concluded, however, that Hamas did not complete its transmutation from movement
organization  to  political  party  within  the  time frame of  the  analyses;  rather  than  leaving
behind  its  identity  as  a  liberation  movement  when  it  ventured  into  institutional  politics,
Hamas tried to reconcile party politics with violent resistance. And even after becoming the
sole  authority  in  the  Gaza  Strip  in  2007,  Hamas  proved  unable  or  unwilling  to  shed  its
organizational and ideological characteristics as a movement organization, instead adding yet
another function to its already encompassing repertoire. By 2011, Hamas filled the roles as a
liberation movement, a governing party, and a party-statelet.
 8.2.1  Theory and occupation
The thesis  has demonstrated that  the  applied theories  can yield interesting findings when
utilized outside their intended scope. It is nevertheless recognized that the peculiarities of the
Palestinian political system has limited their applicability. Analyzing Hamas as a case of party
institutionalization when the organization is an intrinsic part of a political system that escapes
clear classification obviously has consequences for the confidence of the conclusions drawn.
For although the PA shares certain crucial characteristics with a state, it does not qualify as
one.  Even when the Palestinian political  system came to resemble  a  more-or-less  regular
democratic political experience in the early 2000s, the fact remained—as it still does—that
the Palestinian proto-state enjoyed little or no real authority even in the small patches of land
ostensibly under its domain; instead, authority and power in occupied Palestine ultimately
rests with the occupying force, Israel.
Such as state of affairs naturally—and fundamentally—affects both the operational logic and
development of all Palestinian political actors, and thus also Hamas. Furthermore, the ongoing
occupation  and  Palestinian  resistance  to  it  lead  to  a  volatile,  unpredictable,  and at  times
violent, situation. In short, the continued Israeli occupation of Palestine has ramifications for
how politics is conducted there, both in the institutional arena and otherwise.
These  characteristics  of  the  political  system  in  which  Hamas  emerged,  developed,  and
matured  has  consequences  for  the  applicability  of  the  selected  theories;  the  theories
purporting  to  explain  the  emergence  of  movement  organizations,  those  covering  the
development  of  movement  organizations  into  political  parties,  and  the  various  theories
developed to account for different aspects of political parties, all commonly assume rather
stable  and  predictable  political  systems—qualities  occupied  Palestine  patently  lacks.  As
covered  in  the  introductory  and  methodology  chapters,  this  had  consequences  for  the
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analyses. Traveling to occupied Palestine with theories mainly developed to explain political
phenomena in Europe and the US necessitates a high degree of contextual sensitivity, and
even though this need is heeded, the applied theories could not be expected to exhaustively
explain the subject matter.
Attempting to mitigate some of these challenges, frameworks developed to trace and explain
the transmutation of militant and revolutionary movements into political parties were also
employed. Given the fact that the purview of these theories and the focus of the thesis largely
coincided, their explanatory power were deemed promising. However, even if these theories
allow  for  a  certain  degree  of  environmental  volatility,  unpredictability,  and  violence—
conditions  similar  to that  of  occupied Palestine—they nevertheless assume a post-conflict
situation.  Clearly,  a  post-conflict  situation  differs  fundamentally  from  that  of  occupied
Palestine, where Israel continues to dictate the conditions for political development. As such,
even the theories which capture cases similar to Hamas still do not fully fit with the subject of
this thesis, thus potentially limiting their explanatory power.
Given these potential theoretical limitations, the finding of this thesis, i.e., that Hamas has
developed  in  the  direction  of  a  political  party,  rather  closely  following  the  trajectory
hypothesized by the selected theories, is therefore considered relevant and interesting, both
empirically and theoretically. Empirically, as will be discussed further below, the theoretically
grounded  analyses  have  offered  a  more  nuanced  account  of  Hamas’s  development  than
previous studies, covering both its ideological and organizational development, as well as its
increasing level of institutionalization. By consciously applying an interpretative, comparative
case study method, aided by theories developed to explain the emergence and evolution of
political  organizations,  the  thesis  has  offered  a  de-exoticized  account  of  Hamas’s
development; while staying sensitive to the context in which it operates, but without focusing
on or  elevating the  peculiarities  of  the  Palestinian political  experience,  the  analyses  have
helped uncover both the uniqueness of Hamas and how it shares properties with conventional
political organizations.
In line with the aims of this thesis, and despite the above caveats, it has been demonstrated
that the employed analytical frameworks—mainly developed to explain political phenomena
in the Western hemisphere—can be applied to cases in regions outside their intended purview
and return fruitful results, provided the need for contextual sensitivity is properly appreciated.
While  social  movement  theory  previously  and  successfully  has  been  applied  to  Islamist
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movements such as Hamas—and indeed Hamas itself—the application of a variety of theories
intended  to  explain  various  aspects  of  political  parties  and  their  development  have  also
yielded interesting findings. Theories dealing both with institutionalization as a process and as
a property, supplemented by analytical frameworks developed to account for the development
of militant movements into political parties, have all proved relevant and helpful to explain
the development of Hamas from its founding as a liberation movement in 1987 toward that of
a political party in 2011. As will be covered after briefly discussing the consequences of data
quality for the findings, the theoretical approach has also helped explain Hamas’s arrested
development,  i.e.,  the  fact  that  it  so  far  has  failed  to  complete  its  transmutation  and
institutionalization as a political party.
 8.2.2  Quality of occupied data and consequences for the findings
It  was  discussed  at  length  in  the  methodology  chapter,  but  it  merits  reiteration  when
concluding the thesis; the ongoing occupation of Palestine undermines the quality of the data
collected and thus also the confidence of the inferences drawn, both directly and indirectly.
Directly,  the  occupation  made  access  to  interviewees  difficult  or  even  impossible,  and
indirectly,  the  occupation  prompted  interviewees  to  refuse  to  divulge  certain  kinds  of
information, either out of fear for their personal safety or for the security of the organization.
Crucially, the Israeli isolation of the Gaza Strip made it impossible to conduct fieldwork in
what must be considered the heartland of Hamas. Efforts were made to enter Gaza, but despite
aid from diplomats and liaisons inside the Strip, they all failed. Likewise on the West Bank,
where  getting  access  to  interviewees  was  relatively  straightforward,  Israeli  occupational
policies  had direct  and negative bearings  on data  collection.  Many of  the  Hamas  leaders
remained in Israeli prisons throughout the fieldwork periods, rendering access impossible.563
In short, data that could have improved the analyses further and strengthened the inferences
drawn, collected through interviews in the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip or from high-level Hamas
leaders on the West Bank, was unavailable due to the Israeli occupation of Palestine.
At the same time, even if data had been collected on the Gaza Strip and if more high-ranking
leaders of Hamas on the West Bank had been interviewed, the indirect consequences of the
occupation for the data quality would still have been in effect. The security concerns most
often  cited  when interviewees  refused  to  share  information  they  considered  sensitive  are
563 Most of those interviewed had previously been imprisoned for shorter or longer terms, and a number of the
interviewees were later imprisoned.
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expected to be more or less the same in Gaza as on the West Bank. As such, it seems unlikely
that higher quality data on, for example, the internal workings of Hamas will be available as
long as the occupation is upheld.
Importantly,  these  security  concerns  mean  that  certain  aspects  of  Hamas,  such  as  its
organizational structure, decision-making procedures, as well as its financial sources, remain
shrouded in secrecy. And while it was possible to deduce some details regarding its internal
workings  by  triangulating  information  provided  by  certain  free-spoken  interviewees  with
secondary sources and by critically observing the behavior of Hamas, it is recognized that the
quality of the data on these aspects have weakened the overall confidence of the findings.
In particular, lack of reliable data on the following three aspects of Hamas have worked to
undermine the confidence of the overall findings. For one, the exact relationship between the
al-Qassam Brigades and the political leadership of Hamas remains blurred. Although most
observers  seem  convinced  that  the  al-Qassam  Brigades  is  isolated  from  the  political
leadership, it  is impossible to confidently conclude that this indeed is the case. Even if it
ostensibly makes sense for Hamas to distinguish organizationally between its militant and
political  work, neither Israel nor the PA on the West Bank has paid this claim any heed;
political  leaders have routinely been arrested in response to operations carried out by the
al-Qassam Brigades.  Added to this, the opaqueness of the relationship between the militant
and political wings has consequences for the confidence with which it is possible to ascertain
Hamas’s  level  of  institutionalization and  potential  future  trajectories;  if,  for  example,  the
militant  wing  has  more  organizational  influence  than  argued  in  the  analyses,  the  risk  of
re-radicalization or even de-institutionalization of Hamas might be greater than assumed.
Second,  the secrecy surrounding the internal  workings of  Hamas also has bearing on the
question of intra-party democracy; whereas interviewed Hamas members were proud of and
almost  always  emphasized  the  consultative  decision-making  procedures  and  meritocratic
advancement mechanisms within their organization, too little is known to simply conclude
that what they claim is true. In lieu of access to Hamas’s statutes, it is impossible to measure
its  degree  of  intra-party  democracy.564 Furthermore,  as  transparency  is  a  condition  for
democracy,  the  opaqueness of  Hamas voids  its  claims regarding intra-party  democracy.565
564 In their framework for measuring intra-party democracy, Berge, Poguntke, Obert, and Diana  (2013) rely
mainly on party statutes.
565 The  opacity  of  Hamas’s  leadership  structures  and  decision-making  undermines  any  claims  for
accountability and democracy, and, as argued by Brown, strongly indicates that “Hamas is still in many
ways an underground movement even as it has moved into ministerial offices” (2012, 16).
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Although the hostile and unpredictable conditions under which it operates might, for reasons
of  security,  merit  such  opaqueness,  it  simultaneously  weakens  Hamas’s  claim to  being  a
democratic organization.566
Third, knowledge regarding Hamas’s financial situation remains uncertain as a result of the
secrecy surrounding its  revenue sources,  budgetary details,  and exact  expenditures.  While
some details  have leaked from Hamas and Israeli  intelligence sources,  the overall  picture
remains blurred. Following Hamas’s takeover of Gaza, for example, reports diverged as to the
amount  of  Iranian  support  for  Hamas,  with  Hamas  leader  Salah  Bardawil  claiming  that
Iranian funding had decreased  (quoted in ICG 2012, 10, footnote 83), and others sources
claiming that the opposite was the case, i.e., that Iran increased its support for Hamas after its
takeover  of  Gaza  (Sayigh  2011,  18).  Suffice  it  to  say,  such  divergent  accounts  render  it
impossible to draw any solid conclusions regarding the state of Hamas’s financial situation.
Although the above caveats need mentioning, neither should their importance be overstated,
nor should they be taken as proof that the findings from the analyses are incorrect or false.
That the deficient quality of data makes it impossible to map out the  exact  organizational
structure of Hamas and describe  in detail  its internal  workings and financial  situation are
noteworthy limitations,  but  does  not  detract  substantially  from the overall  theoretical  and
empirical contributions of the thesis.
 8.2.3  Contextual  and  theoretical  explanations  for  Hamas’s  interrupted
transmutation
As observed by Panebianco, “no organization can institutionalize beyond a certain point; no
organization can become completely independent from its environment” (1988, 76). And in a
volatile and unpredictable environment such as the one in occupied Palestine, this observation
becomes doubly true. It is therefore argued here that Hamas’s arrested development—most
saliently exemplified by its unwillingness or incapability to free itself from the organizational
identity as a liberation movement and complete its transmutation and institutionalization as a
political party—in part is explained by the continued Israeli occupation of Palestine. 
Although Hamas already has left behind much of its religious extremist rhetoric and eased its
previously maximalist territorially claim, it would be a tall order for a political organization
566 As argued by Gunning, “[t]he fact that, for security purposes, the movement’s decisions are clouded in
secrecy undermines the capacity of elections and consultations to hold leaders accountable” (2008, 114),
thus undermining Hamas’s claim of intra-organizational democracy.
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founded and recognized as  the  religious liberation movement for the Palestinians to discard
such crucial tenets of its founding ideology. Indeed, given the continued Israeli occupation of
Palestine, it would probably be tantamount to political and organizational suicide for Hamas
to  abandon  its  liberation  goals.  Added  to  this  context-specific  reason,  the  theoretical
frameworks  employed  offer  complementary  explanations  for  the  arrested  development  of
Hamas.
  Imprinted legacies, both religious and violent
As discussed in the introductory chapter,  a political  party’s origins is  considered to be of
utmost importance for its later development and institutionalization. In the words of Gunther
and Diamond, the “‘founding context’ [of a given party] can leave a lasting imprint on the
basic  nature  of  the  party’s  organization  for  decades  to  come”  (2003,  173).  It  is  further
hypothesized that the origins of a party affect its development differently depending in part on
its ideological and organizational identity at the time of its founding. In particular, two aspects
of Hamas’s origins are identified as aiding in explaining its arrested development, namely that
of its religious ideology and its violent history.
As  discussed  in  chapter  3,  Hamas  traces  its  ideological  heritage  directly  to  the  Muslim
Brotherhood, an Islamist movement whose overarching goal is the establishment of an Islamic
order in which the principles of  sharia  will regulate society. Notwithstanding the fact that
Hamas  incrementally  came  to  have  a  less  pronounced  focus  on  Islam  in  its  political
statements,  there  is  little  reason  to  question  its  credentials  as  a  religiously  motivated
organization. And Hamas’s religious ideology, it is hypothesized, has had consequences for its
ideological  development.  In  short,  religious  parties  are  not  in  charge  of  their  ideological
development,  but  must  instead  rely  on  and  adapt  to  religious  institutions  and  authorities
outside the  organization to retain  their  religious credentials  (Gunther  and Diamond 2003,
182). The effect of its religious legacy, then, helps explain Hamas’s reluctance or inability to
moderate its ideology further; it could not freely rephrase or re-frame the religious elements
of its ideology, but had to take into account its ideological inheritance from the days of the
Brotherhood. In short, there are limits as to how far Hamas can stray away from its Islamist
roots without losing its core supporters, credibility, legitimacy, and potentially power.
Added  to  this,  Hamas’s  militant  legacy  has  also  curbed  its  ideological  moderation  and
eventual transmutation into a political party. For, whereas a conventional movement-to-party
transmutation is associated with ideological moderation, a movement with a militant legacy
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such as Hamas is expected to be resistant to such change; political organizations  resort to
violence when aiming to replace the  ancien régime with one built according to their own
ideology. Militancy therefore goes hand in hand with a maximalist ideological outlook, which
in turn is associated with ideological rigidity. Furthermore, partisans willing to shed blood for
the cause seem unlikely candidates for ideological flexibility. As discussed in the chapter 7,
the continued influence of the militant activists was one reason for why Hamas was seemingly
unable to adopt a coherent strategy and behavior while in power.
In  sum,  the  theoretical  frameworks  provide  complementary  explanations  for  why  Hamas
seems stuck in its transmutation from movement to party; although the continued occupation
of Palestine must bear the brunt of the blame for Hamas’s reluctance or inability to complete
its transmutation into a political party, its origins, along with its organizational and ideological
legacies, also explain part of Hamas’s interrupted transmutation from a religiously motivated
liberation movement to an institutionalized political party.567
  The development of Hamas summarized
Summarized, then, Hamas has developed as it did due to both endogenous and exogenous
factors; it is the interplay between environmental opportunities and constraints and Hamas’s
internal ideological and organizational development that accounts for the specific trajectory it
has followed on its transmutation away from a movement organization and toward that of a
political party.
As discussed in chapter 4, the outbreak of the first intifada provided an opportunity for certain
elements within the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood to establish Hamas as their armed wing
and through this adopt a militant tactic and pursue an explicit political strategy. Following the
signing of the Oslo accords in 1993 and the subsequent establishment of the PA in 1994, the
de-development in occupied Palestine and the overall contraction of the political opportunity
structures forced Hamas to prioritize organizational survival. Simultaneously, the movement
attempted  to  expand  and  routinize  its  organizational  structure  and  agree  on  a  coherent
567 It is pertinent to reiterate that Hamas was not predetermined to develop as it did. As briefly discussed in the
introductory chapter, the transmutation toward a political party is but one theoretically possible trajectory
available to social movement organizations (Kriesi 1996). And some Palestinian liberation movements did
follow a different trajectory; in the wake of the Oslo accords, a number of PLO organizations developed in
the direction of commercial enterprises or voluntary organizations rather than parties. They founded or
transformed into NGOs in an  effort  to  capture aid  money from international  and Western  donors  (cf.
Hammami 1995, 2000; Hanafi and Tabar 2004). And even those PLO organizations that did develop in the
direction of political  parties,  e.g.,  Fatah,  have followed different  trajectories and reached different end
points from that of Hamas (see Baumgarten 2005; Kurz 2005; Løvlie 2014).
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ideological message, both of which proved difficult in such a hostile environment. With the
outbreak of the second intifada and the institutionalization of the PA in the early 2000s, the
opportunity  structures  again  changed,  most  crucially  in  that  the  benefit  of  entering
institutional politics rose and the costs decreased. These structural changes,  combined with
Hamas’s democratic decision-making procedures and increasingly moderate ideology, account
for its decision to participate in the 2006 elections to the PLC.
The overwhelmingly negative response from Israel, Fatah, and the international community to
Hamas’s electoral victory in 2006 dramatically constricted the political opportunity structures.
Added to this, Hamas was itself initially reluctant to assume power, as it wanted to avoid
bearing the responsibility of governing alone. Combined, these external and internal factors
exacerbated the already difficult  situation facing parties  in  government  for  the  first  time.
Essentially, the organizational and environmental constraints placed on Hamas as a governing
party led it to behave rather erratically as it tried to balance the contradictory aims of resisting
the occupation and governing Gaza to accommodate the divergent interests of its  militant
activists  with that  of its  larger constituency—all  while  suffering international  boycott  and
isolation.
While  in  government,  Hamas  has  failed  both  to  act  consistently  and  to  convincingly
demonstrate commitment to its ideological goals. Instead, Hamas seems to have relegated its
stated aims to tools for organizational survival, suggesting in turn that it has followed the
hypothesized trajectory of an institutionalizing party; from a movement organization with a
manifest ideology, Hamas had transmuted toward that of an institutionalized political party
with a latent  ideology,  prioritizing survival over  other concerns.  However,  while Hamas’s
ideological  credentials  were  weakened  following  its  erratic  behavior  when  in  power,  its
manifest ideology became latent probably only as a temporary measure. It was the hostile
environmental conditions that forced the organization to focus on self-preservation rather than
to pursue its ideological goals.
Based  on  the  above,  the  theoretically  grounded  and  contextually  sensitive  analyses  have
provided  a  nuanced  account  of  the  development  of  Hamas.  Taking  into  account  both
exogenous and endogenous factors, it is concluded that Hamas anno 2011 retained important
elements from its identity as a religiously motivated liberation movement, and that as long as
the occupation is upheld, it cannot free itself of this identity without risking organizational
splits and possible demise. Furthermore, if or when the occupation ends, it seems likely that
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Hamas  will  retain  a  streak  of  ideological  rigidity  because  of  its  ideological  imprint  as  a
religious and militant liberation movement. In conclusion, then, Hamas was still biding its
time in 2011, prioritizing organizational survival over ideological credibility  so that it still
would be around as a political force to be reckoned with if or when conditions improved,
ready to again pursue its ideological goals.
 8.3 Hamas after 2011—euphoria, dashed hopes, and uncertainty568
A major challenge when researching Hamas stems from the fact that the organization is a key
player in a political conflict yet to be resolved.569 In addition to the aforementioned factors
directly affecting the situation in occupied Palestine and thus the development of Hamas—
e.g.,  the  fluctuating  intensity  of  the  Israeli  occupation,  the  continued  intra-Palestinian
violence,  and  international  meddling—the  unresolved  nature  of  the  conflict  has  made
occupied Palestine particularly vulnerable to changes in the international and regional order.
Because of this, even when the situation takes on a semblance of stability and predictability,
there is always a real risk that developments beyond the control of the involved actors will
have sudden and dramatic effects. In early 2011, for example, the situation appeared stable
enough; although calls for Palestinian reconciliation and bridging of the political-territorial
split from 2007 was repeatedly voiced, both Israel, Fatah, and Hamas seemed content with the
upholding  the  status  quo.  Despite  numerous  efforts  to  reconcile  the  Palestinian  factions,
intermittent attempts by various international actors to mediate and get the dormant peace
process back on track, as well as semi-regular Israeli bombardment of the Gaza Strip,570 the
situation had taken on an appearance of order and normality.
However, as will be explored briefly below, the upheavals and revolts that spread throughout
the Middle East in 2010 and 2011 effectively and fundamentally destabilized the regional
568 The following paragraphs draws on the introductory essay to a special section titled Hamas and the Arab
Spring, edited by the author and Dr. Knudsen, published in Middle East Policy (Løvlie and Knudsen 2013).
569 Although the study of any on-going political phenomenon is difficult at the best of times (Büthe 2002), the
volatility and unpredictability of the political environment in occupied Palestine is of such a magnitude that
this challenge has proved particularly testing throughout the analyses.
570 Since Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip in 2007, three major Israeli military operations have been
carried out, attempting to destroy or at least limit the military capabilities of Hamas. The first, in the winter
of 2008–2009, was dubbed Operation Cast Lead, the second, named Operation Pillar of Defense, was
carried out  in November 2012,  whereas the latest,  titled Operation Protective Edge, took place in  the
summer of 2014. All three operations have had dramatic consequences for the Palestinians living in Gaza,
leading to widespread destruction of homes and infrastructure. In total, somewhere between 2 892 and
3 610  Palestinians  have  been killed  in  these  operations,  depending  on  which  sources  to  believe.  The
majority of those killed were civilians, according to the UN.
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order. Consequently, the analyses, inferences, assumptions—both explicit and implicit—and
knowledge previously considered relevant to explaining Palestinian politics in general and
Hamas’s development in particular, were suddenly thrown into doubt. This is not to say that
the findings from the analyses of this thesis are fallacious or invalid, only that caution should
be  exercised  when  generalizing  temporally  based  on  how the  situation  was  as  of  2011.
Furthermore, the consequences that the Arab Spring had for Hamas are still not known, both
because events are still unfolding in parts of the region, and even where the situation has
taken on an appearance of business as usual, the situation remains flammable and can easily
erupt again.571
 8.3.1  Hamas and the Arab Spring
Since  the  outbreak of  the  Arab revolts  in  December  2010,  the  political  landscape of  the
Middle East has been recast, forcing Hamas to respond to a host of fundamental challenges.
Although too little time has passed for any conclusive inferences to be drawn regarding the
consequences that the Arab Spring had for the development of Hamas, some observations
regarding its responses to the revolts reverberating throughout the Middle East are in order.
Furthermore,  given  the  fact  that  the  thesis  found  that  Hamas  had  reached  a  moderately
institutionalized state  between that  of  movement  organization,  party,  and party-statelet  by
2011,  it  follows  that  it  also  should  be  rather  independent  from  its  environment  and  be
expected  to  survive  and  continue  operating  in  the  face  of  fundamental  environmental
challenges.  As  such,  the  developments  since  2011  onward  can  be  construed  as  a  test  of
Hamas’s institutionalization and thus of the finding of the thesis.
In short, and as could be expected, the regional changes ushered in by the Arab Spring has
seriously affected Hamas, both in terms of its ideological and organizational development.
However, the organization has so far proved resilient and capable of adapting to and even
influencing the environment in which it operates. Ideologically, the Arab Spring initially led
to  a  sudden  increase  in  the  confidence  of  the  Islamist  project  among  Hamas  leaders,
prompting a brief  but  noteworthy ideological  re-radicalization.  Organizationally,  the years
since 2011 have seen Hamas continue to battle with horizontal and vertical power struggles,
both of which have had consequences for its development and behavior.
571 This section will not provide an in-depth and encompassing analysis of Hamas in the years since the Arab
Spring; rather, it will only focus on certain select events and developments deemed illuminating in relation
to Hamas’s degree of institutionalization and interrupted transmutation.
318
  Euphoria and optimism
Many interviewed Hamas leaders initially saw the Arab Spring as the inevitable rehabilitation
and realization of their Islamist ideology. Indeed, throughout the region, various branches,
incarnations, and allies of the Muslim Brotherhood fared well in the polls and eventually
came to do well  in the post-revolution elections, prompting interviewed Hamas leaders to
argue  that  the  Arab Spring demonstrated  that  Muslims—and according to  them therefore
Islamists, used synonymously with the Brotherhood, and by extension Hamas—finally were
in the process of deposing their Western-sponsored despots.
This euphoria gave Hamas increased confidence in terms of its political program, stature in
Palestinian  politics,  and  overall  future  prospects.572 A small  but  telling  indication  of  the
resulting  boldness  was  the  sudden  presence  of  Hamas  flags  at  various  events  and
demonstrations throughout the West Bank—the first time these flags were seen there since the
intra-Palestinian split in 2007.573
During the campaigns for the student council elections at Bir Zeit University in 2011, Hamas
flags were prominently displayed (see Figure 12 below). And as shown in Figure 13, also in
the main square of Ramallah, the al-Manara, supporters carried Hamas flags in celebration of
the successful prisoner swap with Israel in October 2011.574
572 This apparent increased confidence in the Islamist project could feasibly—taking its ideological roots into
consideration—lead Hamas to become more assertive and proactive in its politics, which in turn might
have negative consequences for the moderation of Hamas and thus the democratization of the Palestinian
proto-state.
573 Recall that Hamas has suffered intense persecution at the hands of both the PA and Israel on the West Bank
since 2006௅2007, and largely operated underground since then.
574 This was a deal in which Israel released 1 027 imprisoned Palestinians in exchange for the kidnapped IDF
corporal Gilad Shalit who had been in Palestinian captivity in Gaza since 2007.
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Figure 12: Hamas flag at Birzeit University
(Photo by author, October 13, 2011).
In  particular,  the  developments  in  Egypt  were  perceived as  positive  by  both  interviewed
Hamas leaders and analysts.575 For one, the ousting of President Mubarak was expected to
ease access between Gaza and Egypt, alleviating the dire conditions there. Second, Mubarak
had  long  favored  Fatah  over  Hamas,  a  favoritism  that  had  been  detrimental  to  the
reconciliation efforts. And third, Hamas anticipated that the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in
Egypt would translate directly into increased support (Ezbidi 2013).
575 The consequences of the Arab Spring for Hamas was touched upon in numerous interviews. For example,
analyst Khalil Shaheen argued forcefully that the fall of Mubarak was detrimental for Fatah, whereas the
rise of the Brotherhood in Egypt was to the benefit of Hamas (interviewed in Ramallah, May 3, 2011).
Also, Hani al-Masri, director of the Palestinian think-tank Badael and member of a committee mandated to
negotiate Palestinian reconciliation, said that Egypt changed its take on Palestine and Hamas following the
revolts (interviewed in Ramallah, May 16, 2011).
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Figure 13: Hamas flags downtown Ramallah
(Photo by Hilde Kjøstvedt, October 18, 2011).
Although  Hamas’s  interpretation  of  the  events  revealed  an  overly  optimistic  and
Palestine-centric  worldview,  the  Arab  Spring  did  have  a  direct  bearing  on  domestic
Palestinian politics, and in particular on the stalled reconciliation process between Hamas and
Fatah.  For  one,  the  Arab  Spring  sparked  protests  also  within  occupied  Palestine.  These
protestors primarily called for national unity, and neither Fatah nor Hamas could be seen to
ignore popular demands for reconciliation lest they would risk a similar fate as the ousted
regimes elsewhere in the region. And second, the fall of Mubarak prompted Egypt—the main
mediator in the negotiations between Hamas and Fatah—to adopt a more balanced position
toward Palestinian  reconciliation.  Both  of  these  factors  led to  the  eventual  signing of  an
Egyptian-sponsored reconciliation agreement in Cairo in April 2011. The agreement stipulated
that a national unity government should be formed, with both Hamas and Fatah represented.
Furthermore, it was agreed that elections for the PA presidency, the PLC, and, significantly,
for the PNC, the parliament and supreme political body of the PLO, should take place exactly
one year after signing the agreement (Tuastad 2013).576
576 See Al Mubadara  (2011) for a translated version of the signed agreement. Note also that by agreeing to
hold elections to the PNC, Hamas aimed—for the first time—to join the PLO without preconditions. An
eventual implementation of the 2011 Cairo agreement would certainly have reshuffled relationships among
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  Obstacles to reconciliation
Despite the optimism following the signing of the 2011 agreement and apparent intent by the
involved  parties  to  implement  its  stipulations,  the  promised  reconciliation  failed  to
materialize. One crucial reason for this was the organizational disorder of Hamas. As noted in
the previous chapter,  Hamas suffered both horizontal  and vertical  power struggles after  it
assumed power. And these struggles threatened to destabilize Hamas and had ramifications for
the  attempt to achieve national reconciliation with Fatah. In short,  the Political Bureau in
Damascus  officially  remained  the  topmost  executive  body  within  Hamas,  and  thus  was
mandated to negotiate with Fatah. However, the leadership in Gaza was reluctant to follow
through and proved powerful enough to stop the implementation of agreement  (ICG 2012,
18).577
This state of affairs continued in the years following the Arab Spring. Just as Khaled Meshaal
led the negotiations and signed the agreement in Cairo in 2011 (Black and Urquhart 2011),
later attempts to push the reconciliation process along, including the 2012 Doha Agreement
and  the  2012  Cairo  Agreement,  also  took  place  under  his  auspices.  Despite  the  obvious
benefits a united front would bring for the Palestinian cause, the promised reconciliation did
not materialize. The Hamas leadership in Gaza pointed to differences in ideology and strategy
as the major sticking points; reconciliation with Fatah would entail admissions along the line
of the Quartet Principles, i.e., recognition of Israel, adherence to previous agreements, and the
renunciation  of  violence.  It  would  also  mean  integration  of  Hamas  into  the  PLO  and,
crucially, a joint Palestinian security strategy. And while the Gaza branch claimed they could
accede on some of these points, they complained that they had not been sufficiently consulted
during the negotiation process, and thus that the agreements lacked internal legitimacy (ICG
2012, 18).578 
To solely blame Hamas in Gaza for the failure to reach national unity would nevertheless be
both too simplistic  and erroneous.  For  one,  various elements within Fatah were similarly
opposed to the planned reconciliation with Hamas. Second, and more importantly, Israel and
the US were both vocally opposed to Palestinian reconciliation. US opposition was likely due
Hamas, Fatah, and Israel. For details, consult Tuastad (2013).
577 Also, Hamas leaders on the West Bank were for long skeptical toward the accommodating line adopted by
the Political Bureau (ICG 2012, 33).
578 The belief by many in Hamas that the rise of the Islamist movements throughout the region would be to
their benefit also worked to obstruct the reconciliation process. For in-depth analyses of the reconciliation
process, consult Tuastad (2013), Challand (2009), PASSIA (2013), and Ezbidi (2013).
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to  its  official  designation  of  Hamas  as  a  terrorist  organization,579 its  commitment  to  the
Quartet  Principles,  and  its  unwavering  support  for  Israel.  In  the  event  of  a  successful
Palestinian reconciliation, the US would either have to cut its ties with Fatah and thus be
without a client in occupied Palestine, backpedal on the Quartet Principles, or reconsider its
designation of Hamas as a terrorist organization. None of these options seemed particularly
attractive.
As for the Israeli opposition to Palestinian reconciliation, a quote by Israeli PM Benjamin
Netanyahu is illuminating: “The PA [i.e., Fatah] must choose either peace with Israel or peace
with Hamas. There is no possibility for peace with both.” Netanyahu was unequivocal in his
opposition to any Palestinian reconciliation, on the grounds that Israel could never negotiate
or obtain peace with a movement that “aspires to destroy Israel,” a reference to Hamas’s 1988
Charter  (Jerusalem Post  2011).  However,  Israel  probably remained opposed to Palestinian
reconciliation for tactical reasons as well. The Palestinian political-territorial split has been to
the benefit of the Israeli occupation, as a divided Palestine is easier to occupy and dominate
than a united one and is in a weaker bargaining position at the negotiating table.
 8.3.2  Miscalculations and dashed hopes
The optimism following in the wake of the Arab Spring prompted Hamas to take certain
strategic decisions with far-reaching, and ultimately unfavorable,  consequences. Pushed to
pick sides in the escalating civil war in Syria, Hamas opted to side with the revolutionaries
and was promptly forced to leave Damascus and saw its support from Iran cut. Partly, this
decision was made with the belief that the ascending Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt would
take  over  as  the  main  patron  of  Hamas.  However,  the  attempted  switch  of  benefactor
backfired. For one, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt proved less interested in the question of
Palestine  and  Hamas  than  assumed,  and  the  anticipated  increased  support  fell  short  of
compensating for the cost incurred by abandoning the Syrian regime. Then, the Brotherhood
in Egypt was ousted from office only a year after winning the elections, and the incoming
military government reinstated the old isolation policy of Gaza and outlawed Hamas.
In short, the high hopes Hamas had held for the Arab Spring were dashed, and instead of the
anticipated improvements, the organization suddenly found itself in a precarious situation. Its
executive leadership, the Political Bureau, was scattered throughout the region, it lacked a
579 As long as it  designates Hamas as a  terrorist  organization,  the US government is  legally barred from
supporting any unity government in which it plays a part (Cook 2014).
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regional sponsor, domestic support was eroding, and Gaza faced an imminent economic crisis.
To escape the impasse, Hamas handed over power of Gaza to the Fatah-PLO-PA nexus on the
West Bank, effectively abdicating, in the hopes that fewer responsibilities would allow it to
regroup and reclaim some of its lost support and legitimacy. 
However, following a kidnapping of three Israeli teenagers from the occupied West Bank, the
incipient reconciliation was at least temporarily derailed. A large-scale manhunt on the West
Bank was initiated by the IDF, provoking retaliations from Hamas, which eventually pushed
Israel to launch a massive and destructive military operation against Hamas and Gaza. After
seven weeks of Israeli bombardment of Gaza, a long-term ceasefire agreement was eventually
agreed  upon,  effectively  returning  the  situation  to  the  status  quo  ante.  And  while  the
reconciliation process resumed in the following days, its success remains uncertain, as is the
future of Hamas.
  Miscalculations
As discussed throughout the thesis,  Hamas has never been a simple proxy for its various
sponsors. However, in later years its relationships with the Syrian and Iranian regimes have at
times been crucial, both in terms of political and financial support. So, it must be considered a
major strategic change when Hamas in February 2012 sided with the revolutionaries in the
Syrian  civil  war,  left  Damascus,  and  quit  the  so-called  Axis  of  Resistance.  Indeed,  by
opposing Assad and leaving Syria, Hamas also weakened its ties to Iran (Napolitano 2013).580
And the calculus behind this attempted switch of benefactor seemed sound; as the Palestinian
offspring of the Muslim Brotherhood,581 Hamas shares a common history and ideology with
the Brotherhood in Egypt. Intuitively, then, Hamas could expect to benefit from the rise of the
Brotherhood in Egypt.582 
As mentioned above, however, the hopes that the rise of the Brotherhood in Egypt would
translate directly into increased support for Hamas were soon dashed. For one, even if the
580 Note  that  Hamas  for  a  long  time  refused  to  pick  sides  in  the  Syrian  conflict,  adopting  instead  a
wait-and-see attitude. Cf. Napolitano  (2013) for a detailed analysis of Hamas’s responses to the Syrian
crisis.
581 The Democratic Alliance, the electoral alliance dominated by the Freedom and Justice Party, which in turn
was the political party of the Muslim Brotherhood, won a plurality (235) of the 498 seats in the 2011௅2012
elections to the Egyptian People’s Assembly (M. Hassan 2013).
582 Added to this, it can be argued that Hamas’s alliance with Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran was always one of
tactical convenience, not ideological conviction. The other members of the alliance are all Shiite Muslims
(or members of its offshoots), an increasingly salient factor given the rise of Sunni groups and intensified
sectarianism throughout the region.
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Brotherhood government did ease access restrictions to Gaza somewhat, the new Egyptian
government remained preoccupied with domestic politics; the social, political, and economic
challenges facing Egypt were substantial, prompting the regime to adopt and reinforce past
approaches to the question of Palestine (Ezbidi 2013, 100–101).583 Second, even the slightly
improved relationship between Hamas and Egypt would not last. In July 2013, just over a year
after the Brotherhood’s ascendance, the army again took control in Egypt. The leader of the
incoming military government, General Sisi, blamed the deposed President Morsi, the Muslim
Brotherhood, and Hamas for conspiring to destabilize Egypt, and promptly outlawed both
organizations (Thrall 2014). Hamas leaders were subject to travel bans, access to Egypt from
Gaza was again restricted, and the tunnels through which goods had been smuggled into the
Strip were closed (ICG 2014, 4).
The situation in Gaza deteriorated quickly; shortages of fuel and electricity increased rapidly,
garbage and sewage soon flowed in the streets, and what little drinking water was available to
Gazans subsequently became contaminated (Thrall 2014). In short, conditions were dire for
the  civilian  population  in  Gaza,  and  the  Hamas  government  was  unable  to  alleviate  the
situation. Having abandoned its former sponsors in Syria and Iran, and without a new ally
ready to compensate for the shortfall of political and financial support, Hamas found itself
isolated and seriously weakened. Added to the multitude of challenges arising from abroad,
Hamas  also  faced  contenders  for  power  inside  the  Gaza  Strip.  The  general  public  was
naturally dissatisfied with the deteriorating situation, but more critically, the Salafi movement
continued  its  incremental  expansion  and  popular  reach  in  Gaza.  As  discussed  in  the
penultimate chapter, many of Hamas’s younger militants subscribe to the radical ideology of
Salafism, instilling fear in the leadership that if the organization appeared too conciliatory
vis-à-vis either Fatah or Israel, it would suffer defections and possibly even organizational
splits (Sayigh 2014).
  Forced reconciliation and de facto abdication
Still boycotted internationally, lacking a regional sponsor, and with domestic support eroding,
Hamas found itself in dire straits. And because of these challenges, Hamas realized that it was
583 While Hamas leaders expressed disappointment with the lack of change in Egypt’s approach to Palestine, it
should be noted that throughout his election campaign,  President Morsi of Egypt had promised that he
would not touch the 1979 Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty or in other ways destabilize the precarious regional
balance. Morsi  won the presidential elections in Egypt in June 2012, taking 51.73 percent of the votes
against Ahmed Shafik’s 48.27 percent. However, only a year later, Morsi was ousted from office, and the
military again took the reigns in Egypt (The Economist 2013).
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in no position to improve the lot of its subjects in Gaza, which was deteriorating rapidly both
because of  the ongoing Israeli  isolation of  the Strip and the recent  coup d'état  in Egypt.
Beleaguered on all fronts, Hamas was compelled to alter its reactive and default wait-and-see
attitude to find a way out of the quagmire, both for its  own sake and for the sake of its
subjects. And out of the more or less viable and attractive alternatives available to Hamas,584
the organization opted for abdication; in a reconciliation agreement with Fatah signed April
27, 2014,585 Hamas handed over power and responsibility of Gaza to the Fatah-PLO-PA nexus
on the West Bank to escape the current impasse (Brown 2014).
In essence, the reconciliation agreement entailed an almost complete surrender on the part of
Hamas, and thus an almost complete victory for Fatah. For one, the new unity government
would not contain a single Hamas member or ally. Although most cabinet members would be
independents and technocrats, Fatah retained control of important ministries as well as the
overall leadership of the PA. Second, Hamas agreed to let PA security forces from the West
Bank—presumably  Fatah-loyalists—to  operate  in  Gaza.  Hamas  would  not  be  allowed  to
move  any  of  its  security  forces  to  the  West  Bank in  return.  Third,  the  new government
promised to comply with the Quartet Principles, i.e., adhere to past agreements, recognize
Israel,  and refrain from violent  resistance,  issues  to  which Hamas previously had proved
unable to accede (Thrall 2014).586
International reactions to the agreement were more positive and optimistic than usual; the
Arab regimes, Russia, and the EU all expressed cautious support for the attempt to mend the
Palestinian split, and even the US seemed intent to work with the incoming unity government,
provided that Hamas remained on the sidelines.587 Israel for its part reacted negatively and
punished  the  Palestinians  by  approving  3 300  new  settler  homes  on  the  West  Bank,
584 Thrall (2014) identified four potential exit strategies for Hamas. The first was rapprochement with Iran, but
at “the unacceptable price of betraying the Brotherhood in Syria.” The second was to levy new taxes, at the
“risk [of] stirring up opposition to Hamas rule.” Third, Hamas could instigate a new war with Israel, hoping
that a new ceasefire agreement would improve conditions. However, “Hamas felt too vulnerable, especially
because of Sisi’s potential role in any new conflict between Gaza and Israel, to take this route.” Finally,
Hamas  could  do as  it  did,  namely “hand over  responsibility  for  governing Gaza to  appointees  of  the
Fatah-dominated Palestinian leadership in Ramallah” and thereby escape from the current impasse.
585 While the importance should not be overstated, it is noteworthy that this time around it was not Khaled
Meshaal, head of the Political Bureau, who signed the agreement with Fatah, but rather Ishmael Haniye,
Hamas’s PM since 2006 and long-time leader in Gaza.
586 Recall that the international boycott of Hamas from 2006 and onward initially was attributed to its refusal
to accede to these same Quartet Principles. Cf. chapter 7.
587 According to Booth and Gearan (2014), the US had apparently “worked behind the scenes to suggest terms
for the new coalition government that would not trigger the U.S. ban, reasoning that the money helps
preserve American leverage.”
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implementing economic sanctions against the PA, and vowing to cut all diplomatic ties with
any PA government supported by Hamas (Booth and Gearan 2014; Cook 2014).
  Reconciliation derailed
As a first step in the reconciliation process, the Hamas government in Gaza officially stepped
down on June 2, 2014, handing power over to the newly appointed technocratic government
mainly based in Ramallah on the West Bank. In the face of Israeli objections and threats of
continued sanctions, the Palestinian leaderships were set on implementing the reconciliation
agreement, hoping that the seven year political-territorial split finally was coming to an end.
Although a number of obstacles were yet to be overcome, such as the promised elections to be
held within six months after the agreement went into effect (Cook 2014), the signals from the
US that it would support the new government as long as it proved committed to the Quartet
Principles gave the Palestinians hope for improvements.
The situation soon took a turn for the worse, however. During the night between June 12 and
13, 2014, three teenagers were kidnapped from an Israeli settlement close to Bethlehem on the
occupied West Bank. The response from Israel was swift; by June 14, the IDF had initiated
Operation Brother’s Keeper and entered the West Bank in force. In the following days and
weeks,  the  IDF  and  Shin  Beth,  Israel’s  internal  security  services,  carried  out  a  massive
manhunt on the West Bank. Thousands of houses were searched, large parts of the West Bank
were closed off, and some 530 Palestinians—including most of Hamas’s leadership there—
were arrested. Eventually, on June 30, the bodies of the three teenagers were found, close to
where they had been reported kidnapped (The Economist 2014).588
From the outset, Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu had confidently and consistently blamed
Hamas  for  the  kidnappings.  Even  when  it  was  revealed  that  the  men  arrested  for  the
kidnappings  were  known  Hamas  members,  however,  the  political  leadership  vehemently
denied the allegations. While admitting the kidnappers were from Hamas, Khaled Meshaal
and others from the leadership claimed no prior knowledge of the operation and argued that
the kidnappers had acted on their own initiative. Then, in late August, Saleh al-Arouri, an
exiled Hamas leader residing in Turkey, claimed that the operation indeed was carried out at
the orders of Hamas’s armed wing, the al-Qassam Brigades. Although the seniority and actual
influence of al-Arouri was called into question, his claim naturally weakened the credibility of
588 On July 2, in what appears as an act of revenge, Israeli youths kidnapped and set fire to a 16 year old
Palestinian from East Jerusalem, eventually killing him.
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Hamas’s denial of involvement (Crowcroft 2014). 
One possible explanation for the divergent claims made by Hamas lies in its organizational
structure. As discussed in previous chapters, Hamas separated the al-Qassam Brigades from
its social and political branches early on, precisely so that the political leadership could more
or less credibly claim no knowledge of the military operations, and so that the organization
would  retain  its  operational  capabilities  independent  of  the  status  of  its  public  leaders.
However,  even if  the operation was carried out  by the al-Qassam Brigades without  prior
knowledge  from  the  political  leadership,  the  timing  was  rather  delicate  and  somewhat
suspicious. The reconciliation process that would see Hamas marginalized—at least in the
short-term—was just underway. It stands to reason that those elements within the organization
that had sacrificed the most during Hamas’s seven years in power, i.e., the militants, would be
loath to see their hard-won power and position exchanged for an uncertain future.589 As such,
if  the  kidnappings  were  planned  and  ordered  by  the  al-Qassam Brigades,  and  given  the
adamant denials from the political leadership, at least the timing of operation might suggest a
widening rift between the political and armed wings of Hamas.
  The return to the status quo ante
Regardless of who actually carried out the kidnappings, the persecution of its leaders on the
West Bank prompted Hamas to retaliate and fire rockets from Gaza into Israel. Eventually—
and predictably—Israel responded to the rocket fire. On July 8, the IDF initiated Operation
Protective Edge with the stated aim of ending the rocket attacks and destroying or at least
limiting Hamas’s military capabilities. The ensuing seven weeks of bombardment by the IDF
inflicted  unprecedented  destruction  in  Gaza.590 Critical  infrastructure,  including  the  main
power plant and sewage pumping stations, factories, livestock, and farmland crucial for the
economy, as well as numerous schools, hospitals, and health clinics, were destroyed by the
bombardment.591
Figures of casualties and injured are naturally disputed. According to one reputable source,
the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2 104 Palestinians were killed,
589 Recall that a somewhat similar situation developed in June 2006. Just as Hamas and Fatah were about to
establish  a  national  unity  government,  the  al-Qassam  Brigades,  together  with  militants  from  other
Palestinian liberation movements, kidnapped the IDF Corporal Gilad Shalit.
590 Bollier and Ali (2014) provide a general overview of the destruction visited upon Gaza. 
591 For details of the destruction, consult the daily Situation Reports by the UN Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)—Occupied Palestinian territory found at http://www.ochaopt.org. For a less
detailed overview, see Knell (2014).
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including 1 462 civilians, of whom 495 were children and 253 were women.592 Sixty-nine
Israelis  were  killed,  including  four  civilians.593 Over  10 000  Palestinians  were  injured,
including  approximately  3 000  children,  around  1 000  of  whom  are  expected  to  suffer
permanent disability. By contrast, 123 Israelis were injured. Added to this, 108 000 people in
Gaza  had  their  homes  destroyed  or  severely  damaged,  and  some  475 000  people  were
internally displaced (OCHA 2014).594
Despite the military supremacy of Israel and the consequent asymmetry of the conflict, with
limited Israeli losses but extensive destruction of Gaza and thousands of civilian Palestinians
killed, the fighting helped Hamas reclaim much of its legitimacy. In a poll fielded on the West
Bank late in July, 31 percent of respondents considered their political views to be closest to
Hamas.595 Although  largely  attributable  to  the  rally-around-the-flag  effect,  this  increased
popularity also stemmed from Hamas’s surprisingly resilient resistance to the Israeli ground
incursions.596 That  Hamas  willingly  resigned  from  power  was  patently  neither  proof  of
military weakness nor a declaration of capitulation, but rather a strategic decision to escape
the responsibilities of office and to regroup as a liberation movement.
After a number of failed attempts to end the hostilities, Israel and Hamas entered a long-term,
open-ended cease-fire agreement on August 26. As in the aftermath of Operation Cast Lead in
2008௅2009,  Hamas  was  again  hailed  as  the  victor.  Despite  suffering  enormous  losses,
Palestinians throughout the occupied territories celebrated the end of the fighting as a victory
for their cause. In a poll conducted by PSR in the immediate aftermath of the conflict, 79
percent  of  Palestinians  said  they  believed  Hamas  won  the  war  (2014b).597 However,  the
592 Based on these figures, roughly 70 percent of the Palestinians killed were civilians. According to the IDF,
2 000 Palestinians were killed, approximately half of whom were militants (Laub and Alhlou 2014).
593 Consult  the  monthly  reports  by  the  Israeli  Security  Agency  (Shabak)  at  http://www.shabak.gov.il for
detailed figures of Palestinian attacks against Israel and Israeli casualties.
594 For similar estimates, consult BBC (2014). See also Heyer and Mittelstaedt (2014).
595 The  respective  score  for  the  other  alternatives  were  as  follows:  Fatah  (24  percent),  leftist  groups  (7
percent), Islamist groups (6 percent), and independents (33 percent).  In lieu of a “none” alternative, it
seems  likely  that  respondents  who did  not  consider  their  political  view as  being  close  to  any of  the
categories opted for the “independents” alternative. This would explain why independents got such a high
score  in  this  poll  when compared to polls  by PSR and CPSR.  Note that  only 300 randomly selected
Palestinians were interviewed face-to-face for this poll, all from the West Bank. The reported margin of
error was ± 5 percent (AWRAD 2014).
596 During Operation Cast Lead in 2008௅2009, Israel ventured far into Gaza but lost only ten soldiers, four of
whom were killed by friendly fire. In the 2014 conflict, Israel stayed at the outskirts of Gaza but still lost
more than 60 soldiers (Thrall 2014).
597 Only 3 percent thought Israel emerged as the winner, whereas 17 percent believed both sides to be losers.
Interviewed  face-to-face  in  127  randomly  selected  locations,  1 270  adult  Palestinians  were  randomly
sampled from the West Bank and Gaza. The reported margin of error was ± 3 percent (PSR 2014b).
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ceasefire agreement essentially meant the return to the status quo ante; none of the underlying
factors  explaining  the  intermittent  fighting  between  Hamas  and  Israel  were  addressed.
Notwithstanding  the  necessity  of  resolving  the  larger  conflict  between  Israel  and  the
Palestinians, a continued Israeli stranglehold on Gaza is all but certain to provoke renewed
fighting  between  Hamas  and  Israel—regardless  of  the  outcome  of  the  intra-Palestinian
reconciliation process.
 8.3.3  Concluding remarks
In face of the fundamental challenges introduced by the Arab Spring, the apparent equilibrium
Hamas had reached by 2011—filling the roles of liberation movement, political party, and
party-statelet—proved unsustainable;  in  short,  and as  explicated above,  Hamas eventually
resigned from office and handed governance of Gaza over to the West Bank government in
order to escape an increasingly precarious situation. While the dire conditions in Gaza and the
unfavorable  regional  developments  were  the  immediate  reasons for  Hamas to  abdicate,  it
should be reiterated that the organization from the outset had been hesitant to both assume and
remain in power. As discussed in chapters 6 and 7, Hamas did not aim for victory when it
decided to contest the 2006 PLC elections, assumed office reluctantly after Fatah rebuffed its
overtures to join in a unity government, and became the sole authority in Gaza only after
emerging victorious in the 2007 Palestinian civil war.
Added  to  this,  Hamas  had  abandoned  neither  its  identity  nor  capabilities  as  a  liberation
movement, despite simultaneously filling many of the functions of a political party, inter alia
nominating candidates for office, participating in and winning elections, and governing for
seven years. As demonstrated by its performance when resisting the 2014 Israeli Operation
Protective  Edge,  Hamas  was  still  a  committed  and  able  liberation  movement.  And  as
discussed at length in previous chapters, it was the attempt to balance being in government
with resistance that led Hamas to behave erratically and fail to convey a coherent ideology.
The  decision  to  resign  from power  and return  to  a  grassroots  organization  committed  to
non-institutional resistance can thus be partly explained by the finding of the thesis; exactly
because Hamas had not  completed its  transmutation into a  political  party but  retained its
identity as a liberation movement, reversing the transmutation process was a viable recourse
that gained traction as the problems and challenges of being in government mounted.
However, it is doubtful that Hamas’s abdication from power should prove to be the beginning
of a de-institutionalization process or a permanent reversal of the transmutation process. In
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terms of institutionalization, the decision to resign from power might even have a positive
effect. While the unpredictability of the Palestinian political environment partly accounts for
why Hamas had not achieved a higher degree of institutionalization by 2011, its efforts to
balance the incompatible roles of governance and resistance also have been detrimental to its
institutionalization. By discarding its role as a governing party and focusing on its role as a
grassroots organization, Hamas is better positioned to build and routinize its organization, and
again articulate a coherent ideological message, both of which have the potential to mitigate
the horizontal and vertical power struggles that for long have plagued the organization.
As for the transmutation process, Hamas’s resignation from power could be understood as a
reversal  to  its  roots  as  a  movement  organization.  However,  the  decision  to  abdicate  was
probably  taken  only  as  a  temporary  measure.  There  is  little  to  indicate  that  Hamas  has
discarded  its  political  goals  or  ambitions,  and  it  is  therefore  doubtful  that  it  will  remain
content on being relegated to the sidelines of Palestinian politics in the long run. Instead,
Hamas’s abdication is interpreted as a tactical maneuver, aimed at escaping an increasingly
difficult situation as the governing party in Gaza. Free of the responsibilities of government,
Hamas  can  now  assume  a  less  prominent  and  demanding  role,  focus  its  energy  on
recuperating from its costly years in office,598 and bide its time for a more conducive situation
to emerge.
No longer shackled to the obligations of office, it is possible that Hamas will regain some of
its  strategic and ideological  consistency,  as  it  no longer  needs to juggle the incompatible
demands of governance and resistance. For similar reasons, Hamas might also re-radicalize;
without the moderating effects stemming from being the responsible party in office, and eager
to reclaim the legitimacy and popularity it has lost, a return to its ideological roots—both as a
religious  movement  and  a  liberation  movement—is  a  distinct  possibility.  Added  to  this,
Hamas gained dramatically in the polls following Operation Protective Edge in 2014, for the
first time in eight years surpassing Fatah as the most popular Palestinian faction.599 As stated
in the report by PSR (2014b), such spikes in popularity have been observed in the aftermath
of previous Israeli operations in Gaza, and “things might revert in the next several months to
598 While Hamas’s years in power have taken its toll in terms of domestic legitimacy, it remains the second
most popular Palestinian faction by a wide margin.  In the polls by PSR  (2014a),  Hamas has hovered
around 20 percent factional support since 2011, consistently outperforming the combined support for all
other Palestinian factions, barring Fatah.
599 Forty-six  percent  of  those  polled  said  they  would  vote  for  Hamas  if  elections  were  held  today,
compared to 31 percent who said they would vote for Fatah. All other parties combined would receive
7 percent, and 17 percent remained undecided (PSR 2014b).
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where they were before the war.” Yet, it is feasible that the militant activists within Hamas
might  interpret  this  as  the  rehabilitation  of  their  modus  operandi,  lending  force  to  any
tendency of re-radicalization.
Notwithstanding this potential for re-radicalization, the experience from being in power will
probably  continue  to  affect  the  ideological  and  strategic  thinking  within  Hamas.  The
organization spent seven years holding on to power in Gaza, despite the best efforts of Israel,
Fatah, and much of the international community to oust it from office. And throughout these
years,  Hamas  and  its  ministers  gained  crucial  political  experience,  such  as  the  need  to
compromise, necessary for any future role in government. As such, the forced moderation
observed in this period is expected to have had a real and lasting effect on Hamas, although it
might intermittently seem absent when the militants enjoy a spell of increased influence.
As  demonstrated  by  this  thesis,  Hamas  has  matured  ideologically,  strategically,  and
organizationally  since  its  emergence  in  1987.  Notwithstanding  the  current  uncertainty
surrounding its immediate future and the real risk of re-radicalization, it is clear that Hamas
throughout its history has laid a strong foundation to remain a key actor. In the event of a
solution to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, and a subsequent emergence of a
real and free Palestinian polity, Hamas will most likely be a constituent player in any party
system.  And  until  such  a  development  transpires,  Hamas  will  certainly  remain  both  an
intrinsic part of Palestinian politics and a force to be reckoned with in the Israel-Palestinian
conflict.
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Appendix A: List of abbreviations
DFLP – Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
DOP – Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements
Fatah – Palestinian National Liberation Movement (Harakat al-Tahrir 
al-Watani al-Filastini)
Hamas – Islamic Resistance Movement (Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya)
IDF – Israeli Defense Forces
NUG – National Unity Government
PA – Palestinian National Authority
PFLP – Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PLA – Palestine Liberation Army
PLC – Palestinian Legislative Council
PLO – Palestine Liberation Organization
PNC – Palestinian National Council
UN – United Nations
UNGA – United Nations General Assembly
UNSC – United Nations Security Council
UNSCR – United Nations Security Council Resolution
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Appendix C: Election data in occupied Palestine
Table 4: Allocation of seats per district, 1996 PLC elections600
Gaza Strip
Gaza North 57
Gaza City 12
(1 reserved seat for Christians)
Gaza Central / Deir el-Balah 5
Khan Younis 8
Rafah 5
Gaza Strip total 37
West Bank
Jerusalem 7
(2 reserved seats for Christians)
Jericho 1
Ramallah 7
(1 reserved seat for Christians)
Bethlehem 4
(2 reserved seats for Christians)
Jenin 6
Hebron 10
Nablus 8
(1 reserved seat for Samaritans)
Tubas 1
Salfit 1
Tulkarem 4
Qalqilya 2
West Bank total 51
Total 88
(Source: CEC 1996).
600 Reliable percentages for the votes cast in this election have proven difficult to locate, but e.g., Bhasin and
Hallward claim that despite winning a majority of the seats, Fatah only received around a third of the votes
(2013,  79).  They  cite  a  Jerusalem  Media  &  Communication  Centre  website,  which  has  no  further
references backing up this claim  (JMCC 2008). Official numbers are probably unavailable because the
organization responsible for the 1996 elections is now defunct.
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Table 5: 1996 PLC election results
Alliance or Party Seats
Fatah 55
Independent Fatah 7
Independent Islamists 4
Independent Christians 3
Independents 15
Samaritans 1
Others 1
Vacant 2
Total 88
(Source: CEC 1996).
Table 6: Percent of vote in four rounds of local elections in occupied Palestine601
Party First round
(Dec. 2004௅Jan.
2005)
Second round
(May 2005)
Third round
(Sept. 2005)
Fourth round
(Dec. 2005)
Fatah 30 39 45 35
Hamas 31 32 31 44
Others 39 28 20 18
(Source: Shikaki 2006, 119).
601 The exact results from the local elections are not readily available. Attempts have been made both by the
author  and  others  to  reconstruct  and  compile  a  detailed  overview  of  the  results  (see  for  example
Butenschøn and Vollan 2006, 14 and 119ff.), but the lack of official information has made this a futile
exercise. 
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Table 7: Allocation of seats per district, 2006 PLC elections
Gaza Strip
Gaza North 5
Gaza City 8
(1 reserved seat for Christian)
Gaza Central / Dier el-Balah 3
Khan Younis 5
Rafah 3
Gaza Strip total 24
West Bank
Jerusalem 6
(2 reserved seats for Christians)
Jericho 1
Ramallah 5
(1 reserved seat for Christians)
Bethlehem 4
(2 reserved seats for Christians)
Jenin 4
Hebron 9
Nablus 6
Tubas 1
Salfit 1
Tulkarem 3
Qalqilya 2
West Bank total 42
Total 66
(Source: CEC 2006a, 31).
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Table 8: 2006 PLC election results
Alliance or Party Percent of PR vote PR seats District seats Total seats
Hamas 44.45 29 45 74
Fatah 41.43 28 17 45
PFLP 4.25 3 0 3
The Alternative 2.92 2 0 2
Independent Palestine 2.72 2 0 2
Third Way 2.41 2 0 2
Others 1.81 0 0 0
Independents N/A 0 4 4
Total 100 66 66 132
(Sources: CEC 2006b; Shikaki 2006, 118).
Table 9: 2006 PLC election results—Mixed System alternative
Alliance or Party Percent of PR
vote
PR
seats
District
seats
Total
seats
If the system had
been a truly mixed
system
Hamas 44.45 29 45 74 58
Fatah 41.43 28 17 45 54
PFLP 4.25 3 0 3 5
The Alternative 2.92 2 0 2 4
Independent
Palestine
2.72 2 0 2 3
Third Way 2.41 2 0 2 4
Others 1.81 0 0 0 -
Independents N/A 0 4 4 4
Total 100 66 66 132
(Source: Butenschøn and Vollan 2006, 142).
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Appendix D: Criteria and indicators of party institutionalization
Table 10: Elements, criteria, and indicators to measure institutionalization
Conceptual element Criteria Indicator
Systemness Coherence Tendencies, not factions
Lack of power-struggles (both horizontal and vertical)
Routinization
(both formal and 
informal)
Routinization of leadership change
Routinization of decision-making procedures
Routinization of recruitment and advancement procedures
Correspondence between actual power structure and statutory 
norms
Material resources Financially self-sufficient
Decisional autonomy Links to civil 
society 
organizations
The more dominant the party, the more institutionalized
External sponsors Linkage, not dependency
Number of donors
Value infusion Cohesion Lack of defections after unpopular decisions
Reification Support Lack of fluctuation in popular support
Identifiability Monopolizing important symbolic values
Recognized as serious contender by political competitors
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